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Abstract 
This thesis is an account of a project that investigated the possibilities for 
counselling supervision offered by the philosophical positions that produce 
narrative approaches to counselling. Thus, the research was positioned as a social 
constructionist project. It drew on the work of five local counsellors who met 
together regularly over a year to engage in reflecting team supervision and to 
reflect on the practices thus produced. The project recognised, too, that local 
professional cultures have produced supervision in particular ways. 
Out of this project I have come to tell some supervision stories differently. Most 
recent mainstream approaches to counselling supervision construct supervision as 
a generic activity, and an activity that is best produced independently of particular 
metaphors of counselling practice. I argue that such approaches appear to be 
constrained by their inattention to the epistemology of practice. Aspects of 
dominant supervision discourse place an overriding emphasis on supervisor 
responsibility, producing an apparent dependence upon instrumental practice. 
When the emphasis is on supervisor responsibility, counsellors tend to be 
produced at the margins of the very activity that the profession constructs as 
critical to their effective and ethical counselling work with clients. 
In contrast, the focus of this analysis is on the possibilities for a supervision where 
responsibility is relationally exercised and dialogically produced, whether in 
dyadic supervision or in a professional community of concern such as offered by 
the reflecting team used in this study. The analysis demonstrates a shift to an 
understanding of supervision as having a moral and ethical focus: from asking the 
instrumental question, what to do with Client X? counsellors and supervisors ask 
what are the effects for practice of thinking this way? What are the effects for 
clients of practising these ways? With this shift, the discourses of counselling 
practice and the positions for counsellors within those discourses are available for 
rigorous investigation, with an emphasis on the politics of practice. I argue for a 
politics of supervision practice that responds to the location of supervision itself 
as a site of professional governance, and takes responsibility for the kinds of 
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professional self the practices of supervision are called to produce. Professional 
truth claims, both those that construct supervision and those that construct 
counselling, are shown to be open for examination and negotiation in a 
constructionist supervision practice. In the dialogical examination and negotiation 
of professional truth claims in supervision, a storying counsellor professes the 
moral and ethical authority by which they produce their work. 
At the same time as it is a serious practice of ethical responsibility, supervision 
also depends, I propose, upon counsellors and supervisors taking up the 
imaginary. When we ask what counts as professional truth, when we ask how 
things might be otherwise than they are, we take supervision dialogue into other 
dimensions. When we take seriously our responsibilities to profess, to story our 
own professional identities in action, we generate also, I argue, possibilities for 
storying the pleasures of our counselling work. To take supervision talk into the 
domain of the imaginary and of pleasure, is to produce supervision otherwise. 
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"Our selves, our minds - and, indeed the society in which we live - are all co-
created projects, never solo performances in which we have star billing and 
others are mere background. We celebrate the other, for without the other there 
is no existence for us either". (Sampson, 1993, p.142.) 
With gratitude and humility I acknowledge and celebrate all the 'others' who in a 
great variety of ways have made possible the project represented in this thesis you 
now read. I greet them, and I greet you as you join me as reader. 
For too long, our major cultural and scientific views have been monologic 
and self-celebratory - focusing more on the leading protagonist and the 
supporting cast he has assembled for his performances than on others as 
viable people in their own right. (Sampson, 1993, p.ix) 
And surely a doctoral thesis is a cultural expression that might readily bring forth 
the monologic and self-celebratory. Here I am cast as leading protagonist, having 
assembled a cast made up of both research participants and contributors to and 
commentators on the discursive fields in which this project is located. Here am I, 
perhaps cast as grand teller of a grand tale, a sole performer in the supposedly sole 
performance of a doctoral thesis. But Sampson's words draw attention to the 
ethic that I worked to address as I began this project, that I lived out at the data 
generating stage of the research process, and that I have continued to struggle with 
as I write this thesis. That ethic is about serving practice. Sampson's words 
remind me of the importance of both what I write out of and what I write into. I 
begin, then, acknowledging the ethical dimensions of this project, and the call, to 
live and practise and write in ethical relationship, that is part of the cultural and 
scientific view upon which this thesis stands. 
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Chapter One 
An introduction to the study 
Introduction 
This thesis document tells many stories, but two in particular run from beginning 
to end. One story is an account of how counselling professionals in a New 
Zealand setting might produce counselling supervision when our work is informed 
by the narrative metaphor. This is the story that I set out to tell when I began this 
project that has been an important focus of my professional life over recent years. 
A second story is about the production of the research process: I will introduce 
that story below. 
In introducing this first account here I argue that the storying metaphor of 
narrative approaches to therapy might be appropriately applied in professional 
supervision. When the stories people have and tell about themselves are 
understood to be constitutive of identity, supervision might be understood to be a 
site of storying and thus producing professional identity and professional practice. 
I suggest that the tasks and responsibilities of counsellor and supervisor when they 
meet in supervision are more similar than different: to take this position is out of 
step with most accounts of supervision. Both counsellor and supervisor are 
concerned with the production of the counsellor's professional identity and so 
with the production of ethical and effective practice. In this production, the 
emphasis of the supervision relationship is upon collaboration and upon 
collaborative storying, as counsellors become researchers of their practice, 
engaged in supervision and counselling in ways that are generative rather than 
reproductive. 
Further, this study has led me to argue that the understandings of power offered by 
discursive approaches to therapy have particular implications for supervision, both 
for how supervision is constructed in particular supervision relationships and how 
the profession constructs supervision. In particular, I suggest that responsibility in 
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supervision and for ethical counselling and supervision practice is produced 
relationally. I argue that supervision itself should be understood as above all an 
ethical practice, concerned with the ethics of its own production and with the 
ethics of the relations produced in and for counselling. Of particular interest to me 
in this investigation are the interrelationships between international and local 
professional cultures and the strategies of governance in which supervision is 
implicated in the local professional culture. 
But let me move now to the story of the beginning of the project, when I 
developed both my research questions and a process to answer those questions. 
For that story, the story of producing a research process that would be congruent 
with a collaborative ethos of narrative therapy, is the second story told in this 
document. It is a story told explicitly and transparently for I believe that the 
successful interweaving of practice and research is not to be taken for granted. 
In writing now about this project's beginning, I am of course no longer the 
inquirer I was when I began. Not only has my research practice been transformed 
in and through the research process but the field itself has shifted in significant 
ways during the project's life. There are always tensions in writing research 
reports when studies are located in a philosophy of knowledge more suited to 
diachronic (across time) telling when reporting formats support a synchronic 
(slice of time) perspective (Polkinghorne, 1997). Recognising that tension, I 
continue this introduction by locating myself and the hopes with which this 
project was begun largely in the terms of my research proposal, for I want the 
study's genesis to be understood. In narrative accounts meaningfulness is 
produced through location in place and across time. 
Locating myself and the genesis of this project 
I came to this research project out of three professional roles - as a counsellor and 
a supervisor, and as a member of a team of counsellor educators. At the time the 
project began I had worked as a counsellor for fourteen years. Throughout this 
time I had engaged in individual, peer and group supervision of my own 
counselling practice, with supervisors representing a range of theoretical 
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perspectives and using a range of working styles. For some years I had also 
provided professional supervision for counsellors in community and education 
settings, with changes in my style of supervising reflecting my changing 
philosophical and theoretical orientation. While working as a counsellor I had 
contributed part-time to counsellor education, most recently as a member of the 
team in the Department of Education Studies at the University of Waikato. As an 
active counselling practitioner, my teaching focus within counsellor education 
was professional practice. I had become particularly interested in the interface 
between students' university-based learning experiences and their placement-
based learning, and the critical role supervision plays as students of counselling 
produce themselves as professional counsellors. I was also interested in 
supervision as an ongoing aspect of professional practice mandated for all 
counsellors in professional codes in New Zealand, as it is in the U.K. (New 
Zealand Association of Counsellors Code of Supervision, 2000; British 
Association of Counselling, 1996). 
Most particularly, however, I was brought to this project by the philosophical 
standing ground of the University of Waikato counsellor education programme. 
As I saw it, this standing ground offered an opportunity to make, and indeed 
required, some important developments in supervision. The programme drew on 
the richness of a variety of traditions. Firstly, as a professional counsellor 
education programme, we were positioned by our identifying as counsellors 
professionally associated with the New Zealand Association of Counsellors 
(NZAC), whose Code of Ethics and Code of Supervision further informed our 
expectations and understandings. I note here, too, a matter to which I shall give 
attention later, the influences of differing institutional practices in counselling 
supervision in the United States and in the United Kingdom, from where we draw 
our literature and some practice traditions. 
Secondly, and more significantly, the counsellor education team had made the 
decision to locate the programme in social constructionist ideas and the 
approaches to therapy characterised as narrative (Monk & Drewery, 1994; 
Monk, Winslade, Crocket, & Epston,1997; Winslade, Monk, & Drewery, 1997). 
Internationally and locally, and particularly at the time I began the study, 
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postmodern developments in therapeutic practice had been led mostly by those 
who either currently or historically identified themselves as family therapists. 
Michael White, David Epston, Jill Freedman and Dean Combs, Wally McKenzie, 
Johnella Bird, Vicky Dickerson and Jeff Zimmerman are particular examples. In 
New Zealand, narrative approaches were very much more in evidence at family 
therapy conferences than at counselling conferences. Many narrative therapists 
had a background in social work rather than counselling. However, here at the 
University of Waikato, we were teaching the ideas within the context of a 
programme that had historically focussed on an eclectic approach to counselling 
and guidance in school and community contexts. In the programme we thus 
called on two major traditions, family therapy and counselling, each with its own 
histories, understandings and practices around supervision (Todd & Storm, 
1997a), and each with its own literature and theory base. In this bringing together, 
we were breaking down some of the distinctions between the fields. This study, 
then, has drawn on the history, theories and practices of both fields, not to develop 
a unifying or overarching version of supervision, but so that I might use the 
possibilities both fields, family therapy and counselling, offer for bringing 
forward an account of supervision located in constructionist ideas and a New 
Zealand counselling context. 
At the time I was asking what constructionist ethics and practice meant for 
supervision, there seemed to me to be some significant gaps in the supervision 
literature. As the study began there was not a great deal available in either the 
practice or research literature about the implications of the postmodern shifts in 
counselling for counselling supervision. As well, I was aware that in the 1990s 
the trend in supervision practice was to distinguish supervision as an educational 
process rather than a counselling-related one. Interest had moved towards generic 
models of supervision and away from counselling-linked approaches (Carroll, 
1996; Holloway, 1995). And yet, generic approaches tended not to account for 
their own paradigm locatedness: in contrast with accounts of narrative therapies, 
generic accounts of supervision seemed more concerned with the pragmatics of 
practice, paying less attention to the ethics of practice. Beyond generic 
approaches, what might the narrative metaphor and its supporting philosophical 
positions offer to counselling supervision? That was the question this study was 
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intended to investigate. I did not seek to provide some new universal approach to 
supervision but in the spirit of constructionist research and practice I wanted to 
offer an account of supervision that was local and situated. 
My research questions, as I began, were these: 
1. What does embracing a social constructionist position, and in particular 
the narrative metaphor, mean for how supervisors and counsellors 
engage in professional supervision? 
2. What constitutes effective counselling supervision in this counselling 
community? 
3. What, then, are the implications for the education of counsellors and 
supervisors in supervision in a narrative mode? 
A research practice for a counselling practitioner 
My research questions had been constructed out of my own professional history: 
that history also meant that I approached the tasks of investigating these questions 
in certain ways. As a researcher, I wanted to serve the professional practice 
community by engaging in a data-generating process that treated the practice field 
with integrity and by offering an account that would make sense to and be useful 
to practitioners. While this stance was clear, the pragmatics of such practice were 
not. I was satisfied that my philosophical base and the ethics of my practice 
supported each other in counselling: in research I did not have the same 
confidence. My own earlier experiences as researcher and researched had left me 
dissatisfied, and those experiences were located within a wider professional story 
that reflected tensions in the relationships between counselling practice and 
research. That is a story I will address more fully in Chapters Five and Six. 
As I considered how I might answer my research questions, I looked to the 
professional skills and knowledge I already had. Established skills and 
knowledge could support my move into that with which I wanted to become more 
accomplished. On this basis, I adopted a process of "inquiry in which the 
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knowledge processes of practice are given a role complementary to the processes 
of research" (Hoshmand, 1994, p.36). For example, the reflecting team, the 
"prosthetic device" (Shatter, 1992, p.64) which I chose to use to investigate 
supervision, had a history as a therapeutic device rather than an academic research 
one. At the same time, my site of inquiry, the professional practice of 
supervision, was one where researchers had not usually directed the lens upon 
themselves: like most counselling researchers, supervision researchers had 
studied others (Carroll, 1996; Neufeldt, Kama & Nelson, 1996; Sumera! & 
Borders, 1996; Worthen & McNeill, 1996, for example). The study of others is, 
after all, proper and usual research practice. However, it seemed to me that if I 
were to put under research scrutiny the work of other counsellors and supervisors, 
it would be appropriate that I put my own counselling and supervision work under 
the same scrutiny. I wanted to be a researcher with, rather than a researcher of, 
my colleagues. The ethics of research practice were clearer to me than the method 
I might employ. 
And so a fourth research question joined the other three: what kind of 
constructionist research processes might enable me to answer these 
questions? As I have indicated, this question has become as central as the other 
three in the production of this project. To this fourth question the answers about 
how I might generate data at first seemed more readily available than the answers 
about how I might generate tools of analysis. However, in the event, both 
categories of "answer" proved elusive at times. Hoshmand asked, 
Should one conduct a simple survey study or a neatly controlled analogue 
experiment, or should one risk the "imperfections" of a clinical or applied 
study? (Hoshmand, 1994, p.4) 
I have lived with the risks and imperfections, as well as the satisfactions and 
delights, of a work that is both clinical and applied. 
This second story is not only a story of how a research process was conducted, but 
is also a story of how, positioned in these ways, I constructed this particular 
research process. As a counselling practitioner, familiar with reflecting on my 
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work in counselling, I have been similarly reflective about my work in this 
research project. Constructionism has offered me particular theoretical resources 
for the work of reflection. 
The study 
Briefly, the study investigates supervision from a constructionist perspective, 
using as its primary data the supervision conversations of a group of local 
counsellors and supervisors. In this way the study draws on the traditions of 
reflective practice (Moon 1999; Polkinghome, 1992; Schon, 1983, 1987), while 
taking reflective practice into new domains. The supervision research group was 
set up for the study, working together in a reflecting team process (Andersen, 
1989, 1995; Davidson, & Lusardi, 1991;. Lowe & Guy, 1996; White, 1995, 
1997, 1999). I will describe this practice in Chapters Two, Four and Five. I was a 
member of this group of five counsellors/supervisors who met fortnightly through 
a year for supervision. The reflecting team structure, together with further layers 
of group review and inquiry, opened our supervision practice to research inquiry. 
Transcripts of our supervision and research conversations provided the data for 
analysis. Over the time of the data-generating and data analysis the practice field 
and the literature were both rapidly shifting, and my own understandings of the 
implications of postmodern theorising continued to expand. The questions with 
which I entered the inquiry remained important to me and I was engaging with 
them as an active practitioner in a range of sites in my practice, not only that to 
which this research study is limited. 
As the study proceeded, my understandings of the implications of constructionist 
theorising for the practice of supervision were extended. And at the same time, I 
also extended my understandings of the possibilities of constructionist theorising 
for my research practice. I came to understand more fully that the inquiry with 
which I was engaged was woven into a complex web of ethical, pragmatic and 
epistemological questions. These questions would lead me to locate the study 
more particularly than I had when I proposed it. Such an outcome is not 
unexpected in a research study based in professional action and reflection. I came 
to locate my research questions more particularly within the discursive tum, and 
to conceive of my work more purposefully as a broadly discourse analytic work. 
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On this basis, this document responds to my research questions by considering 
them on terms drawn from discourse analytic inquiry. I introduce at this point the 
theoretical resources, discourse and positioning that I employ to structure the 
study. These are important concepts for understanding what follows. 
Discourse 
Discourse can be said to be a system of rules and relations of power, manifested 
in social practices, which also constitute those practices in interactive fashion. 
Discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak" 
(Foucault, 1972, p.49). I investigate supervision as discourse. In this 
investigation I ask questions. These questions render visible the discourses which 
produce supervision. I ask, what is this object, this practice, supervision? What is 
being "talked into existence" (Willig, 1999b, p.114) when professionals, or others, 
write or speak about, or speak within, supervision? How has supervision been 
produced, at different times and in different places? And how is it being 
constructed moment by moment as our research group works with it in a particular 
instance of practice? How has supervision been constructed that we come to 
employ these strategies? With these questions I focus inquiry on the work that 
supervision does as a professional practice. What is supervision called to do as 
counsellors and supervisors reproduce its practices? For how supervision is 
constructed as an object, conceived of as a professional, ethical practice, 
determines and is determined by what we do as individual counsellors and 
supervisors when we meet together in supervision. What are we called to do as 
we reproduce the practices of supervision? As counsellors and supervisors we 
produce and reproduce the discourse practices of supervision: we employ and are 
in the employ of its strategies. These strategies become visible in the texts, 
written and spoken, that constitute the canon of supervision and the everyday 
speech acts of supervision. 
Supervision is of course not constructed as a singular object, but rather multiple 
constructions co-exist, confirming and distinguishing and contesting each other. 
Within this project, I explore some of the constructions of supervision that have 
become dominant, and consider the effects that dominance has had. I ask what 
has produced their dominance and what other constructions of supervision there 
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are and what effects those constructions produce. How do local or particular or 
alternative discourses of supervision produce or interrupt dominant or other local 
or particular or alternative discourses of supervision? These are questions that 
guide my investigation of supervision practice as it is represented in the literature, 
and as it was re-presented in the practice site in which I studied it. And as I 
conduct this investigation of a different genre of supervision discourse another 
question is always present: how do constructionist ideas and the narrative 
metaphor construct supervision as an object? 
In constructing an object, discourse also produces subjects (Fairclough, 1992; 
Fairclough, 1969; Parker, 1994). And so my inquiry considers the subjects 
produced by supervision discourse. As different versions of supervision are 
produced, different subjects are called into being. How do particular supervision 
discourses produce subjectivity for supervisors, I asked. What sort of subject is 
the counsellor who is produced within the terms of this discourse? What relations 
are constructed between these subjects, counsellors and supervisors? What power 
relations are produced within this discourse? 
Power relations and positioning 
Discourse is understood to produce subjects in relations of power. "We should 
talk about discourse and power in the same breath," suggested Parker (1991, 
p.18). Relations of power made manifest in and produced by discursive practices 
determine who may speak and when, and what might be spoken about and in what 
terms. However, relations of power do not work with only singular action: the 
terms of a discourse are not complete or final. Nonetheless, relations of power 
produce the expressions of subjectivity that are available within the terms of 
particular discourse practices. Parker ( 1991) suggested that discourses call us into 
positions which we can identify by asking in what ways "the discourse is hailing 
us ... and making us listen as a certain type of person" (p.9), and then, "what are 
we expected to do when addressed. What rights do we have to speak?" (p.10). 
This is the concept of positioning, a place to which we are called, in relation, 
within a set of social rules, practices, power relations and ways of speaking. 
Discourses produce and are produced by relations of power and thus produce 
positionings which subjects occupy. And so in this study I investigate the 
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positionings offered to counsellor and supervisors, in particular, in the discourse 
practices of supervision. I investigate both those positionings that grand 
narratives of supervision offer and produce, and those positionings that particular 
intimate professional conversations, within this project, offer and produce moment 
by moment in the encounter between a counsellor and a supervisor. 
Willig suggested that positionings might be thought of as being produced in two 
dimensions (1999). Firstly, since "discursive positions pre-exist the individual" 
(p.114) individuals might be understood to take up subject positions constrained 
by the limited availability of pre-existing positions in discourse. Secondly, 
individuals might take up in an "active and purposive" (p.114) way positions 
which discursive constructions make available. These positions are taken up for 
what Davies and Harre (1991, p.45) called their "social (illocutionary) force", for 
the ways they work as social actions. Constructionist practice in counselling 
seeks to make use of this theoretical point for therapeutic purposes. 
Davies' distinction that discourse "has effects", that it produces positionings that 
can be taken up and that it does not identify the speaker's "real nature" or the real 
nature of the spoken-of, is an important one for this study ( 1998, p.136). The 
distinction draws attention firstly to the idea that the self is constituted rather than 
essential: an individual's actions make sense in relation with their "lived history", 
their "sense of their own embodiment", and the access they have had to and their 
"familiarity with a range of discourses" (Davies, 1991, p.140). Secondly, moral 
action, then, is not an essential act of an essential self but rather moral action is 
the selecting of an appropriate "vocabulary of action" (Gergen, 1996, p.22) within 
the terms of the discourses to which one has access and so within the positions to 
which one has access. What counts as moral action depends then upon the 
discourse, the moral order, within which the action is produced. 
I emphasise here the import of these ideas - about the accessibility or not of 
positions within discourse - for how I go on to read supervision texts, both the 
literature on which I have drawn and the primary data texts I have used for 
analysis. These ideas offer the theoretical resources I use to investigate firstly the 
positions offered counsellors and supervisors within the terms of various 
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supervision discourses, and secondly how counsellors and supervisors are 
constituted through various discursive practices of supervision. 
Finding positions that I might use to make readings of discourse and positioning 
in supervision has been a particularly central aspect of my producing this project, 
for the path to those positions has seemed not particularly well trodden in 
practitioner research. As well, amongst those who have taken up the discursive 
tum in social science research there are multiple and competing versions of what 
such a path might look like (Burr, 1998; Davies, 1998; Merttens, 1998; Parker, 
1998, 1999c, for example). In Chapters Five and Six, I shall return to a full 
discussion of my positioning as researcher. However, I introduce this matter here, 
to indicate that while I employ the theoretical tools of discourse and positioning in 
studying supervision, I do not myself step outside discourse to do so: as a 
researcher, I am constituted by discourses of research. 
The structure of this document 
The final task of this chapter is to introduce the process of this document's 
argument. Chapter Two introduces further the philosophical standing ground of 
the project amongst postmodern social theories. A discussion of the narrative 
metaphor and the theoretical resources upon which it depends is used to further 
develop an account of the location of the study. I describe reflecting team practice 
in therapy. This chapter also sets out the questions that my work as a narrative-
informed counsellor raised for how I might understand and practice supervision. 
In Chapter Three I tum my attention to the general field of supervision, paying 
particular attention to work that has had some influence in New Zealand settings. 
I discuss the matter of responsibility in supervision, showing how many accounts 
of supervision construct responsibility as residing unilaterally in the supervisor. 
Supervision has been distinguished in the literature from consultation, training and 
counselling and I investigate these distinctions and their effects. Reviewing 
dominant discourses of supervision, I also account for my interest in going beyond 
the current mainstream emphasis on generic approaches to supervision. Lastly, I 
give detailed attention to the construction of the supervision relationship within 
supervision literature, arguing that counsellors have often been positioned at the 
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margins of the very activity that is intended to ensure that their practice is 
effective and ethical. I argue for a version of supervision that pays more attention 
to the positioning of counsellor and supervisor in relation, and to the positioning 
of counsellors for moral action. 
Chapter Four investigates some aspects of supervision in the local professional 
culture. Then, using Rose's (1991, 1998) ideas about governance, it considers the 
ways in which particular speech acts or particular organisational moves have 
constructed supervision and constructed supervision as a tool of professional 
governance. I argue that it behoves the counselling profession to take care about 
how we, as counsellors, implicate supervision (further) in professional-self 
governance. The final section of Chapter Four considers postmodern accounts of 
supervision, as they are available in the international literature. I draw on 
narrative and solution-focussed accounts that make links between the processes of 
counselling and those of supervision, and I discuss their emphasis on collaborative 
practices and power relations. Group and team supervision practices are 
reviewed, with an emphasis on the reflecting team supervision literature. 
Chapters Five and Six describe in detail the construction of the research process. 
Chapter Five begins with an exploration of the implications of my own 
professional practice history for the ethical stance I brought to this project and for 
the practical choices I made. I investigate my own positioning in research 
discourse, noticing the competing and, at times, confusing positions to which I 
was called in the process of generating a site for constructionist inquiry. The 
activities in which we engaged as a research group in data-generation processes 
are then given attention. Data analysis is the focus of Chapter Six, where I 
investigate a range of constructionist options available to me and locate my 
choices within the wider field of discourse analytic practice. Chapter Six 
concludes with a reflection on my positioning as the writer of this document. 
Chapters Seven to Eleven offer an analysis of supervision based on the data 
generated at the site of my study, a group supervision and research practice. 
Chapter Seven investigates the discourse of supervisor responsibility, noticing the 
positions in relation for counsellor and supervisor that this discourse produces. 
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Examples from practice illustrate the calls to supervisors to exercise 
responsibility, provide expertise and to provide instruction, all within a somewhat 
paternalistic relation. The data also suggest that the centring of responsibility and 
expertise in the supervisor may not position counsellors well for the production of 
ethical counselling practice. 
Chapter Eight uses examples from practice to illustrate aspects of constructionist 
supervision practice. Here, the supervision relationship is produced as a dialogic 
one, where authority is situated and knowledge is generated in collaborative 
inquiry and in research-of-practice inquiry. The data offer illustration of a 
counsellor well positioned for ethical action in their counselling practice. Chapter 
Nine continues the discussion of what the data suggest a constructionist approach 
to supervision might look like. The first example from practice illustrates a 
collaborative assessment of concern about the safety of a client: responsibility is 
exercised in the relationship. The chapter moves on to illustrate the purposeful 
positioning of supervision within a moral order of liberatory practice as a 
supervisor refuses the call to instrumental action. Instead she investigates with the 
counsellor her positioning within employment relations and professional 
discourse. 
Reflecting team supervision is the focus of Chapter Ten. Here, examples from 
practice illustrate the reflecting team working as a professional community of 
concern. As a professional community of concern team members engaged in 
relational and dialogical investigation of our positionings in particular discourses 
of professional practice. The work of actively producing ourselves as counsellors 
in supervision is rendered visible in these examples. 
Chapter Eleven explores the celebration metaphor, a provisional tactic produced 
in the group as a counter-practice. An example illustrates the storying of 
professional identity that a celebration agenda made possible. A further example 
demonstrates the restraints on the rich storying of practice and professional 
identity when such practices have not been mutually negotiated. This example 
provides the opportunity to theorise two aspects of the storying of professional 
identity. The first of these is an investigation of the extension of the celebration 
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metaphor to suggest that supervision might be a site wherein counsellors take 
pleasure in our work by richly storying those aspects of our work that are pleasing 
to us. Secondly I offer a discussion of the storying subject, asking about the terms 
on which the storying of professional identity might be richly and ethically 
accomplished. 
A similar theme runs through Chapters One to Six, and Chapters Seven to Eleven. 
That theme is ethical action. I introduce this study with the claim that this 
document is an account of research as ethical action, rather than of research as 
instrumental action. Similarly, I argue that counselling supervision is concerned 
not only with the instrumental actions of counselling practitioners but with the 
ethical actions by which counsellors produce their professional identities. 
Supervision does not take place independently of the moral orders within which 
we make sense of our professional practice and so of our engagement with clients. 
In Chapter Twelve, I discuss the implications that this study offers for the practice 
of supervision in constructionist mode, particularly in a New Zealand counselling 
setting. Then, in Chapter Thirteen, I describe the application of ideas from this 
study in an example of my practice in counsellor education. Chapter Fourteen 
offers a summary and conclusion, drawing together the two stories identified in 
this current chapter. It again locates the study and the contingency of the 
knowledge it has produced, both knowledge about supervision and knowledge 
about research. 
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Locating narrative approaches to counselling 
Persons give meaning to their lives and relationships by storying their experience, 
and ... in interacting with others in the perfonnance of these stories, they are 
active in the shaping of their lives and relationships. (White & Epston, 1989, 
p.21) 
Introduction 
This study is located within the streams of social theory variously and divergently 
characterised by commentators as the narrative tum (Polkinghome, 1988), the 
linguistic tum (Fairclough,1992; 1995), the discursive tum (Parker, 1999), the 
relational paradigm (Gergen, 1994; McNamee & Gergen, 1999), a 
"participatory" stance (Shatter, 2000, p.123; 1996). The study depends, too, 
upon a Foucaultian understanding of power as productive power, and the 
particular use made of Foucaultian ideas by Rose (1989, 1991, 1998) in his 
exploration of the work of the psychology-derived (psy) disciplines, and by White 
(1989, 1995, 1997) in his exploration and use of poststructuralist ideas in therapy. 
An account of these theoretical influences will be developed in Chapters Five and 
Six where the story of the production of the research method is told. 
Drawing on these diverse but affiliated streams in social theory, the account in 
this document will show this project to be a hybrid one that has been variously 
influenced. With post modernism has come the abandonment of belief in the 
explanatory power of the grand truth narratives of the modernist project. Rather, 
accounts are seen to be local, and situated, to hold true according to particular 
conditions, and to be fragmented rather than unified. My task in this account is to 
bring together the influences - theoretical, professional and personal - on this 
project and to offer a local account that makes use of diverse ideas yet establishes 
some coherence. But how "grand" must a local narrative be? I have found it 
useful to think in terms of "a provisional tactic to help us move forward rather 
than a grand strategy to solve all the problems and close questioning down" 
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(Parker, 1999b, p.2). I will not manage to close questioning down or solve all the 
problems of the theoretical setting, or indeed within the practice implications, of 
the study. As well, in accounting for my research position and practice I have not 
felt compelled to draw some of the theoretical boundaries drawn by those upon 
whose theorising I call in this study: I have used works that do not always sit in 
neat agreement with each other. Rather, in producing this study I have made links 
with a number of streams of postmodern work, finding fluidity rather than rigidity 
more useful to support the practice orientation I sought. This is the ethos about 
which Rosenbaum & Dyckman (1996) wrote: their metaphor speaks to the spirit 
of this study. 
In our tellings we must give self-identity boundaries. It is important, 
though, that these not be the rigid boundaries of penned-in lines on a 
political map; wars are fought over such boundaries, despite the fact that 
on the land itself these map lines cannot be seen smelled, heard, tasted or 
touched. Our boundaries must rather reflect living shores, where sea and 
winds constantly change the form of cliffs and cove, inlets and jutting 
rocks. Boundaries are always expressed in action. (1996, pp. 269-270) 
And so as I account for the theoretical influences on this study, my focus is on the 
study's purpose of offering alternative understandings of and ways of working in 
the professional practice of supervision: the focus is practice. "The criterion for 
acceptability of a knowledge claim is the fruitfulness of its implementation" 
(Polkinghorne,1992, p.162): I think this position is useful in both counselling 
practice and in research practice. 
As this chapter continues, its focus is the practice of narrative therapy with an 
emphasis on the central theoretical concepts that support that practice and so 
produced this project as an investigation of narrative approaches to counselling 
supervision. In describing narrative therapy I will employ a number of ways of 
naming the therapy. I have come to think of narrative approaches to therapy as 
multi-storied, and I will write of these approaches interchangeably as narrative, 
social constructionist, and discursive. This languaging practice reflects the 
changing, fluid, "living shores" (Rosenbaum & Dyckman, 1996) of these 
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therapeutic approaches. The ideas that produce the naming practices, narrative, 
social constructionist, and discursive, are accounted for within the descriptions of 
the therapy that follow in this chapter. 
Social constructionism holds that speaking is always local and situated, that 
speaking is always from a particular position within discourse. Familiar with the 
practice of identifying the positions from which I am speaking, I begin the 
account of narrative therapy that is the focus of this chapter by locating myself in 
relation with what I think of as a community of practice and ideas. 
Migration of professional identity 
Some years before engaging with this current study I had undertaken what I now 
think of as a migration of professional identity. My own education in counselling 
had been in a programme that was eclectic and I had gone on to counsel, then 
supervise, and then teach, in this mode. Along the way my interest in narrative 
therapy grew as a result of exposure to the convincing evidence available of the 
"fruitfulness of its implementation" (Polkinghorne, 1992). At first I encountered 
this evidence in the writing, and teaching, of Michael White and David Epston 
(Epston, 1989; White, 1989; White & Epston, 1989), where story after story told 
of clients who were reasserting their own purposes for their lives, reasserting 
those purposes of which problems would have robbed them. Inspired by the 
problem-resisting interests of narrative therapists' conversations, I took into my 
own counselling the narrative practice of externalising conversation. These 
practices involve speaking with clients in ways that objectify and investigate 
problems rather than people. They lead to conversations that investigate the 
relative influence of problems over people, and people over problems; they 
investigate problems in terms of their histories in people's lives, their effects on 
people's lives, and the strategies by which problems had gained influence (White, 
1989). At the same time conversations that draw out the often unnoticed 
influences of people over problems provide alternative stories. Together these 
practices call clients into authority, over problems and in the production of their 
own lives: I witnessed in my own day to day practice the effects for clients of 
speaking in these ways and the changes thus made possible as people grappled 
with and won their lives back from the influence of problems of various sorts. 
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But there is more to the work of narrative therapy than externalising 
conversations, and I became aware that to locate my practice in relation with the 
narrative metaphor would be to undertake a migration of professional identity. 
The metaphor of migration of identity has been used in narrative therapy to give 
some sense of the work of learning new cultural practices, and the self practices 
those cultural practices offer, when people have made very significant changes in 
their lives. White (1995) first used the metaphor to story the experiences of 
women moving into lifestyles free of violence from lifestyles dominated by 
violence. Describing the experiences of those claiming back their lives from the 
grip of Alcohol's regime, Smith & Winslade (1997) also drew on this metaphor. 
To employ the same metaphor to speak of professional identity is to point to the 
significance of making the epistemological shift involved in taking on a social 
constructionist orientation in my counselling work. To accept the constructionist 
idea that "knowledge is not something people possess, somewhere in their heads, 
but rather something people do together" (Gergen, 1985, p.270) was to leave 
behind the modernist and romantic assumptions that had previously informed my 
counselling work (although I had not called them that at the time). The 
therapeutic and relational practices of narrative therapy were produced out of 
different assumptions than those that had produced my earlier counselling work. 
As I began to understand these differences it was clear that to implement narrative 
practices skilfully and ethically I needed a richer understanding of the 
epistemology of the practice with which I had affiliated my professional work. 
Although I had purposefully chosen to extend my practice, I had not at first 
understood that these changes would also involve me in a migration of 
professional identity. Change was at first most visible at the site of my 
counselling practice, but I could make meaning of those experiences and take my 
work forward only in relation with the social theory that storied the cultural and 
intellectual landscape within which narrative counselling had been and was being 
produced. As with migrations between countries, there was a disruption of that 
which I might have previously taken for granted, and fine nuances of difference 
were at first not perceptible and then took time and work to understand. This is 
not necessarily problematic. In particular I do not think of the migration of 
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professional identity I have undertaken as a discontinuous conversion experience 
from a mode of practice that was in error to one that represents "the truth" about 
professional practice. To take such a position would be in contradiction to the 
postmodern assumption of multiple truths. The move I have made is one that 
involves both continuity and discontinuity. My professional practice has been 
shaped by many influences for "we cannot easily shed[ ... ] the interpretive 
frameworks that we took up as our own in learning to understand and use 
humanist discourses not just as social scientists, but as participants in the 
everyday world" (Davies, 1991, p.47). The ways of thinking about and speaking 
of therapy and people that had been familiar continue to be available in the 
everyday and professional worlds around me. Nonetheless this project constitutes 
a public performance of my professional identity as a narrative therapist: the 
migration I had undertaken, and which I continue to story in my everyday 
practice, has made such a project possible. 
Discourse and positioning and storying lives 
A narrative therapist is interested in the stories and storying that shape people's 
lives. Describing the constructionist idea that stories about the world construct the 
world, Potter suggested, 
Reality enters into human practices by way of the categories and 
descriptions that are part of those practices .... It [the world] is constituted 
in one way or another as people talk it, write it, and argue it. (1996, p.98) 
People take on particular identities, they become the particular people they and 
others understand them to be, as they live out the stories they have about 
themselves and others have about them. Narrative therapy engages with people in 
making meaning: meaning is not a possession in the head (or heart) of a client 
and therefore to be uncovered, or in the head of the counsellor and therefore to be 
taught, but rather meaning has been "made together" (Gergen, 1985) in past 
conversations and is to be made together in the counselling conversation. This 
idea is of profound importance in changing the shape of therapy: once I had 
grasped its import I could no longer think in terms of eclectic practice but rather I 
moved to reinterpret familiar practices in relationship with constructionist 
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accounts. The ideas that knowledge is something that is "done together" and that 
stories are constitutive invite counsellors to pay attention not only to the stories 
clients tell in counselling, but also to the stories that counsellors tell about 
counselling. Stories about therapy shape counsellors' engagement with clients as 
surely as stories of the self shape our clients' lives. 
The stories that produce our lives are those available to us in the varied cultural 
worlds that we inhabit. They are not the creation of each of us as individuals. 
This point is central to narrative therapy. White drew on the French 
poststructuralist work of Michel Foucault in suggesting that people are formed 
and shaped as we engage in the discursive practices of the cultural discourses we 
inhabit (White, 1989; White & Epston, 1989). Discourses offer us positions that 
we take up, thus producing our lives in particular ways. Foucault had paid 
particular attention to the institutions of the clinic and the prison, suggesting that 
by their practices these institutions produce modem citizens as docile bodies 
formed according to prescriptions of normality offered by these institutions 
(Foucault, 1977, 1989; Rabinow, 1984). These and other institutions shape not 
just those who physically inhabit them but all of us, for we are all caught up in the 
practices of power produced, and thus the webs of meaning woven, within 
discourses of health and sanity and morality and so on. Our identities are 
produced on the terms such discourses offer us. Our lives are shaped by 
disciplinary power, the power of the disciplines to produce the descriptions of 
normality by which we measure our lives. Narrative therapy, a discursive 
therapy, engages counsellors and clients in collaborative investigation of the 
cultural stories, the discourses, the descriptions of normality, on the terms of 
which our identities are shaped. For example, a narrative therapist might 
understand eating disorders as a manifestation of the discursive practices by 
which women, in particular, are called to produce their bodies according to 
particular cultural prescriptions. Discourses of gender and the body and health 
and beauty and fashion and sexuality and fitness produce the social and cultural 
space in which eating disorders are taken up as discursive practices, and in which 
eating disorders are considered to be problematic, or not. 
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In a discursive therapy, a counsellor engages with a client in investigating 
discourses and the client's positionings within those discourses as they are 
produced and re-produced in the accounts clients have of themselves and their 
lives. Together client and counsellor explore the particular cultural stories out of 
which the client has storied their life and their identity. This aspect of the work is 
known as deconstructing. Deconstructing involves rendering strange those 
familiar, taken for granted, meanings, practices, and assumptions that produce and 
are produced within discourse. Deconstructing involves the counsellor working 
from a stance of curiosity. They are curious firstly about the client's experiences 
positioned within the discourses in which the problem is produced. They learn 
from the client about the effects of the problem on the client's life and 
relationships. The counsellor is curious, too, about those sites in a client's life 
where the problem story does not prevail or hold so much sway. Such sites might 
be scarcely apparent, but in the deconstructing conversation the possibilities for 
their production are enhanced. For the counsellor's curiosity is not neutral: a 
narrative counsellor does not hold that all stories are equal. Particular cultural 
stories gain ascendancy: Foucault drew attention to the power/knowledge matrix 
by which dominant discourses determine what counts as truth and how and by 
whom that truth might be spoken (Rabinow, 1984). Dominant discourses are seen 
as having a totalising effect, offering totalising identity descriptions, such as 
anorexic. Such descriptions tend to smooth out and tum attention away from 
contradictions and exceptions to the stories they tell. These scarcely noticed and 
therefore unstoried contradictions and exceptions and resistances in the lived 
experience of clients are of particular interest to narrative therapists, for, made 
meaningful, they provide the material with which client and counsellor more 
richly story the client's life. "There is always a history of struggle and protest -
always," asserted White (cited in Wylie, 1994), referring to those events in the 
client's life and history that contradict or fall outside the terms of the dominant 
story. White called these events "unique outcomes" (1989, p.16), suggesting that 
woven into a meaningful account, unique outcomes offer alternative storylines by 
which people can re-author their lives. Alternative stories are those stories that 
are constructed beyond the terms offered the client by a problem-saturated story: 
new ways of speaking and therefore of producing oneself are called upon. Re-
authoring, however, is not a simple matter of replacing a problematic story with a 
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preferred one. for "there is no single story of life that is free of ambiguity and 
contradiction" (White, 1995, p.15). Rather, since lives are "multistoried" the 
purpose of therapeutic conversation is to position clients well to take authority, 
both as knowing about a problem in deconstruction and in expressing their own 
purposes for their lives. That is the work of a deconstructing therapy, recognising 
and working with clients in terms of lives that are multistoried, moving beyond 
the thin description that leaves clients positioned as storied, to thick descriptions 
(White, 1995) that position them as storying. 
In storying, people are actively negotiating the positions they get to take up in 
their lives, expanding the discursive positions available for taking up. The work 
of counselling is to expand the possibilities for a client to take up subjective 
positions as an agent who can manoeuvre for a preferred position, within 
discourse (always), that offers some right to speak. On these terms, a subjective 
position is in contrast to a subjected position (Drewery and Winslade, 1997). In 
constructionist thinking, the person taking up a subjective position is not the 
centred, rational, essential unitary self produced by the metaphors of modernism. 
Rather the self is construed as a "relational self' (L0vlie, 1992): Drewery 
suggested "neither individual nor social exists without the other" and that "agency 
is not possible except in relationship" (2001, p.324). While the term "agency" is 
also used in humanistic psychology, Davies reinscribed it to describe the exercise 
of subjectivity in constructionist terms: 
Agency is never freedom from discursive constitution of the self but the 
capacity to recognise that constitution and to resist, subvert and change the 
discourses themselves through which one is being constituted. (1991, 
p.51) 
Storying, we are agentive in noticing and working to select the texts that we speak 
and are spoken by. However, some texts will always be more accessible than 
others, because of history, culture, gender, embodiment and the other discursive 
resources on which we have to call. We cannot escape the inevitability of 
complex relations of power, by which we might be positioned well or poorly to 
accomplish our purposes. 
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Deconstruction and the ethics of storying practices 
The epistemological positions I have been describing have offered me particular 
ways to think about the ethics of counselling practice. For a deconstructing 
therapy is not only not neutral in engaging with the stories that produce clients' 
lives. Nor is it neutral about the stories that produce therapy. Lamer offered the 
perspective that "deconstructing does not attack disciplines like psychotherapy 
from the outside but inhabits them in a certain way" (1999, p.50) (my emphasis). 
Thus counselling becomes an active negotiation for positions in relation with, an 
active attention to the ethics of one's practice and to the positions one inhabits as 
professional. Another description from Lamer, with its sense of the productivity 
of deconstruction and attention to ethics, is particularly useful: 
Deconstruction articulates the paradoxes and double binds inherent in 
discourses of power and institution, in order to minimize their violent 
repression of difference and the other. (1995, p.39) 
It is on this basis that narrative therapy assumes the co-production of knowledge 
and takes a co-authoring stance. Client knowledge is brought from the margins to 
the centre of the therapy, and meaning is negotiated, valuing what local 
knowledge and local cultural knowledges bring to the therapeutic conversation. 
As I have explained, it is understood that institutionalised knowledges produced 
within the terms of dominant discourses do not ever tell the complete story: those 
subjugated knowledges, represented as "stories of protest" (White, cited in Wylie, 
1994), are always available when we engage with genuine curiosity in 
conversations intended to bring those knowledges forward. 
Davies' description of a Derridean I approach to deconstructing adds to the 
understanding of deconstruction being developed here. Her description offers two 
points in particular. The first is to emphasise again the productivity of 
deconstructing: that rather than being oppositional in a static sense, it is an 
1 Derrida is another of the French poststructuralists writers whose deconstructive work has been 
called upon by theorists in this stream of social theory and by some discursive therapists (Larner, 
1999, for example). 
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activity that is concerned with the possibility of things being other than they are, 
for example, in noticing in that which is present that which is absent. 
Derrida puts a cross through the word he is deconstructing in such a way 
as to leave the word visible, readable. The cross signals that it is still a 
word we need to use, as we do not know how to proceed without it. By 
putting it under erasure we can signal that it is problematic, in need of 
deconstructive work. That deconstructive work may eventually lead to the 
production of a different way of talking, of making sense of who we are or 
what we are doing. (Davies, 1998, p.139) 
In narrative therapy deconstructing is a tentative process, as client and counsellor 
together find their ways forward. Reconstructing, re-authoring accounts are 
always present in deconstructive work in this therapy. As the effects of problems 
become more visible in externalising conversations, alternative ways of talking 
become available. That which was absent from the surface of a story told on the 
terms of the problem discourse is made present. These alternative ways of talking 
and making sense support clients in shaping stories about their own purposes for 
their lives. 
Secondly, I want to draw attention of the surface of the grammar of Davies' 
words. For the grammar of her description throws light on constitution: 
deconstructing is an ongoing, negotiating in-process process, by which we 
produce our subjectivities. I consider that the use of the participle form, 
deconstructing, and the adjectival form, deconstructive, rather than the noun, 
deconstruction, is significant in indicating the fluid and ongoing work involved. It 
is an ongoing activity, attending to the ethics of living and of professional 
practice. This point is a critical implication of constructionist approaches to 
counselling and is important for this document's argument. 
The therapy being described here is one that pays attention to the ethics of 
practice and to the politics of practice. That is not to say that that therapy is 
prescriptive of particular positions in relation to ethics or politics or morality, but 
that it engages in an ongoing process of asking and negotiating questions about 
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the ethics of practice. Griffith and Griffith argued that "dialogical and relational 
rigor" (1992, p.10) are more critical than the technicalities of questioning in this 
work, suggesting that therapists need to be active in choosing both 
epistemological positions and relational ethics. They argue that training in 
postmodern practice modes should include attention to selecting the 
epistemological positions from which therapists practice. In this way we will 
account not just for what we do, but also for the thinking, the epistemological 
position, that produces the practice. 
How accounts get produced 
The account of narrative therapy that I have been constructing here is a more 
theoretical one than I might use to introduce the therapy in a practice context. 
This present account has emphasised the theoretical positions that produce the 
therapy for these positions are central to the argument of the thesis. It would, in 
any case, be impossible to tell a story of narrative therapy without recourse, in 
some way in another, to these theoretical ideas. For a storyline that tells of the 
actions of a therapy depends upon a storyline that identifies these actions within 
the wider landscape of ideas within which the therapy is produced. Drawing on 
Bruner (1986), White (1995) suggested that the storying of lives moves 
backwards and forwards between two landscapes, the landscape of action and the 
landscape of consciousness or identity. In the movement back and forth between 
these landscapes, stories are layered, event upon meaning, and meaning upon 
event. I think of there being layers folded vertically along an horizontal plane: the 
telling of those aspects of story that are to do with the plot, where events are 
linked together, in experience, and in sequence over time (Bruner, 1986; 
White,1995). These events plotted on the vertical folds across the horizontal 
plane take place in the landscape of action, producing a storyline. Then there are 
the layers of story that sit above and below this horizontal plane, folding upon it 
horizontally, as events in the landscape of action produce personal-social 
meaningfulness. These layers of story are those that are narrated in the landscape 
of identity, layers that are to do with interpretation of events. Events in the 
landscape of action are thus made meaningful in terms of the work that they do in 
the production of identity. Storylines are thus built on the landscape of identity, 
too - perhaps a story of resistance or of strength - supported by a landscape of 
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action storyline that tells of the events that produced such descriptions. The 
storyline on the landscape of identity - of oneself as a person of strength for 
instance - then produces further opportunities for such events to recur in the 
future, for the storyline of strength will offer narrative coherence to such events. 
Stories are in these ways constitutive of identity. In telling a story here of 
narrative therapy, my emphasis has been on a storyline that emphasises what I 
will provisionally call the "intellectual identity" of this therapy, the ideas that 
produce the therapy. Narrative therapy is meaningful in the discursive context 
within which it was and is produced. A storying therapy, narrative therapy's 
'own' story is meaningful when told in relation with the intellectual landscapes by 
which it has been shaped. Deconstructing involves us in an investigation of how 
accounts and practices have been put together as they have. 
Storying lives in relationship 
Before going on to introduce the question that had become pressing for my 
supervision and teaching practice - what does all this mean for supervision - there 
is one further aspect of narrative practice to which I wish to draw particular 
attention, for it was central to the production of this study. Narrative therapy 
employs a number of connection-building practices that live out the idea that 
identity is relational. Indeed, White wrote of the "the identification and 
recruitment of audiences to the preferred developments of people's lives" (1999, 
p.55) as a central aspect of narrative practice. Reauthoring is a collaborative 
practice where collaboration goes beyond the therapeutic relationship to the wider 
network of relationships within which lives are and have been lived. These 
networks of present and past relationships are purposefully identified and 
recruited for therapeutic purposes. 
Foucault had drawn attention to the individualising and objectifying of lives and 
bodies in the practices of the institutions of modern Western society. Separated 
from others, each person is subject to the "gaze" offered by the normalising 
descriptions of selfhood spoken into being within the terms of dominant 
discourses. In this way, as individual units we police ourselves, managing 
ourselves according to what White described as a highly individual specification 
of personhood, "self-possession" and "self-containment" (1989, p.22). 
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Deconstructing such specifications, narrative therapists have developed a number 
of connection-building practices. Connection is a purposeful counter-practice to 
the dividing and categorising practices of the disciplines as Foucault described 
them. For example, in re-membering practices, those who have been significant 
in contributing to the production of preferred events or meanings are taken (back) 
into the membership of the club of a person's life (Myerhoff, 1986; White, 1997). 
A question such as, Who is there who wouldn't be surprised that you have done 
this, who would have had faith in you, believing that you had the strength to see 
this through, may well elicit the presence in the story of a person whose voice 
might provide another time and place in which the preferred story might be 
plotted and developed, so that that story might be more richly populated and 
thereby more richly storied. Such a person, as live or imagined audience, bears 
witness to that which is preferred, to their knowledge of the client's preferred 
qualities and ways of being and so to the alternative stories being produced. Such 
support might come, too, from a community of concern (Madigan & Epston, 
1995) expressed through other practices, such as Epston's Anti-anorexia League. 
In this League those breaking free of anorexia's regime work in a team to support 
each other, joined by therapists, family and friends and others who support their 
struggle. League members join together in exposing the practices by which 
anorexia would have them in its grip and by which they would otherwise be cut 
off from each other and from others, each imprisoned in an individual cell of 
anorexia's construction. In this deconstructing, other actions and descriptions are 
made visible and enlarged and community is emphasised. Reflecting team 
practices (White, 1995) are another expression of practice that counters the 
individualising and objectifying of lives, counter practice that declares that the re-
storying of lives is more than individual activity. Rather these counter practices 
suggest that lives are to be lived out in community, and identities storied in ways 
that make visible the webs of cultural and community meaning within which 
storying takes place and identity is produced. Identity is public and social, 
cultural and historical (White, 1999): the practices of narrative therapy draw 
attention to the relational production of identity. 
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Reflecting team practices 
This project drew on reflecting team practice in generating its primary data. I 
introduce reflecting team work at this point in this account because of the 
importance of an understanding of both the theoretical background and the 
material practices of these practices. I shall return to reflecting team practice 
again in Chapter Four when I consider reflecting teams and supervision, and in 
Chapter Five when I clarify how the reflecting team process produced the data-
generating processes for the study. 
The antecedents of reflecting teams are the team approaches of systemic and 
strategic family therapy; their initial practice is attributed to Tom Andersen of 
Norway; but the accounts that could be given now of their development and the 
uses to which they have been put depend very much on the position of the speaker 
and are widely varied (Andersen, 1987, 1991; Davidson & Lusardi, 1991; 
White, 1995, 1997, 1999). And as Andersen (1995b) noted, his own accounts 
have shifted over time. Like narrative therapy, reflecting team practices are multi-
storied. 
Andersen wrote of the moment when the idea that became reflecting team practice 
"pushed for a birth" (1991, p.11). Familiar practice for family therapy teams was 
to work behind a one-way screen, invisible to and its conversations unheard by the 
clients. However, at Andersen's "moment of birth" the team members were made 
visible by the switching on of the light in the room behind the screen where they 
had been listening. By this move, the team members went on to make themselves, 
and some of the thoughts and words that they were offering to the therapeutic 
process, visible and audible to the clients. The clients were now in the listening 
and observing position that the team had been. As part of this moment of birth, 
the clients were, in the next move, invited to respond to the team's conversation 
while the team moved back out of the light. There are two aspects of Andersen's 
account to which I wish to draw attention. The first is the rewriting of the ethics 
of therapeutic relationship. Team members were no longer positioned as invisible 
experts, but were now visible to the family as they responded to the family's 
story. In this visibility there was more opportunity for their accountability to the 
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client family to be realised. Familiar power relations between therapy team and 
clients were thus disrupted, and in this disruption, deconstructed. Secondly, there 
is a particular emphasis to the positioning of team members in both their listening 
and their speaking. Andersen pointed out that the Norwegian refleksjon offers the 
sense that "something is taken in and thought about before a response is given" 
(1991, p.11). This captures the sense that the listening team is engaged in a 
responsive dialogic process: in the listening position they mull over ideas before 
taking up a speaking/listening position wherein together in conversation they offer 
their thoughts for the family's consideration. Knowledge is not a property already 
held in the head of an expert team member, but rather offered out of responsive 
reflection upon that which the client has offered. Andersen described the style of 
reflection a team member might offer as "appropriately unusual", neither too 
familiar to be not noticed, nor too different to be jarring. 
White's reflecting team work has emphasised the ways in which reflecting team 
practices work as "definitional ceremony" as those at the centre story identity 
claims in community and with community (Myerhoff, 1986; White, 1995, 1997, 
1999). Calling on Myerhoff's anthropological work, White described definitional 
ceremony as "a context for reflexive self-consciousness - in which people become 
more conscious of themselves as they see themselves, and more conscious of their 
participation in the production of their productions of their lives" ( 1995, p.178). 
Team members are positioned as witnesses to an account, a telling, to which they 
then contribute, in a retelling. In contributing they are positioned to honour the 
teller of the story, as tellings and retellings produce richer descriptions, 
particularly as the teller responds to the team's retellings. Like a narrative 
therapist, team members join with a client or family, listening with a 
deconstructing ear, listening for those exceptions and resistances and preferences 
about which they might inquire and so contribute to possible restorying or richer 
storying. The orientation the team brings to the reflecting team process is more 
important than the technical aspects of the process. White's (1995) outline of a 
four-stage reflecting team process is one that I have found helpful. I have used it 
as a guide for reflecting team work in therapy and it informed this project. White 
(1999) also drew some particular distinctions about this work. He wrote of 
reflecting team work as involving "practices of acknowledgement", noting the 
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differences between these practices and practices of applause. Practises of 
applause, he suggested, are at risk in therapeutic settings of reproducing 
normalising judgement because of the power relations of the therapeutic 
relationship. Practices of acknowledgement, however, are "more considered, 
thoughtful and more specific in that they are expressed in ways that are unique to 
the events that they refer to" (p.69). Going on to describe the differences between 
conversation and monologue and the importance of team members supporting 
each other to engage in "decentred sharing", White suggested 
To embody one's interest in other people's lives is to situate this interest in 
the context of those people's expressions, in the context of one's own 
lived experience, in the context of one's imagination and curiosity, or in 
the context of one's purposes. (1999, p.72) 
In situating their responses in this way team members stand apart from those 
positions offered by discourses of normalising judgement. A further strategy 
White offered reflecting team practice is to "engage in explorations of the history 
of thought and practice in the culture of therapy", that is to take a deconstructing 
position in relation to therapy itself. In this way team members are well 
positioned to produce what Kaye called "a non-regulative praxis", that is "to get 
outside particularly disciplinary discourses in order to question their (and our) 
practices of power" (1999, p.35). 
There are two further features of reflecting team work that I wish to point to in 
particular as I end the current description of reflecting team practice, for these 
aspects of practice are ones I shall return to through this document. The first is the 
involvement of multiple voices, the bringing forward a sense of a community of 
speakers offering many possible ways of speaking. Not only does the speaking of 
many voices interrupt the more familiar private dialogic encounter of therapy, it 
also disturbs the authority of the psy profession's uni vocal prescriptions for ways 
of living based on expert knowledge. The disturbance of expert knowledge thus 
enhances clients' appreciation of there being many possible ways of living well. 
The Russian literary theorist Bakhtin (1981) distinguished between ways of 
speaking that are "authoritative" and those that are "dialogised". The latter ways 
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of speaking have had their authority investigated. In reflecting team work the 
team is heard, in the second phase of the process, transparently negotiating 
together the making up of knowledge and the ideas that sit behind the making up. 
Smith, Yoshioka and Winton's (1993) study of clients' experiences of reflecting 
team practice suggested that clients found it helpful when the contributions of 
team members offered multiple descriptions, and when those different 
descriptions were each located in "credible explanations" (p.40). When 
professional knowledge is situated, and is brought forward by many voices that 
can sustain the possibility of there being different accounts, the ethics of 
professional relationships are differently produced. The second feature of 
reflecting team work to which I draw attention here also involves the interruption 
of dialogue. The listening position, which the client takes up in Phase Two, offers 
the person consulting the team space to reflect, to listen without having to produce 
immediate response. The physical repositioning offers an opportunity for the 
client to listen to and reflect upon and thus produce accounts that might generate 
possible alternative discursive positionings. Listening to the team's tentative 
inquiries and responses, the client is better positioned to reflect on and evaluate 
those accounts and their usefulness to them in storying their lives. In Phase Three 
the ethic of positioning the client as "senior author" (White, 1995) is enacted as 
the client is consulted about their responses to the team's reflections. The 
practices described here are those by which White (1999) differentiates these 
particular approaches to reflecting team practice as poststructuralist for he 
demonstrates particular interest in practices of power and the work of 
deconstruction. 
Some questions for supervision 
When counselling is made up in the ways I have been describing here, what are 
the implications for counsellor supervision? This question had become pressing 
for me and generated this research project. The migration of professional identity 
that I had undertaken as a counsellor came to have significant implications for 
how I understood and practised supervision. Questions were raised both for the 
moment by moment practice of particular supervision relationships and for the 
work of supervision in the professional culture in which I was practising. In 
Chapter One I outlined the interrogation I brought to supervision in employing the 
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theoretical tools of discourse and positioning. I think of those questions as 
researcher questions, produced as I positioned myself more purposefully in 
research discourse. The beginnings of those questions, however, were in 
practitioner inquiry. They arose as I thought about practice and the ideas that 
produced practice. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the practitioner 
questions that narrative counselling produced for me as a counsellor, supervisor 
and counsellor educator. 
If the stories people tell aqout themselves are constituting of their lives and their 
lived identities and relationships, so the stories we tell about our professional 
practices are constituting of our professional lives and the professional identities 
that we live and of our professional relationships. What does this mean, then, for 
how counsellors and supervisors work together in supervision? What does it 
mean for the accounts our profession gives of supervision? If we are to pay 
attention to the ways so-called truths about persons and social practices and 
institutions are constructed, then what truths about professional supervision 
practice might we also pay attention to? And what truths about counselling 
practice do we pay attention to in supervision? If we are working "towards a non-
regulative praxis" (Kaye, 1999) in counselling, what does that mean for 
supervision, when the profession construes supervision as regulatory? These 
questions all engage with a matter of much interest in the supervision literature, to 
which Chapters Three and Four attend, of the connections and differences 
between counselling and supervision. While there are a number of ways that 
discussion of such differences and similarities are theorised - for example in 
employing the idea of isomorphism (White & Russell, 1997) - I want to 
emphasise here a similarity based on the ethics of relationship. 
Questions about the ethics of relationship were central to this inquiry. In what 
ways do the power relations of professional practice necessarily produce 
supervision and counselling differently whatever my chosen epistemological 
stance in therapy, I asked. Does counsellor privilege in the power relation of 
counselling mean that the work of counsellor and supervisor in supervision is 
produced out of a different ethical relation than that which produces the 
counselling relationship? Does the power relation of counselling require 
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supervisors to take on a scrutiny in supervision that narrative therapists repudiate 
in counselling? 
If it is the case that counsellors should be subject to normalising judgement 
because of the power relations of professional practice, what are the effects on 
counsellors and on supervisors and on the supervision relationship of a climate of 
regulation and self-scrutiny? How might counsellors both be responsive 
(responsibly) to the power-in-relation of our positioning as counsellors-with-
clients, and responsive (deconstructively) to our positionings as ordinary persons 
living in the same world (of normalising judgement) as our clients? When does 
responsible professional reflection become problematic self-scrutiny and how 
would we know? 
Narrative counselling conversations are possibility-generating for clients when 
counsellors bring a stance of inquiry and curiosity. What happens if we approach 
supervision on those terms? If counselling conversations pay attention to the 
terms on which clients story their lives, what happens in supervision 
conversations engaged with on the same terms? What supervision practices might 
be opened up, if we move outside the already available ways? 
These were some of the questions about supervision that resonated with me as I 
became more familiar with a narrative orientation in counselling. What does the 
narrative metaphor offer the professional practice of supervision? One possibility 
that I had encountered was supervision as a didactic process of the supervisor 
teaching or instructing a counsellor, by telling them the kinds of questions they 
could be asking in a particular situation: after all, the practices associated with the 
narrative metaphor depend on a sophisticated set of practice skills. However, it 
seemed to me that such an approach did not make use of the breadth of 
possibilities that the narrative metaphor offered for how supervision might be 
produced. For one thing, there are problems with limiting supervision to a 
training focus. But more significantly, on the basis that narrative therapy is 
distinguished by a concern with the ethics of practice and the constructionist 
attention to the terms of knowledge production, I was interested to think about a 
supervision premised on the same concerns. How might the ethics of relationship 
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offered in narrative therapy - an ethics of collaboration, the ethic of attending to 
the accounts available to produce identity, the ethics of attending to practices of 
power - be productive of ethical practice in supervision? And what might be 
particular to a local, New Zealand version of supervision? 
Adopting the tactic of assuming that supervision could be investigated on the 
terms that produced deconstructing approaches in counselling, I asked how 
supervision might be thus transformed. Lamer has suggested that 
Deconstructing psychotherapy takes place at the level of practice, where it 
addresses issues of power, justice and ethics in relation to clients, and at 
the level of theory, where it deconstructs its own power and authority as an 
institution of psychotherapy. (1999, p.41) 
At the level of practice, and of theory, supervision might be similarly described. 
In arguing a connection between narrative approaches to counselling on one hand 
and supervision on the other, I remain mindful of the professional literature that 
distinguishes counselling and supervision. "Supervision is not therapy," asserted 
Gamer, Bobele, and Biever (1997, p.224, original emphasis). My purpose here is 
not to conflate the two practices, supervision and counselling. Rather I am 
interested in producing approaches to supervision that attend to matters of power, 
justice, ethics in counselling practice and theory and in supervision practice and 
theory. The narrative therapy literature provides a more developed storyline to 
support this project, I believe, than the supervision literature, for it is the narrative 
therapy literature that consistently pays attention to the ethics of relational 
practices. Nonetheless, this project is not produced independently of the 
supervision literature and mainstream supervision practice: it is in the spaces 
between narrative therapy and supervision that this project is produced. Again, it 
is Lamer's description of deconstructing psychotherapy that speaks to what I 
sought for this project in relation with the institution of supervision. 
A deconstructing psychotherapy is ultimately open-ended, manifold, 
simultaneously inventing new approaches to psychotherapy while 
deferring to its tradition. To think within a tradition is to ask questions 
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previously unasked and unthought within it, to challenge its canon of 
discourse, to open it up to other ways of thinking and speaking as 
questions that make a difference [Gasche, 1994). (Larner, 1999, p.51) 
And so it is to the supervision literature that this current account now turns, 
discussing the traditions within which this project is located and beginning to 
open up its canon of discourse to the ways of thinking and speaking that the 
narrative metaphor offers. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has located this project in terms of social theory. It has also located 
this work in my own professional life as an ongoing engagement with the 
implications for theory and practice of the narrative metaphor. This engagement 
was produced as a result of a migration of professional identity. The chapter has 
described the narrative metaphor as proposing that stories are constitutive, and 
that people encounter problems in their lives when they have been sidelined from 
the production of the stories by which their lives are constituted. Storying is 
understood to be social and relational. Narrative.therapists work to engage 
collaboratively with clients in generating dialogue within which clients might 
position themselves more favourably as agents in their lives. Such dialogue is a 
discursive production as the terms available for storying lives are investigated 
through deconstructing. The chapter has suggested that deconstructing therapy 
pays attention not only to the making up of knowledges within clients' lives, but 
also to the making up of knowledges about clients' lives and also about therapy. 
Questions of relations of power and of ethical relationship are shown to be central 
to the practice of deconstructing therapy. The chapter has drawn attention to the 
terms upon which this investigation of the implications of the narrative metaphor 
for supervision has depended. 
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Chapter Three 
An introduction to supervision, the professional context of 
the study 
My purpose in this thesis is to produce an account of supervision in the spaces 
between narrative therapy and traditional or mainstream supervision. Having 
introduced narrative therapies, I now tum to the supervision literature. This 
chapter surveys the institution of supervision, outlining the mainstream literature 
that has influenced my understandings of supervision. The review in this chapter 
is not all-encompassing. It canvasses in particular the supervision literature that 
has been taken into New Zealand settings: I rely on my own professional 
experiences for the assumptions I make in this selection. I believe that knowledge 
and practice in New Zealand have been more influenced by practitioners and 
practice-based supervision texts and models (mostly U.K.) than by research-based 
material (mostly U.S.A.). Over the next two chapters I also consider those 
contributions that have been useful to me in taking a deconstructing approach to 
supervision and thus in storying supervision otherwise. 
The chapter begins with a description of key aspects of counselling supervision 
and goes on to focus on the monitoring function of supervision and the 
implications of that function for the exercise of responsibility. Supervision is then 
distinguished from consultation and from counselling. Four explanatory 
metaphors of supervision are then investigated: counselling-linked approaches, 
social role accounts, developmental accounts, and generic approaches to 
supervision. I begin to locate my own preference for a postmodern, narrative-
informed approach to supervision in this investigation. I then engage in a 
deconstructing reading of the supervision relationship. In this examination I 
suggest that the supervision relationship has been unilaterally constructed, thus 
positioning the counsellor somewhat disadvantageously for the exercise of ethical 
responsibility. 
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Supervision: an introduction 
In the context of counselling in New Zealand, supervision is a process of critical 
reflection where a supervisor and a counsellor share responsibility for 
"monitoring, developing and supporting" the counsellor in their work (NZAC 
Code of Supervision, NZAC Handbook, 2000, p.27). Regular supervision for all 
Members is mandated in the New Zealand Association of Counsellors' Code of 
Ethics (2000); supervision is considered to be critical in counsellors maintaining 
effective and ethical practice. Brigid Proctor, whose U.K. work is familiar in New 
Zealand as a result of her teaching visits (and, I suspect, the accessibility of her 
material) speaks of this as the "quality assurance" purpose of supervision (Proctor, 
1995). 
In my work in counsellor education I have often referred to Inskipp and Proctor's 
(1994) description of supervision: 
... a working alliance between a supervisor and a counsellor (or 
counsellors) in which the counsellor can offer an account or recording of 
her work; reflect on it; receive feedback and where appropriate guidance. 
The object of the alliance is to enable the counsellor to gain in ethical 
competence, confidence and creativity so as to give her best possible 
service to her clients. (p.1) 
I have used this description because it seems to me to focus clearly on key aspects 
of the supervision task. Each of the themes raised here will be elaborated further 
as this work continues, but at this point I want to pause and highlight certain 
elements. Initially attention is given to the relational aspect of supervision, a 
working alliance between a supervisor and a counsellor, and then to the work 
each does. The counsellor will offer an account, and will reflect on their work, 
while the supervisor will provide feedback and perhaps guidance. There is a 
mutual concern with the ethics of the counsellor's practice, with enhancing 
practice through building confidence and creativity in the counsellor. The focus 
of supervision is on promoting the counsellor's service to clients. 
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There are, however, three particular significant aspects of supervision that the 
Inskipp and Proctor excerpt does not directly encompass that are central to the 
situation and the argument of this thesis. The first two of these are the interrelated 
matters of monitoring and responsibility. The third is the matter of distinguishing 
between supervision and counselling, consultation, or training. 
Quality assurance and monitoring in supervision 
The terms used in the NZAC Code of Ethics to describe the focus of supervision 
are "monitoring, developing and supporting" (p.27) and locally many counsellors 
are familiar with Proctor's (1987) classification of the "normative, formative, and 
restorative" functions of supervision. Some writers have suggested that there is a 
conflict of interest between the evaluative and the facilitative purposes of 
supervision. Mearns (1995) contrasted the "nutritious" and "policing" functions 
of supervision. Shipton, another U.K. writer, referred to "the tensions between a 
predatory gaze and respectful regard" (1997, p.145). Locally, Manthei (1996) 
made the case for the monitoring function of supervision to be made explicit 
since, he contended, it is present whether it is explicit or not. In the U.S. literature 
Deck and Morrow (1989) suggested that "support and confrontation" (p.38) must 
go together, while Bradley suggested that evaluation in supervision was "never 
intended to be fearful", but rather to proactively address an "accountability 
question" about the accomplishment of counsellor objectives (1989, p.25). 
Carroll (1996) noted that there was no agreement amongst professional 
counsellors in the U.K. about formal evaluation as a critical task of supervision. 
There is considerable ambiguity about the extent to which, and the ways in which, 
supervision fulfils a monitoring function, particularly in the U.K. and New 
Zealand contexts where supervisor responsibility is not codified in law or in 
counsellor licensing regulations. For example, King and Wheeler's (1999) U.K. 
study suggested that it is unclear the extent to which supervisors carry 
responsibility, in legal, ethical, moral and practical terms, for the work of the 
counsellors with whom they share supervision. They suggested that "the notion 
that all casework is monitored by an experienced and qualified colleague is a 
fantasy, not a reality" (p.227), tentatively concluding that professional 
associations might provide more formally delineated and prescriptive codes of 
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ethics and practice. Without such moves, King and Wheeler suggested, it would 
need to be accepted that supervision does not provide quality assurance. At the 
same time supervision works to shore up the claim of our profession that 
counsellors are responsible and ethical workers. However, there is nothing in the 
British Association of Counselling (BAC) Codes or the NZAC Codes to suggest 
that supervision should involve a "casework" approach to monitoring. 
Supervision is clearly a term that encompasses a wide range of interpretations. 
Paying attention to how monitoring is written about, I notice the wording in the 
NZAC Code of Ethics: "Counsellors shall monitor their work through regular 
supervision ... ". I argue that it is significant that the subject of the sentence is 
counsellors (Crocket, 1999): the surface of the grammar of this sentence suggests 
that the monitoring responsibility rests with the counsellor. Similarly the BAC 
Code of Ethics and Practice for Supervisors of Counsellors states that 
"counselling supervision provides supervisees with an opportunity on a regular 
basis to discuss and monitor their work with clients" (1996, 3.1). By both these 
accounts monitoring does not centre on the supervisor. Rather, these accounts 
offer the possibility that supervision provides a forum where a counsellor engages 
with a supervisor in a process of quality assurance in respect of their work. The 
NZAC Code states, too, that "Counsellors are responsible for their work with 
clients ... " (NZAC Handbook, 2000, p. 28). The BAC Code of Ethics and Practice 
for Supervisors of Counsellors states 
Within this contract supervisors are responsible for helping supervisees to 
reflect critically upon their work, while at the same time acknowledging 
that clinical responsibility remains with the counsellor. (1996, B.1.2) 
The NZAC and BAC positions are in contrast with the very full responsibilities, 
professionally and legally prescribed, of North American supervisors whose 
responsibilities were described by Borders and Leddick: 
You [the supervisor] are responsible for both a counselor and that 
counselor's clients, for the counselor's learning and the counselor's 
welfare. (1987, p.2) 
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The emphasis of this excerpt is on very wide-ranging supervisor responsibility. 
Its place in a handbook on counselling supervision published by the American 
Counselling Association gives such a statement considerable authority as it 
constructs supervisor responsibility as all-encompassing. This 1987 work remains 
current. Whether the counsellor (NZAC, BAC) or the supervisor (ACA) is 
responsible for clients has a significant effect on how the supervision relationship 
might be produced. If counsellors are responsible both for their clients and for 
monitoring their counselling work in supervision, they are positioned differently 
than if their supervisor is responsible and if their supervisor is to do the 
monitoring. The NZAC and BAC positions might work to call counsellors into 
responsibility for their practice and in supervision in ways that the ACA position 
does not. For there is significantly less room for counsellor responsibility or 
mutual responsibility within the construction of responsibility produced by the 
Borders and Leddick description. That description gives responsibility solely to 
the supervisor. The discourse of supervisor responsibility is pervasive, influential 
even in those professional contexts where it is not explicitly espoused, despite 
ambiguities, and contrasting descriptions such as those offered in the BAC and 
NZAC Codes. 
The discourse of supervisor responsibility is a central interest of this project. 
Within the terms of this discourse, an agentive position as responsible 
professional is clearly formed and readily available for the supervisor: that 
position is thickly described. However, the position of counsellor as an agentive 
responsible professional is scarcely formed. Discourses have effects (Davies, 
1998); they produce particular vocabularies of action (Gergen, 1996, p.22). A 
thinly described and scarcely formed position of counsellor responsibility 
produces a sparse vocabulary of action by which counsellors might produce 
themselves as responsible for their own ethical practice. Yet surely that is the 
purpose of supervision: to produce counsellors who are responsible for their own 
ethical practice. I draw attention to the surface of the grammar of statements from 
the NZAC Codes. I do this to begin to describe more richly the relational 
responsibility that might be exercised in supervision when counsellors are present 
in the subject position in sentences about responsibility: Counsellors shall 
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monitor their work... For I argue that if counsellors are to be well positioned to 
exercise ethical responsibility in their work it is of considerable importance that 
supervision is taken beyond the vocabularies of action offered by the discourse of 
supervisor responsibility. 
Distinguishing supervision 
Those seeking to describe supervision and its tasks have also worked to 
distinguish it from other activities such as consultation and counselling, and to 
distinguish counselling supervision from managerial supervision. There is general 
agreement across the international literature that supervision is distinguished from 
consultation by the ongoing commitment involved in supervision, and that 
supervisors take more responsibility than consultants whether that responsibility is 
unilateral or shared (for example, Barretta-Herman, 2001; Bernard & Goodyear, 
1998; Todd & Storm, 1997b ). There have been some efforts to clarify usage of 
the term 'supervision' and in some cases to introduce a new vocabulary, such as 
consultation, facilitation, mentoring, co-vision, metavision or peervision in order 
to distinguish counselling supervision from the managerial and overseeing 
implications generally associated with supervision (for example, Edwards 1997; 
Lambert, 1989/90; Todd & Storm, 1997b, Wendorf, 1984). However, I continue 
to use the term 'supervision' as I believe we have no better word at present to 
convey the commitment that both counsellor and supervisor bring to the task of 
collaborating in the production of the counsellor as an ethical and effective worker 
with their clients and in their professional life. I think, too, that supervision can 
be re-inscribed when the emphasis moves from oversight by the supervisor to the 
counsellor seeing their work from a number of different positions (Roberts, 1997). 
These positions enable counsellors to look over their work in collaboration with 
the colleague who is the supervisor. This emphasis points again to the 
significance of how we understand the positioning of counsellor and supervisor in 
relation. For this emphasis positions the supervisor as the facilitator of the 
counsellor's looking around their work: the supervisor's responsibility is 
exercised through the skill they bring to the task of facilitation rather than to the 
task of providing unilateral oversight. Then, supervision is distinguished from 
consultation by the commitment of the supervisor and counsellor to work together 
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in an ongoing professional relationship with a collaborative focus on ethical 
counselling practice. 
Arguments for making clear distinctions between counselling and supervision are 
particularly significant for this study. The thesis of this document is in tension 
with current trends in the mainstream supervision literature to regard supervision 
as a practice that is quite distinct from counselling practice (Carroll, 1996; 
Holloway, 1995; McConkey, 1999). Arguments for making a clear distinction 
between counselling and supervision have taken two forms. The first, focussing 
on the content of supervision, suggests that the focus is client work, "the 
therapeutic relationship the supervisee has with the client" (Gardener, Bobele, & 
Biever, 1997, p.225). Thus, clear distinctions between 'personal' and 
'professional' are called for. For a supervisor to provide therapy that has "broader 
goals" than "helping supervisees become more effective with clients" is not 
ethical, according to Bernard and Goodyear (1998, p.7). Kaiser wrote in terms of 
the "'therapising' [of] the supervisee" being a risk when a supervisor does not 
make a clear distinction between personal awareness that is in the "interest of the 
[therapy] work", and that which focuses on the "personal growth of the 
supervisee" [1992, p.293]. These authors made these claims on the basis of the 
evaluative task the supervisor has and the quality assurance function of 
supervision: given the supervisor's responsibility for ensuring safe practice, the 
argument goes, it is unethical for this responsibility to be further complicated by 
the power relation of therapy, for that would position the counsellor in an 
inappropriately vulnerable position. However, Bernard and Goodyear do not give 
guidance about determining what falls within the bounds of helping counsellors 
become more effective with their clients. My observation is that the family 
therapy literature in general more sharply distinguishes professional supervision 
from personal counselling whereas humanistic counselling approaches are more 
sympathetic to a sense of a blurring and overlap between the person of the 
counsellor and the client work. Tomm (1993) questioned the sharp distinctions 
drawn in family therapy in North America, suggesting that dual relationships can 
be enriching if the power relations are managed well and where they are 
transparent. 
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The second form of the distinction between supervision and counselling is of 
more recent origin. It argues that supervision is to be regarded as a speciality that 
is distinct from counselling (Carroll, 1996; McConkey, 1999), involving a 
separate set of knowledges and practices (Todd & Storm, 1997b) acquired through 
a distinct training. Supervision is educative; its process is not allied with 
counselling. To conceive of supervision as a professional specialisation in its own 
right is in contrast to the practice history in the U.K. and New Zealand, where 
counsellors have tended simply to follow on into roles as supervisors by virtue of 
their experience and skill in counselling with no particular further professional 
preparation or training. Both McConkey (1999), in New Zealand, and Carroll 
(1996), in the U.K, advocated strongly for the specialised training of supervisors 
arguing that such a move is another step in the counselling profession's maturity. 
The arguments Carroll and McConkey made for supervision as a professional 
speciality are produced on the terms of metaphors that construct supervision in 
particular ways. If supervision as a specialisation is a step in the profession's 
maturity, the history that has led us to this point is relevant. Particular 
explanatory metaphors of supervision have held the centre ground at different 
times in the history of supervision, drawing attention to different aspects of the 
supervision process and conceptualising supervision in different ways. The 
chapter continues with an overview of this history, emphasising four major 
explanatory metaphors of supervision and their influence on the accounts that are 
current. 
Explanatory metaphors of supervision 
Psychoanalysis: supervision as training but not as therapy 
The practice of supervision was developed as a training function. Early in the 
twentieth century a division arose in psychoanalytic circles in Europe and the 
U.K. One approach favoured training and personal analysis being undertaken 
with the same analyst while the other distinguished training in the skills of 
analysis and the personal therapy required to hone one's capabilities to work as an 
analyst. This division lives on as the therapy field works to distinguish between 
what Edwards characterised as "learning about their own feelings as opposed to 
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learning about therapeutic techniques and strategies" (1997, p.11 ). I have already 
pointed to the current relevance of this distinction. However, this phase of 
supervision history also raises the question of whether training and supervision are 
synonymous. More recently Carroll (1996) suggested that training supervision (of 
students of counselling) be distinguished from consultative supervision (of 
qualified counsellors). For the most part the literature does not distinguish 
between supervision and training in this way (Holloway, 1996; Merl, 1995; 
Santa Rita, 1998, for example). Indeed, much of the literature assumes a training 
focus without making that overt, thus conflating training and supervision. Again, 
the NZAC Code of Supervision offers evidence of efforts in the local profession 
to distinguish supervision and training. The Code lists four aspects of practice 
that supervision is concerned with and in a separate clause it suggests that 
"supervision may also be concerned with" training. This use of the subjunctive is 
not accidental but reflects the strong sense of the Association's Annual General 
Meeting when this Code was adopted that supervision and training should be 
distinguished. 
Counselling model-related approaches 
Psychoanalysis produced a psychoanalytic version of supervision, one that 
theorised supervision on the same terms as it theorised therapy. Then, beginning 
in the 1950s, a number of counselling-linked approaches to supervision were 
produced alongside the invention of new models of therapy, such as Transactional 
Analysis (Carroll, 1996). In this way a clusters of approaches to supervision were 
produced, approaches that sat and sit alongside particular orientations to 
counselling practice. The counselling model is assumed to work as a supervision 
model; the same practices will be employed in supervision as in counselling. 
Thus a supervisor working from a person-centred supervision model works on the 
basis of trust in a counsellor's capacity for growth just as a person-centred 
counsellor works on the basis of trust in a client's capacity for growth, "believing 
in the phenomenological process to such an extent that the wisdom of giving 
advice or instruction becomes a moot issue" (Bernard & Goodyear, 1998, p.19). 
Similarly as family therapy developed, particular supervision practices emerged in 
that field, too. Supervision was most often live supervision during therapy, in the 
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context of a team. It focussed particularly on the client work, paying little 
attention to the person of the therapist. "It is being discovered that a theory of 
therapy and a theory of training are synonymous," Haley suggested (1976, p.170). 
In family therapy the notion of isomorphism has been used rather freely to 
describe the interconnection, the "reciprocal and recursive relationship" (Liddle & 
Saba, 1983, p.4) between therapy and training/supervision. While Liddle and 
Saba noted that the concept of isomorphism drew attention to "what is similar 
between domains that are different" (p.9), they also warned that the isomorphic 
transformation should not be taken too literally nor over-emphasised. Four 
expressions of the notion of isomorphism were noted by White and Russell 
(1997). Firstly, by applying the psychodynamic concept of parallel process to 
systemic work, isomorphism is understood to be the replication of patterns of 
interaction between therapy and supervision. Secondly there is the assumption 
that "therapeutic models, principles and practices can be translated into the 
supervisory domain" (p.317). The third application of isomorphism assumes that 
while the content of therapy and supervision are different, the structure and 
process are similar. Lastly, White and Russell identified an emphasis on 
interventive stance: "one can alter the sequence in supervision with the goal of 
altering the supervisee's in-session behaviour accordingly" (p.317). They 
suggested that when the concept of isomorphism is applied authors should specify 
which of these understandings they are assuming, and that the limits of the term 
should be specified in order not to blur the distinctions between therapy and 
supervision (p.329). 
Given the elemental differences in these two domains of practice, the use 
of the term [isomorphism] should neither facilitate inappropriate 
borrowing of therapeutic terms into supervision nor negate important 
distinctions between the two activities. (White & Russell, 1997, p.330) 
Nonetheless, the structural concept of isomorphism continues to be widely used: 
"within family therapy, the isomorphic structure of the supervisory relationship 
continues to be the most acceptable metaphor for understanding training and 
development" (Santa Rita, 1998, p.129). 
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In counselling, counselling model-related supervision approaches have fallen out 
of fashion over the past decade in particular. As I have indicated, the trend has 
been towards generic approaches (Bernard & Goodyear, 1998; Carroll, 1996; 
Holloway, 1995). Those arguing for this trend have described counselling model-
related approaches in rather pejorative language. Carroll, reporting on his major 
U.K. supervision study, used Holloway's phrase of "counselling-bound" (p.24) 
and reported that Holloway had used the descriptor "parochial" about such 
approaches. He also described such approaches as "narrow". Carroll wrote of a 
struggle to "wean" (p.7) supervision from counselling, suggesting that supervision 
is at "an adolescent stage of development", "poised for independence" (p.28). 
The infusion of a developmental metaphor works to suggest that the field is 
mature when we accept that supervision is a profession in its own right, separate 
from counselling: mature supervision practice will work independently of models 
of counselling. 
As I have noted, descriptions of counselling-modality-linked models of 
supervision as "counselling bound" work in two ways. Firstly, both Holloway 
and Carroll were describing and arguing against supervision taking an alignment 
with a particular counselling orientation. Secondly they were preferring to 
conceptualise supervision as a generic activity that is a speciality in its own right, 
and one that requires a specific training, not just counsellor training. On these 
terms supervision is a very different activity from counselling, separated twice 
over. Holloway (1995) pointed out that research suggested that supervisors do not 
practice supervision as they do counselling. Supervisors are more likely to take 
up a teaching orientation and to give advice, for example. Holloway, Freund, 
Gardner, Nelson, and Walker (1989) studied observable differences in supervisory 
style of a number of major theorists. They conducted their study by watching 
videos of these theorists and coding and comparing their responses according to 
particular categories. On the basis of these observations, Holloway et al. 
suggested that the particular model developed for supervision, Interpersonal 
Process Recall, rather than those models adapted from counselling, perhaps 
enabled a more "equitable and consultant-like" working relationship in 
supervision (p.101). Their analysis of the videotape featuring Carl Rogers, for 
example, suggested that "client-centred supervision does not comply with the 
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theoretical tenets of a client-centred counselling approach" (p.98), since advice-
giving featured in Rogers' supervision work in ways unfamiliar in his counselling. 
Other voices have contributed to this shift away from counselling-related 
approaches to supervision. Across the theoretical spectrum there is interest in 
distinguishing between counselling and supervision, in terms of both process and 
purpose. Bernard and Goodyear (1998), in their overview supervision text, 
acknowledged the similarities between counselling and supervision, while arguing 
for "specific preparation" (p.4) for the tasks of supervision, largely on the basis 
that supervision requires one primarily to be a good educator: the skills required 
of the supervisor are the skills of education, rather than those of counselling. 
Editing a psychoanalytic collection, Shipton suggested that "supervision occupies 
a different space from therapy but it cannot be understood without being 
contrasted to it" (1997, p.144). Haber (1996) offered an integrative, multi-modal 
account of supervision, tracing his own professional lineage through a range of 
models of therapy. Writing in the context of postmodern family therapy, Gardner, 
Bobele, and Biever suggested that the proposal made by some writers that 
supervision is an isomorph of counselling does not hold up because "supervision 
is not therapy" (1997, p.224, original emphasis). They suggested that while both 
practices aim at change the goals are different: that in postmodern supervision the 
focus is the therapeutic relationship rather than the person of the counsellor. They 
argued, too, that while in postmodern therapy there is an assumption that clients 
are experts on their own lives, there is not the assumption in supervision that 
counsellors are experts on therapy. This latter point is echoed by Bernard and 
Goodyear (1998), who suggested in their summary of narrative supervision that 
trainees are just beginning to develop stories of "self-as-professional" while 
clients have well developed stories (p.22). I shall return to this point and critique 
it. However, I include it here as it contributes to the production of an account of 
supervision as a speciality, a separate profession even, that is distinct from 
counselling. By that account supervision involves a separate set of knowledges 
and practices (Carroll, 1996; Mcconkey, 1999; Todd & Storm, 1997b). In 
process and purpose, by this account, counselling and supervision differ. By this 
argument, counselling-model related models of supervision are no longer 
adequate. 
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Before locating this present study in relation with the trend away from 
counselling-model related approaches to supervision, I consider other phases in 
the history of supervision. 
Social role accounts 
Those accounts generally characterised in the supervision literature as social role 
models of supervision assume that we can talk about supervision by focusing on 
the roles the supervisor plays. The early work of Bernard (1979) suggested that 
the work of supervision is done through the roles of teaching, consulting, and 
counselling. The influence of this work continues to be visible in more recent 
work, albeit at times in the background (see Lowe & Guy, 1996, for example.) 
Kadushin (1976) named the functions of supervision (in social work) as 
managerial, educative, and supportive. Significantly, later work (Bradley, 1989, 
for example) adds evaluation to the list of supervision functions. Some 
contemporary accounts (Baretta-Herman, 2001, for example) continue to draw on 
and develop these early social role accounts, accounts that focus on the tasks and 
functions of supervision and on the roles that supervisors take on in the 
performance of these tasks as they lead the work of supervision. Social role 
accounts thus come out of a supervisor-focus. I will go on to argue in this chapter 
that this supervisor focus is a problematic aspect of these and other accounts of 
supervision. 
Developmental accounts 
The developmental metaphor has been particularly pervasive in supervision, 
having occupied the centre ground of U.S. supervision writing in the 1980s when 
a number of developmental models of supervision were proposed. Developmental 
accounts focus on the characteristics of counsellors in training and licensing 
processes as they progress from, as it is characterised in the developmental 
literature, neophyte to master counsellor. Developmental models describe typical 
trainee stages and the characteristics of trainees at those stages. On the basis of 
these descriptions a supervisor then assesses and makes appropriate interventions 
to facilitate counsellor progression between stages towards mature practice. 
Developmental models were proposed by Littrell, Lee-Borden, and Lorenz 
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(1979), Stoltenberg (1981), Loganbill, Hardy, and Delworth (1982), Blocher 
(1983), Stoltenberg and Delworth (1987). Loganbill et al.'s work was perhaps 
the most widely used of these resources in New Zealand: it was the central 
resource both in my university counsellor education programme and in my first 
counselling position in the Vocational Guidance Service. Drawing on 
developmental theory, Loganbill et al. proposed a three stage model: stagnation, 
confusion and integration. A counsellor might be assessed as functioning at any 
one of these stages, or in transition between them, in respect of eight aspects of 
practice: competence, emotional awareness, autonomy, identity, respect for 
individual difference, purpose and direction, personal motivation, and ethics. The 
supervisor might then call on a range of strategies: facilitative, conceptual , 
confrontive, prescriptive and catalytic interventions (p.32). This rather complex 
model has the advantage of conceptualising developmental stage across multiple 
areas of practice, thereby unsettling assumptions about linear developmental 
progression: a counsellor might be assumed to be at a stage of confusion 
regarding personal motivation while at integration in terms of respect for 
individual differences, for example. 
Developmental models were described by Bernard and Goodyear as "intuitively 
appealing" (1998, p.26): we take it for granted that there is a progression towards 
greater professional competence over time and with experience. However, they 
suggested, this intuitive appeal may lead to other accounts of supervision being 
overlooked. Holloway (1987), too, warned that the attractiveness of 
developmental models might distract the profession from rigorous investigation of 
those models and from investigation of alternative metaphors. She had suggested 
that developmental models emerged because of the inadequacy of clinical 
counselling models in explaining supervision and became "the zeitgeist of 
supervision thinking and research" (p.209) in the 1980s. However, she urged 
more caution about developmental models and more investigation of alternatives 
such as learning theory: teaching was one of the roles Bernard (1979) had 
described. In drawing attention to learning theory Holloway foreshadowed the 
emphasis of Carroll and others in the 1990s on an educational model of 
supervision. Worthington (1987) also pointed out deficiencies in developmental 
models, mentioning the lack of detail, of specificity of skills at various stages, and 
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of attention to the person of the supervisor, as well as a focus on stage, rather than 
on transitions between stages. Friedlander and Snyder's study of groups of trainee 
counsellors at various stages suggested that "individual differences override level 
of experience" (1983, p.348). Writing about postmodern models of family 
therapy supervision, Gardner et al (1997) noted the constraints and limitations of 
the descriptions of trainees at particular stages of development and of the 
modernist practice of grouping counsellors in supervision groups in terms of 
developmental level. The postmodern critique of general developmental theory 
offers support for Gardner et al.' s concern: this critique focuses on the 
individualising processes of developmental schema, and the impetus they provide 
for description to become normative and prescriptive and for their terms of 
reference to be naturalised (Burman, 1994 ). As well, the concern is supported by 
research findings that the developmental assumption of increased supervisory 
collegiality over the length of a supervisory relationship held true only for male 
counsellors (Granello, Beamish, & Davis, 1997). Clearly the "intuitive appeal" of 
the developmental metaphor also disguises some of its deficiencies. 
Despite critiques, however, the developmental metaphor continues to infuse much 
of the supervision literature. The metaphor of developmental progression is 
pervasive in everyday supervision talk - it has been naturalised - and in the 
literature. Some of its effects will be investigated further as this chapter 
continues, and in Chapter Four. 
Generic models 
The history of supervision has seen some general phases in which particular 
metaphors of supervision have been dominant: counselling model-related 
approaches, social role accounts, and developmental accounts. A fourth cluster 
has been predominant in counselling in the 1990s, these more recent accounts 
suggesting that other metaphors fail to explain or contain the professional practice 
of supervision and that broader accounts are needed. These generic accounts, 
offering what Holloway calls "the big picture" (1995, p.6) drew in particular on 
social role models. Holloway's and Carroll's combined and individual work 
exemplifies this fourth and important cluster of approaches. With their trans-
Atlantic collaboration, their work is both influential and well regarded. 
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Holloway's (1995) systems approach was derived from the dimensions of 
supervision that she saw as having arisen from "empirical, conceptual and practice 
knowledge bases of supervision" (p.7). Her model has at its centre the 
supervision relationship. Around that central core factor she placed other aspects 
of the supervisory system: the four contextual factors of the client, the trainee, the 
supervisor and the institution, along with two further factors, the tasks of 
supervision and the functions of supervision. Holloway's emphasis was on 
supervision as an instructional process. Holloway and Poulin suggested that 
Supervision is an instructional method that finds its origins in the 
apprenticeship approach to learning an art or a craft. (1995, p.245) 
Supervision thus is taken to involve a unidirectional transfer of knowledge from 
senior practitioner to a counsellor constructed in a more junior position as learner. 
Carroll advocated for an educational model: "education is more at the heart of 
supervision than counselling" (1996, p.27). He suggested that his model was 
"generic and integrative", connecting "the goals and purposes of supervision to 
the function and tasks/roles" (p.44 ). He described seven "generic" tasks of 
supervision: creating the learning relationship, the teaching task, the counselling 
task, monitoring professional/ethical issues, the evaluating task, the consultative 
task, the administrative task. A further argument Carroll made for a generic 
approach to supervision contrasted these multiple supervisor roles with the single 
roles supervisors tend to take up, he suggested, in "counselling-bound" 
approaches. A generic approach, argued both Holloway and Carroll, is applicable 
in different fields of human service work and in supervision with counsellors 
working across different modalities. His generic approach is "atheoretical", 
Carroll claimed (p.44). 
The question of 'fit' between counsellor and supervisor, in terms of practice 
modality has been a repeated theme in the supervision literature. Commenting on 
the matter of modality fit, Feltham and Dryden (1994) suggested that congruence 
between supervisor and counsellor orientation is helpful for trainees; Flintoff 
(1997) argued this position in a New Zealand setting in her study of students on 
our local Masters programme. Arguments for congruence are based on the 
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benefits for the counsellor of a shared rationale, shared language, and shared 
understanding of therapeutic process. Hawkins and Shohet suggested that 
"enough of a common language and belief system" ( 1991, p. 110) is needed for 
supervisor and counsellor to work together. However, they added that a 
supervisor from a different orientation may be alert to matters of which the 
counsellor's own orientation might not take account: the risk is that counselling-
linked approaches may be less open to what other perspectives could offer. 
Generic models are intended to overcome this problem, in offering an approach to 
supervision that produces supervision as a specialist practice in its own right, 
distinct from counselling in knowledge, practice, and purpose. 
In their critiques of earlier models, Holloway and Carroll emphasised the 
expansiveness of generic approaches. They suggested that "not many writings on 
supervision stress the contextual issues that impact on the work with clients on the 
one hand and on the work with supervisees as counsellors on the other" (1999, 
pp.2-3). They attributed this deficit to the problems of an individually oriented 
perspective. Their edited volume was, they said, intended to contribute to "an 
often overlooked dimension - the context" (p.3). Their solution to the 
overlooking, they wrote, was to add on "organizational factors" to an 
"individually oriented perspective" (p.3). However, it is my argument that in 
writing about context in this way, as "often over-looked", Carroll and Holloway 
show evidence of the limitation of the epistemological position of their models: 
for if context can be overlooked it is somehow not necessarily always present. 
For a social constructionist the social is always present: we do not exist outside 
the discursive practices in which we locate ourselves. As I read Carroll's and 
Holloway's work, it seems to overlook acknowledgement of the theory of 
knowledge on which it is based: they do not make clear what might be called the 
paradigm-locatedness of generic models of supervision. Generic models are 
themselves at risk of being "limited" and "bound", as Carroll and Holloway 
claimed counselling model-related approaches are: generic models are limited by 
their own paradigm-locatedness in ways that neither author acknowledges. Any 
model is paradigm located, I suggest, and thus limited and located. This is not a 
problem in itself, but it is of concern to me that in their claims for expansiveness 
of generic approaches Carroll and Holloway do not acknowledge this important 
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matter. I do not agree with Carroll's claim that his model is atheoretical, applying 
"across counselling orientations" (1996, p.44). There are many examples in his 
work that give evidence of his work being theoretically located and thus 
producing different accounts of reality than those I work with. Arguments for 
cross-theoretical approaches give the appearance of assuming that although 
"counselling-bound" models are limited generic approaches are all-encompassing. 
This, I suggest, may not be the case. I shall take a particular example to illustrate 
my concern about this stance. 
Holloway used an extract from a supervision conversation to illustrate one of her 
four "contextual factors", the institutional factor of agency clientele ( 1995, 
pp.100-104). She suggested that the location of the agency in a university setting 
where students get course credit for being clients was a factor in the supervision. 
I agree with her claim. However, I do not think that the developmental 
description and conceptualising that were then assumed are generic. As the 
example was told, the counsellor began by indicating that she was uncertain about 
what to do as the client had said she had no problems but had come for the course 
credit. As the supervision conversation continued the counsellor offered just the 
following information about the client's background, reported here in the 
counsellor's words: 
the client is a volunteer from a college course on interviewing; 
the client was living with her folks but wasn't entirely happy about it. She 
has a boyfriend she has been seeing for about 6 months and going home to 
her parents every night is not very convenient; 
she is afraid to bring up moving out to her parents. She doesn't want to be 
ungrateful and actually has a pretty good deal ... free rent and board. So 
it's sort of complicated, I think, but she says it will take care of itself; 
she's 19 and will be 20 in April; 
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With just this much information, the supervisor was able to name the client as 
having a "developmental issue of separating from her parents" and the counsellor 
was asked to consider how this counselling might be approached as having a 
developmental focus. This supervisor response belongs in a particular paradigm, 
one that accepts a supervisor's authority to speak in this way about a client on the 
basis of little information; and one that on the basis of little information assumes 
the authority of a developmental discourse to recommend separation from parents 
as an appropriate goal for a young adult. The systems model is taking account of 
context in considering the institutional factor of the location of the counselling 
clinic where the trainee counsellor was working. However, as it is used here the 
model is also limited, from my perspective, by some theoretical assumptions that 
are not made explicit in the example. While the context is taken into account, it is 
taken into account on the basis of assumptions that are not universally held to be 
true. The assumptions, both of the authority-to-diagnose-on-little-information and 
of the authority to-recommend-on-the-basis-of-a-developmental-discourse, offer a 
reading that locates this example in particular discourses of both counselling and 
supervision. Within these discourses there is an assumption that meanings are 
given rather than being available for making, and that the supervisor is to name 
the given meanings. As I read this instance of practice I am positioned in a 
different set of discursive practices than those re-produced in the Holloway 
example. I am reminded of Anderson and Goolishian's warning from a 
Collaborative Language perspective that "the more quickly a therapist understands 
people, the less opportunity there is for dialogue" (1988, p.382). Although a "big 
picture" (Holloway, 1995, p.6) systems approach is at work it nonetheless works 
in ways that are paradigm-located: quick understanding rather than dialogue 
appears to have been privileged. Holloway's model itself is at some risk of 
cutting out of the picture possibilities for supervision. Yet this is the charge that 
Holloway offered to counselling-related approaches. Holloway's claim that 
counselling-related models reflect "parochialism" (p.4 ), because they do not 
consider knowledge from related disciplines such as developmental, educational 
and social psychology - that is they lack theoretical breadth - might well be made 
of any approach that does not recognise the constraints and limits of its own 
terms. 
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Supervision and epistemology 
I suggest that there is a theory of knowledge, an epistemological position, present 
but generally unacknowledged in all of the accounts of supervision available to us. 
In proposing constructionist approaches in supervision I have worked at the same 
time to learn from the work of Holloway and Carroll, and others, and also produce 
a version of supervision that gives an account of its own locatedness. I am not 
seeking a for-all-purposes version of supervision, but rather a particular local 
version that is overtly located in constructionist epistemology. In working to 
produce a constructionist account I am mindful of Weingarten' s ( 1997) approach 
in writing: she declared her interest in offering an account that might be placed 
alongside other accounts, rather than replacing or displacing those accounts. My 
interest in speaking of epistemological difference is not to establish primacy of 
one account over another. Rather, I hope to establish points of difference and of 
interconnection that open space for new possibilities to be spoken, and for 
epistemological-locatedness to be acknowledged in supervision. For in speaking 
about supervision, or in supervision, about the ethics and effectiveness of our 
counselling work, counsellors and supervisors inevitably traffick in epistemology 
talk. We traffick in epistemology talk whether that talk is at the surface of our 
conversation and writing, or in the subtext, in the gaps between the words. I am 
interested in producing a version of supervision that acknowledges 
epistemological position. Holloway expressed her hope that her text would offer 
"dialogue about supervision that anchors the conversation in the knowledge of 
science and the intuition of practice" (1995, p.181). I, too, have hopes for 
dialogue: for the terms of our scientific projects must be negotiated if the 
dialogue Holloway sought is to take place. 
Where Holloway claimed that relationship is "the core factor" (1995, p.43) in 
supervision, I argue that paradigm-locatedness, that epistemology, sits alongside 
relationship as the medium around which the supervision process is negotiated. 
For it is in paying attention to epistemology that we pay attention to forms of 
relation (Griffith & Griffith, 1992), as this thesis goes on to demonstrate. In the 
Holloway example referred to above, the prescriptive authority of the supervisor, 
based in a particular theory of knowledge and approach to practice, produced a 
Chapter Three 56 
particular kind of supervisor-counsellor relation. A discourse of supervision as 
instructional method produced the supervisor in a position of authority over the 
counsellor's practice and over the client's developmental and counselling needs. 
The epistemological position produced the form of their relation. 
The relationship's the thing- or is it? 
Holloway (1995) is not alone in positing relationship as central to supervision. 
Shohet and Wilmot (1991) suggested that the supervisory relationship is the "key 
issue" in supervision; Kaiser (1997) devoted a whole book to the supervision 
relationship; Anderson and Swim (1995) argued for collaboration; Bernard and 
Goodyear (1998) suggested that the relationship is the most critical aspect of 
supervision. Carroll (1995) offered a number of examples of metaphors, drawn 
from his research, to describe the supervision relationship including the familial, 
psychodynamic metaphor suggesting that "grandmother/mother/baby is like the 
supervisor/counsellor/client" (1996, p.54). Not surprisingly, he commented that 
none of the metaphors offered is "adequate", but that there is clearly a "hybridity" 
to the counsellor-supervisor relationship. 
I think that there is much that is problematic about the ways in which the 
supervision relationship has been conceived. Bird's (1993) work on therapeutic 
relationships opened a particular door for me in thinking about the supervision 
relationship. Bird claimed that the therapeutic relationship "has been constructed, 
interpreted and maintained by one side of the relationship, the therapist's" and she 
suggested that "it is time to bring the therapeutic relationship out of the closet" 
(p.48). I suggest that the same claim could be made about the supervision 
relationship, that it has been "constructed, maintained and interpreted" by only 
one side of the relationship, the supervisor's (Crocket & McKenzie, 1996). 
Despite the quest of contributors such as Anderson and Swim (1995) for 
collaborative approaches to supervision, there is considerable evidence of 
unilateral construction. I consider here, in particular, two aspects of this evidence, 
firstly by paying attention to language form, and secondly to literary form 
(Crocket, 1999). 
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The history of my own preference for speaking of the partners in supervision as 
counsellor and supervisor (Crocket & McKenzie, 1996; Crocket, 1999) predates 
my encounter with narrative approaches to therapy, which I now use to theorise 
my preference, and to interrogate the relational pattern offered by the alternate 
pairing and form, supervisor-supervisee. I am not unaware that supervisee is a 
term familiar through the supervision literature that comes out of North America. 
It is embedded in state licensing regulations for counsellors, and is situated in a 
culture of supervisors having legal liability for the counselling work of those with 
whom they engage in supervision relationships. These phenomena construct 
supervision and the supervision relationship in ways that may seem to be 
unassailable, but are not outside scrutiny particularly in a New Zealand context. 
The familiar grammatical form constructs a particular supervision relationship: the 
grammatical form of the word supervisee offers a position in relationship that 
construes the counsellor as subjected, as the one acted upon. A supervisor 
supervises and a supervisee is supervised. The language form, supervisee, posits 
the holder of that position as an object of the supervisor's practice. And yet, it is 
the counsellor's work as a professional that brings them to supervision. A 
supervisee is positioned differently from a counsellor: a position from which to 
engage actively and responsibly in producing effective and ethical practice is less 
accessible to a supervisee than to a counsellor. A supervisee is hailed (Parker, 
1991) as, and offered a speaking position as, a person who is different from the 
person hailed as a therapist or a counsellor. For counsellor agency is obscured 
when a therapist or counsellor becomes a supervisee in relation with a supervisor 
in participating in supervision. The counsellor is produced as the object of the 
sentence, the done to person, rather than a doing person. In the obscuring of the 
counsellor's agency, the position of responsible professional practitioner becomes 
less accessible to the counsellor. For a supervisee is grammatically positioned to 
have their identity "authored for them" rather than to author themselves (Candlin, 
1997, p.xi). These language practices are not neutral: they reproduce particular 
relations of power (Parker, 1991, p.18). The reciprocal positions of supervisor 
and supervisee and produced by and reproduce a discourse of supervisor 
responsibility, a discourse that is then enacted at the institutional, professional 
level and at the level of local, particular supervision relationships. The terms on 
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which we speak about the partners in the supervision relationship thus raise 
fundamental questions about the supervision relationship, what the profession 
expects of it, and how we will each produce and reproduce it. 
From my position outside the restraints of the U.S. counsellor licensing system, I 
note Anderson's and Swim's (1995) continued use of the grammatical form of the 
word supervisee. They continued this usage despite their moves from positivist, 
instrumental therapies towards collaborative therapies situated in post-modem 
ideas, therapies that depend on the idea that we are constituted by language, and 
despite their quest for collaborative approaches to supervision. I argue that the 
language form offers a positioning antithetical to the emphasis on subjectivity and 
on bringing forward possibilities for collaboration associated with the practices of 
which Anderson and Swim wrote. 
But my concerns about the one-sided construction of the supervision relationship 
do not end here, with the matter of language forms, for there is also the matter of 
literary form. As a counsellor educator, responsible for working with counselling 
students in their preparation to engage (some for the first time) with supervisors in 
the community, I had struggled to find contributions from the literature that 
addressed the counsellor. I looked for material that engaged with counsellors in 
the matter of counsellor subjectivity in supervision, that might support counsellors 
to consider the positionings available to them in supervision. Overwhelmingly I 
encountered a literature that spoke to supervisors about supervision; there was 
little addressed to the counsellor. While Anderson and Swim (1995) entitled their 
article, Supervision as collaborative conversation: Connecting the voices of 
supervisor and supervisee, the restraints to collaboration were again visible, in 
that, while supervisee (sic) voices were present to represent their supervisory 
experiences, those voices were included to address those on the "other side" of the 
supervisory relationship, to illuminate the work and stance of the supervisor. 
Counsellor voices were included, but not to speak of their positionings and 
experiences of those positions in ca-constructing supervisory relationships and 
practices. Their voices were used to illuminate the contribution of supervisors to 
what seems like rich and satisfying supervision, but not to make visible the 
contribution of counsellors to that supervision. In this way, it seems that what 
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counsellors have to say is somehow mediated by the position of supervisor, that 
they are positioned as responding, commenting on and evaluating. This in itself is 
not problematic. Indeed, to consult in this way creates a considerable shift in 
power relations at the level of the local supervision relationship. However, at the 
same time the effect of the focus on the supervisor, I suggest, is to privilege 
supervisor knowledge about supervision, and to position supervisors as very much 
the senior producers of supervision. Again, it could be argued that this is not 
necessarily problematic. However, I believe that these discursive conditions, 
where supervisees have been invited to make visible the supervisors' contribution 
to collaborative supervision but not their own contribution, leave therapists and 
counsellors positioned as not-knowing about the practice of constructing 
collaborative supervision. They thus remain positioned as junior authors, not 
necessarily of their therapy practice, but certainly within the supervision 
partnership and its work. The question, to whom is the supervision literature 
addressed, is answered similarly across a wide range of literature I reviewed with 
this question in mind. 
Consider, for example, Todd and Storm's major supervision text in the marrriage 
and family therapy area, with its inscription, "To all the supervisors and 
supervisors-in-training we have worked with, who have convinced us that there is 
still much to be learned about supervision" (1997a, p.v); and Bernard and 
Goodyear's offer of a "review of the clinical supervision field in a way that will be 
equally useful to the student of supervision and to the supervision practitioner" 
(1998, p.xii). These are two major texts on supervision, yet neither of them 
addresses the side of the supervision relationship that is the counsellor. Even 
when the voices of supervisees (sic) are present, in Todd (1997) for example, it is 
to advise supervisors rather than to address therapists. This practice is not 
confined to the literature from North America. In the U.K., Feltham and Dryden 
(1994) headed each subsection in a chapter entitled Creating a supervisory 
alliance with an instruction to the supervisor. In positioning the supervisor as the 
recipient of their instruction, these authors invoked a discourse of supervision 
where the creation of a supervisory alliance is a unilateral action on the part of a 
supervisor. In the terms of this discourse the counsellor is relegated to the 
margins of supervision, and possibilities of a co-constructed supervision 
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relationship are obscured. Given the emphasis of the literature on unilaterally 
constructed supervision, it would not be surprising that Carroll reported that 
supervisees (sic) were "very ignorant" about what to expect from supervision, and 
"fitted in" with supervisors' expectations (1996, p.40). If a counsellor is to use 
supervision to support their development and practice as an ethical and effective 
counselling professional, it is reasonable that they might be offered some thoughts 
about how they, too, might participate in creating a supervisory alliance. There 
are, in my view, real possibilities that the creation and maintenance of a 
supervisory alliance might be produced as a two-sided, two-professional process. 
There is of course never only one story, and there are exceptions to the story I am 
telling. Inskipp and Proctor (1993) addressed counsellors, in the first part of a 
two-part publication on supervision, noting that they had found themselves unable 
to write for supervisors until they had written for counsellors. Carroll noted the 
importance of supervisees having "some training" in being supervisees so that 
they have appropriate skills and knowledge to use supervision well, but he did not 
suggest what that training might be (1996, pp.90-91). Webb and Wheeler (1998) 
suggested that counsellors need to be supported to use supervision effectively, in 
particular in disclosing sensitive issues. Greater willingness to disclose concerns 
and clearer understandings about supervision were reported as effects of limited 
role induction for trainees (Bahrick, Russell, & Salmi, 1991 ). A brief review of 
her own experience as a supervisee is offered by Moore (1991), although in the 
same volume Shohet and Wilmot, in a chapter on the supervisory relationship, 
wrote only of the supervisor's responsibilities. 
How might it be explained, this extended absence of the counsellor/therapist from 
the literature about supervision? While the literature might describe them, and 
give advice about what to do to them or with them, it for the most part does not 
address them or have them make visible their understanding of their part in 
constructing the supervision partnership. 
Further, what are the implications of this absence in the supervision literature of a 
dialogical voice that speaks with a present counsellor (rather than for an absent 
one)? What now becomes visible in the discourse of professional supervision? 
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What are the effects on the supervision relationship and the work of supervision of 
a literature that positions the supervisor as overwhelmingly responsible for the 
constructing of the supervision relationship? 
A text entitled Supervisory relationships: Exploring the human element might 
lead a reader to expect the addressing of the therapist as partner in supervision. 
However, even from this text the counsellor is absent, while supervisors to whom 
the text is addressed read, are told, "As supervisees grow, they often become 
clearer about what they want in supervision" (Kaiser 1997, p. 90). Similarly 
Carroll reported his findings that "supervisees are very passive vis-a-vis 
supervision" (1996, p.92). I wonder how would it not be difficult for counsellors 
to be sure about what they want in supervision when they are mostly positioned in 
the literature as absent, or as objects to be moved or shifted, developed, 
monitored, grown, or collaborated with. My point is that counsellors are not 
offered a subjective position in the construction of supervision literature: the 
discourse practices by which we language supervision do not construct 
counsellors as agentive or knowing subjects. 
Perhaps the absence of the therapist as dialogical partner from supervision texts 
can be explained by therapists having been introduced to supervision in general 
introductory counselling texts. Perhaps, it is in learning about counselling 
practice that counsellors are also introduced to supervision practice. However, 
some examples of general counselling texts suggest such an explanation has little 
credence. For instance Egan (1994) contains no reference to supervision at all, 
while McLeod (1998) reproduces Frideman and Kaslow's (1986) stage model and 
Hawkins and Shohet's (1989) process model, but presents no discussion that might 
offer a therapist some ideas about taking a subjective subject position in 
supervision. Bahrick, Russell, and Salmi (1991) noted that training programmes 
do not tend to prepare counselling students for supervision. General family 
therapy texts do not tend to offer anything better than counselling texts: Nichols 
and Schartz's (1995) volume, described in Minuchin's foreword as "the definitive 
textbook of family therapy" (p.xiv), contains no mention of supervision. In an 
example of a counselling text from the New Zealand context, Manthei (1997) pays 
rather more attention to supervision than other texts I have considered here. 
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Indeed, some of his text reads as though counsellors are positioned as his 
audience: "How does one find a supervisor who will meet one's needs?" asks a 
subhead (p.140). 
I am left with what I think are some very important questions. What is it 
counsellors do in the construction of the supervision relationship and how might 
we make that more visible, not just in each individual supervision relationship, but 
in the style and the content of the literature and theory that supports professional 
practice? What might be the effects of promoting conditions that call both 
partners in supervision into positions of moral agency and authority in the 
supervision itself, and in the literature that supports it? And are such conditions 
desirable? Does our profession want to construct supervision as being relationally 
productive of ethical practice? 
These questions help open the spaces in which I can begin to articulate a 
constructionist account of supervision, for, together with the discussion of the 
literature I am offering, they point to significant aspects of the discursive practice 
of supervision which have had little attention as supervision has been theorised. 
They produce further questions that help locate my interests. 
What knowledges about supervision are useful for counsellors to have? Must they 
learn them in apprenticeship-style in the supervision room? Or are there some 
stories to be told and accounts to be given that could position therapists, including 
those new to the field, as agentive in co-constructing supervision, without such an 
opportunity being dependent only upon the supervisor's offer of a collaborative 
position? I am thinking of stories and accounts that do not merely address a 
general audience of professional therapists in the neutral tone of some accounts of 
supervision but that invite counsellors into responsible authority as partners in 
superv1s10n. 
Ongoing exploration of the positionings the literature offers supervisor and 
counsellor in the supervision relation gives evidence of further restraints on 
counsellor subjectivity. Haber's suggestion that "the supervisor, then, is a 
necessary vehicle to help the trainee develop an effective, clear, diverse, and 
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creative professional identity" (1996, p.37) again points to the supervisor, rather 
than the supervision, the two-person relationship, as the vehicle for the production 
of professional identity. Further, supervision is thus constructed as unidirectional: 
it is always the counsellor who is to learn from the supervisor. In a New Zealand 
context, Matthews (1981, quoted in Hermansson, 1999, p.62) as President of 
NZAC suggested that "accountability is achieved in two complementary ways: by 
the receiving of regular supervision and by ACTIVE participation in professional 
matters" [original emphasis]. While it might be understandable that Matthews, at 
that time the president of a professional association, would have been encouraging 
active participation in the association, I am more interested to notice the contrast 
here between the emphasis on active participation in professional matters and the 
passive being in receipt of supervision. To receive supervision is to hold a 
grammatically different position than to participate actively in supervision, or in 
professional matters. Manthei (1997), too, reproduced this form: his text heads 
the section on supervision, "Receiving regular supervision" (p.136). I argue that a 
supervision discourse that produces a counsellor as receiving supervision, is likely 
to be a supervisor-centred supervision, and thus one that reproduces the counsellor 
passivity that Kaiser (1997), Carroll (1996) and others were concerned about. 
Through this section I have argued that particular aspects of the literature 
construct the supervision relationship in particular ways. The pairing of the 
grammatical form supervisor-supervisee constructs a relationship where the 
counsellor is in a subjected position. I argue that the absence of counsellors from 
the supervision literature other than as subjected subjects, to be developed by 
supervisors, limits the possibilities for producing counsellors as moral agents in 
their counselling work. Again I make the point that the purpose of supervision is 
to produce counsellors who are responsible for their own ethical practice. I prefer 
to language supervision in ways that make positions of responsible professional 
accessible to counsellors. I argue that appropriate grammatical forms and rich 
storying that includes the counsellor in accounts of the supervision relationship 
will enhance the work of supervision in producing counsellors as effective and 
ethical workers in their counselling practices. 
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However, the discourse of supervisor responsibility and an accompanying 
unilateral construction of the supervision relationship dominate the supervision 
literature. Carroll (1996) cautioned about transferring research conclusions from 
the U.S.A. (where most of the research has been done) to the U.K., and 
McConkey called for a "genuine New Zealand version of the discipline" (1999, 
p.82) of supervision. I believe that the NZAC Codes offer significant opportunity 
to produce some local accounts that are distinguished from those I have described 
here. In positioning counsellors in the subjective subject position in sentences, 
these Codes provide important strategies for the rich storying by counsellors who 
occupy positions other than at the margins of supervision. There are other 
distinguishing features of counselling and supervision in New Zealand that have 
implications for local versions of supervision. The next chapter goes on to 
consider further some of these distinguishing features. 
The work of this chapter 
In this chapter I provided a selective overview of the supervision literature, 
focusing on that which is best known in professional counselling in New Zealand. 
Having drawn attention to key aspects of supervision, I suggested that supervision 
practice is shaped by a discourse of supervisor responsibility. This discourse is 
pervasive, influencing even those professional settings where alternative accounts 
are available. NZAC Codes, for example, place responsibility upon the counsellor 
for monitoring their counselling work in supervision, not upon the supervisor. I 
briefly reviewed the history of supervision, placing this project in contrast with 
the most recent move in the field towards generic models of supervision. I argued 
that generic models do not adequately account for the epistemological positions 
that practice produces and that produce practice. I went on to investigate the 
supervision relationship, thus demonstrating some implications of the theoretical 
position I am taking in this thesis. This deconstructing reading of the supervision 
relationship opens possibilities for supervision to be produced otherwise than a 
discourse of supervisor responsibility would have it. Co-construction offers 
different possibilities for the supervision relationship than unilateral construction. 
I argued that given that the purpose of supervision is to ensure the production of 
ethical and effective counselling practice, this purpose will be well served by 
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those discursive practices that position counsellors well to be moral agents in the 
production of their counselling practice. 
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Chapter Four 
Situating supervision, in New Zealand, and in the psy complex 
To live as an autonomous individual, you must learn new techniques for 
understanding and practicing upon yourself. (Rose, 1998, p.17) 
This chapter further situates my approach to the study of supervision in a critical 
orientation. Firstly the chapter considers supervision in New Zealand, noting further 
aspects of the professional context that are particular to New Zealand. It then turns to 
a discussion of the psy-complex (Rose, 1989; 1991; 1998) and the self-regulation 
produced by the psy disciplines, and considers the implications of this theory for the 
professional practice of supervision. I argue that the self regulation and self-scrutiny 
that legitimise claims for professional status are not unproblematic activities. Turning 
again to aspects of the local profession, the chapter then draws attention to the acts of 
governance which NZAC, in particular, appears to want to use supervision for. I 
conclude that a postmodern version of counselling supervision will take account of 
the strategies of self and other governance in which supervision is implicated. The 
final task of the chapter is to locate this current work in relation with commentaries on 
postmodern supervision practice. 
Some further particulars of the local setting 
The NZAC Code of Supervision encourages supervisors to pursue research into 
supervision (NZAC Handbook, 2000). However, a review of local counselling-
related publications (Manthei & Miller, 1991) identified no published counselling 
supervision research in New Zealand and there has been none since that date. 
Unpublished material includes Flintoff' s (1997) masters dissertation which 
investigated the supervision experiences of students in our Waikato programme, and 
an MPhil thesis in the social policy and social work area (O'Donoghue, 1999). 
O'Donoghue's study investigated the perspectives of probation officers and service 
managers in the Community Probation Service. Under the auspices of the Winston 
Churchill Memorial Trust McConkey visited supervision trainers in the U.K. In his 
report, McConkey commented on the New Zealand context: 
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Supervision needs attention. It needs to be talked about, examined, read about 
and understood. Our own historical development of supervision requires 
researching and documenting, so that a genuine New Zealand-based version of 
the discipline is developed, rather than merely 'transplanting' something from 
the northern hemisphere (1999, p.82). 
In this way, McConkey's report supported the claims I had made in my doctoral 
research proposal that the local supervision context should be studied. Bunce, too, 
had pointed out that the cultural context of counselling in New Zealand is distinctive, 
arguing that "it seems timely to examine overseas research more critically, to assess 
its relevance and applicability within the current New Zealand setting" (1992, p.2). 
An overview of the supervision literature offers much opportunity for such an 
assessment, and to note particular distinctions. 
Much of the North American literature on supervision focuses on the supervision of 
counselling students at masters or doctoral level (Bahrick, Russell, & Salmi, 1991; 
Friedlander, 1983; Kurpius, Gibson, Lewis & Corbet, 1992; Morran, 1995; Olk & 
Friedlander, 1992; Pitts, 1992; Swanson & O'Saben, 1993). Glidden and Tracey's 
(1992) study of supervisory dimensions drew on a pool of supervisors with an average 
of nine years post-doctoral experience. Such a group stands in contrast with the pool 
of supervisors available to masters students here in Hamilton. Students in our local 
context are supervised by practitioners in the community: much of the U.S. research 
literature appears to draw on the work of faculty supervisors who also carry 
responsibility for assessing students' work, and of doctoral students supervising 
masters students. In their collaboration, Ronnestad (Norway) and Skovholt (U.S.) 
(1993) wrote about a quite different research scene where "supervision research is 
carried out by student researchers studying student supervisors supervising student 
counsellors working with student clients" (p.396), and of a different pool of 
practitioners, "senior practitioners with twenty to forty years experience" (p.398): 
such complexities are not available in most New Zealand contexts. As well, in the 
contexts described in the U.S. literature, supervision tends to include the acquisition 
of skills. When I began this study I believed that it was the expectation in the 
profession here in New Zealand that supervision focused more on the application of 
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skills: locally supervision had more to do with practice and less to do with training. 
In the intervening period, I think the field has shifted and I no longer confidently 
make this claim. Importantly, as I pointed out in Chapter Three, supervisors in this 
country are not legally liable for the work of those counsellors with whom they 
supervise, nor have they had the same gate-keeping role as in the U.S.A. (Todd & 
Storm, 1997, p.3). King and Wheeler (1999) found that in the UK there are many 
versions of how much responsibility supervisors have. Without legal tests the 
situation in New Zealand is perhaps somewhat ambiguous, but there is no codified 
requirement for supervisors to take responsibility for the work of those they supervise. 
While the North American focus on the supervision of trainees means that most of the 
supervision research has focused on this particular group - counsellors in training- in 
New Zealand the profession has tended to follow the British practice of supervision 
continuing after training, as a regular aspect of a counsellor's practice. For members 
of both NZAC and BAC, supervision throughout a counsellor's career is a 
requirement of membership. A sense that this requirement is not generally accepted 
has appeared in the U.K. literature only recently (Feltham, 2000). Cantwell and 
Holmes ( 1995) wrote of the "realisation that supervision is not just for beginning 
therapists but part of the life of any responsible practitioner" (p.35), a realisation that 
at that time was not new in a New Zealand context. In that context, Manthei (1981) 
claimed that "on-going supervision of practising school counsellors is now widely 
recognised as both desirable and essential to the development and maintenance of 
effective guidance services" (p.40), and Hermansson (1981) suggested that 
supervision "is fundamental to practice, especially in the early stages of doing 
counselling work" (p.267). 
Despite these assertions and a familiar assumption by counselling professionals in 
New Zealand that supervision functions as "the profession's chosen assurance of 
quality and ethical practice" (Proctor, 1994, p.309), we know little about the manner 
in which supervision happens in this counselling community. I suggest that, given the 
distinct professional culture and the lack of local research, we urgently need more 
than the good faith with which practitioners offer, seek and provide supervision, 
amidst a rapidly changing professional culture that is making increasing demands on 
supervision. Over recent years supervision has come to be much more visible, in 
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NZAC newsletters for example, and has been increasingly implicated in governance 
processes in the Association. I trace some of those instances that are documented in 
order to notice the discursive conditions of this study. 
Professionalisation and professional self-regulation 
At this point, I return to Rose's notion of the psy complex, introduced briefly in 
Chapter Two, in order to use it to support my investigation of supervision, both the 
"grand narratives" of the international counselling professions, and the local 
expressions of those narratives. The psy complex is that group of psychology-derived 
disciplines that Rose (1989, 1991, 1998) suggested offers individuals the self-
management techniques needed for life in the modem world. Rose suggested that 
psychology has come to offer the individual "precise ways of inspecting oneself, 
accounting for oneself, and working upon oneself in order to realize one's potential, 
gain happiness, and exercise one's autonomy". Psychology has done this through "a 
range of psychotherapies that aspire to enabling humans to live as free individuals 
through subordinating themselves to a form of therapeutic authority" (1998, p.17). In 
the Foucaultian tradition this is "disciplinary power": modem subjects are enjoined to 
subordinate ourselves, through examination and confession, to the authority of the 
accounts of personhood the psy disciplines offer us. 
My interest is in what Rose's ideas about the psy-complex might mean for 
professional supervision. If therapy is understood to work in this self-regulatory 
manner, offering autonomy on the basis of subordination, what might it mean if the 
same lens is focused on supervision? Using the notion of the psy-complex, 
supervision could be understood to function as a technology to which counsellors 
"freely" submit, a site at which through inspection, accountability, and self-work 
counsellors produce themselves as ethical practitioners and autonomous professionals. 
Supervision may thus be constructed as a site of confession and examination. 
While it might seem that a thesis that is concerned with the practice of counselling 
supervision might do what the great bulk of the literature does, and take for granted 
the professional practice context, the postmodern positioning of this thesis creates 
fissures where such assumptions might otherwise comfortably lie. Such fissures make 
room for questions about professional practice, professionalism, and 
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professionalisation to arise. When counsellor and supervisor are understood to be 
decentred participants in a discourse rather than "sovereign" professionals (Luke, 
1999), we need to ask more about the discourses of professionalism that produce such 
subjects. When texts are understood as "simultaneously representing reality, enacting 
social relations, and establishing identities" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9), we need to 
interrogate the discourse practices of the counselling profession (local and 
international) that produce and are produced by professional supervision and 
professional self-regulation. Narrative therapy works to interrogate the discourses 
which position clients problematically in the world: thus it disturbs the limiting and 
disabling effects of normative judgement. I argue for the extension of this 
interrogation into the domain of professional practice and, in particular, into 
supervision. For supervision is a technology by which counsellors maintain ourselves 
as professionals. 
Everyday professional talk abounds with many assumptions about what it means to be 
a professional. "That's what being a professional is about" is a phrase often heard in 
the context of professional talk, to do with willingness to examine one's actions and 
take responsibility for one's actions. For counsellors in New Zealand participation in 
supervision is a mark of being professional. But what are we calling on, when 
counsellors make this claim that we are professionals? How does the claim to 
professionalism position us? What are the effects of being positioned in a discourse 
of professionalism? 
Abbott and Wallace (1990) suggested that the professions originating from medieval 
universities - law, medicine, and the clergy - have come to provide the measure for 
claims to professional status. According to trait theories, which describe these 
measures, members of professions "own" particular expert knowledge, acquired 
through scientific study; entrance to membership is monitored; an ethic of service 
and altruism prevails; claims to autonomy are made on the basis of self-policed 
standards (Abbott & Wallace, 1990; Ramprogus, 1995). Such descriptions align with 
popular understanding of the nature of the professions. Developmental theories 
(Caplow, 1966; Miller 1994) describe a staged set of events that produce a group's 
claim to professional status, from founding a professional organisation, through 
developing a code of ethics, to seeking public recognition in the form of legislative 
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protection. Similar themes emerge from each of these theories: closed membership, 
autonomy and self-monitoring, protection for members. Abbott and Wallace point 
out that "'professional' in modem, capitalist societies is generally a term of approval" 
(1990, p.7) and that "to claim to be a profession is to suggest independence, autonomy 
and control over work" (p.7). In the context of this project I have a particular interest 
in the matters of autonomy and self-monitoring. For, as explained in Chapter Three, 
in New Zealand the profession's claims to autonomy and self-monitoring depend, to a 
significant extent, upon supervision as an assurance of effective and ethical practice. 
"I believe that the fundamental building block of our accountability process is good 
supervision for all members" (Grant, 1995, p.16). Supervision is a technology by 
which the counselling profession claims to police standards of practice in relation 
with its stated code of ethics: thus it claims to protect both its members and the 
public. 
Autonomy and self-scrutiny are the conditions of being in which Rose and other 
commentators working in the Foucaultian traditions have taken a particular interest. 
My interest here is in the question of the implications, for those of us who profess to 
be counsellors, of the intersecting of two discourses. On the one hand this 
interdiscursive moment is produced by the discourse of professionalism, and in 
particular autonomy and self-monitoring. Disturbing that discourse is another 
produced by the understandings of the role of disciplinary power that these 
commentators have offered. Attention has been given to the ways the disciplines 
regulate the general populace, but what of those of us who work as professionals 
within the disciplines, who are not immune from, nor outside of the effects of, the 
disciplines of which we are part? Given this notion of the regulatory function of the 
disciplines, it seems to me that the combination of professional self-monitoring, and 
the inevitable regulation by the disciplines, might have professionals particularly 
caught in webs of self-scrutiny. 
My argument is that as counselling professionals we are not just complicit in the psy 
disciplines that serve to regulate the populace at large. We are also, ourselves, 
subjected to such regulation twice over, firstly as citizens and secondly, and no less 
keenly, as counselling practitioners. For self-monitoring is foundational to 
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professionalism and is the basis of the counselling profession's claim that supervision 
offers quality assurance of counselling practice. 
The irony is that professional autonomy and self-monitoring are much cherished. 
"Regulate ourselves or be regulated," declared the cover of the Australia and New 
Zealand Journal of Family Therapy (1997), signalling an article that argued, "if 
counselling and psychotherapy don't choose to regulate their own practice, that 
practice will be regulated by government from above" (Cantwell, 1997, p.166). In 
New Zealand, warnings about the dangers of the dictates of third party funders and 
the inherent threat to professional autonomy were offered by Miller (1994). 
"Counselling can only ever be safe in the hands of a self-regulating autonomous 
professional," argued Webb (1998, p.13). She went on to examine the effects for 
counselling professionals in New Zealand of wider socio-political and economic 
developments, suggesting that the strategies of New Right managerialism in our 
country "disable systems of care". She advised that professional counsellors need to 
keep noticing the influences on us of the ways of thinking, such as "the promotion of 
personal responsibility" (p.13), advanced by these politics. While Webb warned of 
the "high-jacking of our own concepts" (p.15) as New Right influence gained 
momentum, I suggest that it might be wise to take Webb's warning further: we 
cannot take for granted that the system of care that is professional supervision stands 
apart from the disabling strategies to which she referred. As I will show shortly, 
moves in the professional association's use of supervision have brought subtle but 
significant changes to supervision as a (discourse) practice. 
Within counselling, claims for professional status are accompanied by the self and 
other-monitoring by which we justify such claims. Writing of the caring professions 
of nursing and social work, Abbott and Wallace suggested that "the words 'profession' 
and 'professionalism' are used in everyday language to control those who use or lay 
claim to the title" (1990, p.7) and that "the idea of professionalism is used to police 
the actions of those who lay claim to a professional status" (p.8). More recently, 
Feltham offered a similar observation about counselling. 
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Perhaps supervision both keeps counsellors in order and also impresses on the 
public that serious steps are being taken to monitor and preserve quality. 
(2000, p.17) 
I suggest that the claims of professionalism, for which the professional association 
and individual counsellors in New Zealand depend upon supervision, cannot but be 
double-edged. 
The technologies of power to which Foucault gave particular attention were the 
examination and the confession. "If the examination is the technique of objectifying 
people, the confession is the technique of subjectifying them" (Fairclough, 1998, 
p.53). Through the examination we are measured against norms; records are kept on 
us; we are made visible. Through confession we act upon (speak about) ourselves in 
the presence of another, the authority (or representation of the authority) who 
"requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to 
judge, forgive, console and reconcile" (Foucault, 1981, p.61 cited by Fairclough, 
1998, p.53). My argument is that it is useful for counsellors and supervisors to think 
about supervision on these terms, not because we can somehow create separate new 
orders of discourse outside the operation of these technologies of power, but so that 
we might recognise how we are thus constituted. Then, in recognising, we might go 
on to "resist, subvert and change the discourses themselves through which one is 
being constituted" (Davies, 1991, p.51). 
The point I want to emphasise is that we are less free in choosing self-regulation than 
the everyday discourses of professionalism and autonomy would have us believe we 
are. "To live as an autonomous individual, you must learn new techniques for 
understanding and practicing upon yourself' (Rose, 1998, p.17): to practise as an 
autonomous professional counsellor, you must take up particular techniques for 
understanding and practising on yourself (and others). Self-regulation is not an 
unproblematic matter for as Foucault observed, 
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force 
relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the 
same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form 
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from one strategy to another, opposing strategy. (1981, p.101, cited in 
Fairclough, 1992, p.99) 
White (1997) took a critical step into asking about the constitution of the lives, not 
only of clients, but also of counsellors through professional discourse, noting that 
such considerations had been relatively neglected. Noticing the "powerful 
incitements to join in the self-government of the self' that professional discourses 
offer, White asked, 
Is it likely that therapists could journey into what is the heartland of this 
culture's technologies for the administration and management of life 
[professional discourses], and yet resist the powerful incitements to engage in 
the policing of their own lives? (White, 1997, pp.123-4) 
In Chapter Three I considered how the literature posits professional supervision as 
regulation through monitoring. As autonomous professionals in supervision we put 
our work up for review, in this way producing ourselves as moral and ethical subjects. 
However, counsellors are at the same time subject to the call to a problematic self-
surveillance that is a feature of modem life and that, it can be argued, creates 
clienthood for many of those who come to us as clients. 
Here is a particular challenge that a poststructuralist understanding of power offers: 
supervision works as regulative practice in multiple ways. One face of the regulatory 
function reflects counsellors making a responsible acknowledgement of the power 
relations manifest in counselling work. This practice positions counsellors as offering 
our work into the professional community, through supervision, as the responsible 
production of ethical practice. To assemble ourselves as ethical subjects counsellors 
participate in this professional "technology of self government", offering our work for 
monitoring and development (the examination?), and ourselves for support (the 
confession?). And, paradoxically, at the same time such technologies of power work 
to call us into the policing of our own lives (White, 1997) and into what Bird (2000) 
characterised as the "pathologising self-gaze" of the professional counsellor enjoined 
to self-scrutiny. 
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In the light of these reflections on the subjectification of the professional self, I tum to 
the question of what it is that the counselling profession in New Zealand wants 
supervision to do. In what ways do the profession's intentions for supervision match 
the work each of us who meets in supervision wants supervision to do? And what 
expectations do third party funders, employers, the public and others have of 
supervision? In turning to this question, I limit my focus to consider the location of 
supervision in the context of professional counselling in New Zealand. 
New Zealand: professionalisation and supervision 
"How professional are we and how professional should we become?" asked Ted 
Wadsworth in 1974, in his opening address at the inaugural NZAC conference 
(quoted in Hermansson, 1999, p.16). I note that he was asking the question, not 
arguing for professionalism. I remember also the first essay I wrote in the counselling 
field: the essay question ran along the lines of, "Is counselling a phenomenon of 
everyday life or an increasingly specialised profession?" That such a question was 
being asked in the early 1980s in New Zealand is perhaps both an indication of the 
recent arrival of counselling as a profession is this country, and of some ambivalence 
towards the move into increasing professionalisation. Did counsellors want the expert 
status of the psy professions, or were we reluctant participants? 
But as Miller (1994) pointed out and Hermansson (1999) documented, the trappings 
of professionalism in New Zealand's largest association of counsellors, NZAC, 
followed in a rush in subsequent years. From formation there soon followed 
membership processes, a Code of Ethics, a complaints process, a Code of 
Supervision, accreditation of senior members, an Ethics committee, supervisor 
endorsement of membership, more rigorous membership requirements, accreditation 
of supervisors, membership growth. The question of registration is just now 
becoming more pressing: with the imminent move to registration of social workers 
counsellors will be the only workers in the mental health area to remain outside 
registration processes (Esler, 2001). 
Supervision, too, has changed over this time. When I became a counsellor, few paid 
for supervision: it was a favour given between counsellors. One of my early 
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supervisors, despite being in private practice, insisted that supervision with me, for 
which she did not charge, was her gift to the profession. The early supervising I did 
was, likewise, without charge. Supervisors might themselves have been relatively 
new to counselling, with little or no training in supervision. Supervision, in my early 
experience, was a much more "private" contract: it was left up to me to see that it 
took place. The emphasis of the supervision room was the confessional, rather than 
the examination room: although the individual was focussed upon, no records or 
reports to others were required. There was not a Code of Supervision to guide 
practice until 1993. 
It was not until my application for accredited membership of NZAC in the early 
1990s that the matter of supervision was raised in relation with my membership of the 
professional association. At the same time records were being introduced: an 
acceptable report from a supervisor became one of the requirements for gaining 
membership of the association. In 1995, without negotiation with its members, the 
association introduced the requirement of an annual report from each member, 
attesting to professional development undertaken, and co-signed by the supervisor. 
The discourses of professionalism and accountability were both at work in these 
developments, in these extensions of governance. Supervision became both 
confession and examination. "The norm of autonomy secretes, as its inevitable 
accompaniment, a constant and intense self-scrutiny" (Rose, 1991, p.241): the notion 
of professional autonomy calls our profession into increasing scrutiny of ourselves, 
and supervision is one mechanism by which we do this throughout our professional 
lives. The professional self-scrutiny that counsellors employ in supervision in this 
way calls us into close ongoing regulation of our practices. Given this level of 
surveillance, as a profession we need to take care how we employ the strategies 
supervision offers. 
Rose (1991) suggested that the governance made possible through the technologies of 
the disciplines has not been the result of some purposeful grand plan, but that 
"innovations have frequently been made in order to cope, not with grand threats to the 
political order, but with petty and even marginal problems" (pp.8-9), sometimes 
initiated and/or carried out at the formalised centres of structural power, but more 
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often by occupational or interest groups. There are examples of such innovations 
within NZAC. 
For example, in 1997 Janet Irwin, Chair of NZAC's Ethics committee, reported that 
some "pretty appalling things" were happening in the name of counselling. She 
suggested the need for "increasing emphasis on competent, effective supervision", 
because "our professional integrity is on the line" (quoted in Hermansson, 1999, 
pp.147-148). In both this recommendation and in the earlier introduction of annual, 
supervisor-endorsed reports, further regulation of members was initiated by national 
committees with responsibility to manage aspects of the professional organisation that 
mark it as professional - monitoring standards, and membership. However, I want for 
a moment to put these two events together. 
In 1997 Irwin reported there had been eight complaints lodged with the Ethics 
Committee in the previous year. Between 1991 and December 2000, one hundred 
complaints had been processed through NZAC's complaints procedure (NZAC, 2001). 
Of these 26 were not assessed (because those complained about were not members of 
NZAC); twenty nine were assessed but were not considered prejudicial to the 
interests of the association; the remaining forty five went on to be considered by 
hearing panels. Of these, five went on to mediation, and sixteen to formal hearings, 
with charges being upheld in twelve instances. My experience as a member of 
Complaints Panels of the Association's Ethics Committee means that I do not naively 
assume that the seventeen complaints where the Association exercised its authority to 
intervene were the only ones where complaints had substance. However, in the light 
of these statistics I notice that at the same time there were well over two thousand 
members, all of whom with their supervisors, were furnishing annual supervision 
reports to be surveyed by the half dozen voluntary members of the Association's 
Membership Committee. While the behaviours which aroused Irwin's concern may 
not have been petty or marginal in themselves, what is at work here is an act of 
regulatory governance that has re-positioned supervision as an explicit tool in the 
maintenance of counsellors in the category of member/professional counsellor. In this 
way innovations of governance represent responses not to grand threats to the 
professional order, but to isolated instances, albeit instances of serious concern to 
those dealing with them. 
Chapter Four 78 
Manthei (1995, 1997) raised the question of whether it is the professional 
association's job to enforce standards/behaviours, on behalf of professionalism, or 
whether responsibility for safe practice rests with individual counsellors. His 
preference was the latter. Winslade (1997) expressed concern about the increased 
policing of members and applicants, suggesting that NZAC was in danger of 
"inadvertently allow[ing] the evaluative gaze to advance its influence in our own 
professional identities" (p.15) and of enabling a more hierarchical supervision regime 
to gain sway . Such matters are still under debate. A regular columnist in the 
Newsletter, the Mad Hatter, whose contributions tend to be as provocative as his 
authorial name suggests, wrote: 
it seems that NZAC is involved in far too much policing for my liking. Like 
policing training. Policing competence. Policing accreditation. Policing 
supervision. Policing to keep us elitist and keep people out. (Mad Hatter, 
1999, p.16) 
In a response in the next Newsletter, from Jim Halliday, past Convenor of the 
Membership Committee of NZAC, we see at work the practices of governance in 
which we are caught up: as professional counsellors we must police ourselves and 
each other in these ways in order to assemble ourselves as trustworthy professionals 
in the political milieu in which we work. 
The Members [of the Association], the public and the employing agencies 
look to the Association for standards of accountability, credibility and status 
that distinguish the professional worker from just any persons who may 
choose to call themselves counsellors. (Halliday, 1999, p.3) 
Innovations of self and other governance come in the guise of providing assurance. 
But what is being assured? And how do we know it is? 
It seems to me to be important that we do not assume that by increasing the use of 
supervision as an arm of governance we enhance the work that supervision does in 
sapporting ethical and effective practice. Indeed, Sampson (1995) comparing 
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centralised and decentralised ideas about personhood and social order noted that 
research suggested that the introduction of extrinsic factors, in situations where people 
otherwise have acted in relation with intrinsic factors, reduced the likelihood that 
behaviour would be ongoing without the reward. He went on 
We might reasonably conclude from the preceding that the imposition on an 
ongoing system of something external to it in order to govern the behaviour 
within that system undoes the self-regulating mechanisms that have evolved, 
thereby requiring ever greater externality of rule in order to sustain what 
would otherwise have been self-sustaining. (Sampson, 1995, p.120) 
It might be argued then that the increasing involvement of the professional association 
in governing supervision relationships is likely to decrease, rather than increase, 
ethical behaviour. Perhaps in asking supervision to do more, the association produces 
it as able to do less? It is clear at least that it cannot be taken for granted that 
innovations of governance involving supervision will enhance the work of the 
supervision relationship nor, more importantly, the work of counsellors with clients. 
Some implications for this study 
In the context of this study, then, there are many sites at which supervision as 
professional practice might be interrogated. On Rose's (1998) terms, supervision 
might be construed as a particular instance of an "assembling of subjects", an 
assembling of counsellors as "responsible subjects in the machines of morality" 
(p.182). With these ideas in mind, I need to ask, rather than take for granted, what 
kind of practice of the professional self is supervision? In what ways does 
supervision serve "professionalism" in assembling supervisors and counsellors as 
responsible and ethical subjects? What is the project in which we are caught up? As 
what sort of selves are we intent on producing ourselves? 
These are questions that highlight the paradigm-locatedness of generic supervision 
models, for those models do not tend to raise such questions. These questions return 
me again to my first research question. What might a narrative version of counselling 
supervision look like? What will be its concerns? First of all, in response to these 
questions, I suggest that a narrative supervision will consider seriously the politics of 
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its own production. A narrative supervision will be purposefully attending to the 
relations with the self its practices produce. It will acknowledge the strategies of self-
and other-governance in which it is implicated. 
The available accounts in the area of postmodern supervision vary in the extent to 
which they interrogate the practice of supervision itself. For the most part the 
emphasis is on describing supervision processes. I go on from here to review the 
wider postmodern supervision literature, noting that it mostly comes from family 
therapy rather than counselling. Cantwell and Holmes (1995) and Bobele, Gamer, 
and Biever (1995) pointed out that there was little literature that applied 
constructionist theory to supervision: much of that which I review has been written 
since this project was begun in 1996. Others have been asking questions similar to 
those that brought me to this study. 
Counselling supervision: some constructionist perspectives 
The storying work of supervision 
Here, too, White's work provides a significant starting point. White (1989/90) 
suggested that re-authoring is an activity for training and supervision, as it is for 
therapy; stories about therapy and about the therapist's "life as therapist" (p.27) invite 
therapists into storying experiences that "parallel" the experiences of those who are 
clients in therapy. Referring to Geertz, White suggested that, in situating our 
experience within available stories, stories which are always indeterminate, and 
negotiating the interpretation of the stories that are thus produced, we are involved in 
processes of originating: "it is the copying that originates" (Geertz, 1986, p.380). I 
think that this idea is critically useful in taking a narrative orientation to supervision 
for it offers up the supervision space for collaboration in generative practice. When 
supervision is constructed as productive of new knowledges, rather than reproductive 
of already known and established knowledges, then supervisor and counsellor are 
offered a repositioning in relation with each other. For knowledge resides not only in 
the supervisor; it becomes possible to create knowledge in the spaces between the 
counsellor and the supervisor, and between the counselling and the supervision, and 
between the client, counsellor and supervisor. The storying work of counsellor and 
supervisor focuses on that which the counsellor has already originated, that which 
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counsellor and supervisor, or counsellor and client, might together originate, and that 
which is being originated in the supervision itself. Supervision can be understood as a 
storying of practice that depends not just upon accounts that relay the facts of what 
happens, but on the making up of accounts. The distinction drawn by Parry and Doan 
between indicative (fact telling) or subjunctive (possibility-producing) modes (1994, 
p.188) points to the productivity of storying professional identity when meaning-
making is central to supervision talk. 
Also arguing that there is similarity between the processes of counselling and those of 
supervision, Parry and Doan (1994) suggested that the processes of "revisioning" of 
stories that therapists use with clients are to be applied in "revisioning" the stories 
therapists have about their clients and about themselves as therapists. "Therapist 
competencies expand when tagged and accepted," Cantwell and Holmes suggested 
(1995, p.45). Similarly Neal (1996) wrote of trainees being given opportunity to story 
their preferences for their therapy work. 
Not all constructionist commentaries agree with the claim that the processes of 
supervision mirror those of therapy, however. In Chapter Three I noted the 
distinctions drawn by Gardner, Bobele, and Biever (1997), and also Bernard and 
Goodyear (1998) between therapy and supervision. Gardner, Bobele, and Biever 
suggested that while in postmodern therapy there is an assumption that clients are 
experts on their own lives, there is not the assumption in supervision that therapists 
are "experts on therapy" (p.224). Bernard and Goodyear suggested that trainees are 
"just beginning" to develop stories of "self-as-professional" while clients have "well 
developed" stories (p.22). Both author teams thus drew a distinction between therapy 
clients, whose knowing and expertise about their lives is to be valued, and therapists 
in supervision who, they proposed, come without material to be storied because of a 
thinness of professional experience. I believe that to suggest that there is little 
material to draw on in storying the professional identity of a therapist new to the field 
is to edit out the possibility that the therapist brings a richness of lived experience 
upon which they draw as they story their professional identity. The storying of 
professional identity that we do in the supervision room depends upon very much 
more than just stories about therapy. Of course professional knowledge and wisdom 
and practice experience are to be valued: those are the pre-existing stories into which 
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we insert ourselves and thus produce new stories. However, received professional 
knowledge and wisdom is not all that there is, and the field is impoverished if we 
behave as if it is. Further, even beginning counsellors have practice that they and 
their supervisor might collaboratively research and story in supervision: this is an 
implication of taking seriously the value of local knowledge. Inquiry such as, "What 
did you notice?" and "How might we make sense of what you noticed?" and "What 
does this (making sense) mean for your practice preferences?" offers material for 
storying professional identity. It is the sort of inquiry that might well be made by 
supervisors of counsellors new to counselling. I suggest that the idea that therapists 
early in their careers do not have enough knowledge or experience to draw on to story 
their practice and their professional identity is strongly influenced both by 
developmental discourse and by the discourse of supervisor responsibility. Further, I 
will argue that it behoves supervisors not to take for granted the positions offered 
counsellors and supervisors within these discourses for those positions obscure 
counsellor agency and responsibility and undermine possibilities for collaboration. A 
rich storying of professional identity is not supported by such positions. 
Solution focussed and strengths based approaches 
The focus on the similarities between therapy and supervision processes features, too, 
amongst systemic and solution-focussed writers. Like clients in counselling, 
therapists in supervision are looking for "an expansion of options and meanings", 
suggested Cantwell and Holmes (1995, p.36). Lowe and Guy (1996) acknowledged 
the isomorphic relationship between supervision and therapy that is presumed in their 
solution-oriented approach to reflecting team supervision. They wrote of "using 
solution-oriented methods to identify and build upon the supervisee's competencies, 
affirm their struggles, and help identify future possibilities and challenges" (p.30). 
Thus, the theoretical alignment between counselling process and supervision process 
was a significant distinction in the process they outlined. Solution-focussed 
supervision was also posited as isomorphically transformed from the process of 
solution-focussed therapy by a number of other authors (Santa Rita, 1998; Selekman 
& Todd, 1995, Todd, 1997). Amongst family therapists there appears to be more 
ongoing acceptance that models of therapy might be extended into supervision, and 
there is less emphasis, than in counselling, on distinguishing these fields of practice in 
terms of process. 
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A collaborative orientation 
A collaborative orientation in supervision is echoed by a number of postmodern 
writers (Anderson & Swim, 1995; Bobele, Gardner, & Biever, 1995; Fine & Turner, 
1997; Gardner, Bobele, & Biever,1997; Storm, 1995). I have found Fine and 
Turner's metaphor of the style of work thus produced very useful in making visible 
the substance of collaborative practice. 
Therapists experience the supervisor co-laboring with them in creating new 
therapy paths - everyone wearing the same yellow hard hats as they jointly 
forge through the brush and maneuver across uncharted ground. (1997, p.237) 
There are visible here a number of moves that indicate the possibilities for a 
postmodern supervision. Firstly, the relationship is characterised as therapist-
supervisor, opening space for therapist as subjective subject. Unfortunately, as I have 
already noted, many postmodern writers in supervision do not make this move and 
continue reproducing the supervisor/supervisee form (for example, Anderson & 
Swim, 1995; Bobele et al., 1995; Gardner et al., 1997; Lowe & Guy, 1996). 
Secondly, the work of Fine and Turner's description is co-laboring, working together 
at the same task. Both these moves, for therapist as subjective subject and for co-
labouring, while not removing hierarchy, unsettle the familiar power relation of 
mainstream approaches to supervision and thereby produce supervision differently. 
In this account, both therapist and supervisor are finding ways forward, and producing 
knowledge for local situations where neither has been before. Knowledge is to be 
produced in a mutually generative process, rather than reproduced out of the 
supervisor's rich store of privileged knowledge about all facets of therapy and 
supervision. This shift in the understanding of knowledge production was echoed in 
Neufeldt's (1997) constructivist account and in Bobele et al.'s constructionist one. 
Rather than having a ready set of tools or ideas to give to the supervisee in 
some developmental sequence, we are ready to offer to supervisees an 
opportunity for collaboration. (Bobele et al., 1995, p. 18) 
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As emphasis is offered to meaning systems and to the collaborative negotiation of 
meaning in dialogue, new therapy paths are created (Bobele et al., 1995; Cantwell & 
Holmes, 1995). And the yellow hard hats of Fine and Turner's description? Perhaps 
supervision is not the safe and reassuring haven where therapists are offered the 
protection of the supervisor's expertise, but rather it is a domain in which hard work is 
to be done, in collaboration. The focus is no longer on the role of the supervisor alone 
as in social role accounts of supervision, but supervisor and counsellor are co-
labouring at the same task, finding ways forward over previously uncharted ground. 
Power 
Amongst the postmodern accounts of supervision some attention is paid to the matter 
of power. For example, Fine and Turner (1997), Bobele et al. (1995, 1997) and White 
(1997) have all pointed to the ways in which the supervision space is itself subject to 
the practices of normalising judgement. White's work stands out for its attention to 
the effects of professional culture on therapists. As I have noted, he suggested that in 
bringing concerns to supervision therapists are subject to the kinds of internalising 
self-judgements that produce problems for clients. In response to this problem, White 
suggested that narrative consultation should mirror the practices of narrative therapy 
by deconstructing "negative truths of identity" and "renegotiat[ing] meaning in regard 
to the many events of therapy" (1997, p.151). As well, White paid attention to the 
power relation between counsellor and supervisor, arguing that, because of the 
payment for service and the privilege of consultation, the power relation of 
supervision should be acknowledged rather than obscured as it is, for instance, in the 
adoption of a term like co-vision. White's points, about professional self-judgement 
and about the power relation of supervision, will be critical to the argument I make in 
this thesis about how supervisor responsibility might be understood. My interest is in 
a supervision that takes responsibility for the ethical production of power. Fine and 
Turner pointed to the value of transparency, open dialogue about power relations and 
attention to the sites of its production. They suggested that in such practices, "the 
power hierarchy is tempered, not eliminated" (p.234). 
Concerned with managing both the ethical production of power and their 
responsibilities as academics in evaluation and accreditation, Flemons, Green, and 
Rambo (1996) asked some important questions about the ethics of evaluation within a 
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postmodern framework. Although their focus was on the evaluation of counselling 
students and was more directly concerned with matters of academic assessment than 
with the supervision practice that is my focus, their arguments are useful in this 
present context. They suggested that "ethical decisions ... are neither subjective nor 
objective, but relational" (p.45, original emphasis). I understand them to be arguing 
that ethical decisions in counselling, in supervision and in assessment are processes 
that are available for dialogising: the realities of our practices are to be negotiated in 
practices of respectful relation in the local contexts in which they occur. A similar 
point is made by Stewart and Amundson: "fairness, justice and ethics are struggle" 
(1995, p.73, original emphasis). Ethical practice, in supervision and for counselling, 
is an ongoing process of relational negotiation, and a task at which counsellor and 
supervisor work (and struggle) together, mindful of the practices of power in which 
they are engaged. 
Group and team supervision practices 
Most of these commentaries on postmodern applications in supervision are provided 
by those whose background has been family therapy and social work. There is 
significance in the cultural context of this professional group, for already practices 
such as live supervision (Hardy, 1993; Lambert, 1989/90) and team supervision have 
produced a supervision practice that is familiar with more diversity and fluidity than 
counselling traditions of individual supervision. Supervision and training tend not to 
be distinguished either, as training is done in live contexts as teams work together 
with families. I go on here to survey the literature on reflecting team supervision. 
Much of this writing is systemic rather than constructionist/narrative. By including it 
I am not intending to conflate the sets of therapies, but rather to acknowledge the 
broader professional landscape within which this project is situated. 
In Chapter Two I introduced reflecting team work as one practice used in narrative 
therapy to recruit wider audiences to the storying of clients' lives. White (1997) 
argued for the decentring of the therapist through such therapeutic practices. I have 
been building an argument in this document for a version of supervision that disturbs 
the centrality of the supervisor in supervision, de-centring the supervisor. Reflecting 
team practice provides a technology by which a supervision that is not supervisor-
centred might be produced. As I have said, the literature largely focuses on reflecting 
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team supervision practice as a training function. Firstly there are descriptions, such as 
James, Maccormack, Korol, and Lee's (1996), of live training and supervision in the 
context of client work. The team, made up of the supervisor and student colleagues of 
the therapist, reflect in the presence of the clients and after the client has left. James 
et al.'s work is systemic, rather than contructionist. The dialogical emphasis of 
Andersen's and White's work is absent: "the reflections usually lasted between three 
and five minutes allowing each member time for one or two comments", reported 
James et al. (p.50). A research study by Young, Saunders, Prentice, Macri-Riseley, 
Fitch, and Pati-Tasca (1997) suggested that, in this style of reflecting team 
supervision, therapists in training were much more alert to the power relations 
between them and the supervisors than were supervisors. The therapists in training 
reported considerable anxiety about performing appropriately in the team setting, 
confirming Perlesz, Young, Paterson, and Bridge's earlier suggestion that 
the use of reflecting teams may have inadvertently created competition 
amongst trainees to provide the best, most relevant reflective comments for the 
family (and for the live supervisor!). A side effect of the R.T. [sic] format is 
the added pressure to be helpful, which may lead to errors in the direction of 
working too hard, saying too much, and directly and/or indirectly making 
suggestions about what family members should or should not do. (1994, p.23) 
Writing of their use of reflecting teams in social constructionist training, Biever and 
Gardner (1995) suggested that supervisors need to take responsibility for ensuring 
both clinical and training issues are considered. Both foci are present and it seems to 
me that it must be the therapy that is the over-riding imperative when therapy and 
training needs are competing in such situations. Pare (1999c) suggested that those 
who work with reflecting processes in counsellor education must understand the 
social constructionist theorising that produces the practice (p.304). For example, he 
suggested that reflecting team members use curiosity to "effectively 'deconstruct' 
problems, creating space for alternative stories [White, 1992]" (1999c, p.296). Pare 
offered some particular guidelines, both for inviting and preparing clients and also for 
preparing the reflecting team, intended to produce an ethical process of reflection. He 
noted, too, the use of tapes of client work to which therapists in training respond as a 
reflecting team, making a tape for clients. This is a practice he had encountered in our 
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work in the programme at Waikato. The emphasis on this reflecting team work is the 
same as in live work: the direct audience is the client and the team responds in terms 
of the client-counsellor conversation. It is thus training, rather than supervision, 
focussed. 
The second emphasis of reflecting team training is on those contexts where the 
academic supervisor speaks with a counselling student about their counselling work. 
Other counselling students make up the team who reflect on the supervisory 
conversation. In these settings the client work is not live: it involves "self report" 
(Bernard & Goodyear 1998, p.92), stories of practice and of professional-self-at-
practice. Roberts wrote of "post hoc supervision: bringing the cases back home" 
(1997, p.341). Supervision in this mode might also involve reviewing tapes of client 
work. In both situations the emphasis of the team is on responding to the counsellor, 
not for the family or individual client as in the first set of practices. While Pare 
( 1999c) argued for the importance of constructionist understanding for reflecting team 
work in training, Lowe and Guy (1996) argued for "theoretically-aligned" reflecting 
team practices (p.27). This stance goes beyond the assertion that the model of therapy 
is the model for supervision, in suggesting that in the supervision both supervisor and 
team take an explicit theoretical orientation based on solution-oriented practice. 
Lowe and Guy suggested that in distinguishing a theoretically-aligned version of 
reflecting team practice from "pluralistic, atheoretical" (p.28) approaches, such as 
Tom Andersen's and Harlene Anderson's, they produce a different version of 
reflecting team practice. This version is marked by the consistent "push for change" 
(p.29) in the work of both supervisor and team. The push for change comes from a 
purposeful solution-oriented supervision process. In Phase One the supervisor's work 
is characterised, Lowe and Guy argued, as "active and directional" (p.31), and the 
focus is on the therapist-in-the work, rather than on the "drama of the case" (p.31). 
I think this is another important distinction of which Lowe and Guy might have made 
more: the focus on the therapist in the work rather than the work. A focus on "the 
issues and dilemmas that the case raises for the therapist" (Lowe & Guy, 1996, p.31, 
original emphasis) contrasts with Roberts' "bringing the cases back home" (1997, 
p.341, my emphasis). Roberts went on to offer a story of practice where the team 
members were invited by the therapist to offer "help with the case" (pp.342-3). Then, 
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she reported, "each person contributed an idea or two": these ideas were practical 
suggestions of what the counsellor might do next. Thus the supervision work is 
"case"-focussed and instrumental: there are echoes of the prescribing of action as in 
the Holloway (1996) example discussed in the previous chapter. Lowe and Guy, in 
offering clear, phase by phase, guidelines for solution-oriented reflecting team 
practice, declared a preference not to "avoid instrumentality but to avoid neither the 
valorisation or denial of instrumentality" (p.44 ). However, I think their discussion of 
instrumentality could well have extended into further discussion of the implications 
for the process of the supervision of their emphasis on the therapist working with 
clients. The field is already sufficiently warned that counsellor-alone is not ethical 
supervision practice (Gardner et al., 1997). However, I do not think that the case for 
the counsellor-in-relation-with-client focus of supervision has been sufficiently made 
or theorised. Lowe and Guy's position makes a contribution to this task, to which this 
study will continue to pay attention. 
Reflecting team supervision is innovative practice in counselling in New Zealand, and 
particularly when this study began. Lowe and Guy's suggestion that the reflecting 
team format no longer seemed "novel or unusual" (1996, p. 26) in therapy and 
supervision did not and does not hold true for this context. More recently, Lowe and 
Guy (1999) described a move from consultant-led reflecting team supervision to peer-
group supervision. They suggested that it was useful to have two consultants 
available as the group began, one to conduct the interviews in Phases One and Three 
and one to work with the team in Phase Two, both modelling solution-focussed 
practice. They noted the potential for peer supervision that the reflecting team 
process offers. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has situated supervision in a New Zealand context, noting that there is no 
local research base on which this study might draw. It has made connections between 
matters of supervision and governance in this local context, drawing on Rose's work 
on the governance offered modern subjects within the psy complex, and noting that 
increasingly supervision is being produced within NZAC as a tool of governance of 
counsellors. Finally, this chapter has located this study within the literature on 
postmodern approaches in supervision, noting that for the most part these accounts 
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have been produced out of family therapy, and thus draw on different practice 
traditions than this study. 
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Chapter Five 
A research practice for a counselling practitioner 
The best way to find out what professionals do is to become one yourself; but it is 
difficult, in the process of being socialized into a profession, to avoid identifying 
with it and internalizing its frame of reference. (lngleby, 1985, p.80) 
Introduction 
I have already written of the three professional roles out of which I began this 
research project - counsellor, supervisor and counsellor educator. My 
professional identity as academic researcher was less well formed. As I worked to 
develop a satisfying research practice within this academic context, I was aware of 
my positioning in contesting discourses. Despite now having immersed myself in 
the protocols of academic research in the process of accounting for this project, I 
do not want to avoid acknowledging what might be called, on Ingleby's terms, my 
pre-socialisation experiences nor the positions I found for myself along the way. 
Weingarten (1992) suggested that we should cherish the evolution of our ideas: 
the ideas that have been produced and the processes of their production have been 
equally engaging for me in this project. This chapter will attend to both the ideas 
about research put to work in this project and the evolution of these ideas in my 
professional life. 
I believe that it is an ethical act to select a research method, rather than a technical 
act. It is an ethical act to give an account of one's selection as well. Personal and 
professional histories are productive of selection (Hoshmand, 1994; Hanrahan, 
1998) in ways for which most research reporting does not give account. In this 
document, I take the position that research practice is imbued with moral action: 
at every step of the process, from identifying the site of inquiry, naming the 
purpose of inquiry, constructing a method for inquiry, conducting inquiry, and 
producing an account of inquiry, research practice can be construed as ethical and 
relational practice and accounted for on those terms. In this project, I looked to 
take up and extend the ethos of which Martin wrote: 
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Recently, I have begun to wonder if the fundamental coins of therapeutic 
exchanges might earn richer dividends of understanding if considered 
more as 'moral goods' than 'discursive data for social scientific 
dissection'. (Martin, 1995, pp.245-246) 
My intention is to engage with the discursive data that this project offered me, and 
to account for that engagement and in that engagement in ways that give evidence 
of my understanding of these actions as moral actions. 
And there is a third thread to insert into the story line at this introductory point. 
That third thread is the pragmatic story of the research process. In summary, the 
data generating phase of this project involved a group of five counsellors and 
supervisors, including myself, who met for reflecting team supervision as a 
particular kind of peer group supervision. We met together fortnightly for a year. 
Our supervision work, our reflections on and in that supervision work, and our 
meta-level research conversations about supervision all produced the data that I 
went on to analyse, using discursive analytic tools. But how did I come to select 
such a process? And what ethical, technical, theoretical and practical questions 
presented themselves at each stage of this project? That is the story I tell in this 
chapter and the next. 
Thus there are three threads to be woven through the account in this chapter: the 
interdependent ethics and pragmatics of the research process, and my producing 
that process within the discourse practices of social science research, and 
counselling research in particular. Research design is a circular rather than a 
linear process. A linear account of the research method would report in a 
straightforward way what the research events were and what body of research 
practice they drew on. This present account, in working to address both the 
development of a research design and also the playing out of the research method 
will perhaps lack some of the linear clarity of the more familiar genre of reporting. 
The design occurred before and during the research: that aspect of the telling tells 
my story as designer as well as the story of the research. The playing out of the 
method occurred during the time when I worked in the project with others and it is 
still occurring as I write: but the call of the research report genre is to write as 
Chapter Five 92 
though the process happened in a staged and closed time frame and to tell it as 
though it can be told independently of the results stories. I alert readers to my 
decision to compromise linearity to some extent, in this telling, in favour of a 
richer description of the production of a unique research process. Having 
produced a research project that I claim fits Kaye's description, "productive rather 
than reproductive, creative rather than representational" (1990, p.35), I have taken 
to heart Lincoln's suggestion that "'getting it right' is a project best abandoned" 
(1997, p.52). Rather, making sense of it has been at the heart of this project. 
As the chapter continues, it considers first the relationships between research and 
practice, noting how my professional life and so this project have been shaped by 
my positionings within those discourses. I outline the particular ethical and 
knowledge positions from which I engaged with producing the project. I describe 
the steps in designing and setting up the data-gathering phase, and the inquiry 
processes that yielded the data. 
Relationships between research and practice in counselling 
Again, I point to the specificity of the New Zealand context and to Bunce's (1992) 
claim that counsellors in New Zealand do not take for granted that research and 
practice go together. Just this week, in the NZAC Waikato Branch Newsletter, 
the new branch Chairperson said this about herself in an introduction to the 
branch: 
I am an ENFP in personality type which means I am gregarious and 
values-based in my approach to my work. I will always think 'Who do I 
need to talk to' about this, not what book, journal, netpage should I scan! 
(Barrett, 2001) 
At the time of my own counsellor education (then called "training", as much 
counsellor education in New Zealand still is), there was not a masters degree in 
counselling in which I could enrol. In the small piece of original research I did 
then, and in subsequent academic research, my experiences were of not being well 
supported by the methodologies available to me. Bunce recommended that the 
relationship between practice and research be strengthened, but did not offer ideas 
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about particular approaches to research that might more meaningfully inform 
practice. To my practitioner eyes and ears, over the years of my involvement in 
counselling there had been much written and spoken in our field expounding the 
need for research to inform practice and many calls for practitioners to do things 
differently. Talk about the value of links between research and practice had a 
dominant theme of exhorting practitioners to read and engage in and with 
research. And it seemed to me that much less attention was paid to reflecting on 
the hierarchically-arranged nature of the research-practice binary or, in particular, 
to the pragmatics of how research processes and findings might be made more 
accessible to and useful for those whom research purports to serve. Despite good 
intentions, calls for "joint ventures" (for example, Anderson, 1991) between 
practitioners and researchers, that did not speak of how such ventures could be 
possible, seemed more like empty rhetoric than invitations to participate. 
Howard, whose U.S. writing I used at the time of my own university counsellor 
education, asked the question, "Can research in the human sciences become more 
relevant to practice?" (1985, p.539), questioning whether the scientist-practitioner 
model had delivered on its promise. In their commentary on Howard, Heppner 
and Anderson (1985) noted a number of authors who had also suggested that 
counsellors did not see research as being much use to them. While both these 
articles and my own counsellor education go back more than fifteen years, the 
issue of the relationship between practice and research is a matter of continuing 
interest across the wider fields of psychology, counselling, and education 
(Anderson, 1997; Atweh, Kemmis & Weeks, 1998; Banister, Burman, Parker, 
Taylor, Tindall, 1994; Hoshmand, 1994; Hoshmand & Martin, 1995; Hoshmand 
and Polkinghome, 1992; Lampert, 2000; Moje, 2000; Polkinghome, 1997; 
Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1992; Stricker, 1992; Whiston, 1996; Yeatman, 1996, 
for example). 
This project, then, is located within the history of an ongoing discussion in the 
counselling field on the themes of research and practice positioned, or not, in a 
binary relation. Within this project I worked to go beyond the binary in exploring 
other meaningful ways to conceptualise the relationships between counselling 
practice and research. The hyphen is a location in text (Fine,1995): I have 
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worked to produce this project with an awareness of both the connecting and 
separating processes that might be possible at the hyphen between practice and 
research. For example, I worked to pay careful attention to "the social relations of 
knowledge production" and the kind of knowledge that might be produced 
(Weedon, 1987, p.87). Weedon's call was more than an instrumental one: it was 
a call to ethical action. And it was a call that has echoes in other feminist research 
literature as well as in education, psychology and counselling research writing, 
where increasing emphasis has been given to the power relations of research 
practice and the implications of those relations for the subjectivities of research 
participants. 
Over the past decade increasing attention has been paid to changing the terms on 
which the research-practice relation is interpreted. An emphasis on bringing 
forward practitioner knowledge and in research processes being practice-informed 
is evident (Hoshmand, 1994; Hoshmand & Martin, 1995; Hoshmand and 
Polkinghome, 1992; Lampert, 2000; Polkinghome, 1997; Whiston, 1996; 
Yeatman, 1996). Polkinghome wrote of turning his "wisdom around and look at 
what could be learned from the practitioners about how research could be done" 
(1998, p.x). Advocating for the "study of practicing knowledge", Hoshmand and 
Polkinghome suggested "practice as the appropriate context for constructing and 
testing our maps of instrumental knowledge" (1992, p.63). While this thesis goes 
on to make a distinction between instrumental approaches to knowledge and 
constructionist approaches to knowledge, I am nonetheless interested in 
Hoshmand and Polkinghome's emphasis on constructing and testing maps and 
accounts for practice in practice. Similarly, the emphasis Kaye put on both 
research process and purpose offered an emphasis I wanted to foster in my 
research. 
Inquiry must derive from a framework capable of accessing the processes 
involved in psychotherapy if we are to become more effective therapists 
and if our research is to have any meaning for practitioners. (Kaye, 1990, 
p.38) 
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In constructing this study, I was attracted to the positioning of practice and 
practitioners that I understood to be offered here, and that I heard in 
Polkinghome's suggestion that "the criterion for acceptability of a knowledge 
claim is the fruitfulness of its implementation" (1992, p.162). Research might 
benefit from the involvement of "practitioners and ordinary knowers" (Yeatman, 
1996) not just as informants to the research but also to the research process and to 
its evaluation. Distinguishing between practitioner inquiry and researcher inquiry, 
Polkinghome (2000) went on to suggest that "practitioner inquiry is based not on 
a general to specific inquiry, but on a contextualised dialogic between a particular 
practitioner and a particular client" (p.454). Ideas about the processes of everyday 
inquiry of ordinary people acting in the world, from the philosophical work of 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Dewey, are relevant, suggested Polkinghome, to 
understanding the processes of practitioner inquiry. Gamader, for example, drew 
on the Aristotelian distinction between phronesis and techne. The latter is the 
prepared, already-in-place "blueprint" for certain action in a defined context, and 
the former a negotiated engagement with the particular dimensions of the context 
where change may occur in the context and for the parties in the context 
(Polkinghome, p.275). This distinction between what I call the instrumental 
application of knowledge and the construction of knowledge in application has 
been central to the ideas I have developed out of this research project. 
Howard's 1985 question, "Can research in the human sciences become more 
relevant to practice?" (p.539) appears now, in 2001, to have many possibilities for 
an affirmative answer, and to have evolved into the productive question, "In what 
ways is research in the human sciences engaged in productive interrelationships 
with practice?" One of these ways, I suggest, is to construct research as an ethics-
centred practice. In constructing a research process to investigate the questions I 
had about the professional practice of counselling supervision, ethical and 
pragmatic questions were always interrelated. 
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Constructing a research process 
Beginning with ethics 
There were a number of criteria that I set myself as I looked for a research design. 
Many of these criteria centred on my relationship with participants. I had not ever 
understood research as "just a matter of collecting and analysing scientific 
information [about 'subjects'] (rather than) research as relationships between 
people", as Hanrahan (1998, p.303) described her transformation. Rather, I saw 
the ethics of relationship as central to my research design. I wanted to work with 
participants in such a way that their giving to a research project would be 
reciprocated in some way. As I saw it, participants would be offering time, 
knowledge, interest, and commitment and I wanted participants' offerings to be 
somehow directly reciprocated, beyond a more general recognition that they were 
giving to the field in terms of the knowledge this study might pass on. In 
whatever ways I proceeded I wanted to reduce the chance that my emphasis would 
be on credentialling myself while overriding the interests of the practice 
community, and the particular practitioners, upon whom the research would 
depend. I wanted a method of inquiry that would offer the best chance of the 
research being generative for participants as well as for me. I sought a method of 
inquiry, too, that offered me respectful relationship with participants in not asking 
them to participate in the project in ways I was not willing to do myself. 
Hanrahan wrote that despite her efforts at partnership in research her research 
subject was "taking all the risks of action and self disclosure" (1998, p.312). 
Paying attention to the social relations of the production of knowledge in research 
as Weedon (1987) advised, I had been wary that I might be similarly positioned. I 
was thoughtful, too, about what I might do with the actions and disclosures of 
research participants. What method of inquiry might treat with respect what 
participants had offered a research project, producing data that were clearly 
"moral goods" (Martin, 1995), at the same times as what became the project's 
data could be investigated with professional and intellectual rigour? 
Other aspects of my positioning 
These concerns for the ethics of research practice all led me into a preference for 
some kind of collaborative approach to inquiry. My interest in collaboration was 
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also influenced by my own positioning and history. In looking towards 
collaboration, I was looking away from the isolation that I had observed was the 
experience of many of those involved in research for academic qualifications. My 
preference in my teaching and counselling and supervision practice was for 
relationships of collaboration. How might I bring such practices into research? It 
seemed to me, too, to be wise to draw on that which I knew well as I moved into 
that with which I had less familiarity and facility. Since my own experience as a 
counselling practitioner was far greater than my experience as a practitioner of 
academic research, how might my knowledge and experience as a counselling 
practitioner inform my newer practice as a researcher? As I asked myself this 
question I favoured a research process that could get me as close as possible to the 
supervision practice that I wanted to research. Although Shotter (1992) suggested 
that the best we can do in research is to feel our way about with prosthetic 
devices, in feeling my way about in supervision I wanted a research tool that drew 
on practice knowledge in order to get as close a feel as possible. I was interested 
in having access to the "small and ordinary" (Weingarten, 1998, p.3) events of 
supervision, the ways in which ordinary counsellors and supervisors were working 
in the to-and-fro of their everyday practices. When our counsellor education team 
brought together a team of people to write a text about narrative practices (Monk, 
Winslade, Crocket, & Epston, 1997), it seemed to me that an important aspect of 
that endeavour was that we were paying attention to what I saw as the ordinary 
work of ordinary practitioners (p. xiii-xiv). In that project a participatory and 
inclusive stance made possible the involvement of a range of practitioners. That 
experience confirmed that to share one's work with others one needs only to be 
interested in dialogue: prior expertness is not a prerequisite. Again, there is value 
in the voyaging that produces ideas, as much as in the arrival at ideas. The 
question, how are ordinary practitioners making sense of these ideas in their 
practices, and making sense of their practices with these ideas, seemed to me to fit 
well with a postmodern interest in local accounts. 
For my seeking of a method of inquiry was informed by the location of the project 
in social constructionist theorising. Could I use in research the theoretical tools of 
constructionism that I used in narrative therapy, and if so, how could it be done? 
Commonalities between counselling and action research processes had been 
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articulated (for example, Whiston, 1996). Although there were no clear pragmatic 
templates of formal constructionist research practice in counselling or supervision 
on which I could draw, the ethos on which I could build my research practice was 
clear to me. In particular, I sought a process that would firstly produce ethical, 
respectful and collaborative relationships with participants, mindful of the 
relations of power between researched and researcher. 
Available models of practitioner inquiry 
In research practice a particular expression of collaborative inquiry was the co-
operative inquiry groups that came out of Reason's "new paradigm" work 
(Reason, 1988, 1994). It seemed to me that the reflection in action on action for 
action of a co-operative inquiry group successfully took into a collaborative 
research format the processes of reflective practice familiar from counselling. 
So in co-operative inquiry all those involved in the research are both co-
researchers, whose thinking and decision making contribute to generating 
ideas, designing and managing the project, and drawing conclusions from 
the experience, and also co-subjects, participating in the activity being 
researched. (Reason, 1994, p.326) 
Further, co-operative inquiry was a research practice that had been used 
effectively in introducing new counselling practices in a practice setting similar to 
my own (Farrell, 1993). Evidence of efficacy was appealing. As I worked to 
answer my fourth research question about suitable inquiry processes, the co-
operative inquiry group appeared to offer a relationally ethical and collaborative 
research process. There were two problems, however, with going on to apply 
Reason's work directly, in my own study. There are significant epistemological 
distinctions between the humanistic psychology that produces co-operative 
inquiry and the constructionist inquiry that I sought to generate. Co-operative 
inquiry emphasises the experiential production of knowledge while constructionist 
inquiry emphasises the discursive production of knowledge. Reason asserted a 
critical difference between co-operative inquiry work and postmodern work: 
experience can be unmediated by discourse, he claimed. 
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... we can bracket off that discourse and approach experience more 
directly. We can do this through mindfulness disciplines[ ... ] 
consciousness-raising, and through systematic engagement with the cycles 
of action and reflection that are a central part of participative and action 
inquiry methods. (Reason, 1994, p.334) 
Further, Reason voiced opposition to the use of deconstruction, suggesting that 
... given the current power relations on the planet, the first voices likely to 
be "deconstructed" are those of people already oppressed, the voices of the 
poor, of women, but also of the body and of the earth itself. (1994, p.334) 
While I believe this claim misunderstands the politics of deconstruction, at the 
same time Reason's concern for the politics of research practice resonated with 
the disquiet I brought with me as a practitioner about data analysis processes in 
research. The move from "field texts to research texts" (Clandinin & Connelly, 
1994) is construed less problematically through the humanistic lens of 
collaborative inquiry processes, for experiential knowing is privileged. The task I 
faced was to reconcile my own concern for the politics of my research practice 
while taking a position that did not slip into an acceptance of experience as 
outside discourse. Even in a world of postmodern plurality there was no narrative 
coherence in researching constructionist practice on the terms of humanistic 
inquiry. At the same time, my desire for a collaborative research practice that 
could access the processes of supervision and produce research that would be 
meaningful for practitioners meant that I understood Reason's charge of 
"overintellectualizing" (p.334) amongst deconstructive approaches. The dilemma 
of positioning my research was not one in which I was alone. The attraction of 
humanism's "respect for the integrity of experience" in response to mainstream 
modernist psychology having been "dehumanizing in its theory and practice" was 
noted by Parker (1999c, p.25). However, continued Parker's argument, the 
attractive alternative of humanism has its own problems, for a more complex 
understanding of subjectivity is needed than the privileging of individual 
experience that humanistic approaches to research have offered. Lambert noted 
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the danger of assuming that research participants are offered "voice or agency" 
when researchers present a sense of an unmediated story (2000, p.93). 
While humanism was an attractive counter-practice to scientism, it was not the 
most appropriate alternative for my purposes. Working to locate my research 
practice in social constructionism, I looked beyond co-operative inquiry, while 
influenced strongly by the positions-in-relation its collaborative research 
processes offered and by its clear privileging of practice. However I wanted a 
different position in analysis than its epistemology offered. 
Research design and method 
Introduction 
It was from counselling practice that I drew the substance of the data-generating 
processes. In Chapter Two I drew attention to narrative therapy's purposeful 
identification and recruitment of audiences in the rich storying of clients' lives 
(White, 1999). As a researcher I would also be taking up an audience role in 
working at a research site. I decided then to make use of the narrative practice of 
working with audiences in such a way that my research work would not be 
intrusive but rather productive. The reflecting team could offer a research-
focussed audience and a practice-focussed audience to the rich storying of 
counselling and supervision practice. The reflecting team, developed as a 
therapeutic process, also offered a very suitable site in which I could research 
supervision in a way that both met the ethical positions I sought and drew on my 
existing practitioner strengths. Reflecting team practice was central to the 
research proposal I developed. White suggested that counsellors and clients are 
"primary researchers" and those who gather more data in a more formal way are 
"secondary or supportive researchers" (1995, p.78). There was compelling 
evidence of the reflecting team process as an excellent site for primary research 
(Mclean, 1995a, 1995b, for example): this project extended the application of the 
reflecting team process into more formal research. 
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Steps in setting up the research project 
I proposed that I would form a group of counselling practitioners who would meet 
regularly over the course of a year for supervision. I would be a member of the 
group. Our supervision would be peer supervision, structured in a reflecting team 
format with alternating supervisors. The work of the group would be open to 
research. The reflecting team would produce an "already-open" site for research: 
as researcher I would not be "interrupting" the privacy of a one-to-one supervision 
relationship with my researcher activity. The group would be formed on the basis 
that it provided a research site for me to investigate narrative approaches in 
supervision: it would provide supervision for its members. 
The next step I took was to test my ideas out informally with some local 
counsellors whom I knew had an interest in supervision or in narrative practice. I 
was interested in whether they thought the project was a viable one for me to do, 
and if they thought it would be worthwhile for the local counselling community. 
This testing out was done by phone and in person with individuals. All those I 
consulted were enthusiastic and on the basis of their support and my own 
satisfaction that this process was practically possible and ethically sustainable, I 
wrote a formal proposal to the University's Higher Degrees Committee and made 
application to the Ethics Committee of the School of Education. 
With approval for the research to begin, I met with potential participants as a 
group on two occasions. On the first occasion I introduced in more detail my 
ideas for the project and sought the group's responses to those ideas and their 
thoughts about possibilities for the project. How would this work in practice? We 
talked, too, about practical matters, such as timing of meetings. It was at this 
point that my relationship with those counsellors whom I had consulted changed, 
as they formally became positioned as potential participants rather than as 
collegial informants. 
Subsequent to this meeting I developed drafts of the project's guiding documents. 
With ethical approval to proceed with the project, I mailed these draft documents 
to those who had come to the first meeting. The changed positioning of potential 
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participants was formalised as I provided a statement about the project, 
Information for participants (Appendix I). This statement outlined the 
background to the project. I also provided the Proposed ethical guidelines, 
Proposed structural guidelines, and Proposed supervision working agreement 
(Appendices II-IV). These documents all related to the work and ethics of the 
reflecting team supervision and the research processes. The documents were 
posted to potential participants, together with an initial consent form (Appendix 
V). On the basis of this initial consent form, potential participants could then opt 
in or out of the next stage of developing the project. That next stage involved a 
full morning meeting with potential participants to negotiate the project on the 
basis of the proposed documents and to clarify any further aspects of the project. 
At that meeting, too, we spoke together about reflecting team work, and 
arrangements were made for those present to view a video tape of a reflecting 
team process. The video was a personal one filmed by Michael White at an 
intensive training programme at the Dulwich Centre in Adelaide. Some viewed 
the video later, together with me, and others took it and viewed it in their own 
time. Reading material about reflecting team work was made available for the 
group members to take away (Andersen, 1995; White, 1995). It is important to 
note that there was not reflecting team supervision material that described the 
process we were to use, and work that I have drawn on in Chapter Four, such as 
Lowe and Guy (1996) was not available at that time. Those present at the meeting 
were then invited to consider whether they wished to participate in the project and 
were given a further consent form to sign. From that point the reflecting team 
supervision meetings got underway. 
Informed consent 
While recognising that the overall research design was mine, and the overall 
responsibility for the project as a doctoral study was mine, I wanted to take as 
collaborative a stance as possible in setting up the research. All potential 
participants had conducted counselling-related research at Masters level, and were 
familiar with the ethical requirements of research conducted within an academic 
context. The research community was also a professional counselling community, 
and I wanted the research guidelines to be subject to the approval of participants 
as well as to the School's Ethics Committee approval. For this reason, I used a 
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two-stage informed consent process whereby in the second stage of the process 
participants actively engaged in amending or accepting the guidelines I proposed 
and in developing a working agreement in regard to the supervision task. The 
Ethics committee endorsed the guidelines and agreements that the group finalised. 
There was a further significant consideration in terms of informed consent. When 
supervision is the object of study there are some less "witting" participants: the 
counselling clients of those counsellors who bring their work to supervision. In 
our day to day practices counsellors do not generally inform particular clients that 
we will be discussing our work with them in supervision. However, clients have 
the right to know that a counsellor is taking part in a supervision research project. 
I therefore asked participants to provide clients with a professional disclosure 
statement. I provided my clients with one too. Amongst other things, this 
statement informed clients of the counsellor's commitment to professional 
supervision, noting that the counsellor was participating in supervision in a group 
engaged in a research project on supervision. In this way clients were informed. 
One of the participants, Clare, noted that some of the counsellors she supervised 
in her private practice had asked that she not consult the reflecting team group 
about her work with them. 
Participants 
The initial selection of potential participants occurred as I was designing the 
study, asking myself who might be interested in such a project. I wrote a list of 
about ten local counsellors and supervisors, known to me within the local and 
nearby counselling communities, whom I might contact to test out the viability of 
such a project. I had taken a dual focus in my inquiry: narrative approaches to 
supervision and the New Zealand context. Because of this dual focus I had 
approached counselling colleagues whom I knew to have knowledge and 
experience of, or interest in, narrative approaches to counselling and supervision, 
or to have considerable experience as a supervisor and some sympathy towards 
narrative approaches. All those colleagues I approached initially to gauge 
response to the possibility of such a project supported me going ahead to propose 
the project, and they each expressed interest in participating in the development of 
the proposal. Because all expressed a keenness to participate that was beyond my 
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anticipation, I accepted their offers. I wanted to limit the group numbers, and I 
did not want to put myself into the position of selecting, even randomly, amongst 
a larger group of potential participants once the consultation had taken place. 
All those who participated in the initial meetings consented to join the project, and 
they all continued to participate throughout the year. One consequence of my 
selection process was that the group members were all women. Although there 
had been some men on the list of those with whom I thought to test out the 
project, those potential participants who were available by phone when I made my 
initial inquiry, to test out whether or not they thought the idea was workable, were 
all women. Group members who joined me came from a range of practice 
contexts, in community agency, education, and private practice settings. All had 
masters degrees in counselling, and had therefore undertaken research themselves. 
The ongoing research group was a closed group: it was not set up to include new 
members. Group members were all members of New Zealand Association of 
Counsellors and so bound by the Association's Code of Ethics and Code of 
Supervision (New Zealand Association of Counsellors Handbook, 2000). 
My approach to those potential participants whom I approached at first was 
guided in two ways. I have already noted my interest in working with "ordinary" 
practitioners, rather than consulting those regarded as expert, or leading figures. 
To work with ordinary counsellors and supervisors would live out the ethic of 
building communities of practice that narrative ideas offer. Secondly, my own 
migration of professional identity and my locations in the local counselling 
community had alerted me to the ways narrative therapy was held in some 
ambivalence in some groups in the local counselling community. By some 
they/we were seen to be a rather selective lot, and by others we were seen as 
misguided. At that time I was concerned not to add to a story of a professional 
community somewhat divided between narrative practitioners and "others", by 
selecting only those who were rigorously narrative in their practice. Rather, I 
wanted to stay in touch with the wider local practice community in this study of 
supervision. My interest was not only in narrative practice but also in 
understanding more about local supervision. I wanted to accommodate 
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multiplicity within the project: that fitted with a postmodern stance. I did, 
however, select to approach only those whom I knew were sympathetic to, 
interested in and had some familiarity narrative practice. The project was, after 
all, overtly designed to investigate narrative approaches to supervision. With the 
benefit of hindsight I am able to identify the complexity I invited in through the 
theoretically different and inclusive, rather than theoretically aligned (Lowe and 
Guy, 1996) and selective, invitations to participate. Overall, I think that aspect of 
the selection led to the project emphasising more of the local and less of the 
constructionist than I had anticipated. 
Dual role relationships are another particular complexity in engaging in this kind 
of research in a relatively small professional community. However, Tomm 
(1993), pointing out that dual relationships present both dilemmas and richness 
and are not necessarily problematic, offered useful guidelines. As a group we had 
varying relational connections with each other, which we each disclosed in one of 
the preliminary meetings when we were negotiating the project. For example, 
although, at an earlier time, I had been in a teaching relationship with two of the 
group members, we had since become professional colleagues. Two others had 
worked together in a counselling relationship many years earlier. In living and 
working in a small counselling community all of us brought prior successful 
experience in managing dual role relationships. As far as I am aware we went on 
to manage these relationships very well. 
My participation 
I was both participant and researcher. As a counsellor and as a counsellor 
educator I brought my own work to supervision, and I was a reflecting team 
member and a supervisor, in turn. I was also a researcher. As I have explained, 
my participation came out of my willingness to position myself amongst those I 
researched, to ask no more of others than I was willing to ask of myself. 
Recognising that participants would take a risk in putting their work under the 
scrutiny of their peers by engaging in this project, I wanted to acknowledge and 
support that professional action by engaging in it myself. On one hand this 
protected me from the angst of which Hoskins wrote: "When I hid behind my 
participant's experiences, I felt the angst of expecting her to do what I was 
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reluctant to do myself' (Hoskins, 2000, p.56). On the other hand the flattening of 
the research hierarchy produced by my participation may have obscured some of 
the authority I had in the project as researcher. There was also the authority that 
accompanied my position as a counsellor educator and academic. My role was 
also complex on a practical level. I was dealing with many processes. I set up 
video and audio-taping before every session, managing the changing and turning 
on and off of tapes during session; I prepared drinks for the start of every session, 
and food for the research meetings; I shepherded beginnings and kept the project 
going at the same time as I was a group member, participating as others were. 
Immediately after the research meetings I returned to my work with clients at the 
Student Counselling Service: I did not have the luxury of being immersed in 
research, but was immersed in practice some of which I was researching. 
At times I wrote to the group between meetings, recognising the commitment of 
participants, offering some comments about reflecting team processes, clarifying a 
permanent change of venue, explaining delays in sending transcripts, and giving 
other practical information. In the early stages I wrote the letters to support both 
relationship-building and confidence-building. I understood myself to also have a 
group leadership role, building and maintaining the group both for the purpose of 
supervision and for the purpose of research. 
Confidentiality for participants 
In the tasks of supervision, group members were bound by the NZAC Codes of 
Ethics and Supervision (2000). In terms of the supervision, team members needed 
the protection of confidentiality in ensuring their freedom to address problem 
issues in their practices. The ethical guidelines we negotiated offered possible 
responses for counsellors when material was inappropriate to bring to the 
supervision group. In Chapter Six I explain my approach to confidentiality for 
reflecting team members as I write this document. 
More critical was the need for confidentiality for the counselling clients of those 
counsellors who brought their work to supervision. Confidentiality of clients was 
protected by changing names and identifying details on transcripts and in this 
document. In one case a transcript was withdrawn from the study. As I have 
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written this document I have kept in mind the risk of identification, and for that 
reason I have not used one other transcript. 
Other ethical considerations 
In setting up the group, although I was already known to them all, I offered 
members information about my qualifications and abilities to lead both this group 
and the research process. The Ethical Guidelines for Group Counsellors 
(Association for Specialists in Group Work, in Corey & Corey, 1992), while not 
ethically binding, provided a useful reference point in considering the group 
dimensions of this project. I provided these guidelines as a resource to group 
members, to make clear my willingness to take the responsibility of maintaining 
ethical group practices. At the same time, I was clear in my expectation that we 
were forming a research community, and that I wanted to be a member of the 
group, as much as a leader of a project. In this I was recognising the skill and 
experiences group members brought to the project. 
There was a potential conflict of interest between the purposefully interrelated 
foci of the inquiry group, which was formed for the purposes of both supervision 
and research. I deliberately chose a process that did not dichotomise research and 
practice, but rather one that interwove them. Therefore I took part in the group as 
a participant; and I also took responsibility to monitor the balance and to ensure 
that both sets of foci were given appropriate attention, checking out with the 
group members, from time to time, that from their point of view both supervision 
needs and the research agenda were met. On one occasion when I felt keenly the 
competing foci, I chose to privilege my supervisor responsibilities over my 
researcher role. On that occasion, Anne, the participant who had been the 
counsellor while I had been the supervisor, commented in the Phase Four 
conversation: 
I wanted to say that I felt like you were very much fully there as my 
supervisor rather than as a person doing research. 
I refer to this instance of practice here to show how my response to the dilemma 
appeared to the participant. 
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'Preserving' the research conversations 
I audio and video recorded all meetings of the group, at all stages of the process. 
The processes described in the section that follows generated about fifty hours of 
supervision and research conversations and many hundreds of pages of transcript. 
Transcripts were made principally from audio recordings, but with reference to 
video recordings in some instances where audibility was a problem, or where a 
number of people were speaking over each other. Many transcripts were 
reworked a number of times; some small passages of conversation remained 
inaudible. Transcribing was done using standard prose punctuation, without 
sophisticated transcribing conventions. I chose this style to make the texts 
accessible to group members, since transcripts were available for group members 
for checking, and annotating if they chose, as each script was finished. I was 
concerned not to offer transcripts to participants in what Burman described as an 
"inaccessible representation of the interview that might compound further the 
potentially alienating effect of seeing spoken language written down in all its (in 
terms of written codes) untidiness [Stubbs, 1983]" (1994, p.64). The transcripts in 
this way became smoothed out text, with most of the smoothing out having been 
done by my hand, but some corrections having come from participants. The 
untidiness of speech has been smoothed out in this document for purposes of 
accessibility to practitioners, and for those more familiar with reading narrative 
text than text overlaid with transcribing conventions. Bird (2000) suggested that 
all transcription is fiction. I suggest that smoothed out transcript-text is no more 
partial, and no less scientific, than text overwritten with transcribing conventions, 
for both are fictions of one genre or another. 
At first I sent each group member a copy of the transcript for their own interest, 
and one to return to me if they wished to make any comments or corrections on it. 
After some time, with the agreement of the group, I sent only one copy, which 
could be read if the participant wished to read it, or annotated and returned if that 
was what they wished. Some participants regularly read and returned the scripts 
with brief notes, but for others the scripts were a burden that I did not feel 
comfortable imposing on them as busy practitioners. This was where the research 
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task was mine to carry, and my invitation to share interpretive authority was not 
possible given the time commitment that most participants had available. 
The reflecting team as a mode of inquiry 
With ethical approval and the initial negotiation of the project complete, the data 
generating phase of the project began, with the reflecting team process as its 
central research device. The reflecting team process gave me access to what I 
wanted to study, the practices of constructionist supervision and local supervision, 
and it offered opportunities for constructionist research practice. It thus kept the 
project aligned with my initial research questions. Like a co-operative inquiry 
group, it made possible the production of "knowledge in action for action" 
(Reason, 1988, p.13). As I have explained, reflecting team practice was 
developed as a therapeutic tool, rather than a research tool. It had been used in a 
variety of ways in therapy, in a health advocacy project (McLean, 1995), and in 
restorative practice (McLean, 1995). While Cox's (1997) doctoral study 
researched the use of the reflecting team as a training device for counselling 
students, I am not aware of the reflecting team being used as a formal academic 
research tool, to give access to practice. While I first thought of it as a device by 
which I could engage with supervision as a site of inquiry, I quickly saw that 
reflecting team supervision practice would be an aspect of the supervision inquiry 
as well. In introducing the reflecting team earlier in this document I emphasised 
its development in the process of live therapy work in teams (Andersen,1987); 
White's production of the practice of definitional ceremony (White, 1995, 1997, 
1999); and the use that has been made of reflecting teams in live training (Young 
et al., 1989; Davidson & Lusardi, 1991) and in solution-focussed supervision 
(Lowe & Guy, 1996, 1999). Here, I offer some comment on how I see the 
reflecting team working as a research device, before going on to describe in step-
by-step fashion the processes of data-generating that it enabled. 
The reflecting team offered a particular orientation to reflective practice and 
inquiry. As I have indicated, in many ways it dismantled the borders between 
practice and research. The reflecting team process offered us opportunity for 
moment by moment reflection on our work, and inquiry of each other about our 
practice. In these ways we were engaged in aspects of what White suggested was 
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primary research, that done by practitioners and their clients. And at the same 
time aspects of the secondary research, such as the transcripts and the videos that 
we watched in Research Meeting Two, immediately influenced the practice of 
participants. For example, Liz commented in Research Meeting One: 
I think that is also the value of having a transcript. I went away thinking, 
"How did these things happen?" But I was able to look back at the 
transcript and have some more ideas about that. 
In the moment Liz had not been in a position to answer her reflection on practice, 
but the research products supported her inquiry, which she was then able to take 
back to the team for further investigation. 
The processes of reflective practice were studied by Schon (1983) who drew 
attention to the practitioner processes of building theory from practice. He 
differentiated between espoused theory - the professional canon - and theory in 
action, explanations of practice that are not accounted for by professional theory. 
The emphasis of Schon' s work was on reflection on the moment by moment 
aspects of practice: the reflection upon practitioner action was through a close-up 
lens. Situated alongside an approach to therapy that acknowledges that moment 
by moment living is a social and cultural production, the research process of this 
study emphasised not only reflection on what practitioners do, but also the tools 
available to them for both practice and reflection. Attention was drawn to the 
discursive and situated processes of reflection, rather than to the reflective 
practitioner as autonomous actor. In this way the reflecting team offered a 
process of practitioner inquiry that produced reflective practice as discursive 
activity. 
The inquiry process: the reflecting team in supervision 
The reflecting team group provided professional supervision for its members 
(action) and researched that process (knowledge seeking and generating, for 
further action). The group met fortnightly on an ongoing basis for peer 
supervision from February to December, 1997. One meeting was cancelled at 
short notice when I was ill, as the technical setting up for recording was my 
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responsibility. However, when I was at an international conference other group 
members chose to continue to meet (the forewarning making it possible to 
organise recordings). I take this latter instance as evidence of both the 
commitment my colleagues offered to the project, and its value to them. Our 
meetings were held at the University, all but the first three in a room dedicated to 
the counsellor education programme and with a one-way screen. The room had 
not been used by any participants during their own counsellor education: for them 
it was a research and practice room, not a teaching room. 
The roles of supervisor, counsellor, and listening team members were rotated 
according to a schedule set up at the beginning of the year. On most occasions 
that we met for supervision, we held two separate reflecting team supervision 
processes, each with a different counsellor and supervisor. However, every third 
meeting a Review, which I shall describe shortly, was substituted for the second 
supervision. During each supervision set, the supervision took place in a four-




Firstly supervisor and counsellor spoke together, with the team 
behind the one-way screen. 
The second phase saw the counsellor and supervisor take up the 
listening position while the team reflected on and responded to the 
first phase conversation. 
Phase Three The counsellor and supervisor responded to the team's reflections 
and responses according to the counsellor's interest. The 
supervisor and counsellor concluded the supervision itself. 
Phase Four The whole group came together, reviewing the supervision process 
that had just occurred, and linking it with ideas about supervision 
practice. 
At this point I am aware of the fine line between a description of the research 
method and the reporting of results: the acts of production, producing, and the 
results of production, product, are not readily separated. I will leave sparse this 
description of the reflecting team process in order to highlight here the structure of 
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the process in which the inquiry group engaged, acknowledging that reflecting 
team process is only very thinly described. 
It would not be accurate, either, to assume that Phases One, Two and Three were 
the practice phases and Phase Four the research phase. Practice and inquiry were 
interwoven. While we were engaged in shared inquiry about the processes of 
supervision in Phase Four, inquiry was ongoing: that is what reflective practice is 
about. Throughout Phases One to Three practice was in the open and available to 
the inquiry process. At times I found myself taking a monitoring role in Phase 
Four if participants became captured back into the content of the supervision 
conversation and in this way re-engaging with the supervision. Interestingly, I 
found no comment in either the therapy or the training literature about this 
phenomenon, of returning to the content of the session. I considered it important 
to take this lead in clarifying for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to ensure that what 
had been consented to was followed and counsellors were not led back into 
conversations that had been "closed". Secondly my intervention meant that the 
research practice was given focus. Others took up this monitoring role on 
occasions too. 
I note here that Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine emphasise the dyadic work of 
Phases One and Three. Chapter Ten focuses on the reflecting team process and in 
particular on Phase Two. All the results chapters call on the Phase Four 
conversations as that was the time when the team took a metaposition, exploring 
from a number of positions the supervision work we had just done. 
Reviews: an inquiry process and managing the project 
Every third meeting the second supervision time was available to the group as a 
Review meeting. The meetings were unstructured: my intention in building them 
in was to have time when any aspect of the project could be talked about, 
problems or difficulties could be addressed, and I could check out participants' 
experience of the project. The group used the time to review ideas about 
supervision, to review their experiences and the group process, and to review a 
range of aspects of the project. For example, at one point I was very keen to 
change from having two supervision sessions each meeting, to having only one in 
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order to give more time for a more unhurried process. My suggestion was a 
matter for negotiation and in discussion other group members expressed 
preference to continue to have two supervision sessions each time. The group's 
preference prevailed. Practical matters, too, were attended to during this time. 
For example, we reorganised the schedule when someone was going to be away 
from a meeting. These Review meetings were also recorded, and the 
transcriptions contributed to the data. 
Research Meetings 
The inquiry group also met three times during the year, in June, September and 
December, when we engaged in a meta-level structured reflection that focussed on 
the research questions more directly and purposefully. On each of these occasions 
I used a different group process: this was part of my project of producing myself 
as a researcher. Just as one cannot produce oneself as a counsellor just by reading 
accounts of counselling and then reproducing those practices, one cannot produce 
oneself as a researcher just by reading accounts of research and reproducing those 
practices. The inquiry group provided a forum to learn how to do research at the 
same time as I learned about supervision. While it is more usual for thesis writers 
to extract their own learnings about research process into other documents (for 
example, Hanrahan, 1998; Mc William, 1993), my learnings at each of these 
research meetings influenced the project as it continued: hence their inclusion 
here. 
Prior to the first research meeting, I sent a letter about the meeting to the group, 
offering some questions for reflection, and some responses of my own to the 
question what the narrative metaphor offered to supervision. These responses 
were intended to show my good will, my willingness to also offer my thoughts, 
rather than to "hide behind" participants (Hoskins, 2000). However, with 
hindsight, I wonder to what extent my taking the position of first speaker (Cobb, 
1993) also closed down possibilities for others to speak, or to speak differently. 
As well, the conversation was wide ranging, perhaps because of the familiarity in 
the group, and at times I was not able to pick up points of interest before the 
conversation was taken elsewhere. I think, too, this was a function of my leaving 
the structure and focus much too wide. To my later disappointment as I 
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transcribed and analysed, points of interest to me were left undeveloped because 
of my reluctance to interrupt and to direct the research conversation more clearly. 
I had wanted to be respectful of the group's interest: I did not know what 
possibilities might be brought forth in a relatively unstructured conversation. 
However, I now believe that interruption to thicken particular accounts could have 
yielded richer data than this first Research meeting produced. 
Another significant aspect of Research Meeting One was that to a large extent I 
positioned myself as participant: on reviewing the transcripts there were moments 
when I wished I had employed inquiry rather than offering an opinion. My 
participation, in inserting comments and ideas as other participants did, did not 
serve my research interests as well as inquiry might have. 
At the second of the three research meetings, I offered more structure, both in 
terms of process and content, having asked the group's permission to proceed in a 
more structured way. For the first half of the meeting I had three foci on which 
the discussion focussed: preparing for supervision; workload monitoring; 
experiences in the project of reflecting team work. The first of these foci came 
out of my interest in the work counsellors do to contribute to constructing local 
supervision relationships: I was interested to know what practices participants 
used in their preparation for supervision. This inquiry addressed my third 
research question about education for supervision. I have taken the position that it 
is a task of counsellor education to educate counsellors to use supervision well. In 
asking the inquiry team about the practices they employed in preparing for 
supervision I was seeking a resource for this aspect of counsellor education. The 
second question, about workload-monitoring, arose out of Clare's speaking of her 
experiences of workload monitoring earlier in the project (see Chapter Seven). 
Since I was not familiar with such practices in supervision I was interested to hear 
of its history in her work and of experiences others might have had with that 
practice. This interest addressed the research question relating to local 
supervision practices. My third area of investigation, our experiences of the 
reflecting team process, was intended to help us story further these practices as 
they were being employed in the project. This interest came out of my first 
research question about constructionist approaches in supervision. In the 
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Research Meeting, I focussed my questions on Phases Two and Four, those phases 
more different from the dyadic supervision with which all participants were 
familiar. I asked what practices counsellors had experienced as helpful in those 
phases in our work together thus far. As part of this conversation I spoke of my 
preference for the team engaging in dialogue in this phase. (In Phase Two 
supervisor and counsellor assume listening positions and the team reflects upon 
and responds to the Phase One conversation.) At that time we were still 
struggling to bring, to the Phase Two conversation, the dialogic focus that 
distinguishes narrative approaches to reflecting team practice (White, 1995). It is 
not unusual to have to work to avoid monologue at this phase (Lax, 1995; White, 
1995). I was keen that we work to develop a conversational style where we 
engaged in inquiry about and response to each other's responses to the Phase One 
conversation, and I wanted to make my interest transparent to the group. These 
three matters then were the focus of the content of the research inquiry in 
Research Meeting Two: preparing for supervision, workload monitoring, and the 
reflecting team process. 
As well as offering this clear content focus I offered a very clear structure for the 
process in this second meeting. During the first half of the meeting, I used the 
style employed in the Public Conversations Project (Chasin, Herzig, Roth, Chasin, 
Becker, Stains, 1996; Public Conversations Project, 1997). This strategy was 
designed to open speaking space for difference in contexts where there may be 
widely differing views. In this style each group member, in tum, responds to a 
specific question, with pauses before answering begins, and between speakers. I 
introduced this strategy in Research Meeting Two in an attempt to slow the 
conversation, not because of problematic differences, but in order to give each 
speaker attention, and time to make points fully, without interruption. It meant 
that I heard from everyone in response to each question I asked. I, too, answered 
each question, again positioning myself as participant as well as researcher so as 
not to "hide behind" participants. Some group members commented afterwards 
that they had found the strategy overly structured. However, I found the data that 
were generated offered more sustained attention to particular ideas. 
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In the second half of this second Research Meeting, I showed selected excerpts 
from earlier reflecting team supervision videos, providing transcripts. The 
selections were moments that had offered me puzzlement or pleasure or held my 
interest in some particular way, and were chosen to include brief examples of the 
work of all participants. In watching the videos I asked participants to comment 
on some particular questions, focussed on the themes of preferred practices, and 
dialogical space. For example, I asked, "What do you notice that you'd 
encourage the supervisor to continue? And why would you?" These two 
questions invited the inquiry group into positions as audience to preferred 
practices. My intention was to provide a process of acknowledgement of certain 
practices in ways that would bring them further to our attention and so enhance 
our engagement with them. However, although I was not aware of it as a problem 
at the time, I came to see that these questions could be understood to have invited 
normative evaluation of each other's practice. Group members did not take up 
this invitation, however. I also asked the group: "What ways of speaking invite 
the other person into a position of dialogical partner?" This question was another 
attempt to influence the group towards a more dialogical practice. I positioned 
myself as coach and project director in these actions of drawing attention to those 
practices. 
Participants were more interested in watching the videos than in reading the 
transcripts. It might perhaps have been helpful if I had sent these out ahead of the 
meeting. Watching the video, Liz commented: 
What I'm seeing on the screen that I don't see reading (the transcript) is 
the struggle to make sense. 
Liz's comment speaks to the relationship between transcript-text and video-text, 
to which I shall attend in Chapter Six. 
I asked participants to take the transcripts from this meeting and to make on them 
any annotations they wished. All transcripts were returned to me but they yielded 
a great deal less data than our conversation about the videos did. Perhaps this was 
not surprising given the time-consuming nature of annotating transcripts. 
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Although I consistently made transcripts available to make a place for and call on 
participant authority, my evaluation of this practice is that it is not appropriate to 
ask participants in a project of this size, and indeed in many research projects. 
The project confirmed for me that it behoves me as researcher to do some 
preliminary analysis before asking for further engagement from participants with 
materials generated in transcription. 
In the third Research Meeting I invented an inquiry process that took on some 
aspects of reflecting team work. This was another effort to offer some structure to 
the inquiry and to experiment further with the reflecting process as a research tool. 
I interviewed participants in pairs, in rotation. As I interviewed Clare and Kate, 
Liz and Anne took the listening position. Then I interviewed Liz and Anne while 
Kate and Clare listened. Each succeeding pair was invited to respond to both 
what they had heard from the others, and to respond to particular inquiry from me. 
In this way, again, inquiry was layered upon inquiry, response upon response. I 
remained firmly in a position of inquiry as interviewer, a position much more 
productive of richly developed data. At times, too, the interview pairs with whom 
I was speaking engaged in inquiry of each other, a practice familiar during other 
aspects of the project. 
Certainly this was the research meeting that provided me with the richest material; 
it also seemed to offer participants more opportunity to speak more richly of 
difference. I wondered how much the structure had supported that speaking and 
claim that it did make some conversations possible. One such conversation is the 
deconstruction of the celebration metaphor, explored in Chapter Eleven. But then, 
this meeting was also at the end of the project, so those effects might be expected 
because of the experiences that had been shared together and the relationships that 
had been built. 
At the end of this meeting, we spent time together as a group, bringing to a close 
our work together as an inquiry and supervision group. We then went out for 
lunch. 
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Approaching the analysis 
In many ways this data-generating phase was straight-forward for me: it drew on 
the strengths I brought to the project, and used skills that were familiar to me as a 
counsellor and supervisor. But it was in the struggle to know how to go on from 
here that my socialisation into the position of researcher took on new dimensions: 
in discursive terms, I had to learn to position myself in new discourse practices. 
I began the project with a huge concern for an ethical research practice, expressed 
as a concern to treat respectfully those who participated with me, and to give them 
more than I took from them. Drawing on counselling practice ethics in engaging 
with the participants in the project was reasonably unproblematic for me. 
However, the challenge in producing myself as an academic researcher came 
when I was searching, in post-reflecting team phase, for an ethical path on which 
to continue to pursue the project. What sorts of analytic and re-presenting 
practices could best serve both the community professional practice community 
and the academic assessment one? For Lincoln's comment resonated for me: 
Our friends and critics alike demand that they see evidence that our 
representational and "othering" practices have not done violence to our 
respondents and their lives. They look for proof against our having acted 
colonially. (1997, p.48) 
I tum next to an account of the steps towards generation of an ethical and 
satisfying approach to the data analysis. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has located this project in an ongoing discussion on the relationships 
between counselling practice and research. It has demonstrated how I have used 
counselling practice to inform the research method. It has set out the ethical 
positions that produced the project, emphasising the importance placed upon the 
respectful positioning of participants. The tiers of inquiry that generated data 
have been outlined: the four phase reflecting team supervision meetings, regular 
unstructured Review Meetings, and the three meta-level Research Meetings. 
Chapter Five 119 
Chapter six 
Producing an analysis 
A large part of doing discourse analysis is a craft skill, more like bike riding or 
chicken sexing than following the recipe for a mild chicken rogan josh. 
(Potter, 1997, pp.147-8) 
Introduction 
This chapter takes up the story of the research method, focusing on data analysis. 
Firstly, the chapter explores the complexities I experienced around the analytic 
task, produced by my positioning in relationship with my colleagues. I show how 
I needed to grapple with the theoretical question of what data texts are before I 
could let go of concerns about the ethics of my research relationships that were 
perhaps more informed by my humanist past than my constructionist present. As 
Davies suggested, 
we cannot easily shed ... the interpretive frameworks that we took up as 
our own in learning to understand and use humanist discourses not just as 
social scientists, but as participants in the everyday world. (1991, p.4 7) 
I do not regret my caution about my use of the transcript-texts for that caution was 
informed, too, by an emphasis on relationship associated with my practitioner 
positioning. The second focus of the chapter is a discussion of the field of 
discourse analysis in order to locate this study and its analytic method in relation 
with that field. I then describe the detail of the approaches to analysis that I 
employed, including the particular analytic properties of text on which I focused. 
An introduction to the ensuing chapters follows, before the chapter concludes with 
a reflection on the acts of writing this document. 
Working for an ongoing ethical relation 
Because of the importance I place on accounting for the ethics of my practice I 
decided not to apply the principle of parsimony to this re-telling about the paths I 
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took in generating an analytic process. Rather, I employ an ethic of transparency: 
just as a narrative therapist situates their questions by informing a client about the 
thinking that has produced those questions, so I situate my analysis by making 
explicit the authority I am taking up here. The thick descriptions favoured by a 
storying therapy are perhaps more appropriate in narrative research accounts than 
parsimony. 
The principle of 'parsimony' in psychological theorising, in which the 
simplest, most economical explanation of phenomena is favoured, is just 
one expression of the attempts to filter out the messiness of mental life and 
the complex accounts we develop to make sense of it. (Parker, 1999c, 
p.27) 
"Contradiction, inconsistency, ambiguity and ambivalence [that] are the stuff of 
human psychology", suggested Parker (1999c, p.27): this account acknowledges 
that contradiction, inconsistency, ambiguity and ambivalence are also the stuff of 
this research practice. 
With the participatory phase of the project over and my position changed from co-
researcher to sole researcher, the social relations of knowledge production 
continued to be a central concern. Participants' comments, both within the 
research data and informally, indicated that I had been successful in my desire to 
give back to participants and the professional community at the data-generating 
phase of the project. And as I moved on in the analytic work I wanted to maintain 
the ethic of respectful relation that had been practised during the inquiry group. 
However, I was no longer interacting with the project members, but with data 
texts. Proceeding on the basis that these texts were moral goods (Martin, 1995) 
took me into a new level of understanding, of what it might mean to be an 
academic researcher using constructionist theory, that the participatory phase had 
not. To employ the notion of the constitutive force of discourse, in spoken 
dialogue and in participation with others in counselling or supervision or teaching, 
was familiar practice. However, this history of dialogical engagement left me 
rather more tentative than was helpful when it came to taking up the authority to 
tell a story of the constitutive force of discourse in relation with transcript texts 
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whose contingency was not necessarily visible to others who would read that 
story. 
When I had designed the research process, with my interest in practice I had 
imagined that the data texts would be full of straightforward exemplars of 
constructionist supervision practice that I could transfer, relatively 
unproblematically, to this document. I would thereby hold them up to the 
counselling community as practice that might be followed. In that way I would 
directly acknowledge and honour what participants had offered the project. And I 
would not be in danger of upstaging participants by taking up an expert position 
on their contributions, using my voice to drown out theirs. Rather, I could set out 
a range of discourse practices in supervision, demonstrating preferred 
constructionist practice. But it was not that simple once I had the texts we 
produced. My position as researcher became complex in ways that I had not 
anticipated. There was the matter of competing ethical principles when I was 
considering what I might privilege in the analysis and in this re-presentation. One 
aspect of this dilemma was noted, but not resolved, by Burman (1992), in a study 
of counselling interaction. She acknowledged two competing principles: on one 
hand, her political responsibility to deconstruct practices of professional power 
and, on the other, the relational responsibility to the research subject who made 
those practices visible, especially when that person was a counsellor who was her 
colleague and friend. Should Burman as researcher uphold the principle of not 
doing harm in terms of the counsellor, the research subject, who had entrusted 
Burman with access to her practice and with whom she was in a professional and 
a personal relationship; or should she critique the practices of power she had 
observed in the therapy in order to promote justice? In some ways I had made this 
question less complex for myself than Burman, or Hanrahan (1998) and Hoskin 
(2000) both of whose unease with the power relation of researcher and participant 
I quoted in the last chapter. For I had put my own counselling and supervision 
practice into the research as a participant: my own practice was also available for 
analysis. Nonetheless, the disorderly practice that was represented in the 
transcript-texts presented me with some difficult questions about how I might use 
texts that did not always offer the straightforward exemplars of practice I had 
imagined. White wrote about therapy as a disorderly process (1995), but there is 
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little evidence of disorderliness in his written accounts of his work. Should I 
present the disorderliness of the supervision practice and professional reflection of 
the inquiry group that the transcript texts made visible? And if I did show the 
disorderliness of our practice would that represent the responsible exercise of 
researcher authority in the participant-researcher relationship? 
These questions were about the status of the transcript-texts. What were the texts 
and how I was to understand the relationships between those texts and the 
participants and myself? There were more questions about representation than 
there were readily available answers. The answers that had seemed clear to my 
counsellor-self before the research began or those that seem unproblematic to 
many discourse analytic researchers did not satisfy me. My author-ship was not 
to be at the cost of rendering other participants objects of study, yet the texts our 
project had produced had become my objects of study. Where do the people who 
produced the texts go, when the texts become the object of study, I asked. What 
happens to my relationship with other participants when I cannot but provide 
further re-interpretation in analysis and re-presentation? How much play could I 
find in the space between an understanding of the selves of the participants as 
essential and an understanding of participants as decentred participants in 
discourse? How would I work with the transcript-texts as moral goods? 
I was not only worried by the question of the re-presentation of the people, my 
colleagues, who had first spoken the words that were now written down as 
transcript texts. I was also disturbed by what I experienced at first as the 
transcript-texts' incompleteness compared with the live conversations, the video-
texts, and my memories of the live conversations. I will address in tum these two 
points: my concerns about representation and my sense of the incompleteness of 
the transcript-texts. 
I wanted to remain in responsible and ethical relationship with those whose 
actions had produced the transcript-texts, even as I worked a particular 
interpretive overlay upon the texts. "It is persons [my emphasis] who actively 
employ their brains and hands as implements or tools for the work of thought and 
action" (Harre, 2000, p.744). The texts with which I was working were produced 
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by my colleagues, persons with whom I was and am in relation. In data analysis, 
suggested Parker, 
we need a complex humanism, a good deal of interpretation underpinned 
by theories that take power seriously and a critical reflexivity that is 
embodied and grounded in forms of practice. (1999c, p.34) 
I did not think that a complex humanism was what I needed. But I was sure that if 
I was to "take power seriously" I could not but attend responsibly to how I re-
produced the texts which arose out of the lived speaking of colleagues with whom 
I had worked in the inquiry group. As I discussed some aspects of this dilemma, 
as I then understood it, with participants in Research Meeting Three, Liz 
suggested 
Our voices are still there [as you continue with your research work], even 
though we're not. 
I was part of the production of the texts under consideration; as I read them I also 
hear the voices that produced them. Thus the texts with which I engage are 
imbued with meanings beyond those I can re-present to readers who first see the 
texts and then, if the texts are heard, will hear them in ways they have not been 
heard before. At Research Meeting Three, Anne advised me 
It's also a really good learning process somehow, isn't it, looking at the 
meanings that we might carry forth [in our speaking] that are invisible or 
aren't that 'up front' in our language. 
Anne was giving me permission to take up interpretive authority, to use the texts 
in ways that might not have been visible at that time as possibilities. At that 
meeting, too, Kate spoke to having faith in my "ethical and respectful stance". I 
do not take such faith lightly. Nor do I take lightly the task of theorising my 
choice of position in relation with the transcript-texts. While accepting that the 
transcript-texts are not the people who spoke them, I nonetheless hold that they 
must be used in ways that respect the integrity of those people who made the 
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production of transcript-texts possible in their professional conversations in this 
project. Thus a person:text ambivalence was always before me in my approach to 
analysis. 
The second dilemma of re-presentation arose out of what I at first experienced as 
the incompleteness of the transcript-texts. To make analysis possible we use 
transcription into written mode (Parker, 1994; Polkinghome, 1995). The 
recordings on audio and video and the transcribing meant that there had already 
been layers of translation before I took up the task of analysis: from spoken text, 
to audio and video text, to written texts which were worked up a number of times 
for some sort of 'accuracy' of re-presentation. However, the move from 
practitioner to analyst that I needed to make in my engagement with the transcript 
texts was not easily accomplished. It took me many readings and some video-
viewings to understand the texts as other than mirrors of practice that could be 
appreciated or improved or developed or held up as models: my counsellor-and-
supervisor-and teacher-self responded more readily than my researcher-self. 
Similarly, in Research Meeting Two when we watched video excerpts together, 
participants, too, tended to evaluate their practice as an instance of their own 
practice for what else might have been possible, rather than taking a more 
reflective, inquiring look at what was happening in an instance of the discourse 
practice of supervision. I have already noted Liz's comment during Research 
Meeting Two: 
What I'm seeing on the screen that I don't see reading [the transcript] is 
the struggle to make sense. 
Liz's comment expressed the sense that much of the work that is going on in talk 
goes on in what is around the words. The work goes on, for example, in the ways 
in which meaning is conveyed by gesture; in the storylines that have been 
produced as part of the group culture and that are invoked by indirect reference; 
or in the general discursive context. In spoken conversation the work to produce 
meaning is done with more than spoken words. I was particularly vexed by the 
dissonance between written and spoken texts: my positioning as counsellor, 
familiar with oral-aural mode, meant that I read the transcriptions as 'lacking'. I 
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read them as lacking a sense of register, of tone, of intonation; they failed to pick 
up interruptions at times or the speed of speaking, or many speakers speaking 
together but not quite at once; they did not represent physical orientation of the 
conversational partners or the signals they gave each other about beginning and 
tum-taking and many other aspects of communication. For these signals tend to 
be read, to be part of spoken text, in what Shatter referred to as "immediate, 
precognitive and spontaneous, feelingful way(s)" in the "wordless responsive-
responding to each other" of the dialogues of those "in living, embodied, 
responsive contact with each other's activities" (2000, p. 107). Shatter refers not 
only to gesture and so on, but particularly to the discursive context and what 
Bakhtin calls "answerability" (Shatter, p.111), responsiveness to the calls to us to 
respond in particular ways. Calls that were visible in live and embodied dialogue 
were not necessarily visible in the transcript texts with which I was now working. 
While the transcript-texts echoed for me with the conversations from which they 
had been derived, they told of new and different conversations as I worked to 
produce an analysis. Whether I described the interaction or presented it in 
transcript form, I could not but accept that, far from being "true to the text" (a 
phrase from Parker [1999b, p.2] to which I shall return) of the original 
conversation, these transcript-texts were a different form of data, and the only 
form practicable in this context. Transcripts were more than translation: they 
were new and different texts. 
The transcript-texts did not show many of the subtle and nuanced ways of relating 
(Shatter, 1996, p.51), beyond words, that we had employed as we spoke together 
and that we used to know how to go on in conversation. In not showing these 
aspects of the dialogue the transcript- texts interrupted those subtleties and 
nuances with which we were very familiar. What is important about this 
interruption is that it began to draw attention to and emphasise other aspects of 
subtlety and nuance not readily visible to us in the moments of our working. 
Anne had offered me authority to investigate and interpret these when she had 
said: It's also a really good learning process somehow, isn't it, looking at the 
meanings that we might carry forth (in our speaking) that are invisible or aren't 
that 'up front' in our language. Parker, in more poetic terms, suggested that 
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written text "allows us to bring into focus connotations that normally just twinkle 
at the margins of our consciousness" (1994, p.96). I began to understand that my 
interpretive position was not perhaps as difficult as I had thought. I could find a 
legitimate position from which to interrogate the transcript text when my 
investigation of the subtlety and nuance of those texts was in the cause of 
understanding practice differently in order to enhance practice. I would do that by 
calling attention to the discourse practices at work producing us as certain kinds of 
counsellors and supervisors and team members. And I could do that without 
reducing my colleague's words/actions to "discursive data for scientific 
dissection" (Martin, 1995). For there are many reasons why there is more to see 
than we are seeing moment by moment, even in reflective professional 
conversations. Calling on Wittgenstein, Shotter (1996) suggested a number of 
reasons for things being difficult to see in the moments of speaking: the 
familiarity of the lens one uses; the speed with which things go by; the 
inexpressibility of that which is going on in the background; a seeking for 
explanations at the level of the general rather than the specific. The reflecting 
team process, in opening supervision to collaborative research, offered us 
opportunities to see things other than through familiar lenses and to interrogate 
specific instances of practice; the transcript-texts offered further opportunity for 
slowing down, unpacking the familiar, working to express what was going on in 
the background, and to seek specific explanations. All this produced a deepened 
understanding for me of the import of a discursive approach. In Chapter One I 
pointed out the importance of the distinction that Davies drew: discourse, rather 
than identifying a speaker's "real nature", "has effects" (1998). I used this idea to 
theorise my engagement with the texts: participants were both colleagues, 'real' 
people whom I wanted to treat with respect, and they were participants in 
discourse practices. As they had participated in the research the vocabularies of 
action of particular supervision discourses had called them as counsellors or 
supervisors to particular positions (Crocket, 1998a, 1999a). Just as my analysis 
would not identify and diagnose the "real nature" of speakers, nor would it 
identify and diagnose what was "really going on" as we had spoken together. 
Rather, by attending to that which may have been "twinkling at the margins" or 
inexpressible in the moment I would be attending to the texts in new and different 
ways. My analysis would notice that which had not yet been noticed, and tell a 
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story that had not yet been told about it, and then offer that account to others for 
evaluation of its usefulness for practice. And, just as the presence of families to 
hear the reflections of a team helps guide professionals to speak respectfully, the 
sense of participants voices still being with me would support me to "take power 
seriously" and to exercise a "critical reflexivity" (Parker, 1999c, p.34), as I 
worked with the transcript texts. 
In Chapters Seven to Eleven, I pay attention to subtlety and nuance in the 
transcript-texts as new and different texts from the live conversations and video 
and audio recordings from which they were produced. That attention does not 
undo the warmth and respect of the subtlety and nuance of understanding in the 
"live" texts that helped us to know how to go on with each other in the moment, 
and to produce the project with the satisfaction that we did. That account is one 
that I also carry with me, although it is not woven thoroughly into the visible 
layers of this document. 
In approaching the transcript texts, as new and different texts, my looking has 
taken on new forms to read different nuances. I have looked through less familiar 
researcher lenses; time has been slowed, and texts have been read and reread and 
read again; background and foreground, margins and centre have been 
considered; and very local meanings have been held up alongside more general 
locations. And the transcript-texts have been investigated as instances of 
discourse practice while I have held in mind those who worked with me in the 
professional practice that generated the texts. 
Some might argue that the sophisticated transcribing conventions of 
conversational analysis might have re-produced texts more representational of the 
subtlety and nuance of conversation than the bare, smoothed-out texts I have used. 
However, as I argued in Chapter Five the transcribing conventions of 
conversational analysis, that require familiarity for interpretation, would create 
greater accessibility problems for readers, particularly the counselling 
professionals whom I had set out to serve. Rather than "restoring" a sense of the 
spoken, they would generate yet another interpretive layer that would not serve 
my purpose. Further, texts that use conversational analysis transcribing 
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conventions are no more representational than the smoothed out texts that I have 
used: rather, each version emphasises different aspects of dialogue. 
A discursive approach: situating this work 
Discourse analysis tends to involve improvisation on the basis of the particular 
kinds of data texts one has to work with (Parker, 1999b; Phillips, 1999). To do 
discourse analysis is to employ a "craft skill", suggested Potter (1997): just as one 
rides a bike, one does discourse analysis by getting on and practising, responding 
to local road and traffic conditions, adjusting one's practice as one encounters the 
challenges of action, and adjusting one's practice depending upon the kind of bike 
one is riding. The task is more readily understood in the doing of it than in the 
describing of it. The emphasis of discourse analsyis, as with co-operative inquiry, 
is on action for action. Potter's analogy was a comparative one: discourse 
analysis was more like riding a bike than following a formulaic recipe, he 
suggested. (Those for whom the mild chicken rogan josh, to which Potter 
referred, is indigenous culinary practice might not make the distinction Potter 
made: all claims are situated.) There were no recipes nor even templates in 
discourse analytic literature that I might follow. My work, from inside 
counselling practice and with its direct emphasis on articulating effective practice 
and enhancing practice, was rather different from other discourse analytic studies 
(for example, Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Burman, 1996; Fairclough, 1992; 
1995; Gunnarson, Linell, & Nordberg, 1997; Parker, 1994, 1999b; Potter, 1997; 
Willig, 1999b, 2000). Kogan and Gale pointed out the scarcity of material that 
examined the "management of talk" by postmodern therapists (1997, p.102), a 
point echoed by Weingarten (1998). Kogan and Gale's, and Drewery, Monk and 
Winslade's (2000) investigations of the management of talk in therapeutic 
processes used texts made from videotaped conference presentations by Michael 
White, and Drewery and McKenzie (1999) drew on texts selected from 
McKenzie's practice and written up in his masters thesis (McKenzie, 1993). The 
difference I want to draw attention to is that these texts (demonstrating therapeutic 
practice) were already in the public domain and were called upon by these authors 
to demonstrate particular points those authors wanted to make about therapy. In 
contrast, as a research study my analysis would decide what transcript-texts would 
be selected and put into the public domain; they were not available to be 
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otherwise selected from. Deciding not only to draw on exemplars of preferred 
practice, but to show, to edit in, some of the difficulties of practice was an ethical 
decision I made in response to the particular situation of this work as I improvised 
an approach to discourse analysis. 
My study was further differentiated from other discourse analytic inquiry, both in 
the location in which the texts were generated and the purposes for which they 
were generated. Many inquiries study sites of structural inequality through the 
use of "forms of inquiry that are 'interrupters' of the social relations of 
dominance" (Lather, 1991, p.92). An emancipatory agenda (Willig, 1998, 1999a; 
Wodak, 1997) is behind the work of many researchers who put discourse analytic 
modes to work. The focus of researcher interest and analysis then appears to 
produce research from one of two stances. The first stance offers an investigation 
of the practices of power by which domination is produced and reproduced. The 
persons whose lives/practice become texts in this field might be said to be those 
who occupy the dominating position: social worker in relation with client, for 
example in Hall, Sarangi, and Slembrouck's (1997) text. From the second stance, 
a researcher investigates effects of domination and resistances to domination and 
opens space for the voices of the dominated, whose lives become the texts studied. 
Patai's study (1988, in Lather, 1991) of the lives of "ordinary Brazilian women" 
(Lather, p.93) might be an example of this second stance. Wodak suggested that 
critical discourse analysis intervenes "on the side of dominated and oppressed 
groups and against dominating groups" (1997, p.174). 
To locate my work on one side or other of a dominating-dominated binary was not 
helpful. The power relations of supervision are very complex. While I claimed in 
Chapter Four that I chose to work with ordinary practitioners, the counsellors in 
my study were not ordinary in the way that Lather and Patai indicated. The 
relation of power between (professional) counsellor and client disturbs the 
ordinariness of counsellors; it does not, however, negate it completely. There is a 
relation of power between supervisor and counsellor that is intended, in its 
regulatory function, to moderate the relation of power between counsellor and 
client; supervision can do no more than moderate that relation of power. And in 
that moderating another relation of power exists, that between counsellor and 
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supervisor. In this project that power relation was disturbed through the rotation 
of roles in peer supervision, and by the research process itself. That process 
added other relations of power. My point is that supervision was not to be studied 
in only one dimension. In Chapter Three I showed how the literature has tended 
to construct the supervision relationship in such a way that the counsellor is in a 
subjected position: however, supervision was not to be studied simply for its 
regulatory function, for its use as a technology by which the counselling 
profession mediates the practice of its members, providing for the public, for 
funders, for employers, a "quality assurance" mechanism in its normative 
function. Although there is a relation of power between counsellor and 
supervisor, I would not simply study counsellors as a dominated group, who in 
supervision, a site of structural inequality, submit themselves to domination, to the 
professional gaze personified in the person of the supervisor. At the same time I 
did not want to be blind to the possible construction of supervision as a site 
wherein the profession conspires to shore up its dominance in respect to clients 
and others not present: counsellors cannot be studied in supervision only in a 
subjected position because of the power relations of their work with clients. And 
as the study has already shown it does not make theoretical sense to conceptualise 
supervision other than as a practice of power. However, its construction and 
production is complex. I understood supervision to be a complex site of 
contestation, an interdiscursive site of struggle to perform individual professional 
identity in dialogic relation, and an interdiscursive site of struggle for the 
performance of the profession's claims to professionalism. It was on these terms 
that I wanted to interrogate the transcript-texts, recognising that the transcript-
texts were part of a study that had enabled me to conceive of supervision on these 
terms. There was a recursive relationship between the study and the terms on 
which it was produced. 
A further distinction about forms of discourse analysis is perhaps more significant 
to this study, although I do not limit myself to its terms either. Rose (1998) 
presented this distinction in terms of an analytic focus on "language as 
communication" or "language as assemblage" (p.177). He argued that 
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subjectification is not to be understood by locating it in a universe of 
meaning or an interactional context of narratives, but in a complex of 
apparatuses, practices, machinations, and assemblages within which 
human being has been fabricated, and which presuppose and enjoin 
particular relations with ourselves. ( p.10) 
According to this distinction there is a first set of discourse analytic approaches, 
allied with ethnography and conversational analysis that work at a local level and 
investigate instances of discourse practice, considering such questions as how talk 
is used to produce action and how identities are formed in talk. A second set 
emphasises what Rose refers to as political-constitutive aspects of language with 
its focus on systems of social practice in which power and knowledge are 
inextricably linked. Thus this set of discourse analytic approaches investigates the 
history of how a discourse has come to and comes to constitute particular objects 
and particular subjects, making explicit the relations of power in the social 
practices thus produced (Burr, 1995; Miller, 1997; Potter, 1997, Willig, 1999c, 
2000.). Both sets of approaches offered interrogation of my transcript-texts that 
was productive. For, I argue, the improvisation of an approach depends in part on 
the purpose for which inquiry is undertaken. My interest was in supervision 
practice, and I did not see one set of approaches as exclusive of the other in 
informing supervision practice. The two approaches could be "mutually 
informative" (Miller, 1997, p.41) to answer my practice-focussed research 
questions. 
The question should not be, 'How does this version of deconstruction 
measure up against deconstruction?' but, 'What can this version of 
deconstruction accomplish?' (Jay, 1992, p.70). 
An analysis that interrogated my transcript-texts both as instances of "language as 
assemblage" and as "language as communication", as political-constitutive action 
and as meaning-making action, offered a particular understanding for the practice 
of supervision. For that understanding interrupted the taken for granted place and 
work of supervision by investigating supervision-talk/transcript-texts in terms of 
assemblage. And at the same time it located that theorising in instances of 
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practice, demonstrating on practice terms in practice situations aspects of the 
management of supervision talk in the performance of professional identity. In 
employing both approaches to discourse analysis, I emphasised the ways each 
informs the other (Burkitt, 1999; Miller, 1997) on the basis that "individual sites 
of text" and "the broader context of textuality" (Lowe, 1999, p.79, original 
emphasis) are each produced by the other. 
Engaging with transcript texts 
To construct the readings I go on to offer as this account continues, I had engaged 
in lengthy preliminary analyses. Potter pointed out that preliminary analyses have 
more to do with managing the quantity of data, that codings given in preliminary 
analyses are regarded as provisional, and that discourse analytic work is 
unconstrained about the inclusion or exclusion of particular extracts (1997, p.158). 
As I began I engaged in a preliminary analysis both across and within the 
transcript texts. Having read and reread the transcript-texts and reviewed the 
videotapes, I began annotating individual transcripts in a spontaneous way in 
response to points of interest as I read. At that point my focus was practice, 
particularly the constructionist practice of my first research question, and I was 
particularly interested in practices that might be reproduced as exemplars. 
Overall, these first annotations were guided by the question: what questions, or 
answers, for practice does this (instance of interest) raise, and how might I 
theorise these questions, or answers? As I read I noted such moves as how 
supervision agendas were introduced by counsellors; links between the personal 
and the professional in supervision talk; positioning of counsellor and supervisor 
in relation. Once all the texts had been read, I re-read them one after another, this 
time gathering together common themes under headings such as ethics; different 
theories and different conversations; speaking about clients. When that series of 
readings had been completed, across all supervision texts I considered, for 
example, how supervision agendas were presented and negotiated; and within 
each text I observed the detail of negotiation as counsellor and supervisor worked 
to navigate towards common points of dialogue (Shotter, 1996) to construct a 
shared sense of purpose for their meeting. I had proposed that a storying therapy 
invokes a storying supervision, that constructionism could produce supervision as 
a storying of professional identity and practice as practice and identity each 
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produced the other. I considered the ways in which this proposition was played 
out or disconfirmed in the practice of and ideas about supervision in the transcript 
texts. In this way I considered how supervision was being constructed - what 
discourses of supervision were being reproduced and produced in the practice? 
Amongst all this preliminary analysis, I also took particular note of the analytic 
work already done within the inquiry group over the course of the year. 
Particularly as I worked with the transcript-texts of the three Research Meetings 
and the texts of the Reviews structured into the regular team meetings, I read also 
for the meta-discursive commentaries that participants made on supervision 
practice. For in these particular texts participants had taken interpretive authority 
as co-researchers, interested to produce constructionist supervision practices and 
reflect on local supervision practices. Some participants worked to use the same 
kinds of theoretical resources in the production of the data as I used in the analysis 
of the data. These metadiscursive commentaries were also gathered together; I 
have at times brought forward the interpretive authority of participants as I 
developed the accounts that follow. Where possible I have used instances of 
practice to illustrate participants' interpretations. 
Earlier in this chapter I wrote of my hopes for exemplars of constructionist 
supervision practice. When supervision transcripts appeared to offer such 
exemplars, I examined them in some detail, paying attention to the linguistic 
aspects of the transcript-texts. How was constructionist supervision being 
produced in the language practices being employed? How were social relations 
being shaped in linguistic practices? Similarly I paid particular attention to the 
linguistic aspects of those transcript-texts where there was misunderstanding 
evident. Parker suggested that discourse analysis is "characterised by a sensitivity 
to language above any 'steps' to analysis" (1999b, p.2). A sensitivity to language 
was present in each of the steps in the layers of readings with which I interrogated 
the transcript-texts. I describe now those theoretical tools on which I draw in 
producing an analysis of the linguistic aspects of transcript texts, both those that 
were more oriented to a political-constitutive analysis and those that were more 
oriented to the "communicative" aspects. 
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Examining constitution 
The tools of analysis that produced a political-constitutive reading are those that 
have been introduced in Chapters One and Two and used since then: discourse, 
positioning, subjectivity, power/knowledge, agency. The transcript-texts were 









What sort of supervision practice is being called upon here? (What sort of a 
'thing' is supervision as it is enacted here?) 
As what sort of practice is supervision being enacted? 
What sort of subject is called into being in this practice? 
What discursive practices are being employed as strategies to call that subject 
into being? 
What are the effects of these strategies for the kinds of subjectivity that are 
possible? What kinds of positions are available? 
If these particular subjectivities are being produced, what relational practices 
are called forth? 
How do these relations shape supervision? What kind of supervision (object) 
do these relations produce? 
In their circularity these questions make use of the idea that people are active 
participants in the reproduction and in the production of discourse practices. 
While I did not see myself as having the emancipatory agenda of which Willig 
(1998, 1999a) wrote, I was seeking out what I already understood to be the life-
blood of ethical practice: strategies that invoke counsellor agency and strategies 
that make explicit the practices of power by which both the therapy and the 
current supervision conversation were being shaped. 
• What effects does this practice or this construction of supervision have for 
counsellor agency, in supervision or in counselling? How does this practice 
work to produce the counsellor in positions of ethical relation? 
• How does this practice pay attention to the terms of its own construction? 
• How does this practice pay attention to the forms ofrelationship it produces? 
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In interrogating the transcript-texts in these ways, I called on some particular 
tools and strategies that helped me focus on and describe the linguistic properties 
of the transcript-texts that performed the actions I was investigating. 
Dialogue 
The metaphor of dialogue was one I found useful in an analytic emphasis on the 
transcript-texts as supervision talk. The dialogical metaphor emphasises that 
positioning is always positioning in relation, and that speaking is always in 
relation. 
All single voices are extracted from dialogues, as Bakhtin teaches us 
(Bruner, 1991, p.xii). 
The dialogic metaphor draws on Bakhtin's work in literary theory; in 
constructionist psychology it has been particularly articulated by Shotter (1989, 
1996, 2000). 
By reacting to the actions of others our replies are never wholly our own; 
in being always both reactions to their 'calls' and to the larger 
circumstances in which they occur they are half 'shaped' by influences 
beyond our control. Thus, in such 'joint' or 'relational' circumstances, no 
outcomes can be wholly attributed to the desires or plans of individuals 
involved, nor can they be attributed wholly to outside agencies. [ ... ] For 
in joint action [ ... ] we have between us to 'dance' or to 'navigate' toward 
the common point of our dialogue and toward our 'positions' in relation to 
it and to each other. (Shotter, 1996, p. 8) 
Speech and dialogue are action: invitations are offered and accepted or rejected as 
we find our ways forward in conversation. Invitations may be noticed and 
rejected, or they might not be accessible and therefore refused. We find our ways 
about, toward a common point or not, by taking readings from and interpreting 
points of reference in the changing landscape, and on charts and maps and texts of 
various kinds. Metaphorical charts, maps and texts are revised, redrawn and 
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rewritten as we go, and their meanings negotiated. Dialogue takes the form of 
joint action: both, or many, speakers are working at the navigating, recognising 
the co-production of the endeavour. In the analysis of instances of practice I 
considered the invitations offered, taken up and refused in making sense of our 
efforts at producing dialogue. 
A further aspect of dialogical theory that I found useful in working with the 
transcript-texts also derives from the work of Bakhtin. He drew a distinction 
between language that has been dialogized, its meanings interrogated and 
destabilised, and undialogized language that retains an absolute authority. He 
suggested that authoritative discourse demands acknowledgement and adherence 
to its terms, terms about which negotiation is not possible. Internally persuasive 
discourse, on the other hand, suggested Bakhtin, is always dialogical: "the 
internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else's" (1981, p.345). I 
have used the idea of dialogising to write about particular textual processes. 
Although clearly there are similarities between dialogising and deconstruction, 
dialogising emphasises the work that is going on at the level of words to negotiate 
how meaning is being made. Dialogising, as I have employed it, brings attention 
to the intentional crafting of language in instances of talk, while recognising that 
we can be only partially in control of meaning, for we speak within the terms of 
discursive practices. "Who speaks and under what conditions he speaks: this is 
what determines a word's actual meaning" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.401). My interest in 
dialogue is taken alongside an understanding that discursive practices position us 
in relations of power. Language is political. The language we use in speaking in 
and about supervision is political. The tools of analysis I employed in this project 
investigate language as political and communicative: they are in themselves 
political. 
Linguistic tools for producing speaking positions 
I considered the production of speaking positions, and of the professional 
speaking positions, produced by particular linguistic tools that were at work in 
transcript-texts. The metaphor of navigation brings with it that of the spaces to be 
navigated in the talk. Spatial metaphors have already been in use in this 
document: discursive positioning is a concept introduced in Chapter One. A 
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person who is positioned in discourse occupies a particular subject space or site. 
They are said to speak from a location in the text (Kogan & Gale, 1997, p.112) 
and those who speak in response may offer confirmation of that location or draw 
attention to other locations available for taking up. Kogan and Gale, in their 
analysis of the management of talk, drew attention to the matter of what is centred 
in (therapist) speaking. "The center of a text is the story being told, the margins 
are the story left untold," they suggested (1997, p.106). Deconstruction pays 
attention to that which is pushed to the margins, absent or obscured. Using the 
idea of conversational space, I considered texts for the ways in which they had 
been crafted, and the particular linguistic tools that had been employed, to 
produce dialogical space, and to produce speaking positions of particular sorts. 
Just as speaking is from a location in the text, speaking draws attention to 
locations in the text, or attention away from locations in the text. I investigated 
how this happened in particular transcript-texts, looking at the surface of the 
grammar (Fairclough, 1995, p.147) just as I had with the literature I discussed in 
Chapter Three. For example, I considered the use of pronouns in the transcript-
texts, particularly for the forms of professional agency constructed by pronoun 
use. Shotter (1989) drew attention to the work that the grammatical second 
person pronoun does to shape and craft relations. When a speaker addresses their 
dialogical partner as you they highlight the location in the text where their partner, 
in responding, might be positioned as a subjective subject, as the speaker and 
agent of an account. An invitation to a storying, authoring position is thus 
offered, a position that highlights the subjective subject position that a speaker is 
offered and might take up in their responding. In contrast, speaking that employs 
nominalisation, "the conversion of a clause into a nominal" (Fairclough, 1992, 
p.27), obscures the agency of the speakers. Nominalisation is thus also shaping of 
social relations. I investigated the effects and implications of nominalisation in 
particular sites in the transcripts. In the example I offer in Chapter Eleven the 
counsellor uses Narrative as a nominalisation that I suggest obscures her agency 
in her practice. As I argued in the literature review in Chapter Three, the surface 
of the grammar of sentences can draw our attention to the kinds of subjects we are 
called to assemble ourselves as. The analyses that I report in the following 
chapters pay attention to the words spoken in dialogue for their significance in 
producing social and power relations in the playing out of discursive practices in 
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supervision. The tools used to describe the linguistically-focussed analyses came 
not from a series of questions overlaid upon all transcript-texts, but rather were 
"true to the text" (Parker, 1999b, p.2) in that they were derived in response to each 
particular transcript-text itself. The details of the tools were not predetermined, 
but produced in response to the texts. 
Presenting text 
I have already noted that the analysis and accounts I present here in part draw on 
the interpretive authority of participants: the research design was structured for 
multi-level conversations that gave inquiry group members analytic positions 
during the data-generating phase of the project. I have made visible in the account 
that follows, in Chapters Seven to Eleven, where I have particularly brought 
forward the participants' interpretive authority. Changes in font have been used to 
differentiate between conversations that were supervision conversations, and 
conversations that were Review and Research Meeting conversations. The style 
will be evident as the chapters proceed, as supervision conversations (in a 
distinguishing font) are each introduced and their location in the project indicated. 
(Appendix VI offers an overview of the texts on which I have drawn). Quotations 
from transcript-texts are mostly distinguished by the use of indents. When indents 
are not used, quotes from transcripts are italicised. As an additional aid to readers 
I have presented each extract from supervision conversations, without my 
commentary, on the left-hand side of the page alongside the extract and 
commentary in the ongoing narrative. 
The naming processes I have used in the chapters that follow also draw attention 
to the two classes of text with which I have worked, texts produced in 
supervision-in-action and texts produced in research-on-practice. In the re-
presentation of conversations extracted from Research and Review transcript-texts 
consistent names, chosen by participants, have been used: Anne, Clare, Kate and 
Liz. Pseudonyms have been used for a number of reasons including the 
importance of protecting the privacy of counselling clients. When re-presenting 
supervision conversations, however, I have used a random selection of names, 
telling each extract of supervision practice in a new set of names. This naming 
practice emphasises the discursive conditions of supervision practice and de-
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emphasises the particular person who is speaking (Kogan & Gale, 1997). I chose 
to use a random selection of names rather than Counsellor/Supervisor as a 
compromise, to live out a dialogic and relational understanding of subjectivity and 
recognising that the work calls on the embodied actions of my colleagues. Thus, 
the naming practices I used both disturb the possibilities for identification in a 
small community and produce an emphasis on discursive production. I retain 
some discomfort that this decision means that participants are not recognised and 
acknowledged, by being named in this document, for their contributions. 
However, on balance I decided that protecting privacy, particularly for clients, 
was a higher priority. My preference is to acknowledge how the work of others 
has contributed to my thinking. However, it has turned out that this research 
project was not set up in such a way that the use of participants' own names 
would be unproblematic. 
In the chapters that follow I have maintained a practice orientation, having 
selected for attention both from those aspects of the project that have served my 
ongoing supervision practice well, and from those that have continued to disturb 
and trouble me and for which I have continued to seek answers. I have focussed 
most deliberately on the first two of my research questions as the data most 
directly addresses those questions. In any case, to tell the whole story of the 
research project is impossible, for such a story could not ever be complete. 
There is no means by which a fixed collection of words, sewn between 
inert covers, can encompass the issues in all their complexities. (McNamee 
& Gergen, 1999, p.3) 
Nonetheless, the choices I have made and make to collect and select and write 
words and have them sewn between covers are important ones. The task of 
describing the research process is not complete until the writing, too, is theorised. 
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Writing a final story: the question of immortalising 
The final story must fit the events while at the same time bringing an order 
and meaningfulness that was not necessarily apparent in the event as it 
happened. (Polkinghome, 1997, p.15) 
In the course of constructing analyses and with thoughts of constructing a final-
for-now account I grappled with a further set of questions as I found my way to 
authorship. What is this thesis document in relation with the research project of 
which it is part? Which aspects of the research project do I privilege in giving this 
account - for inevitably I privilege some above others? For example, how much 
attention do I give to reporting the instrumental actions of the research project and 
how much to documenting the dilemmas of the project's production? In what 
ways should I draw on the data-texts? What realities should I produce in my 
efforts in re-presentation? 
Thinking about the connections between the lived experience of the project and 
the written accounts I might offer, I was reminded of Carl Rogers' comments, 
when someone had written a chapter of a book about his theory of personality. 
They were kind enough to send me the chapter in regard to my theory in 
advance of publication, and I guess I hurt their feelings by writing back 
that, "I wouldn't say that there were many misstatements of fact in the 
chapter, it's just that reading the whole thing left me terribly depressed." It 
left me terribly depressed because here was everything all cut and dried, 
and hell, it had never seemed that way to me. It would seem as though, 
well out of all the possibilities this might be one possible explanation. But 
no, when it comes out, especially second hand like that, it is all a nicely 
packaged thing with everything closed. (Frick, 1971, p. 101) 
Everything is not cut and dried, yet reporting and writing and printing and 
dissemination can make it appear so. Epston, referring to writing in the form of 
therapeutic letters, wrote 
Chapter Six 141 
the words in a letter don't fade and disappear the way conversation does; 
they endure through time and space, bearing witness to the work of 
therapy and immortalizing it. ( 1994, p.31) 
In different ways, both Rogers' and Epston' s words remind me of the 
responsibility I have in writing, printing and submitting this document: these 
words in these pages, in bearing witness to the work of this research project, 
constitute an on-the-record version that will endure. The immortalising takes 
place at a particular time in the production that is the project, and from the 
position I occupy as writer, and as writer of a doctoral thesis. Writing has 
performative powers (Penn & Frankfurt, 1994, p.230 ). This document stories the 
professional work of the inquiry group in particular ways, and for that I take 
responsibility. 
I recognise that participants in the inquiry group may experience, as Rogers did, a 
dissonance in reading this account - though I hope they will not be depressed! 
While the supervision and research conversations that provided the data for this 
thesis will have in some ways been immortalised in their inclusion in the pages 
that follow, I emphasise that the reflecting team supervision work thus re-
presented was work that at that time we put forward in a spirit of inquiry, of trying 
out, of experimentation. We were interested to bring our practices forward. The 
practice was not "cut and dried", and for all of us, our work, our practice and our 
thinking about our practice, has moved on since that time. The words of one 
participant, Liz, note this phenomenon. 
This is a dynamic on-going thing, that can keep developing and changing 
too. 
[ ... ] 
The deconstructing questions and the collaborative way of working, it 
allows for expansion all the time, and changes in thinking. 
Thus, as Bird (2000) claimed that transcripts are fictions in that they are made up 
from a record of a conversation, the re-presentations I offer here might also be 
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said to be fictions. I am making up this account, constructing it out of the material 
resources the conversations have become in their transcript-text form. I am taking 
responsibility for giving order, shape and meaning to an account that is one of 
many that could be made up from these data. I offer here, in Rogers' words, "one 
possible explanation". 
The writing in this work is not a therapeutic letter (Epston's focus), the purpose of 
which is to faithfully bear witness to conversation (and thereby provide an 
ennobling account of a life lived). Rather, the purpose of this document is as a 
forum of accountability for me as researcher. I have argued elsewhere for 
accountability in supervision to be construed as the ability to give an account 
(Crocket, 1999a). My tasks have changed with changing phases of the research 
project. My task now in writing here is to present myself as a researcher who can 
produce research of which I can give sufficient account and which in its process 
and its ongoing production is meaningful for professional counselling practice, 
and is in ethical relation with practice. The account in this thesis is also partial in 
this way: it could be said that in the same way as supervision functions as the 
counselling profession's assurance of effective and ethical counselling practice in 
the service of clients, so the presentation of this thesis is about ensuring that 
quality and ethical research is available to the counselling community. In this 
account I work to offer a meaningful account of my (research) practice, in order to 
produce myself as an effective author of, and servant of, that practice. 
In Chapter Three in giving an account of supervision, I left unexamined the 
matter, given attention by a number of writers in the field, of where the client of 
counselling is in relation to supervision. It is an important ethical matter, for it is 
not the client, but the counsellor, who is called to give an account in supervision. 
Bird (1994) provided a reminder about the need for respectfulness in professional 
speaking, a respectfulness which I believe includes the supervision room. She 
suggested for example that therapists not speak about clients in objectifying ways, 
but as though clients were present to overhear the conversation. In supervision it 
is the counsellor, not the client, who is called to give an account; in this thesis it 
is I, not the counsellors and supervisors who participated in the earlier stages of 
the project, who is called to account. It behoves me, then, to provide an account 
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which demonstrates professional respectfulness as well as academic rigour. The 
knowledge claims I come to make are conclusions whose meaning is dependent 
upon the actions I have taken over time, in engaging with others in the practices of 
the inquiry group, with the transcript-texts, with the literature, and with the 
professional field of practice. These meanings, however, are dependent upon the 
knowledge and practice offered to me by the inquiry group members. 
Nonetheless, I ask readers to recognise that it is my re-presentation that is to be 
evaluated here, not my colleagues' contributions. These are moral goods, these 
accounts I am about to present. They depend upon analytic actions taken mindful 
of the professional and personal relationships and the relations of power that 
produced both the discursive data upon which I draw, and upon my positioning 
here as writer. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has continued to account for the ethical terms on which this study 
was produced, in particular its emphasis on the relations of knowledge production. 
It describes my positioning in relation with the transcript texts, clarifying in 
particular the theoretical understandings about discourse and positioning that 
enabled me to engage with the texts from an ethical analytic stance. Discourse 
analysis has been introduced as a practice of improvisation: the improvisations I 
produced for this analysis have been outlined. Finally, the chapter has situated 
this document, the written account of the project, and has noted its contingency. 
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Chapter Seven 
Supervision and the discourse of supervisor responsibility 
Introduction 
This chapter considers in particular the discourse of supervisor responsibility. I 
drew attention to this discourse in Chapters Three and Four, highlighting its 
pervasiveness even in those contexts where its terms are not directly invoked and 
noting the relational positions it produced for counsellors and supervisors. In this 
chapter, I use the data to explore the positions in relation, for counsellor and 
supervisor, produced by and producing a discourse of supervisor responsibility. 
Data are also used to offer examples of the discourse practices of this genre of 
supervision discourse. 
Data from four sets of conversations are used for this exploration: 
1. Reflections on supervision processes made in team discussion during Phase 
Four of each reflecting team supervision conversation; 
2. The Reviews of the project we held every third session; 
3. The Research Meetings held on three occasions during the year; 
4. The fortnightly reflecting team supervision meetings. 
During the year in which the team met I did not focus my own attention or the 
group's attention on the discourse of supervisor responsibility in the particular 
ways I have done in this document. I came to understand and name that discourse 
as part of the subsequent analysis: thus the group's comments and commentaries 
offered in this chapter did not come in direct response to particular questions I had 
asked about that discourse. Rather, many of the examples I draw on in the 
following pages were invoked as participants worked to describe the shifts in their 
understandings of supervision that were produced as the project proceeded. The 
project in this way produced a group and research culture that at times used 
difference to help us describe what we were reaching for. As we named that 
which was or had been present in supervision we came to identify more clearly 
that which was absent or unaccounted for or yet to be produced more fully or 
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named more clearly. And as we articulated that for which we were reaching, the 
effects of previously familiar practices became more visible. Such a process in 
some ways reflects a Derridean approach to deconstruction, one that occurred here 
in relatively unsophisticated ways in the to and fro of conversation that was not 
purposefully deconstructive. While I do not think that participants would all have 
named what they were doing as deconstruction, I am claiming an effect of the 
group's exploratory conversations can be understood as deconstructive action. In 
this chapter, participants' comments and commentaries, from the first three sites, 
are a focus for my purposeful deconstructive attention as I present the data that 
renders visible the discourse of supervisor responsibility. Having established the 
authority of the participants' contributions, I then use an example from the 
supervision texts, the fourth site, to explore further the practices produced on the 
terms of that discourse. 
The construction of the supervision relationship 
Counsellor positioning 
Commentaries on the positioning of counsellors in supervision were offered both 
in the course of exploring earlier supervision experiences and in offering critique 
of those experiences. Speaking of her early knowledge of supervision, Clare said 
that she understood that as a counsellor 
you were to take, you were to consider everything you had done that you 
wished you had done better. 
Similarly, Anne suggested that counsellors were positioned in supervision 
discourse as 
coming and telling of your shortcomings and your failings. 
Images of supervision as confession are evoked by these descriptions: the 
counsellor is positioned as supplicant. Supervision is produced as a problem-
focussed activity, where shortcomings are acknowledged and responded to. 
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Positions in relation 
In relation with the counsellor positioned as supplicant, the supervisor is 
positioned as the authority responsible for putting right. She had understood, 
reported Kate, that 
they [the supervisor] will put me right [because] they know what they are 
doing. 
Kate's understanding was produced within a discourse where authority and 
responsibility are vested in the person of the supervisor. The counsellor 
assembles herself as a subject to be put right: the supervisor is assembled as 
omniscient and responsible. Similarly, Liz commented on the construction of the 
supervision relationship as a reciprocal one of reporting in and checking up. 
Reporting in, the counsellor is positioned to offer a particular relational call to the 
supervisor who exercises regulatory authority and responsibility in their checking 
up. Kate's words as she spoke of herself as the supervised person demonstrate the 
effects of regulatory authority: the counsellor becomes the object of supervision 
practice, subject to examination. By submitting to processes of confession and 
examination one partner in supervision is supervised while the other knows and 
puts right. 
Relational practices: providing instruction 
In the reciprocal relation of putting right and being put right, supervisor and 
counsellor are positioned as having quite different tasks and roles in supervision: 
one is to report in to a higher authority, while the other as a higher authority is 
responsible for putting right through the use of their knowledge in instruction. In 
the light of their not knowing and needing to be put right, the counsellor will be 
given instruction about what to do next, according to Kate. In this discursive 
regime knowledge is thus directed towards instrumental action: the supervisor 
instructs the counsellor on what they should next do in their counselling work 
The effect of the counsellor's positioning in the subjected being put right position 
of this discourse is that their counselling work is dependent upon the supervisor's 
knowledge: counselling happens as the counsellor reproduces the supervisor's 
knowledge offered as instruction. By these strategies, both counselling and 
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supervision are constructed on instrumental terms: supervision is about 
instructing the counsellor on what to do next in counselling, for the supervisor 
knows more than the counsellor. They know the right things I could do, and will 
tell the counsellor what those are, as Kate represented the supervisor's positioning 
in this discourse. The knowledge needed for the situation, for right practice is 
already in existence, held in the person of the supervisor. Such knowledge can be 
transferred unproblematically from supervisor to counsellor to client, according to 
the terms of this discourse. 
Relational practice: exercising responsibility 
A reciprocal putting right and being put right relation constructs supervisors in 
positions of sole responsibility. Positioned in this way supervisors are to act upon 
counsellors, the supervised persons. Needing to be put right, counsellors are 
absent from positions of authority or responsibility. Kate's reflections on her 
earlier experiences of supervision continued as she spoke of her positioning in this 
way: 
To a large extent, I gave the decision-making about how the supervision 
would be to the supervisor; I didn't really make a lot of demands. Maybe 
I didn't know what to ask for. 
Kate's words make visible the unilateral construction of the supervision 
relationship. It would seem that Kate, like the counsellors in Carroll's (1996) 
study and of whom Kaiser ( 1997) wrote, had not been well prepared to engage in 
supervision. The supervisor would both put the counsellor right, and make the 
decisions about how the supervision would be enacted. Kate continued: 
And I guess I assumed, and gave away the deciding of, I guess I sort of 
gave away the deciding about what should be in the supervision contract to 
the supervisor, rather than take responsibility for that. I would think, 
"Well, okay, if I have forgotten something then the supervisor will put me 
right about that. They know what they're doing anyhow because they have 
supervised a lot of people. Therefore it's okay if I'm not too sure, or not 
too demanding, or not too anything, because they know what they're 
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doing." So I was actually putting them in that superior or authoritative 
role. 
Kate was here locating the problem in her individual action: according to this 
account the action of a counsellor as a sovereign individual was responsible for 
the supervisor being in an authoritative position. However, on the terms of the 
theoretical position I am taking, the counsellor (like the supervisor) acted out of a 
discursively produced position within the discourse of supervisor responsibility. 
That discourse reproduced what might be called a relation of reassuring 
paternalism between counsellor and supervisor. Because expertise is constructed 
as residing in the supervisor, out of their previous experience in supervision -
because they have supervised a lot of people - the counsellor can be reassured that 
the supervisor can make good any counsellor deficit, any forgetting by the 
counsellor. In the face of supervisor expertise, a counsellor will not be subject to 
too many expectations - she won't have to be too sure, or too knowing or be 
expected to know what to ask for, or too anything at all. Too anything at all?: the 
counsellor is positioned as almost absent, not sure, not speaking, not visible, 
scarcely present, a subject positioned at the edges of a discourse of supervisor 
responsibility. 
However, within a discourse of supervisor responsibility this positioning of the 
counsellor is not necessarily as problematic as my last comment suggests. For the 
supervision relationship is also here constructed as paternal and protective. Under 
the watchful eye of a supervisor a counsellor is not alone, but has the support of 
another, more senior person, who will not only put the counsellor right to prevent 
any mistakes, but will also provide back up should the counsellor go on and make 
a mistake. The safety for clients and reassurance for the counsellor, who is 
positioned as a beginner by such developmental constructions, is demonstrated in 
Kate's next comment. Kate had said, in Research Meeting Three, that she had put 
the supervisor in that superior or authoritative role: in response I asked her 
whether that had come about from a particular sort of training in supervision or 
out of a lack of training in supervision or in some other way. Kate responded: 
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At the beginning, I wanted and needed to have a more senior counsellor to 
watch me for, say, for ages. And then I don't think I ever changed my 
attitude. I think that I came in with that idea, "Good, you know, okay, this 
woman is going to be supervising me, if I stuff up anywhere I'm going to 
have a back up". 
The supervisor is positioned as an ever-vigilant back up upon whom client safety 
and counsellor security depends as a relation of protection and paternalism plays 
out in supervision. The supervisor's knowing and experience will enable 
appropriate intervention in the face of the counsellor's not knowing, and ensure 
the safety of both clients and counsellor, for the supervisor functions as an 
assurance of responsible action. They know what they are doing, said Kate. The 
counselling profession's claims for professionalism in practice depend upon the 
location of vigilance, expertness, and responsibility in the supervisor. The work 
of the supervision relationship is produced under the mantle of supervisor 
responsibility. 
Supervision is thus constructed as one of what Gergen called "the family of 
cultural rituals in which the ignorant, the failing, and the weak seek counsel from 
the wise, the superior, and the strong" (1997, pp.239-240). "It is indeed," he 
continued, "a comforting ritual for all who will submit". Supervision, on these 
terms, is a professional ritual in which a more senior, wiser colleague watches and 
puts right a junior, more ignorant colleague. 
Relational practice: providing expertise 
Although much of my focus here has been on Kate's voice, she was not the only 
participant to have experienced relations of dependency upon counsellor authority 
and knowledge in supervision. Liz, too, spoke about her experience of 
supervision working in this way in the early days of her practice as a counsellor in 
a voluntary agency . 
. . . like you said, counselling via the supervision. [ ... ] And it was like we 
kept running back to the supervisor saying, "What do I do now?" So it 
was very much expecting the supervisor to take that expert position. My 
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first supervisor declined to take that position, but even so he was a senior 
psychologist so I couldn't help but position him in that way anyway so my 
positioning never changed. 
Liz drew attention to the work of the supervisor in prescribing the actions the 
counsellor should take next with their client: counselling via the supervision. The 
counsellor is the medium for actions in counselling prescribed by the supervisor. 
Indirectly, it is the supervisor who counsels the client. As well, the words, 
running back to the supervisor, evoke a child-like position of dependency. Those 
who do not know, Gergen's "ignorant", are dependent upon the wisdom of others 
for their own professional actions. A discourse of supervisor responsibility had 
offered both Kate and Liz positions where not knowing and dependence were 
more accessible to them than professional knowledge and professional autonomy. 
Their status as beginners had offered them such positions, and they were further 
spoken into those positions by the instructional practices of a discourse of 
supervisor responsibility. A discourse of supervisor responsibility and 
developmental discourse thus work to shore each other up. 
Relational practice: workload monitoring 
Earlier in the project Clare had spoken about her experience of supervisor 
positioning in responsibility for monitoring a counsellor's workload. In Research 
Meeting One we were drawing comparisons between the group supervision 
process in the reflecting team and individual supervision. Clare suggested that in 
our group she felt less sense of responsibility than she felt in individual 
supervision in her private practice. For example, in one to one supervision 
monitoring involved her knowing for each counsellor 
what their workload is like at the moment, the kind of issues they are 
presented with, whether it is skewed at the moment. 
Clare went on to say that she felt an incredible sense of responsibility as a 
supervisor. As the conversation moved on, Liz asked her what effects knowing a 
counsellor's workload had for how she worked. Clare replied, 
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I guess I feel like I am 'it' and I have a responsibility to monitor [the 
counsellor's workload]. 
She went on to say that she had 
more of a responsibility [in one-to-one supervision] because I am 'it', and 
that I have to know, that if anyone said, "Tell me about your work with X" 
- I know ethically I wouldn't do that - that I should be able to answer 
them. 
Possible surveillance of the counsellor's work and also of her work as a supervisor 
requires Clare to know about counsellor workload. She must know as she is 
produced as responsible to authorities - professional bodies, perhaps - who might 
ask her to give an account of the work of supervision. There are echoes of the 
reporting in and checking up positions of which Liz spoke. Again, Clare repeated 
It is different when you are 'it'. 
According to the description offered here responsibility is unilateral: the 
supervisor is it. Responsibility in supervision is centred on the supervisor. 
I was particularly interested in the construction of the supervisor as responsible 
for work-load monitoring. I had encountered this practice only in social work 
supervision literature and in some counselling practicum placements. When I 
asked Clare about how she had come to take up this practice, she reported that she 
had always assumed that workload monitoring was a part of supervision. 
Although she wasn't sure of the source of her assumption, it had always been a 
part of her supervision as a counsellor. 
As a supervisee, I have a responsibility to tell them [the supervisor, about 
my workload] every few sessions. 
As a supervisor herself, she said that she was active in asking counsellors 
questions about their workloads: it was a supervision activity she initiated. Clare 
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suggested, for example, that she would take the initiative to ask a counsellor who 
had a heavy load of ACC work [counselling in the area of sexual abuse, funded by 
an insurer] about the current ratio of their workload: she was currently aware of 
the make-up of the workload of all those with whom she was supervisor. This 
knowledge would enable her to take responsible action for which she could give 
account if called to do so. 
Producing responsibility in supervision 
The matter of supervisor responsibility in supervision is a very complex one. 
Counselling is responsible work and does call counsellors and supervisors to 
express responsibility. It is not surprising, in an endeavour that engages in 
people's lives as counselling does, that counsellors and those who work with them 
in supervision carry a burden of responsibility, as Clare did as a supervisor. I 
raised the question in earlier chapters whether a discourse of supervisor 
responsibility, that centres responsibility on supervisors, best serves counsellors to 
exercise responsibility in their counselling work. For that is the purpose of 
supervision, to enhance the effectiveness and ethical standards of the counselling 
counsellors offer to clients. The descriptions of the positioning of counsellor and 
supervisor in relation, which are offered by these data excerpts, suggest that 
within a discourse of supervisor responsibility the position of responsible 
professional is more readily accessible to supervisors than it is to counsellors. 
Counsellors are in danger of stuffing up; as beginners they depend upon the 
supervisor's knowledge and instruction. Both Kate and Liz spoke about being 
recruited into the belief that the supervisor knows best in being positioned as 
beginning counsellors: at the beginning I wanted and needed to have a more 
senior counsellor to watch me, Kate said. A supervision relation that privileges 
supervisor knowledge had gained ground, under cover of developmental 
constructions that had positioned Kate and Liz as unknowing beginning 
counsellors. However, a dominant supervisor responsibility discourse had 
persisted beyond that time: the positions that had once appeared to offer 
reassurance and security had in many ways endured. My positioning never 
changed, said Liz. 
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Relational practice: suspicious paternalism 
A discourse of supervisor responsibility positions counsellors as unknowing, both 
about counselling and about supervision. The positioning of counsellors as 
unknowing has effects on the supervision relationship, including a suspicious 
paternalism that Clare expressed concern about. Clare reported having attended a 
supervision course where, she said, the leader had suggested: 
the things that people are not bringing [to supervision] are often the things 
they need to talk about. 
Clare was concerned about the relationship and climate of distrust such a 
construction sets up: supervisors cannot trust counsellors to bring to supervision 
what they need to, and counsellors cannot trust themselves to know what they 
need to bring. As well, supervisor and counsellor are offered a relation of mutual 
non-disclosure when they act out of the positions offered within this discursive 
regime. If the counsellor (unknowingly or knowingly) excludes the most 
pertinent areas of their work from the open space of the supervision conversation, 
the supervisor (with knowingness, but without the agreement of the counsellor) 
must work to flush out into the open that which has not been overtly presented. 
Trust is undermined within a discourse of supervisor responsibility that positions a 
counsellor as unknowing in this way. Again, images of examination and 
surveillance are invoked: the emphasis is on producing a supervision wherein 
supervisor and counsellor are positioned to take up very different roles and tasks. 
Supervisor expertise is enhanced by this construction, and with the enhancement 
of their expertise comes the enhancement of their responsibility. Counsellors are 
offered positions of diminished and diminishing responsibility. Paternalism thus 
reproduces and is reproduced within the counsellor-supervisor relation, but a 
somewhat suspicious paternalism. 
Noticing paternalistic relations: accommodating to instrumental practice 
As the authority of the supervisors know best regime continued to be played out in 
supervision in the earlier experiences of which participants spoke, it became less 
comforting and less comfortable for those positioned as unknowing. Kate and Liz 
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each described a different response they had made as they each noticed the effects 
of the positionings offered them as counsellors. 
Liz said that she had accommodated to a supervisor by setting an agenda that 
would join with the supervisor's preferred practice. 
And then, with my next supervisor, just because of the different theoretical 
approaches, I chose what I would take because of ... different theoretical 
approaches. And sometimes thinking, "Well I won't take anything 
theoretical because that would be too problematic for our relationship. I'll 
just take a client; to take a client will be simple". And so I would 
sometimes choose not to discuss theoretical things, and for her it seemed 
like the best way that supervision worked was if I brought a problem and 
we talked about it. So that that was the framework that she seemed to 
come from and work on for supervision. 
There are a number of threads here that interest me. Theoretical differences 
compromised the supervision agenda: the counsellor selected those items for the 
supervision agenda that would meet with the supervisor's preference. It was the 
counsellor doing the accommodating, keeping the work of supervision simple by 
taking up the supervisor's preferred frame. That frame required the counsellor to 
bring a problem in the form of client work. In that requirement the frame 
disallowed the discussion of theoretical things: to speak of theory would require 
speaking of difference and that was too problematic for the supervision 
relationship, according to Liz's account. Together these threads suggest a 
supervision space where the talk tends to be instrumental talk with a focus on 
problem solving - giving advice, information, opinions and suggestions (Martin, 
Goodyear, & Newton, 1987). The supervision appeared to be focussed on 
supporting the counsellor for instrumental action in her client work, rather than 
supporting the counsellor to theorise her work. No longer positioned to run back 
to the supervisor for advice on what to do next, Liz appeared to be seeking 
positions in supervision that could offer her responsibility for theorising her 
practice. However, it appears that the focus of supervision continued to be 
reproduced as instrumental action. Supervision as instrumental action employs an 
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instructional process that refers to the instrumental action that the counsellor will 
reproduce in counselling. In this way, instrumentality positions the supervisor in 
a position of expertise both in relation with the counsellor and in relation with the 
client. 
Liz's distinction between taking a client and taking something theoretical to 
supervision draws attention to the positioning of the supervisor in authority over 
the work of the counsellor and the work in supervision. Held responsible for the 
work of the counsellor, a supervisor is positioned in surveillance of client work, 
and so their attention in supervision is directed to what has been and might be 
done, rather than to how the counsellor theorises their practice. An effect of this 
positioning of supervisor and counsellor in relation is evident in the counsellor's 
purposeful selection of material in and out of the supervision agenda on the basis 
of that which supervisor authority legitimises. In this way fears that a counsellor 
may not bring that which would be most useful to supervision may well be 
realised, not because counsellors are reluctant or do not know, but because the 
discourse of supervisor responsibility produces a supervision that polices and 
limits what may be brought. 
Noticing paternalistic relations: questioning where expertise lies 
Kate, too, had come to protest some effects of an instrumentally-focussed 
supervision regime that positioned the supervisor as omniscient. Kate first spoke 
of her concerns in Research Meeting One when Liz was reflecting on her (Liz's) 
subsequent reading of a transcript of a session where her work as a supervisor had 
been interpreted as what I call instrumental action. Liz noted that the supervision 
had been interpreted as: 
the supervisor offering suggestions - ... that's what I read the script as 
saying, [that I was making] suggestions of questions [for the counsellor to 
ask her client]. And what it [the practice of that interpretation]invites is a 
consideration [by the counsellor] about whether "I've tried that" or "I've 
not tried that". Like an evaluation [of the work of the counsellor]. 
As Liz went on to explore the interactions thus produced, Kate interrupted, 
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Because you can't ever know the client's story in a supervisory role 
because there has been so much said that you could never be party to. 
In contrast with the counsellor position of which Kate had spoken earlier, where 
the counsellor relies on the supervisor to put her right, a counsellor is positioned 
by this comment as having knowledge to which the supervisor is not party. The 
supervisor cannot be omniscient about the counsellor's client. Being put right is a 
less comfortable position now for the counsellor. There is now a tension about 
knowledge claims. On the one hand a supervisor is positioned as omniscient in 
respect of practice - she'll put me right - and on the other hand they are positioned 
as having an understanding inferior to the counsellor's in respect of this particular 
client work. 
Despite Kate's interruption, Liz continued her reflection on the understandings 
she had from her review of the earlier session, where a have-you-tried discursive 
practice had been played out. Liz went on to speak of how what I am calling an 
instrumental approach to supervision, arising out of supervisor omniscience, 
works to locate deficit. 
There's something wrong with the client or there's something wrong with 
the counsellor. And I was looking back at that and thinking, "That's what 
happened". The questions [I was asking] set up a process of evaluating, 
rather than [exploring] the issue [that I was offering to think about]. I 
think that is also the value of having a transcript. I went away thinking, 
"How did these things happen?" But I was able to look back at the 
transcript and have some more ideas about that. 
Continuing the conversation, Kate persisted with her interest in another effect of 
supervisor omniscience that she had experienced. 
One of the clarifications I've had [in this project] which I am really valuing 
links to what you're talking about. A lot of my previous experience being 
supervised was about discussing the client and there's been a sense of 
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frustration in me as the supervised person because I might have worked 
with this client for eight hours and so there was no way my supervisor 
could appreciate the fullness of what I knew because I couldn't tell my 
supervisor in that time. 
Like Kate, Liz was noticing the position a counsellor is called into in a 
supervision discourse that positions the supervisor as expert on the counsellor, her 
work, and her clients. Within those discourse practices Kate experienced her 
knowledge of her client being marginalised. Hawkins and Shohet (1989, p.23) 
called the phenomenon of contestation for the knowing position in supervision, 
for knowing who can manage the client better, "sibling rivalry". But I suggest 
that counsellor and supervisor are not constructed as siblings by the discursive 
production of supervision as instruction. For, in the grammar of Kate's speaking, 
the counsellor remains the object of the supervisor's action. The counsellor is 
represented as the supervised person, being supervised, hierarchically positioned 
with little room to contest or to know within the power relation of supervision as 
instructional method, even as she resisted having her particular knowledge 
disregarded. 
Liz's and Kate's contributions have suggested that an emphasis on supervisor 
knowledge in instrumental practice risks positioning counsellors or clients in 
deficit, and risks positioning counsellors and supervisors in competition for who 
knows more, particularly when the supervision conversation focuses on clients. 
Although on the occasion of Research Meeting One, quoted above, Kate next 
went on to speak of the changed focus in the supervision we were producing in the 
project, a few weeks later she again spoke of this problematic positioning of 
counsellor and supervisor. This second speaking was on the occasion of 
Supervision 11, during the Phase Four team reflection on the processes of the 
supervision that had just taken place. Kate was a team member in Supervision 11. 
She again expressed her frustration with her past experiences of the positioning 
offered the counsellor when the supervisor is positioned as expert and when the 
work of supervision focuses on the client, rather than on the counsellor in 
relationship with the client in the counselling work. 
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Some of my experience had been that supervision was about trying to 
uncover the dynamics of my client, and I'd found that enormously 
frustrating because there was no way in a supervision session I could 
explain the fullness of what I knew about the dynamics of my client to my 
supervisor. So I have experienced hearing a lot of information about my 
clients that irritated me because it felt as if there was an accusation there 
that I wasn't, oh well, I mean, this was just irritating. 
Again, Kate appears to have experienced herself in the position of which she 
spoke earlier, as the supervised person. Supervised, she struggles to find a 
speaking position for herself as the supervisor works to produce some truth about 
Kate's client of which Kate was unaware: the location of this truth about the 
client dynamics will solve the problem Kate has brought to supervision. 
Supervised, she experiences herself being accused. Being put right no longer has 
the attraction of reassurance it had earlier, because it does not offer voice to what 
the counsellor knows. Rivalry for the better understanding of the client is evident 
in Kate's speaking, but the power relation of supervision produces an uneven 
rivalry. Rather than providing safety and back-up, the supervisor's positioning as 
omniscient is now producing frustration and irritation in the counsellor and is now 
reproduced as accusation of the counsellor for not having done right. The effect is 
the diminishment of the counsellor's knowledge. Kate was protesting both that 
diminishment and the evaluation practices that Liz had also identified. 
Some effects of a discourse of supervisor responsibility 
How are these data to be understood? Developmental models might construct the 
difficulty that Kate was protesting in terms of the need for an appropriate 
assessment of supervisee stage. Such an assessment, according to a 
developmental account, would offer a supervisor a more appropriate supervisory 
intervention now that the supervisee is no longer new to the field. The counsellor 
might be understood no longer to need the level of instruction they previously did. 
According to this construction, knowing continues to reside with the supervisor: 
it is they who make the assessment of counsellor stage of development, and then 
modify their intervention. 
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Extract 7.1. Reproducing instrumental practice 
Zoe is counsellor, and Leah is supervisor in Supervision S. Sharon is a team 
member. This excerpt is from Phase One. 
Zoe's introduction: 
There's a client I'm working with at present it would be really good to talk 
about. I've met with her five or six times. [ ... ] She came initially with issues 
around ... 
So that was the first session. The next session when she came the main 
issue was a relationship she had had for eight years which finished about a 
year ago. 
Now the third session when she came she introduced a third issue which was 
Leah's question: 
What are the effects of ending a relationship? What are the effects still 
carrying on from the relationship? How much time does it occupy in your 
life? 
Leah's next question: 
Does she [the client] know any other people who have ended a relationship? 
Zoe's reply: 
I don't know. I haven't asked her that. 
Leah's later question: 
What effects might there have been for them of ending a relationship? I 
mean, I heard of one woman who said she couldn't read a book for two years 
afterwards. 
Zoe's reply: 
Yes, that's interesting, that line of inquiry. I haven't tried that ... 
However, rather than accepting this developmental construction, I argue that the 
problem is located in the paternalistic discursive practices of instrumental 
approaches to supervision produced within a discourse of supervisor 
responsibility. To support my argument, I now tum to an instance of practice to 
suggest that counsellors are "trained" within the discursive regime of instrumental 
approaches to supervision to report facts and to be answerable to retrospective 
questions of "Have you done ... ?" and "Have you tried ... ?" They are positioned 
to report in as supervisors are positioned to check up. Prospectively, supervision 
is also concerned with the instrumental, with the knowing supervisor instructing 
the counsellor about appropriate action to take, according to the account that 
becomes visible in this following example from practice. 
Extract 7.1. Reproducing instrumental practice 
Zoe is counsellor, and Leah is supervisor in Supervision 5. Sharon is a team 
member. Excerpts are from Phase One and Phase Four. 
As the supervision session began Zoe presented her agenda for the supervision in 
the form of a report. She reported on what the client brought to counselling 
initially and what she had brought to each session. 
There's a client I'm working with at present it would be really good to talk 
about. I've met with her five or six times. [ ... ] She came initially with issues 
around ... 
So that was the first session. The next session when she came the main 
issue was a relationship she had had for eight years which finished about a 
year ago. 
Now the third session when she came she introduced a third issue which was 
I notice, firstly, that Zoe did not say why as a counsellor she would like to talk about 
this work in particular. Secondly, the report did not include Zoe or her concerns: it 
focused on the client not the counselling, on what Lowe and Guy call "the drama of 
the case" (1996, p.31). Perhaps the report form is the production of a counsellor 
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positioned within the they wJ/1 put me right discourse. Perhaps a retrospective fact-
oriented report is a supervision practice that has been produced by a discourse of 
supervisor responsibility: the counsellor is to report in. After all, to exercise 
responsibility the supervisor needs to receive some sort of report. But what is the 
report to be about? In the discourse within which Zoe was producing her 
supervision agenda, it appeared that the report was to be about the client. 
Leah clarified with Zoe what it was that her client was hoping for in the counselling. 
Leah's inquiry, too, was oriented towards the client. As the conversation continued, 
Leah went on to ask some questions. 
What are the effects of ending a relationship? What are the effects still 
carrying on from the relationship? How much time does it occupy in your 
life? 
These questions might be construed on the terms Kate had used, quoted earlier in 
the chapter: uncovering the dynamics of the client. Or they might be construed as 
being produced by deconstructing inquiry, inquiry that asks about the client's 
positioning within discourse. I want to suggest that the discursive positioning Leah 
as supervisor took up in this inquiry can be understood as informed by 
constructionism. The position she took up in this inquiry is what I have come to call 
the commentary position. It is a concept I will return to a number of times in the 
ensuing chapters, as it is a particular position that a discursive supervision practice 
makes available. It is a position that flattens hierarchy between counsellor and 
supervisor, and positions them alongside each other in positions of mutual and 
collaborative investigation of the discursive vista before them both. If the 
counsellor accepts the position call offered by the supervisor from the commentary 
position, together, counsellor and supervisor deconstruct particular cultural stories. 
Deconstructing, they ask about positions and effects, drawing on their shared 
knowledge. The assumption that underlies this position is that knowledge, for 
counselling, will be mutually and collaboratively generated in decentred inquiry. 
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Leah might then be understood to have been asking questions in the manner of the 
commentary position, and so within a discourse of supervision as discursive inquiry, 
as went on to ask Zoe: 
Does she [the client] know any other people who have ended a relationship? 
Zoe replied: 
I don't know. I haven't asked her that. 
Zoe's reply saw her speaking from a position offered by instrumental supervision 
practice. In a discursive supervision regime, Leah's earlier question, What are the 
effects of ending a relationship, carried with it, in its subtext, another question. 
That other question was something like: "Are these symptoms and experiences that 
are being understood by your client as individual pathology perhaps common 
experiences and would she know this?" It thus asked the question that permeates 
discursive work, what cultural knowledge might be useful here? However, without 
any clarification of what the counselling problem was, the focus of the supervision 
was still with the client, and Zoe understood Leah's inquiry not as collaborative but in 
the genre of the reporting ,n/being directed relational positions of instrumental 
discourse. Zoe was called into a position familiar to her in the discursive practices 
of an instrumental supervision: she was to report 111. With Zoe called into a 
reporting in position, Leah's inquiry was reproduced as a suggestion of appropriate 
action that Zoe might have taken. Supervision as instructional method could be 
positioning Leah, in Kate's words, as working from her position of omniscience as 
supervisor, to uncover the dynamics of Zoe's client (of which Zoe was unaware), or as 
taking a position of accusation of Zoe about the actions taken, or not, in her 
practice. 
The question, Does she [the client] know any other people who have ended a 
relationship, unintentionally invoked a supervision-as-instrumental-method discourse. 
It thus worked to position Zoe as accounting to Leah for the specifics of what she 
had or had not done in the counselling: I don't know. I haven't asked her that. The 
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effect of the inquiry was to bring forward Zoe's not knowing. And she did not know 
because she had not asked the client for the facts. 
Inquiry, in an instrumental regime, thus produces the counsellor as not knowing, and 
as not having done what she might have been expected to have done. When the 
supervisor is positioned as all-knowing expert, Zoe's reply is the kind of reply that 
makes sense on the terms that supervision discourse produces: This is the action 
you should have taken: have you taken it? The counsellor's options are directed 
towards reporting actions taken or not taken. What they know or do not know 
depends upon fact, upon instrumental actions taken or not taken. In a supervision 
regime focussed on the facts of particular client work, inquiry about ideas, or 
cultural stories or practices, or theory does not make sense: this was the point that 
Liz had made earlier in describing a former supervision relationship where it was 
simpler to bring a client than to talk theory. 
However, in this instance of practice, Leah did not yet understand the 
interdiscursive misunderstanding that was at work, between practices of 
collaborative inquiry and practices of hierarchical inquiry. Leah followed with 
another question that asked about the cultural stories of separation discourse. 
Again her question employed the kind of decentred, deconstructing inquiry that I 
will consider in subsequent chapters. 
What effects might there have been for them of ending a relationship? I 
mean, I heard of one woman who said she couldn't read a book for two years 
afterwards. 
Leah's inquiry was an indirect invitation to Zoe to pause and think about practice on 
more general terms [in the commentary position]. However, the indirectness and 
unfamiliarity of the inquiry meant the terms it offered were not directly visible to 
Zoe. She was again left positioned to hear and respond from a position within a 
more familiar discourse of instrumentality in relation with an omniscient supervisor. 
Yes, that's interesting, that line of inquiry. I haven't tried that ... 
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Positioned within a more familiar discourse of instrumentality in relation with an 
omniscient supervisor, Zoe responded as though her task was now to trythe 
intervention the supervisor had suggested. She was to try a new line of inquiry 
because that is what the supervisor had suggested. In this discursive regime, the 
location of knowledge is unquestioned and the supervisor is centred in the 
supervision. 
Rather than a collaborative inquiry into cultural knowledge that might support Zoe in 
making meaning of the problem of her client seeming not to be moving, Leah's 
question was produced as instruction. 
The interpretation I offer of this conversation is further supported by Zoe's 
comment during the Phase Four reflecting team conversation, when the team were 
reflecting together on the process of this particular supervision. Commenting on the 
questions Leah had asked (and there had been a number of subsequent similar 
interactions), Zoe suggested that 
They were questions about what possible techniques I could have used, but 
they weren't questions about process, though, were they? 
Zoe had heard the questions as questions of instrumental practice, as suggestions of 
techniques, clearly noticing that she had felt positioned as a beneficiary of 
suggestions for practice produced by supervisor expertness. Within instrumental 
discursive practice, the conversational space had been shaped to produce questions 
about technique, about how a counsellor should go on in the counselling. Counsellor 
understanding is not evident in this version of supervision discourse, with its 
emphasis on supervisor knowledge of appropriate technique/action for the counsellor 
to reproduce in the counselling and with its reproduction of a relationship of 
paternalism and instrumentality. Agency or an agentive position is not available to 
the counsellor. Such a situation may produce the frustration and irritation of which 
I have already shown Kate speaking, if counsellors do not wish to take up, without 
protesting, the positions thus made available to them. Perhaps in Zoe's comment, 
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They were questions about what possible techniques I could have used, but they 
weren't questions about process, though, were they, there is some protest at the 
position in which she found herself. 
As the Phase Four team reflection continued, Sharon drew attention to the focus of 
Leah's questioning. That focus was the client's positioning in the discourse of 
separation. Sharon contrasted that focus with her own interest in the counsellor's 
positioning in the work of the counselling. Leah responded, noticing the positionings 
that had been produced. 
Yeah, and I was thinking, too, that asking questions about the client invites, 
like a checklist, or almost defensiveness. 
In response to Leah's comments on these effects of the focus of the inquiry, Zoe 
offered her reflection on the conversational exchange in the Phase One supervision. 
She, too, had noticed discomfort in the position to which she had been called. 
Well, one of the things I realised I was saying was "I have done that", "I 
have done that". And then I thought, "Am I sounding petulant here?" I was 
just aware of that, that discomfort. And then it makes me connect it back 
to wanting to tell the full story, so that the supervisor understands 
everything that's happened beforehand. 
I think that there are two protests here about the positions Zoe found herself in 
within a paternalistic supervision relation - although Leah's questions can be read as 
offering a different relation. Firstly, Zoe was suggesting that a counsellor who is 
positioned to take instrumental action according to supervisor prescription might 
also have some knowledge and they might already have taken the action prescribed. 
The counsellor might not need putting right, for they might already be right, as Zoe 
suggested she was claiming: I have done that; I have done that, she reported 
herself as having said. Further, according to Zoe's account, no longer was the 
supervisor all-knowing: before instructing the counsellor in appropriate action to 
take in counselling, the supervisor needed to know the full story. The full story, 
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according to Zoe's account, is a story that is located within the counsellor's 
knowledge, not the supervisor's. And the full story, according to this account, is a 
story based on facts. While I would not argue that a "full story" can be known by a 
counsellor or a supervisor (or by any of us), I understand Zoe to have been pointing 
out that a supervisor may be making judgements and giving advice on the basis of 
very limited information, having less information about the client and the counselling 
than the counsellor. Zoe, as I understand it, was protesting an apparent disregard 
for her closer and more thorough knowledge of a particular client produced by a 
discourse of supervisor responsibility and omniscience. 
Familiar with a position in a supervision regime in which there was little space where 
counsellor and supervisor might come to value, or perhaps even be interested in, the 
knowledge a counsellor might bring, Zoe did not identify Leah's position of interest 
in Zoe's knowledge of the cultural stories of separation. Familiar with the calls of a 
supervision discourse that promoted instrumental action, Zoe was poorly positioned 
to shake off the hailing to a paternalistic conversation that invites a consideration 
by the counsellor about whether I've tried that or I've not tried that. The emphasis 
produced by the power relation of paternalism had been on techniques the counsellor 
could have or should have tried, and for which she was accountable. Zoe had been 
well trained to think in the terms, the "hearable meanings" (Harre and Davies, 1991, 
p.58), that this discourse had offered her. Both Zoe's participation in the 
supervision and her comments on it afterwards were produced on the terms of a 
discourse of supervision as instrumental action and supervisor omniscience. 
However, she was at the same time working to reposition herself within it. 
Recognising how it required her to assemble herself on its terms she was looking to 
negotiate alternatives. However, in the interdiscursive moments of the supervision 
conversation and the Phase Four reflection, the call to a collaborative position was 
not accessible to her. 
This instance of practice has been used here to illustrate the effects for a 
counsellor positioned as not-knowing within a dominant supervision discourse 
that privileges instrumental action and supervisor knowledge. Despite the 
counsellor's discomfort, the familiarity of being called to account (by offering a 
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report and in responding to expert inquiry) closed off options for the counsellor to 
take a position other than that offered by a relation of paternalism produced by a 
discourse of supervisor authority and responsibility. 
Producing supervision within moral orders 
Davies and Harre suggested that" the relative nature of positions not only to each 
other but to moral orders can make the perception of one [person] almost 
impossible for the other [person], in the relational position, to grasp" (1991, p.58). 
If I take particular supervision discourses to be produced out of particular moral 
orders, the struggle for meaning in which Leah and Zoe, as supervisor and 
counsellor, found themselves can be understood as an effect of their positions in 
particular moral orders. A moral order wherein "the machinery of therapy" 
(Amundson, Webber, & Stewart, 2000, p.21) is the central concern of supervision 
offers different terms than a moral order that produces a supervision concerned 
with collaboratively generating some understanding of the discursive conditions 
of clients' lives. Zoe had access to a storyline by which she could make sense of 
Leah's inquiry, and that storyline was produced by supervision discourse 
constructed in terms of instrumental practice. A position to work for 
understanding of the discursive conditions of a client's life was not accessible to 
Zoe, as that storyline offered no narrative coherence. Leah, on the other hand, did 
not understand immediately, during the Phase One conversation, the 
inaccessibility to Zoe of the position she was intending to make available in her 
speaking. Later, in Phase Four, however, she noticed how her focus on client 
positioning had invoked defensiveness, rather than collaboration. Leah's 
observation returns me to what I am arguing is a central concern of supervision: 
supervision must work to position counsellors well for the exercise of 
responsibility for ethical and effective counselling practice. 
This example of practice has illustrated how when supervision is produced as 
instrumental practice a counsellor was positioned poorly for she was called to 
defend and to acknowledge what she did not know. Through this chapter data 
from comments and commentaries and from a supervision conversation have been 
used to demonstrate some of the effects for counsellors of being distanced to the 
margins when a discourse of supervisor responsibility produces supervision as 
Chapter Seven 167 
instrumental action on the part of an omniscient supervisor. All participants 
offered commentary that demonstrated the construction of supervision as 
examination and confession. Kate and Liz, in particular, spoke about being 
positioned as beginning counsellors, grateful for the reassurance and guidance 
supervision offered, but finding this positioning double-edged for they also found 
themselves positioned without authority. 
At the end of the reflecting team project, reflecting on the ways in which 
supervision had been produced differently in our work, Kate suggested that she 
would be much more demanding in future in setting up a supervision relationship. 
I read Kate's use of the word demanding as suggesting that she would claim for 
herself as a counsellor speaking rights in the construction of a supervision 
relationship. She was, I suggest, refusing the call of the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility to a pre-existing position for the counsellor of passive, accepting, 
supervised supervisee, subject. Rather, she was speaking of a much more active, 
engaged-in-asking, putting-forward-expectations, subjective position in a different 
supervision discourse. I note, however, that to have voice, to have and to put 
forward expectations, to exercise agency in making up supervision, positions the 
counsellor as demanding, a somewhat pejorative positioning. To demand is to 
take strong action to insert oneself into a position in dialogical space. Perhaps the 
sense is that collaborative relationships are not likely to be offered since they fall 
so far outside paternalistic relation offered by the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility. Is the effect of the dominance of the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility that a counsellor will be positioned as having to demand the 
conditions they seek, to ask strongly for what they would like, if supervision is to 
be otherwise than supervisor-constructed, otherwise than paternalistic? Or 
perhaps having to demand is another face of paternalism: if a counsellor entering 
supervision as a dialogic space in which they claim some interests may be 
constructed as demanding, paternalism continues to be dominant. On the basis 
that dominant gender discourse has taught women to be accepting, I might 
speculate, too, about gender discourse constructing Kate as demanding when she 
is other than accepting of what she is given. Perhaps Kate's experience reflects 
Granello, Beamish, and Davis'(1997) findings that increases in supervisory 
collegiality over the length of a supervisory relationship was more likely for male 
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counsellors than for women. As a woman counsellor would Kate have to work 
harder, demand even, to achieve increased collegiality? Each of these readings 
suggests that to be much more demanding is to take up a position that resists and 
subverts the paternal relations of the supervisor will put me right discourse. It is 
to make a claim as counsellor that/ also know what I am doing. And it is thus to 
challenge the dominant discourse of supervision, and so to change that discourse. 
That was the task we had undertaken, to investigate the effects on dominant 
discourse of supervision through engagement in supervision on the basis of the 
politics and ethics produced by the narrative metaphor. However, as Extract 7 .1 
has shown, changing the terms of the discourse is not an easy call. We did not 
meet with unqualified success in our efforts. For as Liz noted in another 
conversation, structures within our culture get reproduced in supervision in 
unilaterally hierarchical processes. Liz made this comment, noting that 
supervisors aren't the originators of the idea that responsibility resides in a 
supervisor. To look to experts as the source of knowledge is a product of the 
knowledge:power matrix to which Foucault drew attention: it is a practice that 
permeates our culture. Dominant supervision discourse assembles supervisors as 
experts. Supervisors' knowledge status positions them as experts in the power 
relation of supervision. As part of her example of how supervision is caught up in 
reproducing structures within our culture, Liz went on to note that some 
employing agencies require the provision of a supervision report. This 
requirement may be taken up by the supervisor as an invitation to provide 
unilateral evaluation of the counsellor's counselling work, based on the 
supervisor's experiences of the counsellor in supervision, or maybe on the basis of 
tapes they have heard. The responsibility to report to others outside the 
supervision relationship is constructed as belonging only to the supervisor, a 
strategy that comes out of the construction of supervision as surveillance and 
examination. In this way supervision becomes a They'll put you right, discursive 
practice. Here it is the employer who is to be reassured that counsellor practice is 
effective and ethical, and the supervisor is charged with the responsibility of 
attesting to that, on the basis of their expert status. In the evaluation practices 
offered by this construction of supervisor responsibility, the supervisor is centred 
and supervisor knowledge is centred. In Liz's words, structures within our 
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culture produce supervision in these ways as they reproduce hierarchical relations 
where one person with expert status examines and completes a report about 
another. 
The matter of supervisor responsibility is a complex one. The work both 
counsellors and supervisors do is responsible work. However, there are many 
possible ways in which that responsibility might be expressed in supervision. The 
possibilities for producing supervision differently, and exercising responsibility 
relationally will be taken up in subsequent chapters. Data presented in this 
chapter suggest that the centring of responsibility in the person of the supervisor 
does not position counsellors well for the production of ethical practice. 
The work of this chapter 
Through the course of this chapter I have shown how a discourse of supervisor 
responsibility might offer to induct counsellors into positions of safety and 
reassurance if they accept its terms. On the terms of this discourse, within 
relations of paternalism between supervisor and counsellor protection is offered to 
clients and counsellors, employing authorities and professional authorities. What 
the protection is from is not altogether clear: perhaps malpractice? Protection is 
offered through the provision of oversight and direction by an expert. Thus, 
counsellors are reporting in to supervisors and supervisors are checking up that 
things are right. Expertise and knowledge are centred in the person of the 
supervisor. These locations have effects on how supervision gets produced, 
enabling some forms of action and restraining others, enabling some forms of 
relation between counsellor and clients and restraining others, enabling some 
forms of thinking about counselling practice and restraining others. Disciplinary 
power is exerted through confession and examination. The discipline of 
counselling reproduces itself. The version of unilateral supervisor responsibility 
reproduced in the discursive practices discussed in this chapter is one that 
constructs an instrumental relation between supervisor and counsellor and 
between supervisor and client. The emphasis is on an indicative, fact-relating 
mode (Parry & Doan, 1994), on instruction about what to do in practice rather 
than theorising practice. 
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Discourses position us. The data presented in this chapter suggest that a discourse 
of supervisor responsibility may not position supervisors and counsellors well to 
collaborate in the tasks of supervision; nor may it position counsellors well to 
exercise responsibility for effective and ethical practice in their counselling work. 
Its discourse practices tend to obscure the professional abilities of counsellors. 
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Chapter Eight 
Producing constructionist supervision practice: Dialogical 
practices 
Introduction 
Chapter Eight focuses this account on aspects of constructionist supervision 
practice. It demonstrates the supervision relationship being produced as a dialogic 
one: examples illustrate the co-production of knowledge in dialogic inquiry. 
Collaborative deconstructing inquiry and research-of-practice inquiry are 
demonstrated as supervision strategies, through examples of practice. Extracts 
from practice illustrate use of the commentary position in dialogic practice. The 
extracts from practice also exemplify a particular version of reflective practice 
produced when counsellor and supervisor take a metadiscursive orientation. In 
metadiscursive positions they notice the practices by which they are constituted in 
their practice and the moral orders within which those practices position them. I 
draw attention to the implications of a metadiscursive orientation for the 
management of professional responsibility, power relations and the ethics of 
practice. 
In focusing on discursive practices produced in a constructionist orientation in 
supervision, I show our group producing supervision differently than it was 
described and produced in the previous chapter. In offering these accounts (of 
difference) I do not take a stance of ongoing direct comparison with what has 
come before. That stance has the attendant risks that I position myself as a self-
appointed scrutineer of 'right' and 'wrong' practice and that the account I offer is 
limited to binary and opposing descriptions. I wish to produce supervision 
differently, but not 'in correction' of others but in an extension into supervision of 
the tenets of narrative therapy. At the same time, I recognise that as I write of 
constructionist supervision practices, accounts of usual and familiar practices will 
be invoked, for as Foucault suggested, 
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There can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize 
others. (1972, p.98) 
In the inevitable reactualising of other versions of supervision as I describe this 
one, I recognise this is one account of supervision, to be placed alongside others. 
My intention is to examine the practices we developed, through locating our 
practices in constructionist ideas, that made it possible for supervision to be 
"inhabited" differently rather than "attacked" (Lamer, 1999, p.50). To inhabit 
differently, rather than to attack or correct, is my purpose. 
In this chapter I follow a similar style of presentation to Chapter Seven, presenting 
participant comments and commentaries as data from transcript-texts derived from 
three research sites: the Research Meetings, the Reviews and the Phase Four 
conversations. I illustrate those comments and commentaries and develop them 
further on the basis of the transcript-texts derived from the supervision work. I 
purposefully draw on examples in the transcript-texts of two-person counsellor 
and supervisor conversations, in Phases One and Three of the reflecting team 
process. I take this emphasis here and in the next chapter in order to demonstrate 
aspects of dyadic supervision at work: that is the most familiar supervision 
practice for counsellors in New Zealand. 
Evolving ideas 
It is not our ideas we should cherish, but their evolution. 
(Weingarten,1992, p.27) 
One of the strengths of this project was that spaces were created for the evolution 
and ongoing development of supervision practice. We drew on many resources in 
this evolution. The possibilities that we came to produce over the course of the 
project depended upon the discourse practices of both supervision and narrative 
therapy. We drew on our knowledges of supervision; and we drew on our 
knowledges about narrative therapy and the post structuralist and social 
constructionist ideas which have produced that therapy. Other accounts, 
constructed in professional, cultural, familial and personal experiences, also 
informed our navigating. In a rapidly changing professional climate, the accounts 
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on which we called were not static: the already available accounts with which we 
were engaging and on which we drew were being produced and produced anew as 
we used them. While we were negotiating what made up and might make up the 
spaces between narrative therapy and supervision and how those spaces 
themselves might be produced, we were also negotiating what it was that 
narrative therapy and supervision were made up of and how they might be 
produced. 
Noticing the changing maps and accounts, and the changing courses we were 
navigating, Liz commented that her "preferred way of working, because of 
interaction with other people, ... will keep developing and changing. It won't be 
a stagnant thing". The work of the participants reflects such developing and 
changing over the course of the project. When I spoke of "styles" in speaking of 
different approaches we were employing, Liz asked, 
Is this different styles, or is this just developing styles? It's not fixed the 
way we do things. The way I may do something one day is not fixed and 
it's not particularly my style, because I will go away and think about it, and 
I'll experiment and I'll talk about the ideas in other settings, too. 
Anne offered back to Liz a suggestion that she was valuing "the evolution of 
ideas" in her work in the project, echoing Weingarten's appreciation of fluidity of 
ideas making possible other ideas and other modes of practising. Writing some 
time after the conversations on which this document draws, I note that practice 
has changed and developed for all of us who participated, each of us navigating 
new and different waters. To make that possible was one of the purposes of the 
project, although it was not one that was researched. 
For me, more than anything this group is a chance to experiment, and to 
think, I can just have a go. . .. And I might look back and cringe and think, 
'Oh, why didn't I notice that, why didn't I answer that?' It's like not 
having to be right, but just being able at times to experiment, and to think 
that we can all have a say in this, to say 'Was that useful?' and 'What 
might I do differently?' 
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Liz spoke of her positioning in the project in this way in Research Meeting One. 
She was suggesting that our purpose in the research was not the production of a 
model, finished, seminal version of narrative supervision, but that we were 
authorising ourselves and each other to employ provisional tactics as we found 
our way about in response to the project's purpose. These tactics would then be 
available for investigation and reflection in the group in order to generate practice 
that might be useful. We wanted to produce supervision in particular ways - a 
local version for local conditions, and a version that drew on the philosophical 
positions that had produced narrative approaches in therapy. There was little 
literature or 'training' available to us: we were engaged in experimental action. 
As we experimented, the "high ideals" of narrative therapy (Morss & Nichterlein, 
1999) did not insure us against difficulties, difficulties of the kind that, as Liz put 
it, might lead to us wishing we had done otherwise or better when we looked back 
through the lenses of responsible professional review or of self-judgement. There 
were also the difficulties of making sense together of the different ideas produced 
by different epistemological positions, particularly with the risk of invoking 
comparisons and judgements of rightness and wrongness. Inhabiting supervision 
differently was an ongoing challenge as we worked to produce supervision that 
was, to use Liz's description, useful. 
A dia/ogic supervisory relation 
The positioning of the counsellor and supervisor in relation was one of the first 
analytic frames I offered the data. In Chapter Three I drew attention to the 
centrality of the supervision relationship in a number of accounts of supervision, 
(Anderson & Swim; 1995; Holloway; 1995; Kaiser, 1997, for example) and at 
the same time the marginalising of the counsellor, in many accounts, from the 
construction and production of supervision. I was interested, then, to explore the 
versions of relationship that the transcript-texts made visible. As they offered 
alternative accounts, participants often drew on constructions of the supervision 
relationship that diminished hierarchy. There was evidence of a number of tactics 
and strategies being employed to pay attention to the politics of the construction 
of the supervision relationship. I suggest that in working for a supervision that 
sits alongside a therapy that is constructed as collaborative we were also 
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positioned to construct the supervision relation as collaborative. A collaborative 
relation between counsellor and supervisor was spoken about and demonstrated in 
a number of ways. 
For example, Clare spoke of her work in supervision as a walking alongside that 
offered counsellors an opportunity to explore their work and their experience of 
their work. There is a disruption of hierarchy in the walking alongside position. 
According to this construction, counsellors are centred, in relation with their 
work, in the production of supervision, for the supervisor is alongside. Anne 
spoke of the pleasure of having someone else who cares about your work. A 
metaphor of care constructs a different relation between supervisor and counsellor 
than a metaphor of paternalistic responsibility. The supervisor is someone else 
who cares: the counsellor holds the more centred position of first-carer for their 
own work. There is a subtle shift in the location of responsibility in this speaking. 
There is also a subtle shift in the naming of the work that is being done in 
supervision. Metaphors of care, and of walking alongside, contrast with those of 
reporting in and putting right that dominated the previous chapter. 
Situating supervisor authority 
Participants described other practices disruptive of hierarchy that evoked a 
dialogic supervisory relationship. Anne described a practice of situating her 
authority as supervisor, at any time and particularly when called to take a position 
of evaluation. The practice of situating her authority worked to disrupt hierarchy 
and produce collaboration. Anne offered this description during Research 
Meeting Three when she raised the matter of managing evaluation in supervising 
a student. She went on: 
The student I was supervising ... she wanted feed back from my position 
as supervisor and she wanted me to tell her what I was thinking [about her 
work as a counsellor]. And - I mean that's how I like to work, to be able to 
say, "I'm asking this question, I'm wondering about this, because of this", 
or to say, "Because if I was doing that I would have been really wanting to 
know this because of these reasons". What I wanted her to do [ when she 
wanted feedback] was interview me about my comments, so that they 
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would be put in a context, or they could be seen as located with me and my 
thinking, rather than as some factual teaching thing that couldn't be 
contested, or couldn't have had a different meaning applied to them as 
well. Yeah, that was what I was uncomfortable with, as if I would come 
up with something right or better; [rather than] that I might just come up 
with some other possibilities, or have some other ideas about it, what 
could have happened. 
Anne paid attention to the power relations of the supervision relationship by 
taking care that her speaking from the position of supervisor was available to be 
"dialogized". She wanted the positions from which she spoke to be visible in her 
speaking, and her words open to negotiation, their meanings investigated. Her 
speaking as a supervisor should be put in context. Her speaking was one version 
of how things were, and a version about which the counsellor could interview her. 
This supervision practice is thus already constructed as deconstructing: it 
addresses matters of power and justice at a very particular practice level (Larner, 
1999a, p.41) by paying attention to the power relations at work in the supervision 
relation. 
According to Anne's account the supervisor's authority is constructed as de-
centred: her thinking is offered and its genesis made transparent. The ideas the 
supervisor offers are available for negotiating and evaluating. At the centre of the 
supervision is the dialogic space within which the counsellor makes meaning with 
the supervisor of the comments the supervisor has made: meaningfulness is seen 
to be produced in dialogue. The effect of this practice is to disrupt developmental 
assumptions that would otherwise privilege a supervisor's assessment, the 
authority of which would be legitimised by the supervisor's positioning in sole 
responsibility in a discourse of supervisor responsibility. In the disruption of 
hierarchy the supervisor's comments were offered as located with me and my 
thinking. Responsibility is performed differently when discursive practices call 
the counsellor into a position from which they might join in negotiating the 
legitimacy of a supervisor's feedback. Space is made for dialogue, for the shared 
production of meaning and authority. 
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Chapter Ten offers examples, from the supervision conversations, of this practice 
of situating one's speaking. My focus at this point is on comments that 
participants made about their stance and their thinking as they worked to produce 
collaborative and dialogic supervision practice. 
Ongoing negotiation of the supervision process 
Liz described employing similar practices of unsettling hierarchical assumptions 
in inviting counsellors into collaborative relation through engaging counsellors in 
ongoing negotiation of the supervision process. She said that she began from the 
premise that the supervision relation was not already finally constructed, but was 
available for construction: and she paid attention to how it was being constructed. 
She consulted with the counsellor, asking them, Is this [conversation] being 
helpful? Is this working for you? Are these the things you are wanting to talk 
about? Such consultation is familiar practice in narrative therapy. In supervision 
this kind of inquiry positions the counsellor as knowing something of both what 
they want and what they want to ask for in supervision. Further, they are 
positioned as knowing whether or not the current supervision practices are 
producing a supervision that meets their interests and intentions. It posits 
supervision as negotiable: to be made up in reference to both the professionally 
available versions of it and the possibilities that the particular supervision 
relationship might produce. The counsellor is invited into a speaking position in 
the ongoing production of supervision. The construction of supervision is 
bilateral rather than unilateral. 
Taking and offering positions in dialogic relation 
In analysing transcript-texts for how supervision agendas were presented and 
negotiated, I paid attention to the ways in which counsellors, too, contributed to 
the production of dialogical space in supervision. Anne, as counsellor, introduced 
her supervision agenda in Supervision 14 in this way, inviting the supervisor (and 
the reflecting team) into a thinking with position. 
I'm wanting to get some ideas and directions, possibilities, for moving on 
with this client. It's not because we're stuck; it's because he's made some 
fairly important changes in his life and, yeah, I'm just wanting to engage you 
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Extract 8.1: Interrogating decision-making discourse: The commentary 
position 
Lee is counsellor and Ruth is supervisor, in Supervision 18. 
Ruth I'm just thinking, if you're not used to making decisions, how would you know 
how to make decisions? Or if you don't have a sense of control over your 
own life, how would you recognise a decision that happened? Or, decision-
making sort of fits in with goal-setting and planning, and that does seem to 
have a really male philosophy behind it, or a particular world view, behind it. 
Lee So that the words we use are quite important. 
Ruth Well, I don't know ... 
Lee Well, the meaning of them, what's the meaning given to "goal setting" and 
"planning", "decision-making"? 
Ruth Yes, it's quite an agentive thing to do to think of yourself as a decision-
maker. 
Lee And in terms of, particularly couples, thinking about the couple relationship, 
and how does the couple relationship make decisions, or how, what style of 
decision-making does this couple have? 
Ruth Yeah, and where did it come from? Where did the blue print for that [style 
of] decision-making come from? (Yeah) Who does it work best for? Who 
doesn't it work best for? Who reads the blue print well, and who is 
confused by how that blue print works? There's never been much written 
about it, and I haven't really thought about it before. 
and the rest of the group in thinking with me about how can I make the most 
of these. 
The thinking with position highlights a location in the text similar to that 
highlighted by the alongside position that Clare spoke of. Attention is paid to the 
kind of relationship that produces the work of the supervision, and the metaphors 
used are ones that diminish hierarchy by producing partners in collaboration: 
thinking with and alongside. Anne as counsellor sought collaboration in 
generating possibilities for practice. According to this account, the supervisor 
(and the reflecting team) were available to serve the counsellor's interests for the 
supervision, and were to be guided by her in how they would work. The 
counsellor became the consultant to the supervisor not only about the supervision 
agenda, but also about the terms on which the agenda might be met. 
The following extract illustrates an instance of practice where supervisor and 
counsellor were positioned to think with each other. In those positions they 
collaborated in deconstructive inquiry. The centre of their inquiry thus produced 
new possibilities for practice. 
Working in dialogic relation and co-producing knowledge 
Extract 8.1: Interrogating decision-making discourse: the commentary 
position 
Lee is counsellor and Ruth is supervisor, in Supervision 18. 
Lee introduced her supervision interest as having arisen from her work with a couple 
who were making a decision about whether or not one partner would use anti-
depressants. Lee's interest was in how choices and decisions get made; she was 
picking up on the particular and asking how she could be more helpful, generally, to 
clients, particularly couples, in their decision making. Lee's interest was in 
interrogating the discourses of decision making in the light of a particular instance 
of practice and her reflections upon that instance. What does it mean to make 
decisions, she was asking. The purpose of the interrogation was the generation of 
new possibilities to serve Lee in her counselling practice. 
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I pick up the supervision conversation at a point where it appears that the 
conversation, rather than a walking alongside, was almost a running alongside as 
together Lee and Ruth interrogated decision-making as discursive practice. The 
extract opens with Ruth speaking as co-researching supervisor in this interrogation 
of supervision discourse: 
I'm just thinking, if you're not used to making decisions, how would you know 
how to make decisions? Or if you don't have a sense of control over your 
own life, how would you recognise a decision that happened? Or, decision-
making sort of fits in with goal-setting and planning, and that does seem to 
have a really male philosophy behind it, or a particular world view, behind it. 
Ruth's questions, not of Lee, but of the making up of discourse, asked about 
positioning in decision making, the kind of subject called forth by the discourse of 
decision making, and the assumptions that produce a decision-making discourse. The 
you to whom Ruth referred was a generic you. She was making her inquiry from the 
commentary position, one where she used her supervisory authority in a 
deconstructing commentary and inquiry about the making up of discourse practices. 
Ruth's inquiry pointed to locations in decision-making discourse, asking about the 
effects for people of being positioned in those places. Her inquiry pointed also to 
the ways in which decision-making discourse has been produced. In response Lee 
was positioned to reflect on the deconstructing: 
So that the words we use are quite important. 
Lee joined Ruth in noticing the effects of the language practices of decision-making. 
Ruth then paused, deferring to Lee for a fuller explanation of what she was thinking. 
Well, I don't know ... 
Lee continued, making her point more clearly. Her question was not of Ruth, as 
supervisor, but rather it investigated discourse. 
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Well, the meaning of them, what's the meaning given to "goal setting" and 
"planning", "decision-making"? 
Ruth's response was again from a version of the commentary position: 
Yes, it's quite an agentive thing to do to think of yourself as a decision-maker. 
In this version of the commentary position the supervisor is a commentator on 
discourse and positioning, using their supervisory authority to inquire about and thus 
offer comment on power relations. I think of the supervisor as putting their 
shoulder to the wheel of the deconstructive task from a position that is at one time 
both knowing and inquiring. The supervisor is familiar both with the deconstructive 
task and with the cultural stories by which the current speaking is produced. And 
they are inquiring as they join the counsellor in deconstructing inquiry, offering a 
contribution and asking whether or not it is of use to the counsellor's interest. The 
supervisor is making a claim to knowledge about a cultural story and offering it, as 
commentary, for the counsellor's use. It is an offering, not a prescription. 
Positioned alongside the counsellor, the supervisor is commenting on the discursive 
vista before them both, and in which they are both positioned themselves: 
Yes, it's quite an agentive thing to do to think of yourself as a decision-maker. 
Lee located her next question in the particular interest she had brought to the 
supervision, couples counselling. Continuing to produce a discourse of supervision as 
deconstructive inquiry, she said: 
And in terms of, particularly couples, thinking about the couple relationship, 
and how does the couple relationship make decisions, or how, what style of 
decision-making does this couple have? 
With this question Lee was working at the supervision agenda she had first set. Out 
of the mutual deconstructing inquiry she now had a question that gave a title to her 
supervision interest, What style of decision-making does this couple have? As 
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supervisor, Ruth continued to position herself alongside, refocusing her looking on 
the focus of Lee's looking, and noticing the detail that followed the focus, style of 
decision making, that Lee's looking had offered. In her next contribution to the 
dialogue Ruth joined the inquiry on the terms Lee had now produced: 
Yeah, and where did it come from? Where did the blue print for that [style 
of] decision-making come from? (Yeah) Who does it work best for? Who 
doesn't it work best for? Who reads the blue print well, and who is 
confused by how that blue print works? There's never been much written 
about it, and I haven't really thought about it before. 
First Ruth offered a running string of deconstructing questions that asked about 
the pre-existing positions in decision making discourse. Then she changed focus in 
her last sentence, reflecting on her own position in relation with the knowledge that 
was being produced as she and Lee worked in the supervision. This reflection shows 
her stepping back from the inquiry and noticing its effects for her. She was a co-
researcher. The inquiry was decentred: decision-making, not Lee, was its focus. 
However, Ruth noticed her own position as supervisor/researcher in the production 
of the inquiry: I haven't really thought about it before. In building collaborative 
relationship and engaging in collaborative inquiry, Ruth, too, was open to new learning. 
Within the supervision discourse being produced here, inquiry might be generative 
for the supervisor, too. 
As supervision was constructed here, knowledge (about decision-making discourse) 
was produced in the work of the counsellor and supervisor in collaborative relation, 
generated by their mutual inquiry. They were "co-laboring" (Fine & Turner, 1997, 
p.237). The knowledge was not held by either of them before the conversation: 
knowledge was made up in their working together, alongside each other in 
collaborative inquiry. I notice that the extracts from the transcript-texts that I 
have offered here, without my authorial comments, would not make particularly 
evident to a reader who in this dialogue was the supervisor and who was the 
counsellor. The interest in the inquiry was mutual. The positioning in collaborative 
relation of counsellor and supervisor made such inquiry possible. 
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The collaboration at work here was both relational and epistemological. A shared 
epistemological stance produced mutually understandable invitations in their 
speaking: they appeared to know how to go on together. There was a shared 
assumption that deconstruction is a helpful practice and shared understanding of 
the deconstructing task. Lee and Ruth's investigation of the politics of decision 
making was further informing counselling practice, for Lee would have a richer 
understanding of the discursive context of her clients' lives. By Lee's invitation Lee 
and Ruth were calling into question the canon of decision-making discourse, 
producing an alternative account. Their positionings in relation with each other and 
in mutually intelligible moral orders supported them to know how to go on in their 
conversation. Their shared interest in the deconstructive task, and their shared 
understanding that this was the task of this supervision session produced the 
dialogue in which new meanings for practice were made. 
Collaborating, and producing responsibility differently 
Phase Four of the reflecting team supervision process included reflection on the 
processes of the first three phases of the supervision conversations. In the Phase 
Four review of the supervision from which this instance of practice (Extract 8.1) 
is extracted (Supervision 18), Lee commented on the power relation offered by the 
discursive practice of supervision as collaborative and generative inquiry: 
We're talking one competent person to another. 
The commentary position responds to and invites a positioning as competent. 
However, a counsellor's positioning as competent does not negate supervisor 
responsibility, Lee went on to suggest. Speaking about Ruth's work as supervisor 
she noticed: 
It's a focussed conversation. There's still a responsibility that I was 
appreciating that you took, to explore those ideas, and to ask questions 
about those ideas. 
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Supervisor responsibility is being differently produced in Lee's speaking, as it 
was in the supervision just presented. According to this account, the supervisor is 
positioned as responsible for joining the counsellor in exploration and inquiry. A 
shared, deconstructing inquiry was at the centre of the conversation, as a 
purposeful strategy employed by the supervisor in joining the counsellor in their 
supervision interests. The responsibility taken here by both counsellor and 
supervisor was the researching of practice. 
Collaborating in the co-production of knowledge 
Responsibility is produced in thinking with each other about our practices, and the 
ethics of our practices. Lee might be understood to have been actively responding 
to the call to ethical practice in setting this supervision agenda. Noticing some 
effects for her clients of being positioned in decision-making discourse she 
wanted to investigate that discourse for the power relations it invoked. Ruth 
joined Lee's invitation that was, in effect, to walk alongside and think with her. 
This invitation constructed knowledge as a production of a community of 
thinkers, thinking with each other. Ideas would be generated in the thinking 
together. Ruth and Lee's conversation generated knowledge about decision-
making that was not available to either of them before the conversation began: 
they were generating knowledge in the dialogical spaces between them. To 
employ the navigation metaphor, knowledge was not in or on already-established 
maps or charts, but was generated in the sailing, in the readings counsellor and 
supervisor made of available reference points and made up as they produced their 
voyaging. The emphasis was on the spaces between, as they played the dialogue 
between them. For in this constructionist practice, to inquire was to produce 
knowledge: to ask the deconstructing question that Lee asked, What style of 
decision-making does this couple have? was to produce knowledge about 
decision-making practices. I suggest that Ruth's next move, And where did it [ the 
style] come from?" (that is, what is the history of that style, how did it evolve?) 
was both dialogically and relationally responsive: she continued to hold the 
conversational centre open for inquiry. Both Lee and Ruth were drawing on their 
knowledge of cultural stories of decision-making in their inquiry: they were 
simultaneously bringing forward and unsettling familiar knowledge, and 
generating new possibilities for knowing. In contrast with the seemingly 
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unproblematic transfer of knowledge, from supervisor to counsellor, of the 
Holloway example reviewed in Chapter Three, here knowledge is for 
investigation with an expectation of generativity. In this way knowledge comes 
to be produced in the space between the speakers through the actions of both 
supervision partners: the production of authority is a collaborative, dialogic 
endeavour. 
Assuming competence: a position for robust inquiry 
Lee suggested that the supervision conversation (in Extract 8.1) had constructed 
both partners, counsellor and supervisor, as "competent". A number of times 
during the project, arguments were made for a supervision that assumed or overtly 
acknowledged counsellor competence and capability. Such an assumption 
produces a counsellor as agentive in acting with responsibility in the monitoring 
of their own practice. Anne spoke in Research Meeting One, of preferring a 
supervision that normalises not knowing, not knowing how to do it, or feeling like 
you did it badly. To do it badly, she suggested, doesn't take away from your 
capabilities, and your credibility and your ethics as a practitioner: it's just 
normal. And, she continued, It's not about being a novice or a learner or needing 
supervision. Not knowing is constructed then, not as pathology, nor inadequacy, 
nor beginner status, nor as a vacancy in need of the insertion of supervisor 
knowledge, but as an opportunity for (collaborative) investigation. 
There are two dimensions to Anne's claim. Firstly, she was speaking in relation 
with an idea that was gaining strength in the group about celebration in contrast to 
a focus on problems in supervision. The celebration metaphor is a focus of 
Chapter Eleven. In relation with the idea of celebration, Anne was making a 
claim here for the value of rigorous investigation of problems. The second 
dimension to Anne's claim is to do with theorising identity. To take up a 
discursive position for robust investigation of practice difficulties does not speak 
the truth of a counsellor's professional identity as novice, beginner, or deficient, 
she was saying. It is possible in supervision for a counsellor to explore difficulties 
in ways that acknowledge the temporary aspect of that positioning. 
Later Anne continued, 
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Or, kind of like using the supervision process also to explore those times 
you don't know what to do, or felt you really stuffed up. You know, what 
put you in that position? What was over your eyes? What was holding 
your hands [behind your back]? What was keeping you there? And to 
identify them [those restraints]. Like more of a learning process ... And 
not look at them [the restraints] too carefully [or too cautiously, but rather 
robustly]; let's really investigate them. And you can investigate the 
problem from a position of security rather than insecurity. 
In this account, the supervisor is invited into a thinking with position, in a robust 
co-investigation of the restraints upon the counsellor in their practice. Again, the 
invitation is to a collaborative, alongside investigation of the discursive vista. 
Counsellor capacity and competence are assumed. However, the discursive 
conditions in which they were temporarily overridden or less available are 
investigated. The questions Anne offered, above, for an investigation of the 
restraints the counsellor might be experiencing are similar to the questions that 
inform this analysis. What discourses were at work producing the problem? How 
was the counsellor positioned: What was over your eyes? What was keeping you 
there? Anne asked. In Anne's speaking supervision is constructed as an 
investigation of the production of ourselves as counsellors, as we assume meta-
discursive positions that enable us to really investigate. The counsellor is 
positioned as a robust investigator of the discursive production of their practice. 
I go on now to explore an extract from Supervision 4 that illustrates supervision 
produced on the terms of which Anne spoke. In this extract the counsellor will be 
seen working as a robust and rigorous inquirer into her own practice as an effect 
of being positioned as competent, capable and ethical in her own and the 
supervisor's regard. 
Extract 8.2: Assuming competence in inquiry about practice 
Emma is counsellor and Di is supervisor. The extract is from Supervision 4. 
Emma introduced her supervision agenda with a self-monitoring presentation: 
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Extract 8.2: Assuming competence in inquiry about practice 
Emma is counsellor and Di is supervisor. The extract is from Supervision 4. 
Emma I want to talk about a kind of recurring sense of frustration with a certain 
sort of client, and how, I don't really want to talk about the details of this 
client, I want to just talk about me. I mean, I'm not happy to settle for that 
for me as a counsellor and to be feeling like that for that person. 
Di So you're not happy until you settle this frustration (yeah) that's blocking 
your [client-counsellor] relationship. 
Emma No, actually, even irritation, yeah, blocking the relationship. Yeah, it's not a 
useful feeling for me to have that as her counsellor. 
Di You said frustration, even irritation. Can you ... [say some more about that]? 
Emma Well, that's what it sounds like. It sounds really horrible, but this person 
really irritates me, there's a certain type of woman, and there's certain 
types of issues; and it's something to do with different meaning, and 
different expectations ... It's not a sense that I don't understand what's 
trapping a woman, or keeping her in [a relationship], or how painful it might 
be to investigate her relationship, or how difficult it might be to leave or to 
stay there. [further description] And I'm confused, and so that doesn't 
seem a useful way because what these clients - I don't like to say "these 
clients" - but there is that same sort of feeling they just won't answer that 
question, but they move on to something else. [ ... ] 
Di So this particular problem story kind of keeps recurring (yeah) around 
women and relationships, and them kind of taking less for themselves than 
you might want for them? 
I want to talk about a kind of recurring sense of frustration with a certain 
sort of client, and how, I don't really want to talk about the details of this 
client, I want to just talk about me. I mean, I'm not happy to settle for that 
for me as a counsellor and to be feeling like that for that person. 
Emma's presentation of her supervision interest constructed the work of supervision 
as counsellor-focussed rather than client-focussed. She positioned herself as 
seeking something better for herself as a counsellor and so for her relation with the 
person who was her client. The invitation to Di, as supervisor, was to centre her 
inquiry on Emma's experiences of frustration, and on Emma's sense of dissonance 
between her preferences for her practice and having done badly in particular 
aspects of practice. 
Di's response stepped aside a little from the counsellor centre that Emma had 
offered - I just want to talk about me - but offered back a possible centring on the 
counsellor-client relationship: 
So you're not happy until you settle this frustration (yeah) that's blocking 
your [client-counsellor] relationship. 
Emma accepted the focus on relationship offered by Di, renaming the problem and 
noting its effect on the counselling relationship: 
No, actually, even irritation, yeah, blocking the relationship. Yeah, it's not a 
useful feeling for me to have that as her counsellor. 
Emma had requested that Di's inquiry attend to her and her experience in her work. 
Di took that request up: 
You said frustration, even irritation. Can you ... [say some more about that]? 
Emma continued to explore her concern: 
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Emma Yeah. And not ... [Pause] What do they do with me? ... I might even ask [the 
client] that question [about moving from seeing the effects of the problem 
on them to crediting themselves with producing the problem] again, but it 
doesn't feel comfortable asking it again. It feels almost like I get into a 
little bit of a battle with this client; and if I want to keep interested then 
it's kind of not that good a feeling. My heart might not be in the right place. 
I could describe it. 
Di And this is when Irritation starts coming in? 
Emma Yeah. Or else I just sit back, I sort of lose my interest, or connection, with 
them. And the overall thing is with, ... I notice, I mean, I see these people, 
and see their names booked for that week, and I'm thinking. I hope they 
don't come, and I don't want it [that thought]. I don't like how I feel, and I 
don't like how I feel about myself; how I feel as a counsellor. I don't like 
my attitude. 
Di So some of your potence as a counsellor gets taken away by these struggles 
against, against this difference that somehow ... 
Emma It makes me feel like "counsellors are nice people, and you're not actually 
nice." Yeah, I feel bad about my negative feelings towards this person. 
Di Would it be helpful for me to ask you about that [negative feelings] or would 
it be more useful to lay out the problem territory that these clients bring 
that gets you captured in these feelings that would have you feel so bad? 
Emma No, I don't know that I' 11 be ab le to answer very easily, but the problem 
territory that they bring is, claiming their own right not to be hit, or to have 
their own way; they want to just feel okay about themselves and make some 
of their own decisions, the effects of that on their ... This woman that kind 
of has raised it again for me, has left her marriage for two or three years, 
but is feeling drawn back in to try again; but she lays out for me in quite 
explicit detail the reasons why she doesn't want to do that, and I ask her 
Well, that's what it sounds like. It sounds really horrible, but this person 
really irritates me, there's a certain type of woman, and there's certain 
types of issues; and it's something to do with different meaning, and 
different expectations ... It's not a sense that I don't understand what's 
trapping a woman, or keeping her in [a relationship], or how painful it might 
be to investigate her relationship, or how difficult it might be to leave or to 
stay there. [further description] And I'm confused, and so that doesn't 
seem a useful way because what these clients - I don't like to say "these 
clients" - but there is that same sort of feeling they just won't answer that 
question, but they move on to something else. 
Emma noticed the positioning in relation with clients that Irritation called her into: 
clients became objectified as these clients. As she was speaking she noticed the 
effects on relationship of those ways of speaking: it sounds really horrible. The 
subtext of Emma's observations is that she prefers something different: she 
doesn't want to settle for that as a counsellor, as she said at the beginning. I 
suggest that the reflexivity of Emma's observations on the position-in-relation that 
ways of speaking she was using offered her, produce her as a counsellor working at 
responsibility. She is positioned as responsible for the ethics of her practice. 
Like Lee in Extract 8.1, Emma was agentive in producing the tools for the supervision 
conversation. In this agentive position she used the ideas offered to her by the 
theoretical resources - such as noticing the terms of her speaking - which produced 
her counselling work. The these clients description was simultaneously used and 
undermined as Emma described her experience of her hands being tied behind her 
back. 
As the conversation continued Di was not caught by the problematic experience that 
had been frustrating Emma. Nor was she caught by the problematic identity 
description of Emma that the frustration-problem had offered: 
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questions about change and difference and other things and she's really 
clear that she hasn't noticed any change or any difference [in her partner]. 
She gives me examples of even extreme abusive - to me, and she actually 
defines it as [abusive] too - behaviour that he's doing right now as he's 
trying to get her to come back. Then she just seems to switch into a ... like a 
child or something ... 
Di How would you understand that? 
Emma Well, I don't understand it. I just don't get it. And that leads me to have 
frustration and irritation [ ... ]. 
Di Can I just go back a couple of tracks? I am listening you talking about your 
own experience, but just before I come to it, can I ask, (yeah) How do you 
think your client is understanding it? [Brief description of 'it', the 
problematic phenomenon followed.] 
Emma Maybe it's really confusing for her as well. 
Di I've asked her things like that. And I've asked her ... " 
Di What would you usually do when clients are confused between two ... ? 
Emma I think that if I was confused I'd usually ask her and let her know why I was 
confused, or wondering about that. I just think, I don't know if I have, but 
I'd maybe ask her if she had some confusion about it. I don't know what I 
normally do other than bring it up. 
Di I mean, what have you generally found to be the effects of confusion in 
people's lives, when you have asked them about it? 
Di So this particular problem story kind of keeps recurring (yeah) around 
women and relationships, and them kind of taking less for themselves than 
you might want for them? 
Emma Yeah. And not ... [Pause] What do they do with me? ... I might even ask [the 
client] that question [about moving from seeing the effects of the problem 
on them to crediting themselves with producing the problem] again, but it 
doesn't feel comfortable asking it again. It feels almost like I get into a 
little bit of a battle with this client; and if I want to keep interested then 
it's kind of not that good a feeling. My heart might not be in the right place. 
I could describe it. 
Di And this is when Irritation starts coming in? 
Emma Yeah. Or else I just sit back, I sort of lose my interest, or connection, with 
them. And the overall thing is with, ... I notice, I mean, I see these people, 
and see their names booked for that week, and I'm thinking, I hope they 
don't come, and I don't want it [that thought]. I don't like how I feel, and I 
don't like how I feel about myself; how I feel as a counsellor. I don't like 
my attitude. 
Di So some of your potence as a counsellor gets taken away by these struggles 
against, against this difference that somehow ... 
In Di's last contribution we see her speaking of two positions in which Emma is 
represented: Di named the absent (in that it had not been directly named) presence 
of Emma's competence as a counsellor and the position of struggle in which the 
problem had located Emma in its disturbance of her preferences for her practice. Di 
was both "credit[ing] the reality Emma was expressing and "pressing it toward 
evolution" (Gergen, 1997, p.251). Parker suggested that " a deconstructing therapy 
enables an exploration of the location of the subject" (1998, p.74). These early 
exchanges in a deconstructing supervision conversation opened space for inquiry that 
decentred the counsellor in its interest in the counsellor's location, in the counsellor-
in-relation. And at the same time the supervision conversation centred the 
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Emma Well, not knowing where they are, where they stand, what to do; decisions 
are hard to make. Confusion makes decisions hard to know; it's hard to trust 
yourself, to know what you really are thinking. 
Di And I was thinking, what does that mean, then, for somebody who's in this 
territory [gestures] that we are talking about [the discursive positioning of 
the client)? 
Emma It would mean that she is finding it difficult to trust herself in either way. 
Confused about what she sees and what she doesn't see, what she knows, and 
what she doesn't know, what she wants and what she doesn't want. Can't 
make a decision with one leg in each camp. [Pause.] Yeah, yeah, she could 
really be done over by that confusion. 
Di And, amongst all the knowledge that you've got about violence and abuse, 
what do you know about the relationship between those things, you know, 
between the tactics of violence and the tactics of confusion? 
Emma I guess I think it is one of the effects of abuse, and the effect of abuse and 
violence is confusion, losing trust in yourself, not being sure about what you 
see and what you know - and it's really helpful for me to remember this. 
Di In what way? 
Emma It shifts my perception of her a little bit again, being able to see the 
effects of confusion. The effects of confusion leave her really immobilised. 
That feels really helpful as a possibility in my work with her. 
Di How does it [remembering] shift your perception? What difference does it 
make to your perception? 
Emma It makes me see her and then see the effects of confusion rather than see 
her as, you know, a 'stupid woman' - which feels much better. 
counsellor: Di followed very closely what Emma's understanding of the problem was 
and what her supervision interests were. Emma was not the problem: the problem 
was the problem. Emma's knowledge of the problem was being brought forward as a 
resource to the conversation. Further, Di positioned herself as working to 
understand. "The small and the ordinary" (Weingarten, 1998) moves of an ordinary 
supervision conversation worked to engage respectfully with the counsellor's current 
concerns, a sense of having done it badly, while maintaining a shared sense of a 
competency unthreatened by the current concerns. 
Anne had suggested that restraints on a counsellor should be really investigated. 
What is over your eyes, what is keeping you in that position? As the Supervision 4 
conversation continued, Emma spoke about how the Irritation problem was 
positioning her: 
It makes me feel like "counsellors are nice people, and you're not actually 
nice." Yeah, I feel bad about my negative feelings towards this person. 
Di now sought guidance from Emma about where to centre her inquiry: 
Would it be helpful for me to ask you about that [negative feelings] or would 
it be more useful to lay out the problem territory that these clients bring 
that gets you captured in these feelings that would have you feel so bad? 
In response to Di's inquiry, Emma immediately took up a description of the discursive 
context, the problem territory, which was producing the negative feelings for her. 
She began: 
No, I don't know that I'll be able to answer very easily, but the problem 
territory that they bring is, claiming their own right not to be hit, or to have 
their own way; they want to just feel okay about themselves and make some 
of their own decisions, the effects of that on their ... This woman that kind 
of has raised it again for me, has left her marriage for two or three years, 
but is feeling drawn back in to try again; but she lays out for me in quite 
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This is really important to me to make that shift back to seeing the effect 
of it on her. [ ... ] 
Di Why do you think, how do you think you got conned in this instance - because 
I think [pause); I know you well enough to know that you're not usually 
conned into blaming clients? 
Di So that there's a real cost for you in kind of gathering up so many stories 
and in some ways it would seem so much easier if you could say, "Well, send 
her to assertiveness training, it's her problem". But instead the stories make 
a sense to you which is really sad. 
Emma Incredibly sad; and I am remembering the hope of it as well, and what 
women do do, and how they do retrieve their lives and relationships and 
children. and create other possibilities for themselves as well. 
Emma Yeah. It's important for me to remember that. And to remember that if 
she [this particular client] wants to leave she can as well, because she's, well 
there's evidence of her strength as well, in identifying and naming [the 
abuse]. In some ways it's amazing that she's named what was happening in 
the relationship as abuse because of powerful cultural and personal 
invitations to name it as stuff that she brought about and made to happen. 
explicit detail the reasons why she doesn't want to do that, and I ask her 
questions about change and difference and other things and she's really 
clear that she hasn't noticed any change or any difference [in her partner]. 
She gives me examples of even extreme abusive - to me, and she actually 
defines it as [abusive] too - behaviour that he's doing right now as he's 
trying to get her to come back. Then she just seems to switch into a ... like a 
child or something ... 
Di continued to take an inquiry position, making space for the understandings already 
available to the conversation before offering any others: 
How would you understand that? 
Emma Well, I don't understand it. I just don't get it. And that leads me to have 
frustration and irritation [ ... ]. 
Di Can I just go back a couple of tracks? I am listening to you talking about 
your own experience, but just before I come to it, can I ask, (yeah) How do 
you think your client is understanding it? [Brief description of 'it', the 
problematic phenomenon followed.] 
Emma Maybe it's really confusing for her as well. 
Di has continued to pursue an understanding of the discursive conditions within 
which Emma had struggled to position herself well to work with her client. In 
Emma's last response, Maybe it's really confusing for her as well, there is some 
change in her positioning. But that change was immediately interrupted as Emma 
continued: 
I've asked her things like that. And I've asked her ... 
Di then interrupted this re-emergence of the problematic position and the echoes it 
brought of the Have you tried': Yes, I've done that set of discursive practices 
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discussed in the previous chapter. She interrupted by noticing the alternative 
position from which Emma had just spoken, Maybe it's really confusing for her as 
well. and responding to that invitation. Di asked: 
What would you usually do when clients are confused between two ... ? 
In this inquiry Di's question looked to Emma's wider practice to identify resources 
for the current problem. Di was continuing to assume competence and on that basis 
to research Emma's practice. Taking an informant position and drawing on her 
practice knowledge, Emma replied: 
I think that if I was confused I'd usually ask her and let her know why I was 
confused, or wondering about that. I just think, I don't know if I have, but 
I'd maybe ask her if she had some confusion about it. I don't know what I 
normally do other than bring it up. 
The next piece of dialogue was not all audible on the tape and so there is a gap in the 
transcript-text. However, Emma said that maybe confusion was immobilising her 
client, and so there could be value in making confusion clear and speaking about it. 
The inquiry continued as Di asked, 
I mean, what have you generally found to be the effects of confusion in 
people's lives, when you have asked them about it? 
Di's speaking invited Emma into a position as informant, authoritative about practice 
on the basis of her practice knowledge. Emma said: 
Well, not knowing where they are, where they stand, what to do; decisions 
are hard to make. Confusion makes decisions hard to know; it's hard to trust 
yourself, to know what you really are thinking. 
Di continued: 
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And I was thinking, what does that mean, then, for somebody who's in this 
territory [gestures] that we are talking about [the discursive positioning of 
the client]? 
Di located herself as a co-inquirer, I was thinking. The tone of the archaeological 
investigation (Monk, 1997) was one of mutual sifting and looking and investigating. 
Replying, Emma now shifted her focus from the general knowledge she had about 
confusion to the specific instance that had caused her to feel disturbed by her 
response: 
It would mean that she is finding it difficult to trust herself in either way. 
Confused about what she sees and what she doesn't see, what she knows, and 
what she doesn't know, what she wants and what she doesn't want. Can't 
make a decision with one leg in each camp. [Pause.] Yeah, yeah, she could 
really be done over by that confusion. 
The story of practice that had offered Emma the problematic positioning (of 
capture by-irritation-and-frustration and a not a nice person self-description) was 
suspended as this other account was produced. Other practice-knowledge had been 
brought forward to the conversation as Emma's described the positions Confusion 
might be offering her client. On the basis of this practice-knowledge, Emma's 
problematic positioning in relation with her client was disturbed. Emma had now 
spoken of her client as done over by confusion, rather than as a person who 
irritates. The concern about her positioning as a not-nice person was being 
addressed as Emma brought forward her knowledge of the discursive context. 
Emma herself appeared to be beginning to be less done over by the slippage between 
the account of her professional self that frustration and irritation had offered and 
the account of herself with which she identified. 
Continuing the inquiry into Emma's practice wisdom, her knowledge of the cultural 
stories that produce problems for clients, Di asked, 
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And, amongst all the knowledge that you've got about violence and abuse, 
what do you know about the relationship between those things, you know, 
between the tactics of violence and the tactics of confusion? 
Emma replied, 
I guess I think it is one of the effects of abuse, and the effect of abuse and 
violence is confusion, losing trust in yourself, not being sure about what you 
see and what you know - and it's really helpful for me to remember this. 
Slowly and reflectively, I suggest, an account was being put together by researching 
the counsellor's knowledge. Although Emma had begun by saying that she did 
understand what traps women and how painful it is for them to investigate an 
abusive relationship, she was now re-connecting with that knowledge in ways that 
were helpful to her: it's really helpful for me to remember this. Emma now noticed 
the effect of her retelling and reconnecting with these knowledges. Not taking for 
granted how the remembering was helpful, but rather working to thicken the story, 
Di asked: 
In what way? 
Emma spoke of the repositioning the remembering had offered her: 
It shifts my perception of her a little bit again, being able to see the 
effects of confusion. The effects of confusion leave her really immobilised. 
That feels really helpful as a possibility in my work with her. 
Emma was noticing the difference in the position in relation to which she was now 
called. She perceived, now, both how her client was positioned by confusion in her 
struggle to stay separate from an abusive relationship, and how her own 
remembering of these knowledges repositioned her in relation with her client. Di 
went on to exercise her responsibility as a supervisor in inviting Emma to thicken her 
account of this more helpful positioning. Di asked: 
Chapter Eight 194 
How does it [remembering] shift your perception? What difference does it 
make to your perception? 
The inquiry worked to continue to bring forth Emma's knowledge. She now spoke 
explicitly about having restored herself to her preferred position in relation with 
clients, and to her preferred understanding of people and problems. She spoke to 
her chosen epistemological stance, noticing the way in which she had lost her 
footing: 
It makes me see her and then see the effects of confusion rather than see 
her as, you know, a 'stupid woman' - which feels much better. 
This is really important to me to make that shift back to seeing the effect 
of it on her. [ ... ] 
Emma was taking a self-commentary position, making explicit the principles that had 
been infringed in the earlier, problematic positioning. I point out this self-
commentary position, because I argue that the kind of supervision conversation that 
has been going on here produces a practitioner who is reflective and reflexive in 
these ways. In standing back from the instrumentality of supervision practice, 
counsellor and supervisor were able to examine the discursive vista in which they 
were situated, and to notice their noticing of their positionings in that vista. On 
discursive terms this is reflective practice for counsellors, investigating our 
positionings in relation with our clients in order to produce ethical practice. As 
counsellors we attend actively to the work of making up accounts of counselling work, 
attending to the positions to which we are called and purposefully selecting amongst 
them. We notice the moral orders in which our work might be situated and we and 
our clients might be positioned in relation. 
Somehow, the dominant cultural story that describes as stupidwomen who struggle 
and fail to stay out of abusive relationships had separated Emma from the 
knowledge she had garnered in her work with clients, knowledge that offered her 
Chapter Eight 195 
preferred understandings of a complex area of practice. There was still more work 
to be done in the supervision, however. Emma had begun by saying that she did not 
want to talk about the details of the client, but about herself. Di turned her inquiry 
to Emma, asking about the restraints that had left Emma telling a story that 
positioned her in disrespectful relation with her client: 
Why do you think, how do you think you got conned in this instance - because 
I think [pause]; I know you well enough to know that you're not usually 
conned into blaming clients? 
This was the deconstructing work of which I have quoted Anne speaking: what was 
over her eyes, holding her hands [behind her back]. separating the counsellor from 
her preferred practice? Di had now initiated an investigation of these blinding and 
restraining forces. Not only was Emma's position in relation to her client to be put 
right through the collaborative investigation of a discourse of supervision as 
researching-counsellor-knowledge. The disturbing of Emma's story of her 
professional practice preferences might also need to be put right. As I use the put 
right phrase (used in Chapter Seven by Kate) advisedly here, I notice that it is not 
the supervisor who has been putting right. Rather, she has walked alongside the 
counsellor, working with her to bring to the centre of the dialogical space that which 
the counsellor knows. Together they have produced an account that has worked to 
put right on the terms that the counsellor had sought. The putting right has been 
done through the co-researching of knowledge, through inquiry that supported the 
counsellor to reconnect with that knowledge from which she had been separated. 
In order to complete this account I go on to offer a brief summary of the rest of 
the Phase One conversation, and conclude with the dialogue between Emma and Di at 
the end of that phase. 
The conversation went on to weave connections between Emma's life, and her work, 
and her work with this client, and the discursive and extra-discursive production of 
the struggles for women to lead lives on their own and lives free of violence. In this 
conversation, Emma's relationship with her client and with her own account of her 
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professional self were both restored to her preference and storied more fully. The 
conversation was both restorative and generative. 
As the Phase One supervision conversation came to a close, Di responded to Emma's 
speaking of the sadness for her of the stories of women's struggles in leading a life 
on their own, and of the ways their struggles are conceived by traditional 
psychological ideas. 
So that there's a real cost for you in kind of gathering up so many stories 
and in some ways it would seem so much easier if you could say, "Well, send 
her to assertiveness training, it's her problem". But instead the stories make 
a sense to you which is really sad. 
The pull of dominant discourse and the strength it takes for a counsellor to stand 
against the practices dominant discourse produces was acknowledged. In this way 
the supervision had been about me as Emma had asked at the beginning. What are 
the effects for Emma of working as a counsellor with women struggling to free their 
lives of violence in their relationships? What position calls are made to a counsellor 
by the accounts available to explain violence in intimate relationships? What 
positions in relation with clients are thereby offered? These were the questions the 
tools of discourse and positioning were producing behind the scenes to constitute 
the inquiry at which Emma and Di worked together. For counsellors do not live 
outside the discourses which position our clients. The inquiry brought forward to 
the centre of the conversation the counsellor's knowledge of the discourses which 
offered her terms upon which she could give accounts of this work. I suggest that in 
this way counsellor and supervisor collaborated in the production of a supervision 
that told a story of the counsellor's professional life and work in such a way that her 
client would be well served: the positions in discourse, and locations in text, 
available to the counsellor to speak from had been dialogized. At a very personal 
level Di and Emma had worked to deconstruct discourses of women and relationship, 
making visible the costs that women pay in and in leaving abusive relationships. And 
the cost to a counsellor of this work was also acknowledged: so there is a real cost 
to you ... 
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To Di's reflection on the cost to her of this work, Emma replied: 
Incredibly sad; and I am remembering the hope of it as well, and what 
women do do, and how they do retrieve their lives and relationships and 
children and create other possibilities for themselves as well. 
The counsellor had worked to position herself well, in respectful relation, for her 
ongoing work with her client and for her work with other clients. Again clearly 
locating her epistemological preferences, Emma brought the Phase One supervision 
conversation to an end, saying, 
Yeah. It's important for me to remember that. And to remember that if 
she [this particular client] wants to leave she can as well, because she's, well 
there's evidence of her strength as well, in identifying and naming [the 
abuse]. In some ways it's amazing that she's named what was happening in 
the relationship as abuse because of powerful cultural and personal 
invitations to name it as stuff that she brought about and made to happen. 
Deconstructing supervision: producing ethical action 
In Supervision 4 from which Extract 8.2 is taken, counsellor and supervisor 
produced a supervision that could address a counsellor's having done badly 
without in any way pathologising the counsellor. Nor did they have to call on 
instrumental or instructional practice. I suggest that counsellor and supervisor 
have been engaged in a deconstructing supervision on the terms in which Davies 
(1998) offered: once a shared understanding of the discursive context of the 
problem had been produced counsellor and supervisor put irritation and 
frustration "under erasure" (p.139) by investigating their discursive production. 
In a deconstructing supervision Emma and Di gave attention to, named, and 
evaluated the terms available for their speaking in supervision and for Emma's 
counselling practice. Those terms were produced not by Emma, but by the 
discourses in which Emma and her clients and other women are positioned. In 
this naming and investigating of available terms, professional practice was located 
not just as the production of an individual counsellor (who was at risk of being 
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judged not a nice person), but as a production of the ways of speaking that 
cultural and professional discourses offer. This supervision conversation provided 
a dialogical space wherein the counsellor could give an account of the places in 
which she chose to stand to locate her practice, acknowledging the struggle that 
standing there might involve. For a deconstructing supervision, I argue, works in 
a similar way to a deconstructing psychotherapy, described by Lamer as 
addressing, in practice, issues of "power, justice and ethics" and, in theory, its 
own institutional "power and authority" (1999, p.41). The supervision itself 
worked on these terms, addressing power, justice and ethics, and power and 
authority. For example the counsellor's (personal and professional) knowledge of 
the struggles of women on their own was privileged above the supervisor's; a rich 
account (not included in the excerpt presented here) of the discursive and extra-
discursive conditions of life for women leaving relationships to bring up children 
on their own was produced; all participants, including the client, were held in 
respect. The counsellor presented herself at the beginning as a moral agent: 
according to the standards she set herself for respectful practice she would not 
settle for the discomfort being produced by the experiences of frustration and 
irritation she was experiencing. The deconstructing inquiry produced in 
collaborative relationship continued to bring forward the counsellor's agency: her 
prior professional and personal knowledge, her experiences, her self-monitoring 
observations were all grist to the inquiry's mill. In these ways the supervision 
worked to position the counsellor to produce herself as a moral agent in ethical 
relation with clients in her counselling practices. 
Researching practice 
Extract 8.2 and its analysis have shown some of the effects of assuming 
counsellor competence and investigating the personal and professional knowledge 
from which the counsellor had become separated. The first supervision extract in 
this chapter, Extract 8.1, showed Lee and Ruth deconstructing decision-making 
discourse, co-producing new knowledge. In this next example from practice I 
return to Supervision 18 from which Extract 8.1 was taken. The example 
illustrates the slower, purposeful and deliberate processes by which Lee's interest 
in interrogating supervision discourse was storied as the supervision began. Lee's 
interest had arisen from her work with a couple and she was asking how she could 
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Extract 8.3: Counsellor as researcher of practice 
Lee is counsellor and Ruth is supervisor. The example is again from Supervision 
18, at an earlier point in the Phase One conversation than Extract 8.1. 
Ruth So you were noticing how they were kind of trying to make that decision, and 
[you were] asking them some questions that would help them work out when 
they would be able to make that decision? But you began to wonder, in 
general, about ... 
Lee Yes, and I'm thinking - I mean I think I asked a few questions about 
decision-making - but it would be probably quite useful [now] to just develop 
some questions around making a decision. 
Ruth Yeah. What was it in particular that made you start thinking of that 
question [about decision making] in a broader context? 
What was it that you noticed, or? 
Ruth So, one of the questions you asked them was ... 
So, I am wondering if that is what led you to think. .. 
What attracted you about that one? 
So you have noticed that the stories couples have about decision making ... 
And you have got some ideas about ... 
Lee Yes I have lots of ideas about that, and I think they centre around, I think 
decision-making, traditionally, would come from using a model ... 
be more helpful, generally, to clients, particularly couples, when it came to 
making decisions. 
In Extract 8.3 below I emphasise the work of Ruth as supervisor, extracting her 
contributions from the dialogue. I do that, not to present supervision as 
supervisor-constructed, or supervisor-centred. Rather, I emphasise Ruth's work to 
draw attention to the particular practices she employed in bringing forward and 
developing an account of Lee's supervision agenda. She did not assume that she 
understood the history of Lee's supervision agenda. However, she did assume its 
genesis was worth storying. In that storying Ruth's speaking was intensely 
interwoven with the second person pronoun, you. The use of the second person 
pronoun invited Lee to take up a first person account of the history of how she 
had, as a reflective practitioner, researched her practice and developed the idea of 
deconstructing decision making discourse. Ruth's use of the second person 
pronoun made available locations in the text where Lee was a producer of practice 
and of reflection on practice. 
Extract 8.3: Counsellor as researcher of practice 
Lee is counsellor and Ruth is supervisor. The example is again from Supervision 
18, at an earlier point in the Phase One conversation than Extract 8.1. 
In response to Lee's explaining the particular counselling circumstances that had 
produced her current supervision inquiry about decision-making, Ruth paraphrased: 
So you were noticing how they were kind of trying to make that decision, and 
[you were] asking them some questions that would help them work out when 
they would be able to make that decision? But you began to wonder, in 
general, about ... 
Lee went on: 
Yes, and I'm thinking - I mean I think I asked a few questions about 
decision-making - but it would be probably quite useful [now] to just develop 
some questions around making a decision. 
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Ruth continued to research the history of Lee's interest: 
Yeah. What was it in particular that made you start thinking of that 
question [about decision making] in a broader context? 
As Lee hesitated Ruth asked: 
What was it that you noticed, or? 
By this speaking Lee was positioned as an active producer of practice: the history of 
her interest in investigating decision-making discourse could be more richly storied, 
with Ruth. In that storying Lee was the subjective subject, telling the story in 
response to the invitation, to tell a first person account in response to the invitation 
offered by Ruth's use of the second person pronoun. 
As Ruth worked to bring forward this account at this beginning point in the 
supervision conversation, her words continued to highlight locations in text where 
Lee might tell her story: 
So, one of the questions you asked them was ... 
So, I am wondering if that is what led you to think. .. 
What attracted you about that one? 
So you have noticed that the stories couples have about decision making ... 
And you have got some ideas about ... 
In response to this last invitation Lee replied: 
Yes I have lots of ideas about that, and I think they centre around, I think 
decision-making, traditionally, would come from using a model. .. 
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Ruth's inquiry invited Lee to notice her own noticing, to notice the subtlety and 
nuance of her noticing, to notice the history of her noticing, and to notice the 
possibilities her noticing was producing: and thereby to notice her noticing 
differently. Her noticing could then be storied. Ruth's use of the second person 
pronoun opened space and structure in dialogue for Lee to take up a first person 
account of herself researching and producing her practice. Lee was then well 
positioned in a discourse of supervision as a site of generative reflection: she was 
positioned as resourceful both to the supervision and in her counselling practice. 
She was invited into a reflective stance first in the storying in the landscape of 
action the details of her noticing in the instance of practice. Then reflective 
practice was further developed as the inquiry moved from the landscape of action to 
the discursive field, from the work with the particular couple to the discourse of 
decision-making. 
The example in this briefer extract adds to the account I have been building, in 
this chapter, of supervision as a site of the production and generation of 
knowledge. Here, counsellors are visible in the production of knowledge and the 
production of supervision practice in ways that they tend not to be in much of the 
supervision literature or when supervision is performed on the terms of a 
discourse of supervisor responsibility. Further, the supervisor is decentred: her 
inquiry brings forward a story of the counsellor as a knowledge resource. In the 
accounts offered by the data presented in this chapter the emphasis of supervision 
is on dialogic practice that positions the counsellor as an active producer of 
practice, and a producer of knowledge in and for practice. Supervision enriches 
the descriptions of the positions the counsellor might take up as an ethical agent in 
their counselling practice and so enlarges the accessibility of those positions. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has demonstrated, with extracts of supervision conversations, the 
orientation to knowledge for practice that constructionist thinking produced in this 
project. In some instances supervision inquiry focused on counsellor knowledge 
and experience, noticing the strategies that had produced that knowledge and 
experience. This strategy might be called research of practice for practice. In 
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Extract 8.1 the inquiry was decentred, as the supervisor joined the counsellor in 
investigating the knowledges that cultural and professional stories produce. In 
this strategy, in generating the possibilities for professional knowledge to be 
produced otherwise, the supervisor joined the counsellor as a co-researcher for 
practice. In these examples, the emphasis was on opening dialogic space, so that 
in supervision a counsellor was overtly positioned to generate practice. As well, 
not only supervisors, but also counsellors were shown to be engaging actively 
with the production of ethics for counselling practice, paying attention to the 
effects of the moral orders in which they are thus positioned in their relationships 
with clients. 
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Chapter Nine 
Producing constructionist supervision practice: The 
politics of practice 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the presentation of data, focusing again on the production 
of processes of collaborative inquiry in constructionist supervision practice. As 
part of an ongoing deconstruction of the discourse of supervisor responsibility the 
chapter first investigates the collaborative exercise of responsibility in the 
presence of concerns about client safety. The chapter moves on to focus on 
responsibility for inquiry about the politics of practice. I analyse a supervision 
session that directly addressed the question of the sort of professional subject that 
might be produced in supervision. A third, brief, example shows counsellor and 
supervisor working to position the counsellor well to respond to the practices of 
relational ethics. 
These examples continue to construct supervision as a collaborative task that pays 
attention to positions in relation. The counsellor is positioned not at the margins 
of the account, but in relationship and visible, well located to produce ethical 
counselling practice. The examples offer instances of the practice of a 
deconstructing supervision, one that takes a metadiscursive orientation to both the 
power and authority of its own practices and to those of the profession. 
Quality assurance: responsibility, assessment and safety 
One of the more central concerns of the familiar expression of supervision as 
problem-talk has been the assessment of the safety of our counselling work, and 
of the safety of those we work with at critical times in their lives. This is the 
safety-ensuring extension of the back-up and being put right, of which Kate spoke 
(Chapter Seven). It is in the matter of safety that the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility is most reassuring, to counsellors and employers, and for the 
profession's credibility. Critical situations for clients produce the most directive 
supervision (Tracey, Ellickson, & Sherry, 1989). When client safety is a concern, 
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Extract 9.1. Dialogic assessment and producing responsibility 
Deb is counsellor and Jean is supervisor in Supervision 16. 
Deb And, I mean, I'm just bringing it to supervision, really to say this is what 
I've done. This is the sort of letter I got. This is what I've done. I feel 
quite powerless to do, I don't know what else I should do, or if there is 
anything else I should be doing really. That's what I've brought it up today 
for, just to let it be known (yeah) and see .... Yeah. 
Jean So you're talking about feeling powerless because she's [Georgina] saying, 
"No [to coming to counselling]", but you've had a letter [from her] that spoke 
of real desperation? 
Jean And knowing Georgina, you made some kind of judgements about the meaning 
of that letter, given the history of [your earlier work together]? 
Jean And you talked about "it [some aspects of the letter] could be 'teenage 
stuff' that blows over, but knowing Georgina". Can you say some more about 
that? 
Jean So there are things that you know about Georgina that suggest to you that 
where in some ways with [your daughter] you might take these things with a 
grain of salt, knowing that she' II ride these ... 
And what effect [do you think that would have had], knowing what you do of 
Georgina? 
What would you make of the silences? 
So, now, what are you making of the silences? 
Deb I don't know. I just don't know. I don't know how to read it. I don't know 
if it's because of not feeling supported, or heard, or safe with me, or not 
really wanting to take counselling up for that reason, not knowing who else to 
the discourse of supervisor responsibility is most likely to call supervisors into 
positions where they exercise responsibility in directive action. Safety concerns 
are more likely to call supervisors and counsellors into using rulebooks than 
constructing new charts. Positions in collaborative practice may be more difficult 
to access in critical situations. In interrogating the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility I also need to consider if the collaborative practices of knowledge 
production illustrated in the previous chapter are effective and ethical when an 
assessment of client safety is needed. 
An example of practice where the central concern was the safety of a client is the 
next focus of this account. 
Extract 9.1. Dialogic assessment and producing responsibility 
Deb is counsellor and Jean is supervisor in Supervision 16. 
The supervision began with Deb speaking with Jeon about a concern she had about 
recent contact with Georgina, a young woman client who had taken a break from 
counselling. Deb had previously spoken with Jean in supervision about earlier 
aspects of her work with Georgina. Deb's concern as she began Supervision 16 was 
that she had received a worrying letter from Georgina that included a request to 
see Deb. However, Georgina had not come to the appointment that had been set up 
by phone, and when Deb had phoned Georgina again, she had found Georgina very 
hard to speak with and Georgina had turned down Deb's offer of a further 
appointment. After telling the sequence of events, Deb said: 
And, I mean, I'm just bringing it to supervision, really to say this is what 
I've done. This is the sort of letter I got. This is what I've done. I feel 
quite powerless to do, I don't know what else I should do, or if there is 
anything else I should be doing really. That's what I've brought it up today 
for, just to let it be known (yeah) and see .... Yeah. 
Deb had taken up a particular version of reporting in as discursive practice in 
supervision. She had brought this story to let it be known. The idea of letting it be 
known invokes questions of supervisor responsibility. This question is much less 
clear in the New Zealand context, where supervisor responsibility is not subject of 
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call to, and, or whether it's something else entirely. I don't know. (Mmm) I 
feel like there's not a lot that I can know about that. 
Jean Yeah. The one, you know, one of the wonderings I've got is that, how much it 
was the problem that she wrote to you about, the despair and isolation and 
desperation, (yeah, right) that was keeping her quiet [when you phoned]. Do 
you think it ( Yeah.)? (Pause). 
That a young woman (yeah) with whom you previously had a thriving (yeah) 
relationship (yeah) ... 
Deb But not being able to speak, and not even to be able to say anything is very 
familiar for her. Yeah. Yeah, I think it's quite likely that the level of 
despair was making it hard for her to speak [in the phone call]. 
Deb Mmm. I think that's why I feel quite frustrated. (Yeah.) (Pause.) Yeah, 
given that she wrote the letter and did seem to want to have a conversation 
with me. And if I take it that despair was making it impossible for her to 
have the conversation with me, it kind of feels like a little bit more leeway 
for me to continue the conversation via letter: or take up a conversation, or 
invite further conversation. 
Jean Those are serious words, aren't they? (Pause.) (Yeah. Yeah.) [Jean 
repeated words of letter.] 
You know, I'm thinking, I'm sitting with you, asking the question around 
responsibility, and what you might do, and how active should you be, given the 
knowledge you have ... [Jean goes on to ask for some background detail]. 
So we've got this picture of Despair maybe being the block between her 
speaking with you as you kind of might have anticipated given what the letter 
had said and as [ ... ]. 
statute as in North America, and where, as King and Wheeler (1999) found in the 
UK, there are many versions of how much responsibility supervisors have. When the 
counsellor is positioned as letting it be known, the supervisor is positioned as the 
professional to whom she is letting it be known. What is the position call to the 
supervisor, in terms of responsibility, and what are the effects of that call for how 
the supervision relation is produced? What is the supervisor to do with this 
knowledge: how was Jean positioned? 
Georgina's letter had come to Deb from a letting it be known position, too, and now 
Deb, as counsellor, was feeling stymied: she had knowledge, but felt powerless to 
act. Was Jean to share in carrying the burden of care in an inactive sort of way or 
was there some other sort of work to be done in the supervision? This extract will 
illustrate that there was work to be done in the supervision: responsibility needed 
to be taken in response to the safety concerns. Was there, then, in the letting it be 
known, and in Deb's expressed feeling of powerlessness in the situation, an invitation 
to Jean to assume responsibility to adopt a more instrumental mode of supervision 
than that produced in the collaborative practice-generation in Extract 8.1 in the 
previous chapter, for example? Certainly the concern was more immediate and 
serious than the generating possibilities for practice in which Lee and Ruth were 
engaged as they deconstructed decision making discourse. 
There are many ways in which responsibility might be constructed in this practice 
instance. For example, letting it be known might work a little like confession - that 
in letting it be known the counsellor is absolved of responsibility, as responsibility is 
passed to the supervisor, positioned as wiser, older, more responsible. Or there 
might be, in the pre-existing position for the counsellor as the supervisee, as the 
less responsible of the partnership, as constrained by their occupation of a more 
protected position, a sense that counsellor responsibility ends with letting it be 
known. Behind this presentation, informed by dominant ideas about supervisor 
responsibility, sit both these possibilities. However, while these possibilities cannot 
but hover in the background of this conversation, the example will show how 
responsibility came to be produced on dialogic terms as Deb and Jean searched for 
ways forward in response to Deb's presentation of concern. 
Chapter Nine 206 
You know, I'm really sitting with this, you're saying you have brought this to 
supervision, to suss out your responsibility [brief interchange edited out]. 
And that's sitting quite heavily with me, this sense of your responsibility for 
this young woman who [goes on to describe the situation]. 
Jean Yeah, I hear that quite seriously. And the question that comes up for me is, 
you know, is this one of those odd, occasional times when you might 
[describes possible action]. I don't know what your thoughts are about that. 
Jean's response to Deb's presentation came from a position of seeking 
understanding. Jean began by summarising Deb's concern, centring both the critical 
client situation and Deb's response to it in her speaking: 
So you're talking about feeling powerless because she's [Georgina] saying, 
"No [to coming to counselling]", but you've had a letter [from her] that spoke 
of real desperation? 
I read Jean's response as offering Deb an active and purposive position to take up, 
initially as the person with the particular information to offer that would make an 
assessment possible. Jean would collaborate with Deb in that assessment, assuming 
Deb's competence and the value of her authority. Deb went on to amplify the detail 
of the desperation expressed in Georgina's letter. 
In this analysis I am using Jean's words and summarising Deb's, not to privilege the 
supervisor's work over the counsellor's in my re-telling but mindful of the protection 
of the privacy of Deb's client. For that reason, too, I am not making visible the 
content of the letter. 
Jean's response to Deb's amplification emphasised Deb's work in making an 
assessment, and Deb's knowledge of her client. Standing aside from other 
assumptions, Jean wanted to know for now what meaning Deb had made of the letter 
on the basis of her knowledge of Georgina: 
And knowing Georgina, you made some kind of judgements about the meaning 
of that letter, given the history of (your earlier work together)? 
Deb's response to Jean was to give a little more detail of the letter, to which Jean 
replied, Those are serious words, aren't they? In the commentary position, she was 
lending her weight to Deb's concern, treating the serious words with seriousness. 
In this version of the commentary position, Jean was bearing witness to the gravity 
of the situation, in this way exercising responsibility in the meaning making that 
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would be critical to an effective assessment. In the space of the supervision 
conversation, Georgina's words were dialogised, the seriousness of their possible 
meanings investigated. 
After a pause and agreement from Deb, Jean repeated the words of the letter. I 
suggest that Jean was making space at the centre not only for Deb's knowledge, but 
also for the knowledge that was available from Georgina herself (in the letter) in 
this shared assessment of Deb's responsibility to take action. Jean continued, 
And you talked about "it [some aspects of the letter] could be 'teenage 
stuff' that blows over, but knowing Georgina". Can you say some more about 
that? 
An exploration of Deb's experience of 'teenage stuff' in her own family and her 
knowledge of the realities of Georgina's life followed, with Jean summing up again 
with an emphasis on Deb's position as a counsellor with knowledge, positioned as a 
significant knowledge resource to the shared assessment: 
So there are things that you know about Georgina that suggest to you that 
where, in some ways with [your daughter] you might take these things with a 
grain of salt, knowing that she' 11 ride these ... 
The careful gathering of an assessment account continued. The inquiry with which 
Jean structured Deb's exploration and assessment offered Deb the tools with which 
to exercise agency in relation to her concerns for Georgina and in relation with her 
sense of professional responsibility. Selected below are inquiries that demonstrate 
the gathering of assessment information where local knowledge, Deb's knowing about 
her particular client in the context of her practice, was highlighted. Again, this is a 
strategy drawn directly from narrative counselling practice. In subversion of the 
dominant privileging of expert knowledge, indigenous knowledge is sought and 
storied. In navigating toward a common point in making an assessment, Jean had not 
taken over the helm, but stood at the wheel with Deb, consulting her knowledge of 
the seascape and of particular landmarks. 
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And what effect [do you think that would have had], knowing what you do of 
Georgina? 
What would you make of the silences? 
So, now, what are you making of the silences? 
However, although Deb's knowledge as a resource was highlighted by this inquiry, 
Deb herself was not under the spotlight of surveillance for her practice. In 
response to this last inquiry, Deb, struggling to make meaning of the silences about 
which Jean had asked her, responded, 
I don't know. I just don't know. I don't know how to read it. I don't know 
if it's because of not feeling supported, or heard, or safe with me, or not 
really wanting to take counselling up for that reason, not knowing who else to 
call to, and, or whether it's something else entirely. I don't know. (Mmm) I 
feel like there's not a lot that I can know about that. 
In searching amongst possible explanations, Deb named most readily those that 
centred on some deficiency in the counselling relationship: not feeling supported, or 
heard, or safe with me. The problem-with-the-counselling-relationship account was 
offering Deb a reading, but she was not satisfied with what that reading offered 
her as an explanation: I don't feel there's a lot I can know. Jeon at this point joined 
Deb in a different way in meaning production, offering for Deb's consideration 
another possible interpretation. Alongside the counselling-relation interpretation 
Deb had just produced, Jean offered an interpretation focussed on Georgina's 
positioning in relation with the problem with which she was struggling. 
Yeah. The one, you know, one of the wonderings I've got is that, how much it 
was the problem that she wrote to you about, the despair and isolation and 
desperation, (yeah, right) that was keeping her quiet [when you phoned]. Do 
you think it ( Yeah.)? (Pause) 
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This interpretation was offered for Deb's consideration: it was a wondering, made 
available to the dialogue, not an explanation to close down inquiry. Jean's 
interpretation came, I suggest, out of a store of professional knowledge that sat 
quietly alongside the inquiry that had come before. The position from which she 
spoke now, however, still did not offer privilege to that professional knowledge, but 
made it available to the dialogue, to be considered as a possibility. 
Jean then continued, offering an interpretation from a version of the commentary 
position. Here the supervisor takes up the commentary in witness to what they know 
of the counsellor's practice. In this position the supervisor takes up their authority, 
to stand alongside an account which they have previously witnessed, but that is 
somehow threatened in the current circumstances. In counselling this tactic could 
be described as counsellors using our authority to "put our weight behind" a client's 
preferences for the exercise of agency in their own life [Winslade, Crocket & Monk, 
1997, p.63]. In the commentary position the supervisor is putting their weight 
behind the counsellor's practice preferences, or behind a particular account of the 
counsellor's practice that is not visible or that is undermined in some way in the 
present account. In this position, the supervisor is not called into persuasion of the 
counsellor, but rather offers witness to knowledge that would otherwise not be 
spoken. That knowledge was offered here tentatively, for consideration: 
That a young woman (yeah) with whom you previously had a thriving (yeah) 
relationship (yeah) ... 
Deb took up and tested out Jean's offered interpretation. 
But not being able to speak, and not even to be able to say anything is very 
familiar for her. Yeah. Yeah, I think it's quite likely that the level of 
despair was making it hard for her to speak [in the phone call]. 
I notice that Deb was also tentative about this possible account: I think it's quite 
likely. The account was being made up, by Deb and Jean, on the best evidence 
available. Both Jean and Deb were tentative, exercising reflexivity as they 
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knowingly making up an account. Neither Jean nor Deb was taking on an 
authoritative position in relation with Georgina: they were producing an account that 
would serve to produce a best possible assessment of the safety concerns, when 
certainty was not possible. I make this interpretation that they were producing a 
best possible assessment, because the assessment was drawing on and putting 
together both general professional knowledge they both had and Deb's particular 
knowledge of the situation storied in dialogue with general professional knowledge. 
The focus on inquiry led to both a wide and a detailed assessment. 
Jean and Deb continued to co-labour over the assessment task. Together they 
researched the aspects of the story about which Deb had particular knowledge. 
Between those named knowledge points, they were joined in producing possible 
explanatory routes, Jean now also offering both commentary and inquiry. Deb went 
on to summarise, continuing the task of consulting her ethical responsibilities. As 
she did, a repositioning from the quite powerless to do; I don't know what else I 
should do position of which she spoke at the beginning became visible: 
Mmm. I think that's why I feel quite frustrated. (Yeah.) (Pause.) Yeah, 
given that she wrote the letter and did seem to want to have a conversation 
with me. And if I take it that despair was making it impossible for her to 
have the conversation with me, it kind of feels like a little bit more leeway 
for me to continue the conversation via letter; or take up a conversation, or 
invite further conversation. 
Deb was now positioned to experience a little more leeway within which she might 
act to exercise some responsibility in respect of Georgina. Further, she was the 
agent who had produced that leeway. Jean had persisted in accessing and storying 
Deb's concerns. Into that account Jean offered other professional knowledge, for 
Deb's assessment of its value. Throughout, Jean supported Deb in assessment: she 
joined Deb in speaking of concern and supported her to respond to the seriousness 
of the situation which has been presented by Deb. Extracted below are examples of 
the position that Jean took to put at the centre of the conversation the seriousness 
of the concern Deb had brought. 
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Those are serious words, aren't they? (Pause.) (Yeah. Yeah.) [Jean 
repeated words of letter.] 
Jean paid careful attention to both Georgina's speaking, as expressed in the letter, 
and to Deb's. Jean was taking a position of review, inviting Deb to do that, too. The 
emphasis was on positioning themselves well to make an assessment of the concerns: 
You know, I'm thinking, I'm sitting with you, asking the question around 
responsibility, and what you might do, and how active should you be, given the 
knowledge you have ... [Jean goes on to ask for some background detail]. 
So we've got this picture of Despair maybe being the block between her 
speaking with you as you kind of might have anticipated given what the letter 
had said and as [ ... ]. 
[ ... ] 
You know, I'm really sitting with this, you're saying you have brought this to 
supervision, to suss out your responsibility [brief interchange edited out]. 
And that's sitting quite heavily with me, this sense of your responsibility for 
this young woman who [goes on to describe the situation]. 
[ ... ] 
Yeah, I hear that quite seriously. And the question that comes up for me is, 
you know, is this one of those odd, occasional times when you might 
[describes possible action]. I don't know what your thoughts are about that. 
Again, Jean offered a suggestion for Deb's assessment: the assessment continued 
to be negotiated. During the Phase Four reflection on the process of this work, 
Jeon commented that she gets most directive as a supervisor when safety is a 
concern. However, I suggest that this example demonstrates putting to work both 
particular, local knowledge and professional wisdom, in ways that produced Deb as 
agentive in her responsibility towards Georgina and her safety. At the completion of 
the supervision, Deb left planning to take action in respect of Georgina and her 
safety, having authorised her actions in dialogic community by consulting particular 
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and general knowledge. The assessment had been collaborative, counsellor 
knowledge and supervisor knowledge together speaking client safety and respectful 
practice into the centre of the assessment space. 
Deb had begun the supervision uncertain that action was possible in respect of 
Georgina. It seemed that perhaps letting it be known would fulfil her 
responsibility. Together, Deb and Jean researched what was known, so the story 
of what was known about Deb's concern for Georgina was as rich as possible. At 
the same time, both Deb and Jean were calling on professional cultural stories that 
helped to build the account, and position them well for assessment. Pare 
suggested that "the wholehearted privileging of the 'local' restricts persons' 
access to a range of other potentially helpful input" (1999, p.7) in therapy. I 
understand him to be saying that postmodern therapies are not about discarding 
professional knowledge. Rather they are about situating that knowledge and also 
paying attention to local and alternative knowledges, recognising the history of 
their exclusion. Jean's researching of what Deb knew depended not only upon the 
local. Jean herself was calling on and offering professional knowledge about 
safety. She called on this knowledge as she sought a rich account in her 
researching and as she offered possible interpretations. However, the researching 
and the offering were done in ways that recognised dialogic speaking rights - so 
these are things that you know; l hear that quite seriously. It was in dialogical 
relation that the supervisory process was navigated and responsibility taken. 
Responsibility was constructed as relational responsibility: it was exercised in the 
space between counsellor and supervisor in their shared actions, and would go on 
to be exercised by them both. The counsellor now had some means to position 
herself well to take responsibility: she had authorised herself to take action. A 
relational responsibility produced in dialogue provided assessment that was 
ethical and effective, in working both for immediate client safety and for 
producing therapist agency in continuing to work for safety. 
This example, too, stands in sharp contrast with the example from Holloway 
(1995, pp.101-2) that I discussed in Chapter Three. The Holloway scenario was 
not comparable vis-a-vis safety, but it provides a strongly contrasting supervisor 
positioning. There, the supervisor immediately assumed that she knew what the 
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problem was with little researching of the particulars of the situation. The 
supervisor and the knowledge she brought to the situation were privileged. While 
Holloway's claim was that the location of the counselling setting was informing 
the supervision, the local, of postmodern therapy's interest, was not investigated. 
Speed of advice-giving and supervisor certainty about supervisor knowledge in 
the Holloway example contrast, in this example, with the measured gathering of 
the story of the counsellor's concern, and the careful reviewing of the local data 
that had produced Deb's concern. Counsellor concern was privileged; it was at 
the centre of the supervision and its story carefully elaborated. The supervisor 
was present to the elaboration of the concern, her professional knowledge offered 
at one point as possible interpretation, for the consideration of the counsellor, who 
might respond in a number of ways. While there was an absence of certainty in 
the assessment, there was a great deal of care. Responsibility was produced 
dialogically, not as the production of the individual supervisor as in the Holloway 
example. The supervision produced counsellor authority for action, the dialogue 
having built an account that made sense of practice. Meaning making, in dialogic 
relation, for responsible relation and responsible action was at the centre of the 
superv1s10n space. 
Deconstructing supervision: the politics of practice 
From the centring of the inquiry on the nuances of the counsellor's knowledge in 
an assessment of safety concerns, I move on now to illustrate the work of a 
counsellor and supervisor, where the inquiry brought to the centre the politics of 
the supervision practice. In Chapter Two I drew attention to Rose's (1998) 
concern that an emphasis on discourse in terms of the communicative aspects of 
language might mean that too little attention would be paid to discourse as acts of 
governance. This next example delights me for the ways in which it brings to the 
centre and the surface of the supervision the production of supervision as both an 
act of professional governance, and as a site for assembling the professional self 
as responsible. In this way the example shows a supervisor paying attention to a 
particular version of the question that I took from Rose's work, what sort of selves 
are we assembling ourselves as in supervision? 
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Extract 9.2. Deconstructing supervision: Practices of the self? 
Tania is the counsellor and Adele is the supervisor; this extract is from 
Supervision 12. 
Tania And what I've decided to bring up is, how I feel really concerned about my 
low client numbers at [indicates agency context]. Though that fluctuates, it 
hasn't built up into either what I think it should have built up to, or what I 
think other people think it should have built into. 
Adele So, who's "other people"? 
Tania Well, the funders. Not that I've had any queries from funders or the 
[agency directorate]. So there's feeling like, oh, I'm the person who must 
be responsible for that. And the other bit [of the problem]. for me, is 
feeling like, "If you're a good counsellor then you get busy, you get busy". 
And I'm not [busy]. And although it's not continuously at a point where I 
worry about it, it is there fairly constantly." 
Adele Do you mind if I ask you for a bit more background? 
Adele So basically you're "it"? 
Tania Yeah, I'm it. So I do feel like if anything is not all right, then it's me [who is 
responsible]. I'm not ... Yeah, I am it, and that's how I feel. And I think 
that part of the problem, if it is a problem, is well, I think of what else I 
should be doing, or what I should have done. Apart from that, if you're a 
good counsellor then people just find their way and beat a path to your door. 
I don't know if that's true or not, but it's an idea I've got. And the other 
thing is, I suppose I should have done more, but I'm not quite sure of what 
the more is. 
Adele So what's the [agency directorate] role? Is it a [] or a [] or a [], how does it 
work? 
Extract 9.2. Deconstructing supervision: Practices of the self? 
Tania is the counsellor and Adele is the supervisor; this extract is from 
Supervision 12. 
Beginning by saying that she had given considerable thought to what she would bring 
to this supervision session, Tania continued: 
And what I've decided to bring up is how I feel really concerned about my 
low client numbers at [indicates agency context]. Though that fluctuates, it 
hasn't built up into either what I think it should have built up to, or what I 
think other people think it should have built into. 
Adele's first inquiry attended to the socio-political, to how the gaze, to which Tania 
was subject, was constituted. The centre of her inquiry was the site of practice, 
and how a position was being produced for Tania to take up as she told this 
supervision story: 
So, who's "other people"? 
Tania's response made more visible how the problematic of her supervision interest 
was constituted. It drew attention to the self-surveillance that was at work. In 
clarifying the ways in which the gaze was or was not personified, Tania's response 
made a little more visible the dominant professional discourses of autonomy and 
responsibility. 
Well, the funders. Not that I've had any queries from funders or the 
[agency directorate]. So there's feeling like, oh, I'm the person who must 
be responsible for that. And the other bit [of the problem]. for me, is 
feeling like, "If you're a good counsellor then you get busy, you get busy". 
And I'm not [busy]. And although it's not continuously at a point where I 
worry about it, it is there fairly constantly." 
At work here was a good-counsellors (have-lots-of-clients) discourse that provided a 
technology by which a counsellor could act upon herself, by which she could measure 
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Adele So what is their role, or job description, or what tasks ... ? 
Adele Do they offer any support? 
Adele So a lot of your work is also in supporting the [employing agency group]. 
Giving them information ... 
Tania I haven't seen it like that, so far, supporting them. Well I suppose I've 
actually seen my role as justifying myself to the [employing agency]; that's 
one of the things I think I've been doing is justifying myself to the 
[employing agency]. rather than recruiting them ... 
Adele What expectations do you have of the [employing agency]. and how they will 
support you? 
Tania Yeah, looking at it, I'm really interested in thinking some more about how I 
can, maybe, use the [agency directorate] for a way that; changing my 
relationship with the [agency directorate]. And I hadn't realised before 
that I was putting myself in a justifying position, which is easy [to do]; I can 
think how easy that is to happen. But I am interested in ways of maybe of 
changing that, and ways of maybe using, maybe particularly Barbara [member 
of agency directorate]; inviting her onboard more, and get other people 
alongside too. 
herself and find herself wanting. Tania was positioned in both a social and public 
accountability in which she was in relation with others (employers and funders, and 
the profession), and also an internalised accountability produced by the self-scrutiny 
of professional practice. The counsellor might be thought of as a subject assembled 
for confession - for having failed to measure up to the good counsellor criteria - and 
for examination - how deserving is she of the funding - and then for 
treatment/putting right. 
Accountability discourse might have offered the supervisor an invitation to engage 
in a range of problem-solving moves, exploring with Tania possible practical actions 
that she could take to recruit clients. Such moves could well have worked to 
reinforce the positioning of Tania as a counsellor in deficit, while apparently working 
to position her more favourably as a good counsellor. 
However, Adele's reply suggested a reflexive posture towards Professional 
Counsellor discourse. I suspect that she had heard the discourses of Professional 
Autonomy and Responsibility being reproduced in Tania's speaking, and was alert to 
the positions they were offering Tania here. It appears that she was alert, too, to 
the positions offered her as supervisor, and the effect on the counsellor-supervisor 
relation. Positioning herself a researcher-supervisor, Adele appears to have been 
asking herself, "What other stories are at work here? What else do we both need 
to understand? What tools do we have to make meaning of this concern?" She went 
on to ask, 
Do you mind if I ask you for a bit more background? 
Adele continued to ask about the setting and about the relationship between the 
Tania and the employing agency. (Again, to protect confidentiality, I do not offer 
detail here.) As Tania described her work setting further, Adele responded, 
So basically you're "it"? 
Chapter Nine 216 
This is another production from the commentary position. In this version, Adele as 
supervisor was offering witness to the account that she had just heard. She 
summonsed her supervisory authority to name the vignette, the story, she had 
heard. Her response is resonant in the story it tells. In this brief account, you're 
it, and the questions that preceded it, she was opening space for the problem to be 
described differently. The effect of a problem differently described was to bring 
attention to Tania's positioning within a discourse of sole responsibility. The 
different description also brought attention to the ways the pathologising self-gaze 
(Bird, 2000) had been working to produce a deficit positioning within a good 
counsellor/good employee discourse. 
An effect of the different description was that space was opened for making 
meaning differently. Tania responded: 
Yeah, I'm it. So I do feel like if anything is not all right, then it's me [who is 
responsible]. I'm not ... Yeah, I am it, and that's how I feel. And I think 
that part of the problem, if it is a problem, is well, I think of what else I 
should be doing, or what I should have done. Apart from that, if you're a 
good counsellor then people just find their way and beat a path to your door. 
I don't know if that's true or not, but it's an idea I've got. And the other 
thing is, I suppose I should have done more, but I'm not quite sure of what 
the more is. 
In her response Tania repeated, three times, the I am it description. The pausing, 
emphasis and intonation of Tania's spoken words indicated, I think, both reflection 
and the resonance of "experience-near" (White, 1989) description: the I am it 
description made sense of the difficulties she had been experiencing. Some 
destabilising of the problem was occurring: Tania now used the phrase if it is a 
problem. Tania noticed, too, that the good counsellors discourse might have its 
authority unsettled: the lots of clients story was an idea that may or may not be 
true. 
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Amongst the many position calls to a supervisor at this point, Adele made what I 
suggest was a selection based on matters of justice. She elected to stay inquiring 
about the I am it description. Her inquiry brought to the centre of the conversation 
the present-absence in the I am it description: if you are it, where are others? If 
you are at the centre of the attention of the gaze, who is at the margins? With 
whom are you in relation? Adele's inquiry was now clearly located in a discourse of 
employer-employee relationship: 
So what's the [agency directorate] role? Is it a[ ... ] or a[ ... ] or a[ ... ], how 
does it work? 
Adele continued to turn the inquiry outward. This turning was not about finding 
fault in others, but about drawing attention to the discursive production of the 
problem. Her stance suggests that to describe and understand the problem of low 
client numbers, we need to understand the discursive field in which that phrase is 
made to make sense. Adele and the team already had heard that Tania was feeling 
badly, that she was subject to concerns that she was not a good enough counsellor 
because clients were not beating their way to her door. However, as Adele inquired 
further about the relationship between Tania and her work place we learned more 
about that which Tania was feeling badly in relation with. 
Adele's next move, in employing irony in her suggestion that an employing agency 
have a job description, offered a shift in the power relation between Tania and the 
agency. 
So what is their role, or job description, or what tasks ... ? 
Usually it is employees who have job descriptions that make it clear what their 
responsibilities are: could it be that an employer has reciprocal responsibilities, the 
ironic inquiry asked. The inquiry offered reconsideration of the I am it position, for 
it brought others in from the margins. In this way space began to open for 
alternative possibilities as Tania worked to position herself well as a professional in 
her workplace. We had heard earlier that the discourses of Counsellor 
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Responsibility and Autonomy were active in describing the problem. Through this 
inquiry the supervisor now introduced an alternative discourse of Employer 
Responsibility, invoking other possible versions of employer-employee relationship. 
The hesitation of Tania's reply indicated the shift in position she had been offered 
by the new conversational centre. As she reviewed the employing body's role/job 
description/tasks, she struggled to come up with very much substance: such 
considerations might not be particularly visible in dominant versions of employment 
discourse. Adele's next inquiry identified a role absent from that which Tania had 
named. She named a relational quality, support. 
Do they off er any support? 
It seems to me that Adele was taking a purposeful position in an employment 
relations discourse. Deconstructing employment relations discourse, she was using 
her authority to enlarge the possibilities for what might occupy the conversational 
space, thus making other locations within the text available. Her inquiry opened 
dialogic space to consider the positioning of employer and employee in relation, and 
situated her as advocating for employer responsibility towards an employee. Tania 
went on to explain the work she did to involve the agency directorate, and Adele 
responded, 
So a lot of your work is also in supporting the [employing agency group]. 
Giving them information ... 
Adele's response might be read as a simple reflection. But I argue that it was more 
than that, that the subtlety and nuance of her response also contained a (somewhat 
ironic) commentary from a position that rendered strange the familiar positioning in 
employment relations discourse which Tania occupied. This commentary, the naming 
of the positioning-in-relation from which Tania supportedher employer, began to 
unsettle that position, with the effect that the possibility was produced that other 
positions might become available to Tania. 
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Tania responded 
I haven't seen it like that, so far, supporting them. Well I suppose I've 
actually seen my role as justifying myself to the [employing agency]; that's 
one of the things I think I've been doing is justifying myself to the 
[employing agency], rather than recruiting them ... 
The supervisor's inquiry about the employing agency and the counsellor's relationship 
with the agency offered a speaking space for Tania to turn up an aspect of this 
relationship previously invisible and unspoken, so taken for granted was it within 
employment relations discourse. Tania had been constrained by her positioning, a 
pre-existing position (Willig, 1999b, p.114) in that discourse that had constrained 
her professional acting. Intersecting with the Good counsellor discourse was a 
Good employee discourse: a good employee produces herself as an autonomous 
worker meeting all her responsibilities to her employer with little need of support 
from her employer. However, Tania read the subtlety and nuance of Adele's 
question, hearing the disruption of the production of responsibilityand support. A 
different employment relations discourse had been produced, one that constructed 
responsibility and support as more than unidirectional: that discourse spoke not just 
of good employees but also of good employers and invoked responsibility as 
relational. Repositioning herself as she spoke, Tania now gave an account that said 
that within an employment relations discourse she had been called to present 
herself for examination, positioned as a justifying-to subject, constrained by her 
relation with the employing body. She was at once an autonomous subject, who must 
be self-responsible, andthe calculating subject (Miller, 1992, p.61), who must engage 
in the calculating practice of providing information about her work to others to 
whom she was accountable. As she had with the I am it description earlier, Tania 
repeated this idea that had been produced anew in the dialogue: justifying myself 
As she went on to name the possibility of recruiting the employing body to her 
interests, Tania was now taking up an "active and purposive" (Willig, 1999b, p.114) 
subject position. Again language was used subversively to produce a different power 
relation: it is usually employers who recruit staff, not employees who recruit 
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employers into good employer positions. In dialogue a new position was made 
possible: rather than being in justifying relation, Tania might be in recruiting 
relation with her employer, recruiting support for the purposes for which employer 
and employee were in relation. Both wanted an effective counselling service for 
their community: what kinds of employment relations discourse might support that 
intent? 
Adele's supervision work through this example, in locating the problem in discourse, 
and bringing to the centre of the conversation, in gentle, one-step-at-a-time inquiry, 
both pre-existing positions and the tools with which other possible positions could 
be generated, might be described in Andersen's terms as "appropriately unusual" 
(1991). The distinctions Adele's language offered were subtle: her speaking both 
met and disturbed the terms Tania had been speaking in, highlighting locations both 
at the centre and at the margins of the text. For Tania the subtlety of the 
distinctions Adele was drawing made sense and helped her generate new terms for 
describing her location: aspects of her location that were previously shrouded in the 
mist of dominant employment relations discourse were made readable and negotiable. 
She might now locate herself differently. 
In response to the position Tania had now taken up, Adele continued with inquiry 
that continued to refuse the call of a professional discourse that would position the 
counsellor as the object of further surveillance. She refused, too, the call of an 
employment relations discourse that constructed a relation of unilateral support, 
employee to employer. Rather, Adele's speaking highlighted other locations in the 
text of professional discourse and employment relations discourse. With other 
positions available for her selection, Tania could be "active and purposive" (Willig, 
1999b) in the position she took up. There was a position in which Tania could name 
her expectations, expectations you have, of what would constitute support by the 
employer for her: 
What expectations do you have of the [employing agency], and how they will 
support you? 
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These kinds of conversational moves, the ironicising suggestions that an employer 
have a job description, exercise a responsibility to support staff, and be subject to 
employee expectations, continued to disrupt the familiar and to make available 
alternative positionings that Tania might take up. By these moves the conversation 
opened space for the negotiation of how the matter of low client numbers might be 
understood, and for wide consideration of Tania's preferences in negotiating the 
position she took up in regard to the dilemma she had brought to supervision. The 
dilemma was located in discursive practices constituted within professional and 
employment discourse. However, within these relocations the conversation did not in 
any way dispense with counsellor responsibility in the situation; rather, it produced 
responsibility differently. In the opening up of ways of thinking that contested 
total autonomous responsibility for the counsellor, and that contested an 
understanding of the counsellor herself as inadequate, the conversation offered 
Tania more room to negotiate how she might respond responsibly to a discursively 
produced di lemma. 
Tania Yeah, looking at it, I'm really interested in thinking some more about how I 
can, maybe, use the [agency directorate] for a way that; changing my 
relationship with the [agency directorate]. And I hadn't realised before 
that I was putting myself in a justifying position, which is easy [to do]; I can 
think how easy that is to happen. But I am interested in ways of maybe of 
changing that, and ways of maybe using, maybe particularly Barbara [member 
of agency directorate]; inviting her onboard more, and get other people 
alongside too. 
Selecting amongst calls to responsibility 
During the Phase Four reflection at the end of this supervision, Adele remarked 
about the position calls that were available to her as supervisor. She noticed calls 
within a discourse of supervision as instrumental problem-solving, a discourse 
that positions the supervisor as having the answers to problems of procedure. 
[I was noticing] how easy it is to get drawn into responsibility. 
Responsibility for a supervisor to come up with something. I wanted to try 
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to resist being drawn into the same thing [as the counsellor: responsibility, 
as supervisor, to come up with something]. 
I asked Adele what she had seen herself doing to resist the positioning of 
responsible to come up with something. How had she refused the call that could 
have seemed to indicate a straightforward way ahead? 
I think, checking out what the effects were, and how you, Tania, were 
feeling about what was said, and about the process. About resisting the 
idea of coming up with solutions, which I thought then might add to the 
oppression of the problem [for Tania], rather than be helpful. 
I worked just to make things visible, what the issues were, without having 
a sense of finding solutions. 
We hear here how Adele was actively theorising her work, producing a relational 
supervision practice, that took care to notice discursive practices at work in the 
many sites that were represented in this example. She was noticing the call to her 
as supervisor: come up with something; that is, with a solution to the not enough 
clients problem presented by Tania. As good counsellors have lots of clients, so 
might good supervisors always come up with something. Producing this call to 
come up with something was the construction of supervision as a problem solving 
practice, one that sees problems as immediate, and relies on supervisors to have 
practice knowledge and answers to offer. Adele noticed the relation set up 
between her and Tania in this discourse: coming up with solutions might add to 
the oppression of the problem. 
Rather, Adele saw her task as working to make things visible: what is here in the 
discursive vista, she was asking, positioned alongside Tania. To make things 
visible in the ways Adele did was to attend to the politics of both supervision 
practices and counselling practices. It was to ask what practices of the self were 
being produced in supervision. Was supervision to come up with answers to the 
low client numbers problem and add to the struggle for Tania, for example? It 
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was to ask, too, what practices of the professional self were producing the 
problems a counsellor brought to supervision. In asking this question, Adele 
made visible the discursive positioning offered Tania by the version of 
employment relations that had been at work in Tania's situation. And by asking 
questions that did not take for granted taken-for-granted practices within this 
discursive regime, she opened space for Tania to speak to some aspects of the 
problematic positioning she had been experiencing, and to produce possibilities 
for things to be otherwise. Tania could, perhaps, become a recruiter of others into 
shared responsibility, rather than being positioned as solely responsible and 
therefore as justifying. 
My purpose here is to focus on the deliberateness the supervisor brought to the 
position she took up in relation with the counsellor. Her inquiry worked to 
provide an alternative account of the problem, one that did not join the counsellor 
in a pathologising of her professional self. Rather, the supervisor focussed inquiry 
on the situation of the problem, and thence on the local socio-political practices 
that she understood to have produced the problem: under what discursive 
conditions was the problem flourishing? In this way Adele joined Tania in 
constructing a new way of relating to the problem, one that offered Tania more 
possibilities for her relationship with her professional self and so for responsible 
professional action. Responsibility became produced differently for both Adele 
and Tania. 
Discourses work through us: without thinking through the positionings offered 
supervisor and counsellor in relation we can as supervisors end up reproducing in 
the supervision the positioning of the counsellor that was already producing a 
concern for them. (There are echoes of ideas about parallel process [Doehrman, 
1976] that have gained considerable ascendancy in many supervision practice 
circles in this country, and in the U.K. [McConkey, 1999]. I note the presence of 
these echoes. However, the notion of parallel process depends on different 
theoretical resources than the constructionist ones that have shaped this project. 
Given the local ascendancy of these ideas I acknowledge the echo, but I do not 
wish to be diverted from the account I am constructing, for this account does not 
depend upon the psychodynamic notion of parallel process.) All texts generate 
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other texts. The texts of a professional responsibility discourse respond to and 
arise out of previous texts. In taking a metadiscursive orientation, Adele made 
visible the ways in which supervision discourse was being produced and 
reproduced, and thus made visible the relation of power in which supervisor and 
counsellor were positioned in supervision. 
Supervision: assembling our professional selves 
As I draw my analysis of this example to a close, I return to the question that I 
used in the introduction to this section. What sort of selves are we assembling 
ourselves as in supervision? What sort of practice of the self is supervision? The 
version of supervision discourse that has been produced here is one that has 
refused to construct the counsellor as it, as the isolated originator of their practice. 
It has refused to work upon the self of the counsellor as though the self of the 
counsellor could act independently of discourses of employment relations, or 
professionalism and autonomy and responsibility. Rose's (1998) words resonate 
as I struggle to find the words to describe what sort of supervision practice this is 
that has been produced here, for the words I have used thus far say most clearly 
what the practice is not, what the practice has refused to do. Ending his collection 
of essays that explored the modes of subjectification the psy complex has made 
available, Rose suggested that since there has been some destabilising of the 
"once secure space of interiority", 
... we might at least enhance the contestability of the forms of being that 
have been invented for us, and begin to invent ourselves differently. (Rose, 
1998, p.197) 
I argue that this was the kind of activity that we have seen going on here, the 
contesting of forms of being, and the beginnings of inventing alternative forms of 
being. To make such a grand claim about such small acts is also to enter the 
realm of contestability. However, if I am to take seriously the (poststructuralist) 
claims that persons are assembled in modes of being and that we do make our 
selves up according to the modes of being that are made available to us - and I do 
want to take these claims seriously - this supervision conversation can be 
understood not as banal, but as contributing at a particular and local level to 
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contesting the modes of relating to the professional self that dominant supervision 
discourse has offered. For example, the supervision produced here has contested, 
to some extent, the rightness and the naturalness of autonomy and individual 
responsibility in professional practice, by making visible their isolating effects. 
The supervision conversation from which this example was extracted has offered 
a mode of relating to the professional self that understands the professional self as 
produced in relation. Responsibility, too, is a matter of relationship, 
multidirectional rather than unidirectional. I argued in Chapter Four that, in the 
context of professional counselling, supervision is one of what Rose calls "the 
diverse machines of morality" that assemble us as "responsible subjects" (1998, 
p.182). Reconceiving responsibility as relational and multidirectional, and as 
discursively rather than individually produced, as the supervision conversation in 
this Extract 9.2 did, we begin to contest the forms of being offered to us if we 
understand supervision as examination and confession. 
A deconstructing supervision produces a different version of supervisor 
responsibility than those versions of supervision that reproduce practices of 
paternalism and instrumentality. A deconstructing supervision is what was being 
produced here in Extract 9.2, a version of supervision that not only addressed 
power but that took power to be an inevitable interdiscursive presence: discourse 
always produces power relations. As supervisors and counsellors we are always 
caught up in negotiating complex webs of meaning through which power, justice 
and ethics interweave. I suggest that Extract 9.2 illustrates how the challenging 
work of negotiating our ways through complex webs of meaning depends upon 
supervisors positioning themselves well to pay attention, through inquiry, to the 
productivity of power. What are the power relations at work here? Within the 
terms of what discursive practices are these power relations being played out? 
These are the questions that inform this supervision work. 
Locating practice within a moral order 
The last example from practice showed the supervisor positioning herself to pay 
attention to the forms of professional being available to be taken up and to the 
power relations of practice. But to position ourselves well to do this is a complex 
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matter, and we will not always manage as well as we might wish. "The narrative 
therapist may not find it easy living up to the high ideals of the paradigm," 
suggested Morss and Nichterlein (1999, p.165). Such "high ideals" can subject us 
to self doubt, as Morss and Nichterlein suggested, or they may silence us when we 
struggle to find ways to meet the standards of speaking we set ourselves. 
Counsellors might use supervision to support us to produce our practices in ways 
that are consistent with the "high ideals" to which we ascribe. Supervision is a 
site where we work to assemble ourselves as moral subjects. How, then, without 
the confessional of dominant supervision regimes, do we encounter our struggles 
to position ourselves well as moral and ethical practitioners? This next example 
shows, in a very brief sequence, counsellor and supervisor deliberately taking 
positions, in supervision, to support practice preferences. 
Extract 9.3: Positions for ethical action 
Margaret is the counsellor and Louisa the supervisor in Supervision 14. 
Margaret and Louisa were reviewing a situation with clients that had been troubling 
Margaret. Margaret sought to understand a complex situation that had developed in 
her counselling work with a couple. At one point, noticing Margaret pausing and 
hesitating, Louisa asked her: 
What's puzzling? 
In a self-commentary position, Margaret replied: 
Oh, just, it's so easy to invite some of the old words in, like "manipulation". 
Margaret was noticing the call from both lay and professional discourse to diagnose 
the problem as manipulation and thus to invoke a pejorative description of client 
behaviour. The complex problem could be made sense of if she employed the notion 
of manipulation. But manipulation was an old word. a description employed in a moral 
order in which she did not want to position herself. The call to take up a position 
that described the problem as manipulation left Margaret struggling to speak: that 
description, manipulation, did not invoke the respectful relation that she wanted to 
maintain with her clients. Margaret had noticed the call to her to speak of 
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manipulation, and taking a metadiscursive position, she both acknowledged that call 
and refused it. However, in her refusing she had been without words. 
In response, Louisa acknowledged Margaret's preference to speak in respectful ways 
about clients. She went on to ask Margaret's permission for the conversation to 
proceed using the familiar terms, these old words, but bracketing the speaking that 
used the word manipulation as an aside. The notion of manipulation could be used, 
spoken wittingly in order to generate alternative terms. To speak with those old 
words was only a provisional tactic, to support the making up of other accounts, not a 
final account in itself: 
... maybe together we can look at how else we can understand these familiar 
words like 'manipulation'. 
Without the word, manipulation, that offered a particular, though not a preferred, 
understanding of the problem with which Margaret was grappling, it was difficult to 
find a way forward. By taking manipulation as a word "under erasure" (Davies, 1999, 
p.139), Margaret and Louisa could work together to produce alternative possible 
understandings of the positioning of Margaret's clients. 
"High ideals" do not necessarily invoke the reproduction of supervision as a place of 
examination or confession, as this instance of practice has illustrated. While the 
expression, high ideals, is itself ripe for deconstruction, my emphasis here is on the 
ways in which counsellor and supervisor observed and responded to position calls, 
negotiating their ways forward through naming that which was in need of 
deconstruction. Deconstruction is ongoing. "High ideals" are not static 
arrangements, but are negotiated in the everyday dialogue of our practice, 
negotiated in language that might show our struggles to position ourselves well for 
ethical practice. Moral action is not an essential quality, but one for which we 
actively work as we take responsibility for the discursive locations of our practices. 
The work of this chapter 
With three examples from practice this chapter has illustrated the collaborative 
exercise of responsibility in supervision. Through the exercise of collaborative 
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responsibility in supervision, counsellors have been positioned well to re-engage 
with the responsibilities of counselling practice. Inquiry rather than ready 
assumption has been the strategy illustrated in these examples. 
Chapter Nine 229 
Chapter Ten 
Constructing a constructionist supervision: Reflecting team 
practice 
Introduction 
Moving from the general focus on constructionist supervision of the previous two 
chapters, this chapter has as its emphasis the extension of those practices into 
reflecting team supervision as a particular expression of constructionist work. As a 
reflecting team we provided for ourselves a professional community of concern 
(Madigan & Epston, 1995), offering a relational, dialogic and multivocal space 
structured to be sustaining and generative for each of us and of our practices. The 
previous chapters have already drawn, for their examples, on the Phase One dyadic 
counsellor-supervision conversation and the Phase Four team review of and 
commentary on the processes of the supervision. Therefore, Phases Two and Three 
provide the emphasis of the examples in this chapter. Chapters Two and Five 
included an outline of a general reflecting team structure, on which the account I build 
here depends. The chapter explores examples of joining practices by which the team 
produced itself as a particular professional community of shared concern. I then go 
on to show the team working as a community of concern in deconstructing, multi-
voiced dialogues about the politics of our practices. The work of team members, in 
dialogue, consulting each other about professional discourse and the epistemological 
and ethical positioning of their work provided a resourceful professional community 
for enriching the storying and thus the ongoing production of our professional lives 
and practices. The chapter thus continues the development of an account of 
supervision that draws on the ethos and practices of narrative therapy for the work of 
supervision. 
A professional community of concern 
Team members frequently spoke of the support they experienced in the regular 
meetings of the group and through the group's work together, support that Anne 
suggested was for her a significant counter to the isolation of counselling. Clare 
spoke of the reflecting team supervision as luxury, indicating that the commitment of 
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time that we had all made was considerable, and was not something that was possible 
for all counsellors, or in all circumstances. As well, she was indicating luxury in 
having the voices of a number of colleagues reflecting together in supervision. Kate, 
in similar vein, suggested that regular supervision (dyadic) might now seem 
impoverished without the richness of many contributions. 
Professional community as resource 
In producing supervision as a communal activity in a communal space, the work of 
the team disrupted the familiar metaphor of privacy in the practice of dyadic 
counselling supervision. The disruption of privacy had two effects. Clare spoke, in 
the first supervision meeting, of the worry and unfamiliarity of working live before a 
number of her peers. However, alongside the possibility that her work could thus be 
open to judgement was the paradox of her preference to be transparent in her practice, 
by bringing her work into a setting where it would be seen by her peers. Clare also 
spoke strongly of valuing the professional development opportunities the project 
would provide. In the Research Meeting One, Kate, responding to Clare, noted that 
by then working in the group and having our work visible to each other had become 
normal, and helpful, practice. Our work together was changing the discourse of 
counselling supervision. Rather than being positioned in a discourse where visibility 
constituted surveillance, with the effect that we might seek some protection in 
privacy, we were engaging with the opportunities for professional enrichment that the 
visibility of community, in a participatory project, offered our professional practice. 
On these terms resourcefulness could come to be shared, rather than deficiencies 
policed. 
From privacy to community 
Our undertaking a move from dyadic supervision to reflecting team work was 
significant, for there is a strong emphasis in the professional counselling culture in 
New Zealand on privileging the privacy of the dyadic counselling relationship. While 
narrative therapies abound with ideas that counter this impetus to privacy, nonetheless 
the dominant professional discourse that produces counselling as private-and 
sheltered-from-view has supported a construction of supervision as also private-and-
sheltered-from-view, despite the authority of a supervision-as-accountability-and-
monitoring discourse. Team members spoke of welcoming the appropriate disruption 
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of supervision privacy and of shelter from peer review. It was welcomed for the 
number and variety of points of view that the participation of many voices made 
available to the consultation; for the sense of support on which there was to draw in 
producing practice; and for the enriching of practice it offered. I suggest, too, that 
the disruption of privacy here was welcomed because it was a disruption of which we 
were the authors: each of us had chosen to participate in the group. 
Community through structure 
Liz suggested that the peer reflecting team structure, with its a purposeful focus on the 
person nominated, for that session, as the counsellor consulting with the group, 
offered more than group supervision might. She noted that both supervisor and team 
members had particular foci, the supervisor focussing, with Liz, on the development 
of my work, and the team focus of carefully listening: their role is just to carefully 
listen. Anne, too, spoke about the structure, saying 
The structure seemed to make it much deeper and richer in terms of 
development. We've kept very much to our stated purpose which has helped 
it work. We're all really busy, and we've kept on time, and got down to 
business, and the business has brought the connections [with each other] for 
me. 
The professional work and the sense of support and connection produced each other. 
Entering the dialogica/ space of supervision: Phase One 
The examples of practice from the previous two chapters have been drawn from Phase 
One supervision work, when the counsellor and supervisor were in dialogue while 
reflecting team members listened and watched behind the one-way screen. The work 
of the dyadic partners in this phase is in many ways similar to the work of a 
supervisory dyad beginning to work together. For example, in Extract 8.3 we saw the 
careful work as Lee and Ruth set out the history and location of Lee's supervision 
interest in exploring decision making discourse. In Extract 9.2 I showed Adele, as the 
supervision agenda was introduced, paying careful attention as supervisor to the 
positions to which she was called in supervision discourse, and refusing the invitation 
to produce answers, to come up with something, lest she add to the problem. At the 
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same time, the presence of the team listening behind the screen produced differences 
in the setting out and exploratory work of Phase One. For example, I have shown 
Anne including the team in her invitation when as counsellor she began supervision 
saying that she wanted the counsellor and team to think with her. As well, supervisors 
spoke of a sense of being able to let some aspects of the conversation pass, knowing 
that the team would be likely to pick them up: responsibility for responding was 
shared. 
In the listening position, team members were free to track the conversation in detail, 
to listen to themes, to explore silently some particular resonance, to carefully listen, as 
Liz said. At times, too, comments in reviewing the session in Phase Four suggested a 
strong interest in observing the supervisor's practice. Many foci were possible in the 
privilege of the listening position. 
Listening and speaking positions: Phases Two and Three 
The dyadic counsellor-supervisor conversation was interrupted at the end of Phase 
One. Interruption was not a communication strategy that was encouraged when I did 
my counsellor training. However, the interruption of the dyadic conversation was 
another example of a disturbance of familiar counselling supervision practice. This 
disturbance of the familiar produced rich possibilities, as the team members moved to 
position themselves well to offer the counsellor the thinking with they had done, party 
to yet apart from, the to and fro of the Phase One conversation. Reversing positions, 
counsellor and supervisor moved to the listening position, for now it was the 
counsellor and supervisor who were part of, while apart from, the conversation. The 
supervision concern became demonstrably the concern of a community of 
practitioners as the team took up the conversation, and the counsellor was now 
positioned to listen, mull over, take notes, take up a position of reverie, free from any 
burden of immediate response. 
My focus in this chapter is on the Phase Two team work, and the responses of 
counsellors to that work, in Phase Three. 
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Extract 10.1. Joining a community of concern 
Tania is the counsellor, Adele the supervisor, and Mary and Pauline are team 
members, in Supervision 12. 
Mary I feel a bit flat really. I'm really feeling for Tania in that situation. You 
know, the isolation, and I felt she was quite flat when she was talking about 
it. I could really feel for her, knowing her passion for her work and ... 
Pauline 
Mary, is there something there that you know about isolation, that that was 
what you responded to, or is ... ? 
Mary [the effects of the philosophical isolation] on what you keep in, and how you 
define your work, and what you think about your work, and what you choose 
to think about. 
Phase Three 
Tania It was really neat hearing people wondering and caring about that, not 
wondering and thinking about it by myself. I am really struck by that 
(difference). 
[ ... ] 
If I wasn't always trying to work these things out by myself ... 
Joining, an expression of the community of concern 
One of the ways in which the team worked to become a community of resourceful 
support (rather than surveillance) was in the quality of the joining in the team's Phase 
Two reflections. The value for the counsellor of having been joined by the team was 
a recurrent theme in their responses in Phase Three. For example, in Research 
Meeting Two, Kate spoke to the sense of support she experienced in having so many 
people actually concerned and thinking deeply about what she had brought to 
supervision. At that meeting Liz spoke of team members placing ourselves alongside 
both other people [counsellor and supervisor] in producing collaborative practice, for 
instance in reflecting on how that [which we have heard] affects our lives. This next 
example shows a team member placing herself alongside the counsellor as she offered 
reflection, in Phase Two, on the impact of the counsellor's story for her as she had 
listened in Phase One. 
Extract 10.1. Joining a community of concern 
Tania is the counsellor. Adele the supervisor. and Mary and Pauline are team 
members, in Supervision 12. 
Supervision 12 was introduced in Chapter Nine, when Tania's concern about low client 
numbers presenting at her agency came to be located in an employment relations 
discourse. Adele had said to Tania, So you are it. This response from the commentary 
position had had a particular resonance for Tania, making visible her positioning within 
employment relations, and good counsellor, discourses. This present example is drawn 
from the beginning of the Phase Two. Mary began the team reflections, making a 
relational connection with Tania, and noting the impact for her of what she had heard. 
I feel a bit flat really. I'm really feeling for Tania in that situation. You know, the 
isolation, and I felt she was quite flat when she was talking about it. I could really 
feel for her, knowing her passion for her work and ... 
With the reflections begun, it was the responsibility of team members to respond to 
Mary's beginning, to build together on the joining and witnessing (Weingarten, 2000a) 
she had begun. Mary had chosen to respond to the flatness and isolation of which she 
had heard, rather than to other aspects of the conversation, and Mary's reflection from 
the position of first speaker (Cobb, 1993) set an agenda for the group as they began. 
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Pauline engaged with Mary, asking her if she would like to speak further to her 
connection to the isolation story to which she had just responded. In asking Mary to 
enlarge upon her opening, Pauline's task was to support Mary to focus her sharing 
towards serving Tania's interests in the supervision. Pauline took a position alongside 
Mary. Perhaps Mary had some particular knowledge that might be useful to the 
conversation, she asked: 
Mary, is there something there that you know about isolation, that that was what 
you responded to, or is ... ? 
Mary went on to elaborate on aspects of counsellor isolation that she had experienced. 
She identified two aspects of isolation, in particular. She spoke of the isolation of a 
sole practitioner in private practice, and of the isolation that occurs where a 
philosophical position is not shared by others in an agency setting. I suggest that Mary 
was offering a deconstructing commentary on isolation. She spoke about the positions 
isolation offered and the effects thus produced for counsellors, in her experience. She 
spoke about the effects of the philosophical isolation on 
what you keep in, and how you define your work, and what you think about your 
work, and what you choose to think about. 
These small and ordinary acts of Mary joining Tania in her concern, and witnessing to the 
effects of isolation, in both Tania's apparent flatness and Mary's own experience of 
isolation, proved to be meaningful for Tania. This is how Tania began Phase Three, when 
Adele and she began to reflect on the team's reflections. 
It was really neat hearing people wondering and caring about that, not wondering 
and thinking about it by myself. I am really struck by that (difference). 
Mary's acts of witnessing worked against the isolation that had produced the discursive 
conditions in which Tania's concerns about client numbers in her practice had grown. 
Noting that she had thought of speaking in the supervision of feeling flat in relation to 
her workplace, Tania went on to speak further about the effects of isolation, taking up 
Chapter Ten 235 
both the sole-practitioner aspects and the philosophical-differences aspects that Mary 
had offered. Dialogical space had been produced for the deconstruction of another 
aspect of the problem, and Tania was connected with others as she entered that space. 
A community of many voices 
Mary's contribution brought into the supervision conversation a thread that had not 
been developed in Phase One. In Phase One (Excerpt 9.2) one particular aspect of the 
concern had been storied most fully: Tania's position within employment relations 
discourse. This second conversational thread, now woven from Phase One, through 
Phases Two and Three, made visible the effects of isolation and the positions it offered 
Tania. 
If I wasn't always trying to work these things out by myself ... 
Tania said, going on to speak of the ways in which isolation had worked to produce the 
problem she had brought. However, with many voices contributing to the supervision, 
Tania was no longer trying to work it out by herself. She had joined herself with a 
community of many voices, thus making visible the ways in which the difficulties she had 
been experiencing were themselves produced in a regime that called for singular action. 
In the discussion of Extract 9.2 I presented Adele's comment, in the Phase Four review, 
that she had refused the invitation to her as supervisor to come up with something, to 
suggest solutions by which Tania might take singular action. Mary, too, had refused any 
such position. Rather she was making a relational connection to Tania, and locating the 
problem of isolation in discursive terms and in her own experience. She thus offered a 
story of resonance that Tania and Adele could select to pick up in the Phase Three 
conversation or not, depending on Tania's interest in doing so. In this situation, Mary's 
contribution offered Tania another description that put more words to the story of the 
problem she had brought for consultation. These words and descriptions, and Mary's 
voice speaking them, all made connections to community, in this way building professional 
community and countering professional isolation. The supervision team worked as a 
community of professional support, producing descriptions of Tania's practice in terms 
of community action rather than singular action. 
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In the listening position: resonance with the personal and the professional 
While the emphasis of the team's reflections tended to be on a range of professional 
experiences, reflections were not limited to professional stories. In Chapter Four, I 
noted Gardner, Bobele, & Biever's (1997) and Bernard and Goodyear's (1998) 
suggestions that new therapists have a thin store of professional stories to call on. I 
argued that their suggestion closed off the many possibilities for lived experience 
beyond the therapy room contributing to our storying of our counselling work. Aileen 
Cheshire's story of the contribution of her mother, Beatrice, to Aileen's work as a 
therapist (Cheshire, 2001; White, 1997) continues to provide a powerful counter to the 
idea that somehow our personal lives cannot richly inform our counselling work. 
Professional communities of concern need not be dependent upon professional 
resources alone. I go on here to show a reflecting team member joining a counsellor 
in her work by using a story from her own family life as a contribution towards the 
possibility-generation for which the counsellor had asked. 
Extract 10.2 A giving up story: Taking up and producing an invitation to 
community 
Carol is the counsellor, and Gillian is a team member in Supervision 14. 
As she introduced her supervision agenda in Phase One, Carol invited the supervisor and 
the rest of the group to think with her in making the most of very significant changes 
her client had made in his life. She was looking for ideas, directions and poss,bilitiesas 
she thought about taking the work forward. I suggest that Carol was wanting to position 
herself well for the ongoing work, and that consultation with the team as a community of 
concern could help her story more richly what had been and what might be in this work. 
In Phase One Carol told the supervisor that this client had changed from high levels of 
marijuana use and involvement in selling, to a very much-reduced level of personal use. 
Carol spoke of the restraints there might be for her client in building on these 
developments and of her appreciation of the significance for her client of these changes 
that he had already made. Carol's invitation to the team was to think with her: we were 
positioned as supports alongside, a community of concern for the therapeutic team of 
Carol and her client. I suggest that thinking with is yet another contrast with the come 
up with something position Adele spoke of being called to (Extract 9.2). Both Adele's 
idea of working to make visible, to deconstruct respectfully, and Carol's request for 
thinking with offer position calls that invite collaboration. Respectful deconstruction and 
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collaboration are discursive practices different from the paternalism of coming up with 
something for, and thinking for. 
In Phase Two Gillian took up the kind of thinking with position Carol had invited. She 
offered a story from her own very recent family life. Although it is quite long, I 
reproduce it here to demonstrate the work it contributed towards Carol's request for 
the team to think with her to generate possibilities for practice. Gillian's offering of 
her story had a different quality from the Why don't you try? intervention that I 
discussed in Chapter Seven or the reporting of what I did with my client genre of talk 
that is a teller-centred or teller's-client-centred report of facts and instrumental 
action. Gillian offered knowledge of a giving-up story in her own family, thus bringing to 
the team other voices that might join the community of concern. Gillian, in telling her 
story, centred her inquiry on the possibilities it might offer for Carol and her client in 
the manner of decentred sharing (White, 1997). Carol and her supervision interest 
remained at the centre of the purpose for telling. 
As I was listening there - I think Carol said that her client is in his thirties 
somewhere - I was recalling a conversation I had with my Dad over the last few 
days about when Dad gave up smoking nicotine. He would have been about that 
age [of Carol's client]. And so here was I in my forties talking with Dad about my 
memories of the effects of him giving up smoking when I was young. And I was 
just thinking about this man [Carol's client], and wondering where do his children 
figure in his giving up, and I was imagining - I guess I was thinking about this in 
terms of Carol saying, "How can I make the most of these changes?" - I was 
wondering if that's a possible place, to invite him to think about his children 
when they are, say, forty, and what these changes that he's been making now, 
how they will see them in terms of their life and his life. What would be the 
significance of how old the children are now, and them looking back later and 
saying, "Oh, I remember, Dad, when this happened". 
And one of the things I was remembering with Dad, the other day, was somebody 
else coming into our house and commenting that the house smelt different, which 
was, you know, that audience [to the change], and [I am wondering], too, what 
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might his children be noticing about other people noticing [the changes he has 
been making] now? 
A story was in this way offered to Carol as a possibility on which she could draw in 
thinking about the work of making the most of the changes her client had been making. 
There are some conversational moves that I might call "typically-narrative" here: the 
retelling of a telling (White, 1995) ; the audience to the changes; the re-membering of 
lives (White, 1995); the relational connections. We might assume that Gillian's retelling 
of her conversation with her father touched her: but more than that it told, briefly, of 
another father's giving up story and its impact for his children. In this way it offered 
Carol a possibility for consideration as she reflected on the work of this particular 
therapeutic relationship, and how she might be most helpful to her client in working to 
build on the developments he had already made. The story's telling offered both Carol 
and her client links to another's story, a story of change, of relationship, and of time 
passing. Through that story Carol and her client were then offered links with voices in a 
community of concern whose story they could use to support their work. 
The value of Gillian having situated the inquiry in her own life story, rather than 
offering some more disembodied inquiry about the client's hopes for his children, was 
immediately apparent as Carol responded, in Phase Three. 
I mean, I especially liked what Gillian said, because we have talked a bit 
about his children, and what they're noticing, and what difference it might 
make and that; but that kind of putting it right in the future seems like a 
good idea to speculate about; [to make] some guesses around what meaning 
they might make of that, in twenty years time, or whenever. Yeah. 
Gillian's story connected with work that Carol and her client had already done, and 
offered possibilities for building those stories further. It could perhaps add substance 
to a story that had already begun. Carol then continued, 
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I'm expecting, or maybe guessing, that it might become even more a 
focus of the work [his children]. I mean he has some fairly clear ideas 
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about the kids, and he's got really close relationships with his kids - safe 
relationships - close relationships with the kids, and quite open 
relationships with his kids. And he's always maintained that his use has 
not affected them. And I've never argued with that. But I'm wondering 
whether exploring that in more detail might be more possible now than 
has been possible before. But he's very clear that he would prefer 
himself to be less of a marijuana dad, and so maybe some work around 
the kids would be really good. It's sparked off quite a lot of thoughts 
actually, in terms of that. 
Links have been made between past work, present conversation, and possible future 
work. Carol has storied in the possibilities for practice offered by the team positioned 
to think with her in a supervision of possibility. 
This example is drawn from a supervision conversation where Carol used the group as a 
community of concern to help her to take a generative stance in her work. In this way 
supervision was not constructed as a site to engage with problems or deficits to be put 
right. Rather, it was constructed as a site where we joined in reflection to forge new 
possibilities together, to chart sites that had not yet been charted, and to speculate 
about where ways ahead might lead. The lens of our looking was imagination. The 
emphasis was on thinking forward, making up possibilities for practice, in community. 
This example demonstrates the value of the resource that this process gives access to. 
My inclusion of this story has been informed partly by my ongoing work in 
supervision. As a supervisor I do not regard supervision conversations as a grand 
opportunity for the retelling of my own stories, personal and professional, to a captive 
audience. However, I have found that when there is a particular resonance (White, 
1995), such as this example illustrates, and when stories are offered in a way that 
centres the resonance and the possibilities the resonance may offer the counsellor's 
story, this kind of decentred sharing of personal stories serves supervision well. It 
links particular stories with cultural stories and with the communities in which such 
stories are performed. When particular stories are located in cultural stories, we have 
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more tools available to us for making sense: other aspects of the telling become 
differently available to us. 
"Grappling with ideas" in listening and speaking positions 
The team worked as a community in which professional stories were performed, 
providing a vehicle for making links between particular stories of counselling practice 
and stories from the professional culture. With the project focussing on inquiry into 
what constructionism offers supervision practice at the same time as we were working 
to produce that practice, particular stories of practice were often located in accounts of 
epistemology as the team worked to support counsellors in making meaning of and 
for their practice. Anne called this epistemological work grappling with ideas. In the 
Review after Supervision Nine, Liz was musing on the ways in which the reflecting 
team process worked, saying that it was at once respectful and safe and at the same 
time, 
I was going to say challenging, but it's developmental in that it enables 
growth ... It's got no notion of challenging of being, the challenging is of 
ideas, and it's not confronting of persons. 
Anne went on to elaborate, speaking about the Phase Two team reflections. 
It's not like directly confronting personal meaning in a judgmental way; it's 
grappling with the ideas; it's like a space to grapple with ideas; creating 
space for conversation around things. 
Both Liz and Anne were speaking in everyday language of the value of a discursive 
approach to supervision, valuing the kinds of decentred and deconstructing inquiry 
employed for rigorous investigation of ideas and practices. It is these kinds of 
comments that have led me to suggest that talk about what we are taking to be true, 
epistemology-talk, is a central concern of supervision. Grappling with ideas is more 
than 'case conceptualisation' for that term conjures up a micro-focus that suggests 
that one 'case' can be conceptualised independently of others. Rather epistemology-
talk is concerned with the theoretical tools and the theory of knowledge by which our 
thinking for practice is constituted. 
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Extract 10.3. Deconstructing inquiry: legitimising practice 
Laura is counsellor and Elise, supervisor, in Supervision 8. Alex and Gwen are 
team members. 
Phase One 
Laura The issue for me around my work with her is what I experience happening to 
me that I wasn't very happy with. 
The bit that concerned me, I guess, and it disappoints me is, that when this 
came up again I found it hard to stay with my client [description omitted for 
client's privacy] ... its been hard for me to stay with my client and not be with 
the 14 year old. 
And I'm having to work really hard at being with her. She's my client, not 
this 14 year old. 
And there's part of me that wants to say, "Try harder, she's 14". And I'm 
thinking, here's my client, and I'm wanting to say, "Try harder. She's only 
14, and that's tough" . 
... I feel like I'm betraying my client, and being alongside her sister. 
Phase Two 
Gwen And I'm thinking, she [Laura] might have some knowing about what a 14 year 
old without a voice, what they might hope that their caregiver could get 
from a counsellor. [ ... ] Is that some useful knowing she's [Laura's] got that's 
inviting the 14 year old in? 
Alex Into the counselling room? 
Gwen Yes. 
Alex So Laura had a problem with having the 14 year old in the counselling room? 
What did you make of that? She was bothered by it. 
At times our work to locate our practice in both constructionist thinking and in the 
local counselling community left us grappling to find common dialogical space in 
practice and in reflections, and also to speak of difference in ways that were 
dialogical. At other times it was constructionist thinking in practice that helped us 
grapple with the professional ideas that were shaping practice. Deconstructing 
inquiry supported us to bring epistemology talk from the margins of supervision talk. 
Deconstructing dominant professional discourse 
Grappling with ideas often involved the deconstruction of dominant professional 
discourses. At times the material that counsellors brought to supervision could be 
understood in terms of their being positioned unfavourably in particular professional 
discourses: in the last chapter, Excerpt 9.2 showed Tania positioned unfavourably in 
a good counsellors discourse when client numbers were low. This next example 
shows the team asking about the discursive practices produced by individualism in 
counselling, practices that positioned the counsellor unfavourably in another version 
of good counsellor discourse. 
Extract 10.3. Deconstructing inquiry: legitimising practice 
Laura is counsellor and Elise, supervisor, in Supervision 8. Alex and Gwen are team 
members. 1 
Before going on to present the data from the Phase Two conversation, I situate the 
example by describing the work of Phase One. Laura had spoken with Elise about 
frustration with herself in having difficulty staying engaged with her client. She was 
frustrated that her attention in counselling had been constantly drawn to concern for 
her client's younger sister about whom the client had spoken, but who was not the focus 
of the client's purpose in consulting Laura. Laura set out the dilemma in terms that 
spoke of her own problematic practice: she was misguided for her interest in and 
concern for her client's sister. 
The issue for me around my work with her is what I experience happening to me 
that I wasn't very happy with. 
1 This instance of practice was discussed briefly in Crocket ( 1999a). 
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Alex Yeah. So you're also interested in [Laura's interest in her client's 14 year old 
sister], and you're not interested in Laura particularly getting rid of her 
knowing, or her compassion for the 14 year old? 
Gwen No. But rather consulting. 
Alex Yeah, consulting with that, in her role as a counsellor? ... 
I'm interested that you're kind of legitimating Laura having some knowledge 
and compassion for the fourteen year old. I'm interested in that, too, 
because is there an idea in counselling that excludes us from having some, 
even some responsibility, for other people in that person's [client's] life? I 
think it's a good question [to be asking]. Sometimes when I've got a male 
client, I'm curious, because of things I hear from him, about how this might 
be impacting on his wife, or his partner. 
Alex Those things that silence the voice of the counsellor. I realise that it's 
something [for a counsellor] to navigate. 
Gwen To negotiate, yeah. 
Alex But how do we draw that line between what people we allow into the 
counselling room, in a sense, and to take our attention; and with some I 
suppose it's easier, because its more clear that we're interested in, and even 
bring up abuse in the relationship, and as a counsellor we have some 
responsibility to make that visible, when it involves a partner? 
And it's culturally, like we're "allowed" to do that with partners: partners 
have a different status than other people in people's lives. Do partners have 
higher status than friends or children or siblings? 
I was thinking, why isn't the fourteen year old - I can see some reasons why 
and I did hear Laura's concerns about how it was distracting her from her 
work with the client - but why isn't she allowed to be [metaphorically] in the 
room, in some ways? Is it her age, or is it because she's a sister? If she was 
ten, would it have been more OK, or less OK, or? 
The bit that concerned me, I guess, and it disappoints me is, that when this came 
up again I found it hard to stay with my client [description omitted for client's 
privacy]. .. its been hard for me to stay with my client and not be with the 14 year 
old. 
And I'm having to work really hard at being with her. She's my client, not this 
14 year old. 
And there's part of me that wants to say, "Try harder, she's 14". And I'm 
thinking, here's my client, and I'm wanting to say, "Try harder. She's only 14, 
and that's tough" . 
... I feel like I'm betraying my client, and being alongside her sister. 
The idea at work in constructing Laura as misguided for her interest in her client's 
younger sister posits individual counselling as focused only on the individual in the 
counselling room: it directs counsellors to answer very clearly the question, "Who is 
your client?" The implication is that counsellors should not be diverted by the intrusion 
of thoughts about referrers or parents, for example, for the individual counselling 
relationship is privileged. Laura said: She's my client, not the 14 year old. 
The Phase One supervision conversation had paid most attention to the client situation. 
The Phase Two reflecting conversation took on a significantly different focus. Gwen and 
Alex raised the question of what Laura's noticing of a younger sister might mean, and 
what knowledge Laura may have (about fourteen year olds and what they need) that had 
led to her noticing in the ways she had. What if, rather than an activity that should be 
at the margins of Laura's counselling work, her noticing had a place at the centre? Could 
it be legitimate, her noticing, could it be based on soundness? 
Gwen And I'm thinking, she [Laura] might have some knowing about what a 14 year old 
without a voice, what they might hope that their caregiver could get from a 
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Phase Three 
Laura When I began [the supervision] it was about baring my soul. .. I've been 
aware of not feeling good that this [experiencing a distracting concern for 
my client's sister] was happening ... 
Before it felt like I had this all on my shoulder and I was thinking, "Get a 
grip here, who's your client?" 
[Now] I can be a voice for her [younger sister] and that is OK. In fact, I 
feel some responsibility to do that. 
And I think - the analogy with other situations - it would be a lot clearer for 
me if it was a male client and they were talking about some abusive 
behaviour; it would be clearer for me about my concern for their partner. 
counsellor.[ ... ] Is that some useful knowing she's [Laura's] got that's inviting the 
14 year old in? 
Alex Into the counselling room? 
Gwen Yes. 
Alex So Laura had a problem with having the 14 year old in the counselling room? 
What did you make of that? She was bothered by it. 
Alex and Gwen raised the possibility that Laura's interest in the 14 year old sister of 
her client might be a legitimate interest. The call of "Who is your client?" discourse and 
its individualistic focus was open for investigation. Alex's question to Gwen opened the 
possibility for many voices. What did you make of it?. the assumed authority of the 
idea that the client is only the person in the room was destabilised by the inquiry. 
Summarising Gwen's reply, Alex said: 
Yeah. So you're also interested in [Laura's interest in her client's 14 year old 
sister], and you're not interested in Laura particularly getting rid of her 
knowing, or her compassion for the 14 year old? 
Gwen No. But rather consulting. 
Alex Yeah, consulting with that, in her role as a counsellor? 
I'm interested that you're kind of legitimating Laura having some knowledge and 
compassion for the fourteen year old. I'm interested in that, too, because is 
there an idea in counselling that excludes us from having some, even some 
responsibility, for other people in that person's [client's] life? I think it's a good 
question [to be asking]. Sometimes when I've got a male client, I'm curious, 
because of things I hear from him, about how this might be impacting on his 
wife, or his partner. 
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Here Alex is responding to Gwen's inquiry, commenting on it in a deconstructing version 
of the commentator position: is there an idea in counselling .. ? In asking about the 
construction of counselling practice Alex added to the inquiry. Her speaking located 
what had been a problem located in Laura - I'm betraying my client- to a problem 
constituted in counselling discourse: is there an idea in counselling. Alex also situated 
her inquiry in her own practice, showing herself disrupting the idea in counselling that 
counsellors are excluded from responsibility for other people in the client's life: 
sometimes when I have got a male client ... 
The team conversation both disrupted the construction of Laura's interest in her client's 
sibling as inappropriate and also offered an alternative possible understanding of that 
interest. That alternative understanding was situated alongside another, perhaps 
analogous, practice experience of inquiry into relationship. In offering an analogous 
situation, Alex was opening further space for speaking to the alternative idea that had 
been produced: perhaps Laura's interest was sound. That perhaps-analogous practice 
experience made overt the gender power relation that produced Alex's concern for 
women partners not in the therapy room, thus with subtlety opening the possibility for 
consideration that an age-related power relation was producing the concern Laura was 
experiencing in her counselling work. Alex was not asserting directly that therapy is a 
political act and that Laura had responsibility for the younger sister in the same way as 
a counsellor, hearing of particular concerns a male client brought to counselling, might 
consider their responsibility in terms of gender and power relations. Rather the 
conversational space was being used to open up the possibility, for Laura's consideration, 
that her noticing of the younger sister might be understood as a responsibility to be 
taken up rather than as a problem to be overcome. Through a careful opening of 
dialogical space between Gwen and Alex, Laura was being invited, as she sat in the 
listening position, to question the dominant professional idea that would have her focus 
only on her client. She was also being offered, for consideration, an alternative 
professional idea that counsellors have a responsibility to understand power relations 
and to consider acting as an advocate in response to those understandings. I suggest 
that the offering of ideas carries an important relational quality, for what is offered 
may be taken up or it may be refused. In their inquiry Alex and Gwen made ideas 
accessible and available; as the ideas in their conversation were dialogised, Alex and 
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Gwen demonstrated making professional discourse negotiable. Our practice stance is 
something we make up, they were saying by their actions. 
As the conversation continued, Alex offered further inquiry that destabilised the 
construction of Laura's interest as problematic. She commented: 
Those things that silence the voice of the counsellor. I realise that it's 
something [for a counsellor] to navigate. 
To negotiate, yeah. 
Alex has suggested that we navigate our way in practice amongst landmarks and texts of 
reference provided by professional knowledge. To be silenced is not somehow individual 
counsellor deficiency, but rather a usual part of navigating and negotiating our way 
through the practices of counselling. Alex continued: 
But how do we draw that line between what people we allow into the counselling 
room, in a sense, and to take our attention; and with some I suppose it's easier, 
because its more clear that we're interested in, and even bring up abuse in the 
relationship, and as a counsellor we have some responsibility to make that visible, 
when it involves a partner? 
The conversation thus went on to destabilise the authority of the (partner) analogy as a 
reference point for this instance of practice. Alex and Gwen were not taking positions 
of certainty about Laura's practice in their conversation, but rather asking questions 
that affected us all as a community of counsellors finding our way. 
And it's culturally, like we're "allowed" to do that with partners: partners have a 
different status than other people in people's lives. Do partners have higher 
status than friends or children or siblings? 
I was thinking, why isn't the fourteen year old - I can see some reasons why and 
I did hear Laura's concerns about how it was distracting her from her work with 
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the client - but why isn't she allowed to be [metaphorically] in the room, in some 
ways? Is it her age, or is it because she's a sister? If she was ten, would it have 
been more OK, or less OK, or? 
Alex was positioned as an inquirer about how ideas about practice are constructed. 
Supervision was being produced as dialogical inquiry, as these deconstructing questions 
asked how a discourse of individual counselling worked to produce particular practices 
that privilege individualism above relationship. The team's inquiry was directed towards 
professional practice (not Laura's practice): how are the rules and traditions of practice 
made up, they were asking. 
Laura's response, in Phase Three, to the team's reflections makes visible the 
repositioning these inquiries made available to her . 
... When I began [the supervision] it was about baring my soul. .. I've been aware 
of not feeling good that this [experiencing a distracting concern for my client's 
sister] was happening ... 
Before it felt like I had this all on my shoulder and I was thinking, "Get a grip 
here, who's your client?" 
[Now] I can be a voice for her [younger sister] and that is OK. In fact, I feel 
some responsibility to do that. 
In the baring my soul and burden metaphors we hear resonance of the confessional 
metaphor: the counsellor is positioned as supplicant. However, the team's conversation 
undermined the authority of the metaphor of supervision as confession. Alex and Gwen 
were not captured by the idea that there was anything to confess. Rather, out of their 
reflections on practice, the knowledge and care that was expressed in Laura's interest in 
a family member, not in the therapy room, was offered possible redescription. Laura's 
knowledge, care and interest, as the Phase Three conversation reflected on the Phase 
Two reflections, came to be constructed as productive, rather than obstructive, of 
ethical practice. The conversational layers offered Laura a repositioning from 
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deficiency and ineffectiveness, to agency and responsibility. Her concern for a younger 
sister moved from being constructed as erroneous/non-permitted, to permitted, to a 
responsibility she wished to fulfil, because she now had alternative accounts available to 
her with which to story her concern. Relational responsibility had been brought forward 
as a possibility for practice. Counselling texts produced by the discourses of 
individualism had been dialogised. 
The team's deconstructing inquiry was supported by their inquiry about the politics of a 
perhaps-analogous situation. Laura spoke in Phase Three of the value of Alex's offering 
of an analogous instance of practice, in helping her reflect on her preferences for her 
practice, and thus to reposition herself. I suggest that the use of analogy helped make 
the deconstruction the team was offering accessible to Laura, partly by making visible 
how other counsellors made up their practice. 
And I think - the analogy with other situations - it would be a lot clearer for me 
if it was a male client and they were talking about some abusive behaviour; it 
would be clearer for me about my concern for their partner. 
Supporting an inquiry such as Alex offered in Phase Two, Is there an idea in counselling ... 
is the idea that counsellors are producing our practices out of sets of ideas, and that 
these ideas are contested and contestable. Alex's question demonstrates 
deconstructing, decentred inquiry as practice of everyday professional language. As 
Anne noted, it was ideas and the practices those ideas produced that were being put 
under scrutiny, not counsellors. At the same time, it was not a distanced, disembodied 
speaking of ideas, for we heard Alex taking a position in terms of her practice, and we 
heard her situating herself and her practice in the inquiry. She was positioning herself 
as an active member of a professional community of concern, producing practice, and she 
was attending to the supervision conversation as a relational practice. I'm interested 
that you're kind of legitimating laura having some knowledge... I'm interested in that, 
too, because is there an idea in counselling that excludes us from having ... Ideas were 
open for inquiry as ideas that constituted us all. In Anne's words, the team members 
were engaged in grappling with ideas in ways that did not directly confront personal 
meaning in a judgmental way. Ideas were also open for inquiry as ideas that we take up 
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and reproduce or transform. Ideas about practice do directly engage us in speaking to 
the politics of our practices and the epistemologies out of which our practices were and 
might be produced. As a professional community of concern, team members together 
produced what I think of as a dialogical clearing: together they trampled the grass of 
the taken for granted professional landscape, examining its formation, clearing a 
dialogical space for new conversations. Together they trampled possible routes from 
the familiar to the clearing where new meanings could be made. The possible routes 
become visible, for instance, through the joining actions, such as the implication in the 
inquiry that this is a practice dilemma for us all. The team's work provided the dialogical 
clearing, and some routes to that clearing, in which Laura, too, might engage with the 
politics and epistemology of practice on terms not readily accessible at the centre of 
dominant professional talk that had produced the concern she had brought to 
supervision. The ways in which a discourse of individualism produces strategies for 
counselling practice were rendered visible. 
Supervision was thus produced as a site for the dialogical and relational evaluation of 
those professional knowledges by which our practices are produced and which we 
produce in our practices. As reflecting team supervision was produced in this 
example, in the Phase Two conversation team members might take meta-discursive 
positions in a deconstructing supervision. From these positions team members can be 
"active and purposive" (Willigb, 1999, p.194) in the positions we take up as we 
respond to the professional stories we hear. As a professional community of concern, 
we are positioned to evaluate professional knowledge for the discursive practices and 
positions offered us, and for the effects of those positions for the exercise of 
professional responsibility in our counselling work. Not only are we building theory 
from practice, but we are also evaluating theory in relation with practice and in 
relation with other theory. 
Grappling with ideas: epistemology talk 
In Chapter Three I introduced the suggestion that in speaking in supervision of the 
ethics and effectiveness of counselling practice, counseBors and supervisors 
inevitably traffick in epistemology talk. They traffick in epistemology talk whether 
that talk is at the surface of conversation or in the subtext, at the margins of the 
speaking rather than at the centre. Noting that epistemology was not one of the 
Chapter Ten 249 
dimensions of Holloway's model, I argued for epistemology being central to the work 
of constructionist supervision. The previous example from practice, Extract 10.3, 
showed the team bringing to the surface and centre of the talk, for inquiry, the 
epistemological positions producing particular practices. In that example and in other 
examples of constructionist reflecting team practice, team members could be seen 
taking the position of saying, Let's work at understanding what sort of text is 
producing these ideas about counselling practice. In this way the focus of 
supervision, as I have been arguing, is how we think about and might think about our 
practice, not just on the pragmatics of how dominant professional discourse asserts 
practice is done. We are unpicking the origins of statements of fact or claims to 
know, and asking how such authority is produced. We are thus locating our practices 
in particular moral orders. Here, in Extractl0.3, Alex and Gwen were unpicking 
some distinctions between positions produced for the counsellor by a discourse of 
individualism and those produced by one of relational connection, although they were 
not named that way at the time. 
Some of the tensions and difficulties that accompany these ways of constructing 
supervision as an authorising practice that evaluates counsellor knowledge are made 
visible in the example I go on to discuss next. This particular instance illustrates the 
reflecting team again engaging in purposeful inquiry about the putting together of 
practice. I include this example for its contribution to a significant aspect of the 
project for one team member. At the end of the project Maureen spoke of the effects 
of working at the ongoing moral production of the story of her professional practice: 
Some of the questions that have been put to me this year have made me have 
to decide which side of the fence, or whatever, just to make decisions. And so 
with each decision I've made, then, I guess my own practice, and my own 
biases, or whatever you like to call them, my own preferences have become 
clearer to me. 
This next example shows our professional community of concern joining Maureen in 
grappling with decisions about her practice stance. The team supported Maureen to in 
the negotiation of the ethics of work with a male client who had been involved in 
violence against a woman. The team's work in taking commentary positions and 
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locating ideas for practice in approaches to knowledge opened space for Maureen, the 
counsellor in the listening position, to notice the ways in which practice was shaped, 
and so to move toward taking a purposeful, preferred approach. 
As I begin to tell this story, I notice again the problems of reproducing text from 
conversations that were woven and interwoven. Presenting an excerpt is complex for 
each excerpt depends upon and speaks to what has come before. The supervision 
from which this extract is drawn had begun with a conversation in which, I shall 
suggest in the following chapter, Maureen was grappling with the mystique of being a 
good narrative counsellor and seeking to locate a place for herself within that 
category. That work, to position herself favourably within a good narrative 
counsellor discourse, situated the team's work in relation with the concerns Maureen 
presented as the supervision conversation continued: they were sensitive to the 
positioning Maureen was seeking for herself in a discourse of narrative counselling. 
Introducing Extract 10.4. Taking responsibility for taking a position 
In the Phase One conversation Maureen introduced this part of the supervision 
conversation in terms of wanting to think about the ethics of her interest in working 
with a client in areas other than those in the agenda set by her client at the outset of 
the counselling. She said that the client's agenda had included having a sounding board 
and having someone to trust to discuss things with. However, Maureen was concerned 
that she had an agenda different from her client: 
With a lot of other clients I would be horrified that I would have a different 
agenda from my client; but with this person - it's exposing a lot of my prejudices 
- because he's male, and because there have been violent episodes, that that is 
what is tempting me, or what's leading me to go against what he said the purpose 
of our work is. 
While I recognise that this instance raises many possible areas of discussion, I have 
introduced it here to explore epistemology talk in supervision, and to highlight the 
effects of epistemology talk at a moment when instrumental talk could have been 
tempting for a supervisor, who, privileging the immediate ethics of practice, was 
concerned about the implications of counsellor uncertainty in the face of a problem of 
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male violence. I am not suggesting that a supervisor step aside from responsibility, but 
I am suggesting that responsibility can be produced in many ways. One of those ways is 
in the work of epistemology-talk, in accompanying a counsellor in ongoing evaluation of 
and storying of the professional practice truths that they employ in their counselling 
work. 
I have elsewhere argued (Crocket, 2001) that Maureen was engaged, in this instance of 
practice, in negotiating her professional identity as she found her way amongst 
competing knowledge claims. On one hand her thinking was shaped by the idea that she 
may have some responsibility as counsellor to address with her client his attitude 
towards women and violent episodes. And on the other hand was a discourse of client-
centredness that positioned a counsellor as neutral and unconditionally non-judgemental, 
and thus positioned a client as the (sole) determiner of the counselling agenda. Client-
centredness had been more productive of and more thoroughly storied into Maureen's 
practice than ideas about the politics of counsellor responsibility. Positioned as neutral 
within a client centred discourse, Maureen was making meaning of her interest in 
addressing her client's attitude towards women on terms that constructed that interest 
as prejudice on her part, as perhaps some sort of private crusade, and as perhaps 
oppression of her client. 
The Phase One conversation worked at making overt the assumptions that were creating 
this story, and at the same time it worked to open space for speaking more fully the 
story of Maureen's possible responsibility to initiate with her client conversation that 
would more directly address gender discourse and violence. For example, Olive asked: 
Can you tell me about the ideas that lead you to say, the ideas you have that lead 
you to say that there is more to this work than just the agenda of being a 
sounding board? 
The focus of Olive's inquiry was not on what Maureen should do, but on what ideas were 
producing her thinking about her practice, and her practice. Olive's inquiry worked to 
open more space for speaking of that which client centred discourse produced at the 
margins, disquiet about counsellor responsibility in relation with male violence. The 
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inquiry worked to dialogise ideas about the negotiation of agendas in counselling, paying 
attention to Maureen as the agent of the concern that client-centredness might not be 
enough here. Olive's interest at this moment was in making space for the local 
production of meaning: the ideas you have. In this inquiry Olive was taking responsibility 
for taking a position in the politics of the work. She was taking responsibility for using 
inquiry to make more accessible to the dialogue an account of alternative positions for a 
counsellor as a negotiator of the agenda in counselling, and as ethically and responsibly 
interested in inquiry about male violence. 
In Phase Two the team located their contribution in epistemological terms. These 
particular contributions offered Maureen a position from which to gain further 
authority in disputing the position in relation with her client that client-centred 
discourse offered her. In the listening position, too, Maureen was supported to review 
ideas, and approaches to practice, as the team centred their inquiry on the site of ideas 
rather than on the site of Maureen's (professional) person. 
At the outset of the supervision the problem had been constructed as an ethical one: is 
it oppressive of a client for a counsellor to work to influence the therapeutic agenda, 
Maureen had asked. Some team members had considerable experience working in the 
area of violence. Their analyses of the politics of working in the area of violence would 
construct the ethics of this counselling work on terms different from those produced 
within client-centred discourse. They would have agreed with Hare-Mustin (1994), for 
example, about the importance of therapists taking responsibility for introducing to the 
therapy room aspects of gender discourse that would not otherwise be available for 
speaking. How, then, might they position themselves to reflect in Phase Two if 
supervision was to be constructed as a storying of the counsellor's professional identity, 
as dialogical inquiry rather than instrumental activity? How might they position 
themselves as a community of concern, both in relation with concerns about 
responsibility and violence and also with Maureen's work in the first part of the 
supervision to position herself within the category of narrative counsellor? 
Extract 10.4. Taking responsibility for taking a position 
Maureen is counsellor and Olive is supervisor in Supervision 7. Frances, Phoebe and 
Belinda are team members. 
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Extract 10.4. Taking responsibility for taking a position 
Maureen is counsellor and Olive is supervisor in Supervision 7. Frances and 
Phoebe are team members. 
Phase One: 
Maureen 
With a lot of other clients I would be horrified that I would have a different 
agenda from my client: but with this person - it's exposing a lot of my 
prejudices - because he's male, and because there have been violent episodes, 
that that is what is tempting me, or what's leading me to go against what he 
said the purpose of our work is. 
Olive Can you tell me about the ideas that lead you to say, the ideas you have that 
lead you to say that there is more to this work than just the agenda of being 
a sounding board? 
Phase Two: 
Phoebe Yes, for me, I was thinking, "sounding board", what's a sounding board? 
Does a sounding board mean that one person speaks and the other can't, that 
it's a one-way thing? Does that [one-way speaking] then silence the 
counsellor if they are the sounding board? [I'm interested in] just the idea 
of being a sounding board. What does the metaphor mean, of a sounding 
board? 
Maybe some of the more modernist notions of what a counsellor is silence the 
taking of a position by a counsellor. 
Phoebe I think we can claim to have a position against violence ... 
Phoebe I wonder whether that sounding board idea, and some traditional therapeutic 
ideas about what counsellors do, and what position they have, have silenced 
Maureen from having a position. 
Having introduced something of the complexity of the positions offered thus far, 
I go on now to focus on the team's work in Phase Two as they engaged in deconstructing 
inquiry into the production of our practices. 
Phoebe's beginning saw her, too, paying attention to the story of counselling that 
produced a position of supposed neutrality for a counsellor, a position in which Maureen 
was restrained from responding to her concerns about violence as she did not want to be 
oppressive or crusading. 
Yes, for me, I was thinking, "sounding board", what's a sounding board? 
Asking about the positions in relation produced by the counsellor-as-sounding board 
account, Phoebe continued a deconstructing inquiry. 
Does a sounding board mean that one person speaks and the other can't, that it's 
a one-way thing? Does that [one-way speaking] then silence the counsellor if 
they are the sounding board? [I'm interested in] just the idea of being a 
sounding board. What does the metaphor mean, of a sounding board? 
Further unsettling of the authority of client-centred discourse occurred here, as 
Phoebe suggested that sounding boardwas a metaphor(and, implicitly, not a reified rule 
of counselling conduct), and as she asked about the effects of the position offered 
counsellors when the sounding board metaphor constructs the counselling relationship: 
is the counsellor silenced? 
Phoebe was here, I suggest, taking a position that supported Maureen's storying of what 
she, Phoebe, believed to be a responsible and ethical counsellor position. Phoebe was 
herself, as a team member, more than a (neutral) sounding board, for a particular 
position was producing her inquiry. Shortly after, Phoebe suggested 
Maybe some of the more modernist notions of what a counsellor is silence the 
taking of a position by a counsellor. 
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Frances 
I think we're always taking a position, as you talked about. Whether more 
modernist thinking kind of has this value of being non-judgemental, and those 
beliefs and attitudes, [that is a position]. 
Whatever you are doing it is a political action in some way, either disrupting 
or maintaining the status quo, or maintaining it or taking it apart and 
challenging it. It's good to think about these things, because we are always 
doing that [taking a position] whether we are conscious of it or not. 
Phase Three 
Maureen 
Phoebe mentioned that some modernist counselling ideas position counsellors 
in a silenced role. And I recognised that as something that I have been 
battling with and am battling with. Because I had a lot of experiences in 
counselling-related things before I came into this work I am doing now, and 
I'm still shedding the influences of that [style of counselling]. One of those 
influences is about being client-centred, being behind the client, non-
judgemental and absolutely accepting - which actually positions me in a 
silence, it silences me. What I'm recognising is that part of the discomfort 
for me has been the friction of recognising that I am working with this 
client against those ideas of how a counsellor should be [that is, silent], and 
my uncertainty about [my doing] that. I needed time to think about it to 
become clearer on my own position. I'm also realising that what was causing 
the [questions] - "What am I doing? Am I being unethical here? Am I being 
directive?" and all the rest [of the questions] - is the positioning that those 
particular theories would place me in. 
Phoebe identified the restraints on Maureen taking a position as perhaps being located 
in discourse, in modernist notions. Phoebe also took a position in changing the terms of 
the speaking: counsellor actions that had previously been constructed as oppression, 
crusading and prejudice became taking a position. Phoebe herself was clearly taking a 
position in her speaking. She was taking a position against the construction of counsellor 
responsibility in relation with violence as crusading or oppressive. Her next 
conversational move offered further legitimacy to the act of taking a position she went 
on to take an overt position herself in respect of Maureen's concern: 
I think we can claim to have a position against violence ... 
Then, from position-taking, Phoebe assumed a more tentative stance. She moved from 
more general de-centred deconstructing inquiry and commentary (taking in the 
discursive vista through a wide angle lens), to locate this particular instance of practice 
in the inquiry (the close up lens on particular positioning). 
I wonder whether that sounding board idea, and some traditional therapeutic 
ideas about what counsellors do, and what position they have, have silenced 
Maureen from having a position. 
In her reflections and inquiry, Phoebe assumed a version of commentary position to 
engage in epistemology talk. She was asking, what do these sets of ideas mean for how 
we practice. As Anne noted at the subsequent Review meeting, personal meaning was 
not confronted in a judgmental way. Phoebe's own work was clearly constructionist: 
according to Phoebe's account Maureen had been restrained from speaking because of 
her position within a counsellor-as-sounding-board discourse that did not allow a 
counsellor agenda-negotiating rights. Phoebe took a position in two ways: in stating I 
think that we can claim to have a position against violence, and in deconstructing the 
idea, counsellor as sounding board, that did not accord with her own epistemological 
preferences (nor with those towards which Maureen had presented herself as migrating, 
earlier in this session and earlier in the project). Phoebe did not, for instance, choose to 
respond to the dangers-of-evangelism story (on the terms of which the response she 
had made could itself be constructed as evangelical). In her reflecting team response 
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Phoebe was inviting Maureen to join the production of the dilemma according to a 
constructionist epistemology. 
Frances continued in the terms Phoebe had offered, both commenting on the matter of 
taking a position, and in doing so, taking a position herself. 
I think we're always taking a position, as you talked about. Whether more 
modernist thinking kind of has this value of being non-judgemental, and those 
beliefs and attitudes, [that is a position]. 
Whatever you are doing it is a political action in some way, either disrupting or 
maintaining the status quo, or maintaining it or taking it apart and challenging it. 
It's good to think about these things, because we are always doing that [taking a 
position] whether we are conscious of it or not. 
Frances, too, was offering a constructionist understanding of the dilemma, suggesting 
that to be complicit in a client's agenda was no more value free than to engage a client in 
thinking about matters of gender and violence. She was thus disturbing the taken for 
granted tenets of client-centred discourse that had been positioning Maureen. Her 
speaking was from a position of joining Maureen: it's good to think about these things. 
Her use of the inclusive plural first person pronoun also spoke of joining and of a 
position in professional community: we are always doing that. Later Frances spoke of an 
example of taking a position in her own practice, situating her claim in an analogous 
situation as Alex had in Extract 10.3. Frances said that she was careful not to join the 
agenda of women who have been the recipients of violence who come to counselling 
wanting to learn how to manage their men better, to cope better with the violent 
relationship. In this way Frances was speaking in support of an epistemology of practice 
that suggests that counselling agendas are not neutral, and that counsellors have a 
responsibility to work for social justice inside and outside the counselling room, and 
particularly in negotiating an agenda. Belinda added from her practice a further 
analogous example of not accepting a client's weight loss agenda without engaging them 
in a wider conversation. She, too, added depth to the professional story of counsellors 
taking a position. Team members were making links between epistemology and practice, 
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making the links accessible in examples in their own practices. The tone of the 
conversation, however, was not instruction-talk. Rather team members were unpacking a 
professional claim about client-centredness, reworking the ideas and the words that 
constructed that claim, and offering possibilities for alternative claims. These 
possibilities for alternative claims and practices were located not just in speculation but 
in the realities of their own day to day practices. In these ways team members were 
engaged in possibility-talk in respect of Maureen's concern, opening further the space 
wherein it was possible for a counsellor to make claims to knowledge and to negotiate 
therapeutic agendas with clients. I claim that Maureen was not being called into a new 
orthodoxy - 'Do it our way' - but that as she sat in the listening position, she was 
audience to her colleagues making transparent the ideas that they called on in making up 
their practices. At the same time, the team were not putting their ideas forward in a 
neutral way, as though anything goes: they were taking a position that it is an ethical 
charge upon a counsellor to take a position, and they were making their taking that 
position transparent. Again, supervision talk was about locating oneself in a moral order. 
The team's work itself produced the practice, of the responsible taking of a position, 
that Maureen had been struggling to authorise herself to use, but which had been 
constructed in her speaking as crusading and evangelical. Team members took witting 
and transparent positions and used skills of inquiry to make an invitation to responsibility 
to Maureen. A client-centred story of counsellor neutrality had been unsettled from 
the centre of professional talk, as an alternative epistemology was storied more fully. 
That alternative epistemology produced counsellor responsibility in terms of relational 
politics. Maureen had been offered an invitation to consider responsibility in attending 
carefully to her own positioning in taking a philosophical stance, and to consider the 
implications for responsible action in counselling. It rested now with the supervisor and 
counsellor to reflect, in Phase Three, on the tools for thinking about practice that these 
reflections had offered. 
Amongst the ways that the team conversation was helpful to Maureen was the locating 
of the dilemma in epistemological terms: she was constructed as grappling with ideas. 
Maureen took up the position offered by this construction in her response in Phase 
Three. I am interested to notice her use of the word mentioned, in the extract below, 
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because it constructs Phoebe's speaking as having-made-ideas-available rather than as a 
proselytising or crusading or persuading into (alternative) orthodoxy. This is important 
if the reflecting team as a professional community of concern is to be an open, 
multivocal community producing ethical practice dialogically and relationally both 
amongst its own members and with the wider professional community. It is important, 
too, for there is a great distance between mentioning and crusading. Maureen has seen 
how a (supervision) agenda could be extended and an invitation to responsibility offered 
without oppression or crusading. 
Phoebe mentioned that some modernist counselling ideas position counsellors in a 
silenced role. And I recognised that as something that I have been battling with 
and am battling with. Because I had a lot of experiences in counselling-related 
things before I came into this work I am doing now, and I'm still shedding the 
influences of that [style of counselling]. One of those influences is about being 
client-centred, being behind the client, non-judgemental and absolutely accepting 
- which actually positions me in a silence, it silences me. What I'm recognising is 
that part of the discomfort for me has been the friction of recognising that I 
am working with this client against those ideas of how a counsellor should be 
[that is, silent], and my uncertainty about [my doing] that. I needed time to 
think about it to become clearer on my own position. I'm also realising that what 
was causing the [questions] - "What am I doing? Am I being unethical here? Am 
I being directive?" and all the rest [of the questions] - is the positioning that 
those particular theories would place me in. 
Maureen was joined with a community of concern through the locating of the 
dilemma in terms of truths about practice. This was a significant moment in a larger 
story where, in the community of concern, Maureen came to produce herself as a 
storying counsellor, clearer about the genesis of the story lines on which she might 
call and clearer about her own preferences. With each decision I have made, my own 
preferences have become clearer to me, she said. 
Although I have not directly shown it here, Maureen was able to go on to authorise 
her interest in working beyond her client's stated agenda: in community she found 
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the authority to have a voice as counsellor in constructing a counselling agenda. She 
said that in the listening position the team's use of the word transparent was helpful 
in naming what she had been already doing in telling him my position. The earlier 
construction of the dilemma as ethical remained, for Maureen had been watchful of 
her use of power in the counselling relationship. However, Maureen now had 
available to her alternative ways of understanding a counsellor's use of power. The 
team and the supervisor had extended to her the invitation to responsibility that she 
had been unsure about extending to her client. Maureen had had the opportunity to 
test out what different relational positions offered her for her practice. In this way she 
was engaged in negotiating professional identity on terms that she had tested out with 
a professional community of concern. The production of identity is in public and 
social action. 
Epistemology talk in producing professional identity stories 
I have used this practice instance in two different presentations to professional 
audiences, to illustrate the emphasis on a metaphor of supervision as storying, an 
approach to supervision where a counsellor is a purposeful storier of their practice in 
relation with professional truths. I have used it to argue that a storying counsellor is 
well positioned to answer calls about safe and ethical practice. I will take that claim 
further to say that I think a storying counsellor is better positioned than an instructed 
counsellor, for they have engaged with evaluation of the practice truths they are 
employing. Their location in the texts they produce in and about counselling is 
visible to them. They have grappled with ideas and taken responsibility for the 
positions they take in relation with the profession and the community, and within 
particular moral orders. Those more familiar with supervision as instructional method 
have raised the question of whether this supervision (Extract 10.4), this process, 
ensured safe and ethical practice. To answer those queries, I look to the effects of the 
positioning offered Maureen by the metaphor of a storying counsellor who is agentive 
in producing practice. The effects of giving an account in supervision were made 
visible in Research Meeting Three when Maureen spoke about the cumulative effect 
for her of such conversations over the year: 
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There have been themes that have recurred in the supervision that I've had 
here, and that's speaking of issues that I was at the cutting edge of, in terms of 
just trying to come to terms with them and figure out where I fit. 
So that self-reflective deconstructing and meaning-making, I've found really, 
really valuable, in terms of getting a sense of my particular brand, if you like, 
of working. 
Some of the questions that have been put to me this year have made me have 
to decide which side of the fence, or whatever, just to make decisions. And so 
with each decision, I've made, then, I guess my own practice, and my own 
biases, or whatever you like to call them, my own preferences have become 
clearer to me. 
I suggest that Maureen was saying that the supervision in which she had participated 
had supported her to find a subjective position, as author of her counselling practice, 
through supervision conversations such as those in Extract 10.4 above. She had been 
called to account for the ideas that were producing her practice, through being 
engaged in epistemology talk, through looking at the positions offered her within 
particular counselling discourses, and through looking at what the effects of those 
locations and actions from those locations were. In supervision, epistemology talk is 
in effect about the ethics and morality of our practice. In using such talk for storying 
we are asking about the connections between ideas and practices: where do I stand 
and what does it mean that I stand there and what am I standing there in relation with? 
What practices do these ideas produce? If I practice in this way, what ideas am I 
depending upon and reproducing? Is this what I prefer in my practice? How have I 
come to prefer this? What other ways of being that I prefer does this make links 
with? What values am I bringing forward in my work, and what ethical and moral 
stances am I thus producing and reproducing? 
These are questions in dialogue with which we account for our professional practice. 
They are professional identity questions; they both account for and produce our 
practice. To account for our professional practice - to profess - is to take up the 
responsibility of claiming to be a professional counsellor. To employ the storying 
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metaphor in relation with professional identity claims in supervision is to emphasise 
the significance of narrative coherence, the significance both of internal resonance 
within an account and of cultural resonance with other accounts. In a professional 
community of concern Maureen was supported to produce an account of her practice 
that she could test out for its narrative coherence. The client-centred account that had 
offered Maureen a language that described her concerns about violence in terms of 
crusading and being oppressive of her client no longer had coherence with her interest 
in a different version of responsible and ethical practice. For an account that 
constructed her action as crusading and being oppressive offered Maureen no position 
within which she might negotiate with her client to inquire about the effects of 
violence. However, the notions of transparency and taking a position offered 
Maureen language with which to engage in refining her storying of her possible 
responsibility as a counsellor to include violence in the counselling agenda. Again I 
notice the contrast with the notion of case conceptualisation that suggests a 'case' can 
be conceived of independently of what one professes. To the contrary, I argue that to 
construct a story about a particular piece of work, we are calling on what we profess, 
we are calling on and calling forth the accounts by which we story our own 
professional identities, and we are calling on professional and cultural stories. In 
storying our practices, we produce our practices. In storying our professional 
identities in supervision, we produce those identities. 
In this example, Maureen's professional story is captured, in my research story, at a 
moment in time as she explored the possibilities for her and her practice of a 
migration of her professional identity. Maureen spoke of her preferences having 
become clearer to her; she was now more strongly positioned to profess, and so to 
know where she was standing in instances of practice that involved negotiating 
counselling agendas with her clients or in responding responsibly to violence. 
In suggesting that Maureen was exploring the possibilities in a migration of 
professional identity, I am drawing on the metaphor that I used to describe my own 
moves into identifying myself as a practitioner of narrative therapy. The metaphor is 
useful to point to the effects for counsellors of asking ourselves to make the 
epistemological shift that working with constructionist thinking involves. We shift 
ourselves out of the ways of thinking about and speaking of ourselves and others that 
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have been familiar, and that continue to be familiar in the everyday and professional 
worlds around us. We leave old certainties for positions where we cannot but grapple 
with ideas. And, even as the new becomes more familiar, those ways with which we 
were previously surrounded continue their call, as the whole world has not made the 
migration with us. We continue to be constituted through many discourses (Davies, 
1991). I argue that supervision is most of all a forum in which we grapple with ideas, 
in which we work to locate ourselves relationally in professional community, and 
where we take seriously, as Maureen suggested, the ethics of our practices. 
In Extract 10.4 the team's questions helped Maureen to locate the dilemma presented 
to her by an instance of practice in terms of professional cultural stories, and offered 
her sense-making opportunities that centred the dilemma in terms of those stories. 
We see here in practice the team working from the positions Anne worked to 
articulate. 
It's not like directly confronting personal meaning in a judgmental way: It's 
grappling with the ideas; [ ... ]; it's space for conversation [ ... ]. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has focused on reflecting team supervision as relational practice. It has 
shown the team at work in a dialogical and relational evaluation of professional 
knowledge, and in an exploration of epistemological positions. The chapter has 
demonstrated approaches to inquiry about practice and to making claims about 
practice that were neither disembodied nor personally focussed: rather, these 
approaches were produced as discursive and relational. The reflecting team, as a 
professional community of concern, has been shown to be a site where supervision 
produces counselling practice through conversations that situate a counsellor in 
professional discourse: the public and social nature of professional identity becomes 
apparent. 
Liz, in Supervision 19, described how the reflecting team work had assisted her to 
grow a sense of herself in professional community. 
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Yeah, I think it's kind of, like; you come up with that expression, 'lives more 
richly described' [White, 1995], but it seems like [this process invites] a fuller 
experience of what I know; that if I only draw on my own voice, that's far 
more limiting if I've only got my own voice to draw on. But I know that I've 
got your voice to draw on, Clare, and Kate's and Kathie's, and Anne's, and 
everyone here, as well as the voices of the people at work that I draw on, with 
me [in my work]. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Constructionist supervision: Making claims for difference 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates two particular questions that were raised by the reflecting 
team project as they arise out of some of the more challenging aspects of the data 
texts. These questions focus on aspects of difference, both within our group and from 
traditional supervision practices. The questions are addressed here as practical 
questions about the tools available to us in storying our professional lives. 
Initially the chapter explores the group's production of the metaphor of celebration. 
This counter practice to the familiar problem-focus of supervision provided 
opportunity for the storying of pleasing therapeutic events. As an alternative story of 
supervision practice the celebration metaphor was not without problems, however, 
and this chapter shows the group grappling with the implications of different voices 
producing different theories for practice. In its first focus, the chapter illustrates some 
of the tensions of the location of the project in both the local counselling community 
and constructionist practices: that focus shows the group working to navigate towards 
common points of dialogue in understanding how the celebration metaphor might be 
played out in our practices. This description draws on Research Meeting and Review 
conversations. It is followed by an instance of practice where a counsellor introduced 
a celebration agenda, and went on to story further her professional identity in the light 
of a pleasing event in her practice. This work illustrates the possibilities for 
professional identity-talk produced in storying a pleasing event in practice. A second 
instance of practice where a counsellor offered a celebration agenda provides a 
contrast and raises some particular theoretical questions about the storying of 
professional identity and practice. These questions focus on the position of the 
storying professional subject in supervision and so once again speak in terms of ethics 
and responsibility. This instance of practice also provides an opportunity for me to 
suggest that supervision is an appropriate forum in which counsellors might story the 
pleasures (as well as the struggles) of their work. 
Chapter Eleven 264 
The celebration metaphor: A provisional tactic for storying 
The metaphor of celebration in supervision was used by members of the group as a 
provisional tactic that worked to subvert the taken-for-granted discursive practice of 
supervision as problem-focussed. To celebrate an instance of practice is to take a 
very different position from that position produced by the they'll put me right 
discourse, or the reporting in and checking up discourse, for example. And in this 
way the metaphor might be seen as having been taken up to produce an alternative 
strengths-focussed set of discursive practices for supervision. 
However, it seemed that the celebration metaphor somehow slipped into the 
vernacular of the research project without a great deal of examination of what it might 
mean. By Research Meeting One the term had been used frequently by some 
members, and for the first time came under some scrutiny. Kate had been speaking 
about a contrast between exploring the positive and the negative when Liz responded 
by drawing some distinctions. 
One thing, like the celebration, when you talk about 'the positive', the 
celebration comes from the self-reflection on what there is to celebrate or what 
has worked well, rather than that idea of someone else saying, "Haven't you 
done well". 
Yes, it is a quite different sense of 'positive'. [ ... ] And I think that is what the 
reflective process that we have been doing allows, that sort of reflection 
around what is going well. 
Liz was advocating for the counsellor's authority in the exploration of pleasing events 
and the meanings of those events, for the counsellor as storying rather than storied. 
Later that same meeting, when we were discussing our understandings of a 
constructionist supervision, Anne drew a further distinction, noticing that speaking 
about celebration ran the risk of becoming a new imperative. Anne advocated that the 
counsellor be consulted about whether celebration was appropriate at all. 
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I also like to have a [supervision] context where those things [practice 
struggles] can be acknowledged without having to find something to celebrate 
in them. 
Anne and Liz were both working to take their readings from a constructionist map. 
According to their readings, the location of authority is important if celebration was 
not to be reproduced as instrumental practice, dependent upon a positive/negative 
binary or upon supervisor assessment of what is pleasing. 
Dialogising the celebration metaphor 
Efforts to disengage the presentation and storying of abilities from instrumental 
practice recurred a number of times, presenting more explicitly in Research Meeting 
Three as participants spoke carefully about different understandings. At that meeting 
I interviewed Clare and Kate together, while Liz and Anne listened together. Then, 
Liz and Anne joined me in an interview to which Clare and Kate listened. The 
process was then repeated. During the first interview Clare was speaking about her 
approach to supervision: 
I think one of the things that this group has given to me, as a supervisor, is a 
new sense of the importance of celebrating; and so some of the selection [I do 
as a supervisor] is about being directive in terms of asking them [counsellors 
in supervision] to choose something to celebrate with me. And I think 
sometimes there are things to celebrate that perhaps the counsellor isn't 
recognising. 
Because they're so caught up in perhaps the problem around their work with 
the client that they've brought in, they haven't seen the celebration that's there, 
then I think I have a responsibility to be pointing that out, not just as 
something that I might enjoy doing, but that I have a responsibility to do that. 
The discourse of supervisor responsibility had taken on a new emphasis in this 
speaking. It was here concerned with noticing counsellor competence, and drawing 
attention to it. In this way, supervisor responsibility had a sense of being a counter-
cultural practice. The supervisor remained positioned as responsible for pointing out, 
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however. Now Kate took up the concern Liz had expressed earlier, that celebration 
was a matter for counsellor authority rather than supervisor authority. 
That idea of celebration - I would see, rather than an authoritative role, I 
would see the role [ of the supervisor] as one that drew out the strengths of the 
things to celebrate in the work, not necessarily by [the counsellor] presenting 
something to celebrate, but by presenting anything. 
Kate was suggesting that whatever a counsellor presents, the supervisor might 
investigate strengths. She countered Clare's interest in pointing out with a suggestion 
of drawing out. Drawing out strengths distinguishes between a celebration charted 
against instrumentality and one that involves storying practice. Then the term, 
celebration, was itself destabilised a little in Clare's hedging, if I can call it that, as 
she continued: 
I think one of the really interesting things about the celebration sort of model, 
if I can call it that, is that it allows you to look at all of your work in a different 
way. Whereas, to begin with, I think if someone had said, "There'll be quite a 
large focus on celebrating", I would have thought, "Well, hold on a minute, 
that's all very well, but there's other aspects that need to be attended to, and 
maybe those will be pushed away if there's too much celebration". And I 
guess what's happened for me is a shift in recognising that, while all of my 
work needs to be attended to, having a celebration focus does help to attend to 
the aspects that perhaps aren't ready for celebration yet [that is, the counsellor 
has not identified them as matters for celebration] but [they] are still working. 
They are still working: Clare drew attention to the idea that even where work is being 
brought for development aspects of that work might be identified as pleasing or as 
working. There is a sense of reorientation from the discursive practices provided by 
supervision discourses such as counsellor deficit towards those provided by 
discourses of capacity and competence. Clare went on to elaborate on the effects she 
had experienced the celebration metaphor offering her: 
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Well just that; the power of positive reinforcement. It just energises and 
allows you to appreciate your strengths, and the things that you do in your 
own unique way perhaps, that give you that power of thought that, whatever I 
am presented with, in supervision or whatever, I have the ability to work with 
in a positive way. 
Clare employed the familiar language, positive reinforcement, of a behaviourist text, 
to describe her experiences. This was one of the aspects of this conversation that Liz 
and Anne picked up when the interview shifted to them, from Kate and Clare. I 
present here an abbreviated sequence of Liz and Anne's conversation as they worked 
to expand and rework, to dialogise, the descriptions that were available to the 
conversation about celebration in supervision. In their efforts to speak inclusively of 
both behaviourist and constructionist texts they were working to keep dialogical space 
open. 
Liz But I think the meaning often is not there when you come into the 
[supervision] room; it is developed in the [conversational] process. So I was 
thinking, when Clare was talking about celebration, that the celebration comes 
from the questioning, comes out of, develops out of the style of questioning, 
and deconstructing how the counsellor works, and, you know, asking, "What's 
brought this about?" and ... 
Anne Yeah, but why does it develop out of that? 
Liz Because I think it's not known, or it's not on top, until the meaning is made. 
[ ... ] 
Liz ... it's like drawing out the meaning that the counsellor makes; and if the 
counsellor makes the meaning of positive celebration then that's what it 
means, rather than the supervisor imposing the meaning of celebration. 
[ ... ] 
Anne I was thinking of another word - because those terms, like 'positive 
reinforcement' doesn't fit at all for me - as the term that I would like to use to 
describe either the counsellor process or the supervision. 
I like the term 'agency'. And I don't know if that's the right one. 
[ ... ] 
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And a supervision process that, at times, brings to the fore ways that you are, 
that might have been invisible, or hidden, or not very clearly articulated, or not 
valued, ways that you are moving in the direction that you want to be. Yeah, 
it's more than positive reinforcement. 
It would be nice to find a word that wasn't, [to find a word] like, "preferred 
professional development", or "agenti veness" or something - that's what I'm 
casting around for. 
It's not like a supervisor patting someone on the back; it's that person [the 
counsellor] developing their preferred meanings. 
What had been called celebration was now recast in terms of making meaning of 
preferred developments, a description that told a little more about what the activity 
constituted. Anne was casting around to locate the signifiers of a constructionist text 
that might help her make up a way of speaking that at the same time did not close out 
the possibilities that Clare had been trying to produce with the celebration metaphor, 
or the theoretical reference point of positive reinforcement. However, Anne did 
navigate in a constructionist direction, since the terms available within the 
behaviourist psychology text did not do the work she was looking to have words to 
do. And steering a constructionist course was a declared purpose of the project's 
investigation of the implications of the narrative metaphor for counselling 
supervision. 
A second story present here tells of the complexity I invited for myself and for us all 
in locating the research in both social constructionism and local supervision practice. 
With that dual focus, how might we find ways of speaking about difference that were 
not excluding, or inappropriately demarcating? To find such ways is not an easy task. 
Particularly, it is not easy when difference is more visible to some than it is to others, 
or when particular language uses are understood differently. The struggles we 
encountered in the project are reflected in tensions around speaking to distinctions, 
implicit and explicit in the literature and in practice communities. For example, there 
are the protests at what some have experienced as painfully divisive practices 
(Bacigalupe, 1998; Doan, 1998, 2000; Stagoll, 2000) when distinctions have been 
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drawn about narrative approaches. And at the same time the literature shows the 
careful drawing of distinctions about their work by those who present their activity as 
drawing distinctions (Bird, 2000; White, 1995, 1997, 2001) rather than speaking to 
exclude. 
My point is that there is huge complexity in this matter of drawing distinctions in 
speaking in negotiation of professional identity and in negotiation of the descriptive 
tools we use for this speaking, the phenomena, landmarks, ideas, professional 
knowledges and reference points we use. Who has the naming and storying 'rights' in 
respect of these markers and descriptive tools that we employ, and that we each 
employ differently? How are such speaking 'rights' produced? And how do these 
markers and tools serve us? Do they speak for us; do they categorise us; do they 
require us to be unchanging; do they judge us or others and include or exclude us (in 
the manner of the scientific model); or do they serve as that in relation with which we 
come to have a sense of ourselves because of our engagement with the stories they 
off er us about ourselves? 
Every word is double-voiced for it is said[ ... ] with a glance to the other 
(Bahktin, 1981, p.221). 
The use of the celebration metaphor resounds with echoes of the complexity of the 
tasks of working to maintain possibilities for dialogue and multiple description 
particularly when the group was not "theoretically aligned" (Lowe and Guy, 1996). 
As the Research Meeting continued, Kate and Clare's return to the interview positions 
saw Clare pick up this conversation, and comment on the textual reference points she 
was employing and the work she understood those reference points to be doing. 
I was interested when Anne raised the question around the positive 
reinforcement, and her not kind of liking the wording of that so much, and you 
had made a comment that we borrow words from other places. 
And I was thinking, too, that the notion of positive reinforcement came from 
my psychology base, which was my first degree. [ ... ] And yet it does fit, 
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because for me it's about this model of working, reinforcing my work in a 
positive way, which strengthens it and allows it to grow. 
Clare was here re-interpreting the reference point, and like Anne trying to negotiate 
understanding in the spaces between the reference points constructionist and 
behaviourist texts asserted. I asked Clare about where she understood the authority 
for reinforcing her work to lie, and she went on, 
The reinforcement for me comes from the process, not from any person in 
particular, from the process and the way of thinking. Not from an authority; 
like we become the authority, including myself. 
In this context, that reinforcement has been shared. And part of what I go 
away with from here is the ability to do that more for myself. 
In the spaces between, the interest that the group had taken and developed in what I 
call the storying of preferred developments in our work had been articulated with 
some sort of shared understanding of the kinds of author-ity and agency that I 
understand constructionist supervision to be working to produce. Clare's words 
invoked the authority of the community of concern engaged together in co-storying 
our work - we become the authority - and the author-ity of a counsellor who professes, 
who offers an ethical account of their work that is productive of ongoing ethical work. 
Having worked to navigate towards a common point of dialogue we were now 
charting roughly the same course, although the nuances of understanding offered by 
different theoretical stories meant that there were alternative understandings for how 
the sails should be trimmed. I do not want to suggest that all difference needs to be 
collapsed into approximate sameness, nor that all not-constructionist texts should be 
set aside. Rather, I am wanting to demonstrate the struggle we encountered to story 
the processes that were generated by what Bird (2000, p.131) has since called 
"presenting our abilities", or by inquiry about preferred developments in a 
counsellor's practice, practices which all participants spoke of valuing. I do not think, 
however, that the celebration metaphor is sufficiently descriptive of the possibilities 
these storying practices offer. Nonetheless, it was a provisional tactic that gave us 
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Extract 11.1. Storying professional identity: A counsellor's celebration 
agenda 
Beth is counsellor and Raewyn is supervisor in Supervision 4. Cindy is a team 
member. 
Phase One 
Beth Okay, there's a couple of things that I had wanted to bring to supervision. 
Raewyn 
[ ... ] There's some celebration stuff that I want to talk about briefly to 
begin with. And then there's two other things that are a bit of a concern to 
me. 
And the celebration stuff, to begin with, is really about narrative. As you are 
aware I didn't train in narrative, but I'm beginning to take some of that on 
board in my work. And I have had two situations lately with clients, where 
it's been amazing . 
... and it just suddenly occurred to me. You know how when you are with 
someone there's this, "I think I know what will work really well here". It was 
about, it was externalising the situation ... 
It felt like a magic session and it wasn't hard work in the slightest. We were 
both buzzing ... 
So having sort of experienced those two ... examples of how narrative might 
work, does that make you more inclined, I was wondering how that impacts on 
your counselling style? You said you weren't trained in narrative. 
Beth It does make me think more about it [narrative]. I guess the issue - like I 
don't doubt its power - but the thing with me with not having trained in it is 
that I have this idea that narrative works with some people and not with 
others, and I need to explore that idea some more. 
[ ... ] I guess a concern that I had about narrative in the beginning was the 
focus on the alternative story and not giving voice to the problem story. My 
concern is that sometimes if you focus on the alternative story, the pain 
around the problem story won't get adequately acknowledged. 
opportunity to investigate the possibilities of alternative supervision practices during 
the life of the project. 
Employing a celebration agenda 
On the basis of my interest in the co-construction of supervision I had analysed the 
transcript-texts for the ways in which the supervision agenda was presented and 
negotiated. I had looked at how supervisors and counsellors began their work: I 
considered the counsellor's presentation of their supervision interest; the supervisor's 
response; and what came to be produced as the agenda. Of course, negotiating an 
agenda was at times an ongoing process through the conversation, rather than 
something that happened at the beginning and remained unchanged, and negotiation 
occurred directly and indirectly. The preceding discussion showed the contesting of 
how an agenda that included the storying of preferred developments might be 
produced: Clare saw it as her responsibility as a supervisor to point out and Kate 
suggested that the supervisor would draw out strengths. By what authority is 
celebration deemed appropriate, we were asking, the supervisor's or the counsellor's? 
In Supervision Four the counsellor spoke of celebration when she introduced her 
agenda as the supervision conversation began. What were her intentions in offering 
this agenda and what was she hoping for? What was inside the word celebration? 
What kinds of conversation did celebration make possible? That instance of practice 
is now explored for the first person speaking positions the counsellor came to take up, 
and for the storying of professional identity that she thereby engaged in. 
Extract 11.1. Storying professional identity: A counsellor's celebration agenda 
Beth is counsellor and Raewyn is supervisor in supervision 4. Cindy is a team 
member. 
Beth began supervision in this way: 
Okay, there's a couple of things that I had wanted to bring to supervision.[ ... ] 
There's some celebration stuff that I want to talk about briefly to begin with. 
And then there's two other things that are a bit of a concern to me. 
Perhaps the juxtaposition of celebration and concern signals the transgressive nature of 
a counsellor bringing to supervision her pleasure in developments in her work. Beth 
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Phase Two 
Cindy I was thinking, what sort of things have enabled Beth to have worked in a 
different paradigm, and to have stretched herself, and to consider narrative 
approaches. What, I was really interested in what that might say about her 
as an enquirer ... 
Phase Three 
I'm aware that talking about what it is that I do, the way that I work, that 
there's nothing really that fits at the moment. It [my work] doesn't belong 
within any particular category; or I don't feel I have the right to say I do 
'narrative'. 
I certainly do narrative more than most people do that I trained with, and I 
feel like, in a way, I "think narrative" because of the political philosophy 
behind it, but there's a discomfort for me at the moment around, what can I 
say about how I work. I feel like in a way I am between things. 
How will I know when I can say to someone, "I work from a narrative model"? 
noted that the celebration would be talked about briefly: perhaps this was a signal that 
the transgression would be relatively minor. 
There are many explanations we could give for why counsellors and supervisors are 
more likely to put points of struggle and stuckness on the supervision agenda, than 
they are to put appreciative investigation on the agenda. Supervision is produced as a 
discourse practice of professional-self improvement where we oversee counselling 
practice: the Code of Ethics requires that we monitor our work. As I argued in 
Chapter Four, counsellors are not exempt from the effects of the self-regulation and 
surveillance that the examination and the confessional have offered. Bird (2000) 
wrote of the effects of the "pathologising self-gaze" as counsellors reflect on their 
work, a gaze that would have them being self-critical. Bird noted, too, her experience 
that women therapists, in particular, struggle to present their abilities. Mc William, 
writing of feminist research, also made the point that women are "much less practiced 
in textual performances that interrogate pleasure, including the pleasure of our own 
research, writing and teaching" (1997, p.221). Likewise, I suggest, to use supervision 
to interrogate the satisfactions or pleasures of our counselling work is to transgress, 
and to produce both our professional selves and the discourse of supervision 
differently, and in less practised ways. Beth's work here represents the research 
group experimenting with a possibility for refusing - resisting, subverting and 
changing (Davies, 1991, p.51) - the discourse of supervision as problem-talk, through 
her use of the celebration metaphor. I was interested in what this refusal made 
possible. 
Beth continued her introduction: 
And the celebration stuff, to begin with, is really about narrative. As you are 
aware I didn't train in narrative, but I'm beginning to take some of that on 
board in my work. And I have had two situations lately with clients, where it's 
been amazing. 
Beth went on to give a few sparse details to locate the first practice instance, and went 
on to say, 
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... and it just suddenly occurred to me. You know how when you are with someone 
there's this, "I think I know what will work really well here". It was about, it was 
externalising the situation ... 
It felt like a magic session and it wasn't hard work in the slightest. We were 
both buzzing ... 
Continuing, Beth said that she and her client had subsequently encountered each other 
outside counselling, and her client had said to her that '"that session was amazing last 
week, I have just really moved"'. Beth went on to speak of the subsequent and final 
counselling meeting with her client, when her client had spoken of "how powerful the 
externalising had been". 
This talk appears to be constructing supervision as a site in which to identify and name 
and acknowledge pleasing events in practice, and in this instance pleasing events that 
Beth had produced by extending her practice through the use of an externalising 
conversation. The authority of Beth's client, as an audience to the counselling work, was 
also invoked. 
There are a number of possible readings of this story about Beth's supervision agenda. 
A discourse analytic reading suggests that a project produced as a constructionist 
project, a project at that time called "Narrative approaches in supervision", had called 
Beth into a position that invited or perhaps required her to locate herself in relation 
with the narrative metaphor. That reading would suggest that in order to position 
herself favourably in a 'narrative' discourse, Beth was called by the relational power of 
the project's location to produce herself on the project's terms. A 'narrative' discourse 
called Beth to throw her hat into its ring in order to be a member of the group, with the 
effect that she reproduced that discourse's pre-existing discursive practices, such as 
telling favourable rather than problem stories of her practice. By this account, Beth 
was demonstrating already some adeptness at finding her way about in discursive 
practice she said she had not been trained to perform but which the group's location 
made available to her. 
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A 'narrative' reading of these practice events suggests that Beth was storying her 
professional identity. Beth had here given the beginnings of an account in the landscape 
of action, in telling of practice events in which she had been agentive in producing 
effective and pleasing counselling work through employing externalising practices. That 
account, on the landscape of action, would then be more richly described by continuing 
the telling, interweaving these events on the landscape of action with the meanings of 
those events, for Beth's professional identity, produced in the landscape of identity. 
As the supervision continued, Raewyn went on to ask Beth about the effects for her 
ongoing practice of her experiences with externalising practices in these instances she 
had sought to celebrate: 
So having sort of experienced those two ... examples of how narrative might 
work, does that make you more inclined, I was wondering how that impacts on 
your counselling style? You said you weren't trained in narrative. 
Raewyn thus invited Beth to investigate the meanings of these particular events for her 
professional identity. In response, Beth spoke further of her interest in and concerns 
about narrative ways of working, saying: 
It does make me think more about it [narrative]. I guess the issue - like I don't 
doubt its power - but the thing with me with not having trained in it is that I 
have this idea that narrative works with some people and not with others, and I 
need to explore that idea some more. 
[ ... ] I guess a concern that I had about narrative in the beginning was the focus 
on the alternative story and not giving voice to the problem story. My concern is 
that sometimes if you focus on the alternative story, the pain around the 
problem story won't get adequately acknowledged. 
Beth appears here to have taken a position as a critical evaluator of narrative practices. 
The celebration metaphor had opened a clearing in supervision where Beth could take a 
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position to speak of her practice and professional identity in relation with the narrative 
metaphor. Beth had identified one of the restraints on taking up narrative practice -
the idea that narrative works with some people and not with others- and had decided to 
investigate that idea further. The identification of another restraint, concern that pain 
won't be adequately acknowledged, thickened the story of the ambivalence of Beth's 
positioning. Thus, the celebration metaphor was authorising, for it made particular 
conversation possible, legitimate. Beth was investigating possible positions for herself in 
a narrative therapy discourse, and asking about the effects of taking up such positions. 
She could be seen as investigating a possible migration of professional identity. 
In Phase Two the team went on to join Beth with inquiry about the meanings of these 
practice events for her professional identity. Cindy asked: 
I was thinking, what sort of things have enabled Beth to have worked in a 
different paradigm, and to have stretched herself, and to consider narrative 
approaches. What, I was really interested in what that might say about her as 
an enquirer ... 
In the Phase Three conversation when Beth and Raewyn responded to the team's 
reflections to the team's reflections, Beth continued speaking of her positioning in 
relation with a narrative metaphor. 
I'm aware that talking about what it is that I do, the way that I work, that 
there's nothing really that fits at the moment. It [my work] doesn't belong 
within any particular category; or I don't feel I have the right to say I do 
'narrative'. 
I certainly do narrative more than most people do that I trained with, and I feel 
like, in a way, I "think narrative" because of the political philosophy behind it, 
but there's a discomfort for me at the moment around, what can I say about how 
I work. I feel like in a way I am between things. 
She went on to ask the question, 
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How will I know when I can say to someone, "I work from a narrative model"? 
Beth's work here in storying her professional identity echoes with Rosenbaum and 
Dyckman's description of the "living shores" of the boundaries we use in self-identity 
descriptions. 
In our tellings we must give self-identity boundaries .... Our boundaries must 
rather reflect living shores, where sea and winds constantly change the form of 
cliffs and cove, inlets and jutting rocks. Boundaries are always expressed in 
action. (Rosenbaum & Dyckman, 1996, pp.269-270) 
In the actions of telling, Beth had been expressing some self-identity boundaries, 
boundaries that arose out of being in relationship with other professionals and with 
professional knowledge. Earlier in this chapter I showed Liz and Kate arguing that it is 
for the counsellor to decide which are the meaningfully pleasing events in their practice. 
Here, Beth was the agent in and of a professional identity story as she located her work 
in relation with narrative practice, having earlier differentiated between taking some 
techniques and working with a narrative philosophy. As the storying subject Beth was 
telling an agentive-self story in relation with practice knowledge. The "vocabulary of 
action" (Gergen, 1996, p.22) she was employing appeared to posit the storying of 
professional identity as a first person account of relational practice. The first person 
account Beth offered appeared to be an important tool in storying her professional 
identity as her supervision agenda, of celebrating pleasing events in her practice, was 
taken up. Just as in narrative therapy events in a person's life are investigated for the 
identity stories they offer, so in supervision events in professional practice are explored 
for the professional identity stories they produce. Living out those professional 
identity stories a storying counsellor then goes on to produce further action. 
However, my easy assumptions about a storying subject telling a first person account 
were unsettled by an instance of practice that followed soon after this one, when a 
similar supervision agenda was introduced by a counsellor, but a quite different 
account was produced. This latter instance raised for me questions about the 
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Extract 11 .2. The speaking subject and first person accounts in 
supervision 
In Supervision 7 Val is the counsellor, and I am the supervisor. 
Val Well I thought, given a of couple things I've said recently about noticing how 
I always bring problems to supervision, it would be really good to start off 
with a celebration. But there is a challenge I would like to talk about as wel I. 
So I've been working with narrative with her, and just really seeing how 
fantastic narrative is, in terms of, well, in terms of working with sexual 
abuse but in terms of re-storying. Like it's really showing me the power of 
narrative. 
Well, a number of things. Like, in the curiosity, like a lot of her ideas 
herself have actually come from sexual abuse therapy, and from books. And 
so, in the curiosity about, in deconstructing some of these ideas, she's 
disputing her own ... 
Me I'm sitting here with a curiosity about, you know, I'm hearing you giving lots 
of credit to narrative ideas. And I'm wondering what it is about the way 
you've used them in particular that you are wanting to celebrate? 
Val I think the fact that I'm just hanging in there and using it [curiosity]. And I 
guess that one of the things that I celebrate is that, yeah, is that I'm 
holding on to it. 
Me What would it mean for this client to know that this work you've done with 
her is so meaningful [to you]? 
Val Yes, for me or for her? For me. 
Me Well, I was thinking, what would it mean to her if she knew that this work's 
been so meaningful for you in your story of yourself as a counsellor who 
works with narrative? 
Val Yes. I haven't explored that, except for the spontaneous feedback towards 
the end of a session, but no, I haven't told her. 
significance of a first person account as the vocabulary of action used by an agentive 
subject in the accounting and warranting conversations of supervision. I tum now to 
introduce this contrasting instance of practice. 
Extract 11 .2. The speaking subject and first person accounts in supervision 
In Supervision 7 Val is the counsellor, and I am the supervisor. 
I am selecting to make my participation in this instance transparent, since 
transparency serves a discussion of the theoretical questions this instance has raised. 
Val had joined Beth as a speaker of the celebration metaphor in Supervision 5 when, in 
the Phase Four conversation, she commented that her practice had always been to 
present problems, rather than celebrations in supervision. Val then began Supervision 7 
saying: 
Well I thought, given a of couple things I've said recently about noticing how I 
always bring problems to supervision, it would be really good to start off with a 
celebration. 
Val's introduction created a clearing in which she could enter into celebration-talk: she 
drew on a series of events that had occurred over time to give coherence to her claim to 
produce a celebration agenda, and she drew on earlier conversation which supported the 
legitimacy of that agenda - a couple of things I've said recently. The juxtaposition of 
the transgressive supervision practice of speaking appreciatively of one's work alongside 
the usual supervision practice of presenting concerns echoed from Beth's introduction in 
supervision 4, as Val continued, 
But there is a challenge I would like to talk about as well. 
Val went on to explain briefly that she was working with a woman who had previously had 
several years of intensive sexual abuse therapy which the client had found unhelpful and 
tiresome. She went on to say 
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Val Yes, much more fully that I'd imagined actually. I usually throw the 
celebration in and then get into the other stuff. No, that feels good. 
So I've been working with narrative with her, and just really seeing how 
fantastic narrative is, in terms of, well, in terms of working with sexual abuse 
but in terms of re-storying. Like it's really showing me the power of narrative. 
Listening to the celebration Val was offering, I noticed the nominalisations of narrative 
in this account: working with narrative, how fantastic narrative is, and the power of 
narrative. I was concerned that when Val had wanted to celebrate her work, these 
nominalisations disguised (Hall, Serangi, & Slembruck, 1997) and obscured {Potter, 1996, 
p.182) Val's agency in her account and in her work. As she began Val appeared to be a 
support player in an account where narrative was at centre. This was perhaps another 
form of an "agentive self gap" (White, quoted in Winslade, Crocket, & Monk, 1997, p.70). 
As a counsellor I would then work in a number of ways to enlarge a clearing in which the 
speaking conditions supported a client to take a subjective position, to "draw connections 
between significant developments in people's lives and the sense of their own 
resourcefulness or competence that might result if they were to take seriously these 
achievements" (Winslade et al, p.70). I would be working to build dialogical space 
productive of agency (and I would not necessarily be transparent about my purposes). 
As a supervisor I had similar intentions; I wanted to make available to Val dialogical 
space where she could position herself in her speaking and in relation with narrative 
practices. There were a number of reasons for my preference: I took the position that 
effective and ethical counselling depends upon a counsellor's presence in their work and 
on the surface of the grammar of their account of that work. Val, rather than narrative, 
must take ethical responsibility for her work. As well, as an agent Val might be 
positioned to claim authority over and to go beyond the terms narrative offered. Moving 
carefully, I asked Val what it was that was powerful, and again I noticed that she was 
not present in the account, as she answered, 
Well, a number of things. Like, in the curiosity, like a lot of her ideas herself 
have actually come from sexual abuse therapy, and from books. And so, in the 
curiosity about, in deconstructing some of these ideas, she's disputing her own ... 
The story of Val employing curiosity was absent from Val's account. While there are 
arguments for the de-centring of the therapist (White, 1997) in counselling work, such 
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arguments do not propose the counsellor's absence from their own accounts of their 
work. Nor do they propose the centring of a nominalisation that sidelines the lived 
experience of a therapist in a story of preferred developments. 
In retrospect, I might, like Liz, look back and prefer that I had asked Val what it was 
that she hoped we would do together in the celebration rather than assume, as I did, 
that we would follow Beth and Raewyn's practice and story the meaningfulness of the 
pleasing event for Val's professional identity story. Inquiry about the process that Val 
was looking to generate might have worked to establish a shared sense of the purpose of 
this celebration agenda. Without such inquiry we struggled somewhat to establish a 
space between us that was dialogical. 
As Val continued to employ language that obscured her agency, I persisted in my 
attempts to invite her to investigate the meaningfulness of this pleasing counselling 
event for her understanding of her professional identity. However, Val remained in the 
shadows of narrative in her speaking. It was the copying of narrative that produced the 
work according to the account Val was offering; I took it as my task to offer inquiry 
that would make more visible in the story the orginating in which Val had engaged in her 
work with her client (Geertz, 1986; White, 1995). To offer the conversational space 
some difference, I opted then to make more visible the path through the clearing that I 
was working to open for Val to take, asking Val 
I'm sitting here with a curiosity about, you know, I'm hearing you giving lots of 
credit to narrative ideas. And I'm wondering what it is about the way you've 
used them in particular that you are wanting to celebrate? 
Again, looking back I would now prefer that I had asked Val if this inquiry interested 
her too. In this way I would have been offering Val dialogical partnership through 
negotiation in constructing a way forward for the conversation. However, that was not 
what I said at the time. 
My use of the second person pronoun offered Val a path to a position where she might 
speak as the agent who had produced an interest in celebration. The use of you 
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highlighted the location in the text that Val might take up as a first person teller. Val 
took up this position, now inserting herself as the subject of the sentence. 
I think the fact that I'm just hanging in there and using it (curiosity]. And I 
guess that one of the things that I celebrate is that, yeah, is that I'm holding on 
to it. 
Is the subjective position that Val now took up - I'm holding on - a preferred authorial 
position in an account of one's professional practice? Clearly, that is the position I am 
arguing. However, as this instance of practice is showing it is not an unproblematic 
position that I am taking. I am arguing that the narrative metaphor invokes a storying 
supervision, and that to be professional is to profess, to story our practice in relation 
with professional knowledge in a first person account. By this account, counsellors are 
active navigators of relationships with professional knowledge rather than media for the 
practice of professional knowledge. Just as we cannot somehow practise counselling 
independent of a relationship with professional knowledge, Professional Knowledge does 
not practise counselling without the actions of counsellors constructing our practices. 
[Knowledge] lives only through its agents, who themselves employ ideas and 
techniques selectively as their tasks and perspectives dictate. (Freidson, 1986, 
p.217) 
Because of the position of privilege we have as counsellors, it behoves us, I suggest, 
to articulate in supervision those places in the clearing where we stand in our work 
with clients, and the actions we take in constructing our practices. And I want to 
claim, and then to qualify this claim, that we cannot but be the subjects of our own 
sentences as we profess what we stand for and what we stand in relation with. 
As Val's and my conversation continued I worked to find other tools to offer to the 
storying of the meaningfulness of this pleasing event in Val's practice. I did this in 
recognition of the restraints that there appeared to be on Val taking a subjective 
position in the storying. I was looking to extend the storying resources on which we had 
to call. I wondered if an inquiry that, rather than centring Val, focussed on the site 
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that had produced the developments Val had wanted to celebrate might offer resources 
for storying. A focus on the counselling relationship rather than the counsellor might 
offer an opening for and terms for an account where Val's agency in bringing forward 
preferred practices could be described on more substantial terms. Such a move would 
also offer to refocus the conversation from the nominalisation and reification of 
narrative, to an investigation of the specific instance of the counsellor at practice. I 
therefore invoked the presence of the client, who might speak with some authority as a 
witness to those aspects of her work Val had wanted to celebrate. 
What would it mean for this client to know that this work you've done with her is 
so meaningful [to you]? 
With the benefit of hindsight I regret that once again I assumed Val's interest in my 
interest and did not ask her permission for this new direction in questioning. 
My inquiry unsettled the conversation: its unfamiliarity left Val uncertain how to go on. 
Speaking very rapidly, Val expressed uncertainty about what I was meaning. In the 
uncertainty, however, she asked the question about the focus of the conversation that, 
as supervisor, I had been working to make visible. For me. Val could be present and 
visible in the account of her work. 
Yes, for me or for her? For me. 
Although Val had answered her own question, I elaborated my request more fully, to 
make clearer the work I had wanted my question to do. In elaborating, I made an 
editorial re-description that located my question in the purpose I understood Val to 
have nominated for the supervision: your story of yourself as a counsellor who works 
with narrative. 
Well, I was thinking, what would it mean to her if she knew that this work's been 
so meaningful for you in your story of yourself as a counsellor who works with 
narrative? 
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Centred here were both the counselling relationship wherein Val had effectively 
expanded her experience of the effects of curiosity in her work, andan invitation to 
agency to Val in the storying of this practice. The repeated use of the second person 
pronoun - you in your story of yourself- illuminated Val's position as the agent of her 
practice, while the position offered Val as a counsellor who works with narrative 
emphasised Val's relation with that body of knowledge with which she was claiming 
connection. Val was positioned in this speaking in relation with her client and with 
narrative therapy. My intention was to make accessible to Val some resources for her to 
produce herself as storying in a discourse of supervision as making meaning of our 
practice. 
However, what I did not yet understand was that while I was taking a position in a 
discourse of meaning-making, drawing on discursive practices that constructed 
supervision as storying (professional identity), a different discourse of supervision was 
producing Val's supervision practice. Rather than enlarging the clearing for Val to speak 
herself into authority, my inquiry worked to remove her further from an authoring 
position. For, on the terms offered by an instrumental supervision discourse, the inquiry 
served to call Val into a position of not having done. From this position, Val answered in 
terms of why don't you try? discursive practice. 
Yes. I haven't explored that, except for the spontaneous feedback towards the 
end of a session, but no, I haven't told her. 
My words had invoked the authoritative voice of an expert supervisor produced within a 
discourse in which Val, as counsellor, was positioned as answerable to me for her actions 
on terms that I set rather than negotiated. The genre of supervision talk within which 
Val was positioned produced an orientation to a different voice (Fairclough, 1998, p.151) 
than the genre I had been assuming (without negotiation). An action-interrogative, 
reality-focussed supervision text constructed an orientation that produced my question 
as one of instrumentality rather than imaginary. Val became answerable for her actions 
or inactions in a fact-oriented account, and authority for the actions of her practice was 
not hers. The mode was indicative (fact telling) rather than subjunctive (possibility-
producing) (Parry & Doan, 1994, p.188). 
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Thus far, my inquiries did not work to support Val in more richly storying the ways in 
which this work had been a significant mark as she navigated a path for her counselling 
work. The different ways of speaking we were employing, positioned in different 
versions of supervision discourse, often closed off the possibility for dialogue. As Val 
drew to an end the celebration, she suggested that the biggest part of this (pleasing) 
event was just evidence of how exciting narrative is. As I understood it Val was again in 
a position at the margins of her own account, and I felt concerned about the effects of 
the interdiscursive talking past each other that had occurred, and for which I had 
responsibility as supervisor in the power relation of supervision. I felt myself at risk of 
behaving instrumentally and of inappropriately policing conversational contributions 
(Fairclough, 1992, p.157), in my working to produce a clearing for the agentive speaking 
privileged in the supervision discourse out of which I was intending to produce my work. 
And I had not negotiated with Val what it was that she was looking for in the celebration 
that she had brought. Nor had I sought permission for my questions. As we ended this 
first part of the supervision, I asked if we had done any of what Val had hoped for in 
our conversation. Val answered 
Yes, much more fully that I'd imagined actually. I usually throw the celebration 
in and then get into the other stuff. No, that feels good. 
It's clear to me now that my asking Val for some guidance from the beginning about how 
she had imagined we would engage in celebration could have produced a different 
conversation. Perhaps only I had had an interest in developing an account, and all my 
inquiry could be read as instrumental action. Val had anticipated throwing in the 
celebration but I did not understand the nature of her invitation to me. Was I doing 
what Pare calls "duplicating the impositional dynamics" (1999, p.3) of instrumental 
practice that in my interest in the counsellor as author I had been working to avoid? It 
is more than a little humbling to find myself asking such questions. This instance of 
practice has been very useful in making visible the struggles in navigating to shared 
understandings, to common points of dialogue, in sailing conditions where different 
currents meet and produce water that is difficult to read, and where texts offer 
different descriptions of the reference points, or similar descriptions of reference 
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points that are different. When different understandings of and familiarity with 
constructionism and narrative approaches worked invisibly behind the scenes of our 
speaking, our efforts to establish dialogical space were subverted. However, at the 
beginning of this chapter I have also shown the group, in Research Meeting Three, 
navigating towards a common point in dialogue. At that time the structure of the 
interview made the differences easier to negotiate as group members brought different 
understandings overtly to the surface of the talk. For example, distinctions were drawn 
between pointing out and drawing out aspects of the work that were pleasing. 
Extracts 11.1 and 11.2 have been used to demonstrate counsellors taking up a counter 
position in bringing celebration agenda to supervision. The rich storying of 
professional identity that such an agenda offered was evident in Extract 11.1. That 
extract, too, showed the positioning of the counsellor as agentic in evaluating 
professional knowledge and in storying her practice in a first person account. I go on 
now to demonstrate the groups' later investigation of the practice in Extract 11.2 to 
show how we made sense of this interdiscursive moment of reaching for alternative 
practice. I begin by suggesting that the presentation of one's abilities in supervision 
produces the possibility of taking pleasure in our work. 
Taking pleasure in our work 
In this section I go on to explore the celebration metaphor further, suggesting that it 
was a provisional tactic used as we reached for alternative descriptions for the 
alternative practice of taking pleasure in our work and storying those pleasures in 
supervision. 
In the second part of Research Meeting Two, I presented to the group some selections 
of transcript texts, and the video sequences from which they had been extracted. In 
the discussion that follows I draw on our conversations in Research Meeting Two, in 
particular our discussion of Val's and my conversation in Supervision 7 (Extract 
11.2). I included this particular video sequence in Research Meeting Two because I 
was keen to understand how others might put together ideas about this celebration 
agenda. In particular I was interested in what others made of my invoking of an 
action-interrogative position for Val when I had intended to open space for a position 
in a supervision of the imaginary as I sought to invoke the voice of Val's client in 
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storying her celebration of her work. How might it be if. .. , I had intended to ask, as 
an invitation into the imaginary. 
Val's words in Research Meeting Two, as we began watching the video and reading 
this from this (Supervision 7) excerpt, echo with the counter practice she had taken up 
in introducing a celebration agenda: 
It's risky stuff celebrating your work, Kathie. 
What was the risk of which Val was speaking? Beth picked up the trangressive nature 
of such a presentation, in her (ironic) comment, 
And Val also said she was going to do some real [that is, problem focussed] 
supervision after that. 
(Beth's introduction of the practice of presenting a celebration in Supervision 4 had 
used the same format: the presentation of both pleasing developments and concerns.) 
Supervision texts are remarkably thin in references to pleasure: no authors include it 
in their lists of tasks and functions in supervision. The NZAC Code of Supervision 
(2000) says nothing about pleasure: supervision is an altogether more serious 
business. Perhaps the psychoanalytic conflating of pleasure and desire has removed 
the word from the professional lexicon (although it is in use in some academic 
poststructuralist work). I have noted already Bird's comment that women therapists 
struggle to present their abilities (2000 p.131), and McWilliam's comment that 
women scholars are not familiar with a focus on the pleasure of their own work ( 1997, 
p.221). 
In Supervision 7 Val had transgressed by offering her work for celebration but there 
had been restraints on the development of the story of celebration that I wanted to 
understand. Stopping the tape after Val had said, Yes, I haven't explored that, except 
for spontaneous feedback, I said to Val that in reviewing the tape and transcript I had 
wished in retrospect that I more overtly invited her into imagination at that point. I 
was interested to know what had happened for her with my question and in her 
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subsequent interpretation of the conversation. How had my question worked to 
position her as having to account for what she had or had not done in the counselling? 
Val suggested 
I think probably I didn't hear your question as you asked it. I heard something 
else in the question. When I look back and reflect on the words that you used, 
I actually didn't take up the invitation to wonder about the meaning for her 
[my client]. I was actually looking at it more in the context of what I might or 
might not have done. 
Val's comment picks up the interdiscursivity of that moment: supervision as meaning 
making and supervision as instructional method were both being produced in our 
work, each making a different call to Val. The invitation I had wanted to offer Val 
did not work to open dialogical space: the terms of its production had not been 
accessible, as Val had responded to a different call, what I might or might not have 
done. Right practice rather than pleasure is the language of dominant supervision 
discourse. Val went on to suggest 
For me to have heard that as a meaning-making question, I'd probably have 
had to have been warmed up to it, as I think I was on a roll, looking at how 
fast I was talking, and so I think probably I needed an intermediary bit 
between the question and what I was on a roll about. 
The discursive practice that produced my speaking as an invitation into the imaginary, 
where pleasure might be spoken to, did not resonate for Val: she was not warmed up 
to it. She suggested that a clearer invitation to join a meaning-making supervision 
was needed - a supervision in terms of which, at this later time in the project, it now 
made sense to her to speak. The project had in this way offered Val terms to 
distinguish between supervision discourses. Earlier in this Research Meeting Val had 
spoken of another supervision process that she had encountered as a counsellor, one 
where the client is counselled via supervision. The counsellor is the medium for 
supervisor-directed interventions. Such supervision would have coached her as 
counsellor in what I had understood as absence from her account of her work. 
However, I had worked to disrupt that (marginal) positioning without negotiating with 
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Val her interest in the possibilities of other positions, or considering with her the 
effects of the absent-counsellor position. Without the negotiation of the terms of our 
speaking, instrumental practice was reproduced, and the opportunity was missed that 
might have produced a fuller story of Val's increasing dexterity in holding on to 
narrative practices. 
Speaking now of difficulty naming what I'm doing as good, Val suggested that finding 
a position from which to story pleasing developments in her work was not easy, and 
she would have valued finding a position to do that at the time of Supervision 7. For 
us both echoes of other conversations had restrained the possibilities for the dialogical 
partnerships that we were seeking in order to explore a version of supervision as 
celebration. As well, the invisibility, in supervision discourse, of the performance of 
pleasure was a further restraint: the courses we might navigate were being made up 
as we spoke. 
As we reviewed the video Anne suggested that it could have been helpful if I had 
been more transparent about my purposes, and transparent in disclosing my thinking 
about my thinking (Weingarten, 1992), as I asked the question. Perhaps I might have 
located a restraint in dominant gender stories. I might then, she suggested, have said 
something like: 
Why I'm asking these questions is because it's common practice for women, 
we've all been trained not to take our own credit to ourselves. [ ... ] We're seen 
as big-headed, we're seen as "boastful and arrogant", and "not a nice woman" 
when we're like that. 
The effect of this question might have been to relocate the site of inquiry, to make 
available to Val a conversation that spotlighted her positioning within gender 
discourse and made visible the restraints that were working behind the scenes of our 
speaking. In this way the suggestion might have offered a possible path to the 
clearing in which I was seeking to work with Val to build a first person speaking 
position from which she might story her pleasure in what narrative practices were 
making possible in her work. Such a question might have made available a dialogical 
space in which to inquire collaboratively about gender training and speaking oneself 
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into a subject position - if that had been an inquiry in which Val was interested. Val 
indicated at that point in Research Meeting Two that this inquiry, too, would have 
been of interest to her then, in Supervision 7. 
Val and I had been speaking past each other, positioned in different supervision 
discourses. Supervision 7 and our discussion of it, at the time and in Research 
Meeting Two, were significant in our group's work to produce supervision otherwise 
than instrumental. For in this Review, differences in understanding were 
acknowledged at the surface of our talk. As well, in declaring a celebration agenda 
Val had begun a process to re-conceive supervision. She was grappling to produce 
positions for herself as counsellor other than as the reporter, the go-between between 
supervisor and client who reported to the supervisor what changes the client was 
making and was advised by the supervisor what might come next. Beyond 
instrumentality, the possibility of other possibilities was being generated. We had 
begun to ask if perhaps taking pleasure in one's work could be a legitimate 
supervision activity if appropriate language and discursive space could be made for its 
production. 
Anne suggested that dominant gender discourse ensures that 'nice women' do not take 
credit for themselves. Is taking credit a version of taking pleasure in our work? 
Dominant gender discourse might also ensure that women counsellors are not familiar 
with taking pleasure in their work. Dominant professional discourse might also 
suggest that ethical counsellors do not take pleasure in their work for it is serious and 
responsible work we do. If we are to monitor and develop our work and be supported 
in it, is there also room in supervision for stories of the pleasure we take in our work? 
The group's experimenting with celebration was a provisional tactic by which I have 
come to name the storying of the pleasure we take in our work as an important 
narrative thread in storying our professional identities in supervision. To speak of 
taking pleasure in our work is to take our work into a different genre of talk, a genre 
of rich conversation that leaves the have you done/what I have done/what I have not 
done discursive practices looking rather thin. In Chapter Four I argued that Gardner, 
Bobele, & Biever (1997, p.224) and Bernard and Goodyear (1998) underestimated 
storying possibilities in their assertions of a poverty of experience that those new to 
the field have to draw on in their professional self stories. I argue here that we might 
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all, however little or much professional experience we have, enrich our professional 
self stories in richly describing the pleasures of our work. 
The supervision relationship, then, is a site for storying a rich variety of stories of 
professional identity. When we hold that professional stories are constitutive of 
professional selves, stories told in supervision of the pleasures of our work might well 
contribute to the enrichment of our work in ways that are both sustaining for us 
professionally and productive of responsible and ethical professional relationships. 
What could be more sustaining for a counsellor than a professional identity story that, 
while acknowledging the accounts of pain and struggle and injustice that we meet in 
our work, also tells of pleasure? Such stories would tell of the pleasure of the fine 
nuances of languaging which was not previously languaged, of delicate moments of 
producing relational connection, of moments resonant with rich understanding, or of 
robust and uplifting moments in our counselling conversations with those who come 
to us as clients. We might acknowledge for ourselves in such stories the crafting of 
our own practice that they represent. Such stories of pleasure are not stories only of 
ourselves in positions of star billing (Sampson, 1993, p.142) but rather stories of the 
co-created endeavours in which we take responsibility for the ethics of the counselling 
practices we produce. 
Positions for storying professional subjects 
In my presentation of Extract 11.2 I referred to the matter of the counsellor as a 
professional storying subject. I argued for counsellors taking a subjective position in 
speaking about their work, in supervision. Through this document I have worked to 
establish a claim that in supervision we are working to produce ourselves as 
professional counsellors and as responsible and ethical subjects. I have suggested that 
supervision is a site for the storying of professional identity, and that identity is 
expressed in a number of ways, including our speaking of ourselves in relation with 
professional knowledge and other knowledge. In Extract 11.1 I showed Beth as a 
storying professional subject: she was the subject of her sentences as she spoke about 
her work in relation with narrative practice. In Extract 11.2 I showed how without 
overt negotiation of the discursive practices that were producing our work, and so of 
the terms of our conversation, such a speaking position was not readily available to 
Val. My concern was that Val's agency was obscured in the telling: what did this 
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mean for the exercise of ethical and moral responsibility? For the use of the first 
person and the taking of an agentic position are cultural expressions of responsibility. 
One common use for the first person singular, in English, is to take 
responsibility, or to make a commitment. By using 'I' the speaker makes than 
commitment, as himself or herself. (Harre, 1999, p.102) 
In Research Meeting Two Anne suggested that gender was a restraint on taking credit 
for one's practice. There may be other identities as well as gendered ones that are 
restraining of the taking of a first-person speaker in a professional-self narrative. Do 
self-narratives speak with most resonance to those whose cultural locations have their 
histories in western individualism, for example? 
As a pakeha New Zealander I have been introduced to Maori understandings that 
identity is relational: on the marae and in other contexts, Maori speakers claim 
identity by naming the ancestral canoe, the river or sea, the mountain, and the 
ancestral chief that are the significations of identity. As I understand it, such identity 
markers offer turangawaewae, a place to stand. In the standing, and the speaking, in 
this place, this clearing, identity is both invoked and produced. Identity is claimed 
and produced through group (tribal) affiliation. What does this mean, then, for my 
argument that subjectivity is expressed through the professional speaking subject 
inserting themselves in the subject position of their sentences, if landmarks and 
collectivity invoke and produce identity? Am I at risk of practice that imposes one 
(dominant) set of cultural expectations upon another? I think, too, of other examples, 
that offer such interrogation of my argument, such as Ohye's (1998) distinction 
between the significance of individual voice in North American mothering and 
personhood, and the "eloquent and resonant" silence of Japanese mothering and a 
sense of collective identity. I have wondered if the oft-quoted Maori saying, "The 
kumara does not proclaim its own flavour" is roughly equivalent to the pakeha saying 
"Don't blow your own trumpet", or if the former is a more profound expression of the 
idea that a first-person narrative is not a preferred cultural expression, and that 
identity is expressed from a collective voice or from a relational position. Was Val's 
presentation of the excitement of narrative a way of using collectivity, her belonging 
to a narrative community of practice, to be productive of identity for her? 
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If this is the case a question might be asked about the expressions of subjectivity 
appropriate to the professional work of supervision. What forms of being, and being 
responsible, ethical and moral in our practices are available to us and legitimate in the 
work of counselling supervision? 
To story one's professional practice is to take a position in actively exercising one's 
moral compass: it is to feel the focus of the light in the clearing in which one is 
standing and it is to rise in response to one's relational responsibilities. For 
counsellors, it is to understand the privilege and the power relations of counselling 
work, and it is to lift ourselves into visibility in the speaking we offer in responding to 
these responsibilities. Supervision is one of the sites in which we produce ourselves 
as responding to our relational responsibilities. We make our practice visible and rise 
to the call of our ethical responsibilities. My preference for a first person speaker of a 
self-narrative has been predicated on a number of cultural assumptions. There are 
problems with taking familiar cultural metaphors at face value. 
One of the most striking metaphors to describe our culture's personhood ideals 
derives from the notion of authorship. People are encouraged to take charge 
and become authors of their own life stories. To be a character in another's 
story is to have lost authority over one's own life. 
If textual authorship is considered central to our personhood ideal, either we 
need to find a better (more secure) metaphor or agree that our lives as well are 
more open-ended and fluid than we have heretofore found acceptable. 
(Sampson, 1985, p.1207) 
Is there perhaps a difference between "taking charge" and acting as an author in one's 
life stories - or professional stories? I believe there is. Using Wemick's 
characterisation of contemporary culture as promotional culture Fairclough suggested 
that "self-promotion is becoming part-and-parcel of self-identity" (1995, p.140). 
Does the storying of professional identity in supervision, perhaps by the insertion of 
oneself into the subject position in one's sentences or through the use of some other 
metaphor that offers one visibility on the surface of the grammar one speaks, collapse 
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into another instance of "the colonizing spread of promotional discourse" (Fairclough, 
1995, p.140)? 
I want to argue a distinction between self promotion, taking charge, and the storying 
of professional-self narratives. For example, however much Val or Beth might have 
been working to take charge in producing a supervision agenda, their authorship was 
mediated, firstly by the voices of others: those who were speaking at the time, those 
who had spoken before in supervision, and those who would speak about supervision 
from a whole host of positions. Secondly their authorship of their stories of 
celebration was mediated by the positions they occupied in relation with those other 
speakers. For those voices worked to produce a location for those supervision 
conversations; they offered up particular spaces where Val and Beth might produce 
such agenda. The agenda, however, is not created simply by the spaces, nor by those 
voices, but by Val's and Beth's expressions of subjectivity in the spaces in relation 
with those voices. The storying of professional self is a storying of self-in-relation. 
Fairclough, drawing on Giddens, also suggested that "self-identity, rather than being a 
feature of given positions and roles, is reflexively built up through a process of 
negotiation" in post-traditional society, (1995, p.137). Professional self-identity, 
according to this account, is negotiated as a reflexive project: as Clare said, We 
become the authority, including myself The accounting and warranting conventions 
of supervision can perhaps be produced only locally. The exercise of ethical and 
moral responsibility is a locally and culturally negotiated task. I suggest that in 
supervision counsellors assume the speaking positions that offer positions of ethical 
and moral responsibility negotiated as meaningful in the professional and cultural 
worlds they inhabit in their practices. The question, "How is ethical responsibility 
being taken?" may be much more useful than a unilaterally constructed insistence on 
a first-person account. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has extended two of the areas of the research group's work that had left 
me dissatisfied, as it seemed to me that they could be more complexly productive than 
they had been. I have taken the metaphor of celebration, and suggested it has paved 
the way for the storying work of supervision to include rich description of the 
pleasures of our work. I acknowledge that for many of us, trained within the terms of 
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discourses such as professionalism, gender, supervision-as-deficit-talk, there will be 
restraints to taking up the discursive practice of storying pleasure. At other times, it 
will simply not be appropriate. I am not, then, arguing a new orthodoxy that requires 
the presentation of pleasing work. Rather I want to use the telling of these instances 
of research and supervision practice to make less unusual the supervision practice the 
storying of our pleasure in our work. For, such practice offers an honouring of our 
clients and of our relationships with them, and of our own lives and relationships. 
When such practice also includes a negotiated and explicit invitation to the rich 
storying of professional identity, it also offers opportunity for a rich accounting of the 
ethical relation with that which we profess. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Offering an account of supervision 
Introduction 
This project began by asking what the narrative metaphor as it is employed in 
counselling might mean for the practice of counselling supervision. In this 
inquiry I thus argue for employing an approach to therapy as a resource for an 
approach to supervision. This stance is counter to the current mainstream 
argument for supervision as a specialisation, different from counselling in content, 
purpose, and process (Carroll, 1996; Holloway, 1995; Mcconkey, 1999). 
However, I am not arguing to conflate counselling and supervision. Rather I am 
making some different connections and drawing some different distinctions than 
those put forward in recent mainstream accounts of supervision by those who 
have dissociated themselves from counselling model-related approaches to 
supervision. In the family therapy field the concept of isomorphism is a structural 
one that has offered ways of conceptualising the replication of various aspects of 
therapy in supervision (White & Russell, 1998). While the concept of 
isomorphism has been widely applied, indeed more widely than Liddle and Saba 
(1983) had recommended when they first used the notion, the transformations 
between counselling and supervision that I present here are argued on a different 
basis. I offer an account of what the narrative metaphor might make possible for 
supervision on the basis that there are critical areas of resonance between 
narrative approaches in counselling and the work of supervision. That resonance 
is in the realm of ethics and epistemology: the moral order in which the 
counselling is located is similar to the moral order in which the supervision is 
located. 
In Chapters Seven to Eleven I have shown Anne and Clare and Kate and Liz and 
me together grappling with the implications of this resonance between supervision 
practice and counselling practice, sometimes hearing and interpreting with shared 
understanding and at other times caught up in interdiscursive moments of 
misunderstanding. In presenting instances of practice I have suggested that 
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supervision in a constructionist mode is produced as a site concerned with ethical 
and moral action. Action is interpreted from positions within moral orders 
whether we make that positioning or those orders explicit or not. I am arguing for 
a version of supervision that makes explicit our positioning within moral orders as 
part of a commitment to the ethics of respectful relationship in counselling 
practice. In an example I have shown Emma living out this commitment in the 
agenda she brought to supervision (Extract 8.2): Emma's agenda was to speak 
about her experiences of discomfort - frustration and irritation - in order to restore 
her counselling relationship to one of respect for her clients. In Extract 10.4 I 
showed the team supporting Maureen as she grappled with the implications of 
particular systems of practice, and the moral orders out of which they are 
produced, for the relationship she would offer her clients. She asked where and 
how she might position herself as a counsellor when working with a male client 
about issues of violence. In Research Meeting Three, Maureen spoke of the 
effects of this version of supervision: 
Some of the questions that have been put to me this year have made me 
have to decide which side of the fence, or whatever, just to make 
decisions. And so with each decision I've made, then, I guess my own 
practice, and my own biases, or whatever you like to call them, my own 
preferences have become clearer to me. 
For the first time, Maureen had encountered a supervision that called her into 
consideration not just of the pragmatics of practice but also of the ethics and 
epistemology of practice. Inquiry that asked Maureen about the discursive 
positions available to counsellors had been helpful to her in locating her own 
preferences for ethical action. Maureen was thus invited into storying her 
professional identity, through reflection on and examination of the processes of 
producing her practice. This is the work of a reflective supervision practice from 
a discursive orientation. A counsellor and supervisor are doing more than 
building a theory for practice out of practice; they are also investigating the 
theories of knowledge they are using and might use for that building and the 
effects of the practices those theories produce. We do not make up the terms of 
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our theory building independently of the systems of thought that are our cultural 
and professional heritages. 
On the other hand and inversely, I would say that if I am now interested, in 
fact, in the way in which the subject constitutes himself (sic) in an active 
fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not 
something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he 
finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him 
by his culture, his society and his social group. (Foucault, in Fornet-
Betancourt, Becker, & Gomez-Mi.iller, 1988, p. 11) 
The questions that I used in Chapter One to explain my approach to the study are 
those to which I return as I draw together again the themes that have been 
recurrent in this account. What is this practice/object, supervision? What kinds of 
subjects does supervision produce and by what strategies does it produce them? 
What practice strategies do counsellors and supervisors find in their professional 
culture to employ in supervision? How are we positioned when we take up these 
practices? What forms of relationship are available to us to practice upon 
ourselves as we produce ourselves as ethical and responsible practitioners of 
counselling and supervision? When we practice responsibility, to whom are we 
responsible? 
As I consider these questions, the chapter offers a description of a particular 
version of supervision. That version of supervision has as its emphasis the task of 
attending to the positioning in relation of counsellors. I argue that the work of 
supervision is to position counsellors well for the production of ethical counselling 
practice. The focus I take up now in this chapter is a description of supervision 
that emphasises positioning counsellors well for ethical counselling practice. 
Repositioning counsellors in supervision: in from the margins 
If counsellors are to position themselves and be positioned well for ethical 
counselling practice they need access to storylines that offer them such positions. 
I argue for enriching the accounts counsellors have to call on in inserting 
themselves in subjective subject positions in supervision. I have demonstrated 
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instances in the supervision literature that have marginalised counsellors in 
supervision. When counsellors are invisible as professional actors in accounts of 
supervision, they are produced as acted upon rather than agentive. The effects of 
this positioning were visible within this project. A marginal position had been 
reproduced in Kate's experience of supervision as a counsellor. In approaching 
supervision Kate had not had to be too knowing or too demanding, or not too 
anything, because, I argued, in her previous experience the supervisor was centred 
in supervision as knowing and responsible (Chapter Seven). The supervision 
relationship had been unilaterally constructed on the basis of the supervisor's 
knowledge and responsibility-taking, and had continued to be produced on that 
basis. In contrast, in the passage quoted in the introduction above, Maureen spoke 
about the effects of this project: those locations in supervision practice where she 
might be knowing and take up authority had been highlighted. Inquiry had been 
brought to the locations where she had experienced uncertainty, but counsellor 
uncertainty had not been met with supervisor certainty. Rather, the inquiry had 
made visible possibilities for ethical decision making for practice. Maureen was 
offered positions as an agent, as subjective subject, who investigated possibilities 
and articulated her practice preferences. Thus, the counsellor was repositioned in 
supervision discourse. Her access to positions from which she might produce her 
professional self as agentic had been enhanced. She was positioned to act as an 
ethical agent: the task of storying professional identity had been brought to the 
centre of the supervision conversation. 
According to White (1995) and Bruner (1986), in storying identity we produce 
accounts in two landscapes, action and identity. When professional practice is 
storied only in the landscape of action as instrumental practice - what the 
counsellor has done and what they might do next - professional identity is only 
thinly storied. However, when the meanings of our actions are investigated in 
supervision, so that we story our practice in relationship with practice knowledge 
and systems of thought and communities of practice, as well as in terms of our 
own lives and histories and relationships and values, then we produce the kinds of 
rich description that builds professional identity. A richly storied professional 
identity positions counsellors well to be agentic in their counselling practice. 
Supervision is one of the sites where counsellors have ethical permission to speak 
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about our practice and ourselves in our practice: we, counsellors and supervisors, 
need to make use of its potential in order to position counsellors well for ongoing 
ethical action in counselling practice. 
Counsellors as multi-storied1 and multiply positioned 
As counsellors and supervisors we inhabit the available storylines of supervision 
in particular ways. I argue that supervisors and counsellors need to pay ongoing 
attention to the stories provided by our professional and cultural contexts, and to 
recognise the multiplicity of stories that are available to us and that hail us to 
particular positions. The attractiveness of developmental models of supervision 
was noted by Holloway (1987) and Worthington (1987), both of whom warned 
that the profession should look beyond this attractiveness in evaluating 
developmental models. Kate's and Liz's experiences of the effects of being 
positioned as beginning counsellors were described in Chapter Seven. That 
positioning made invisible other positions they held. Bernard and Goodyear 
(1998) and Gardner, Bobele, and Biever (1997) reproduced this singular 
positioning of those new to the field in their assertion that new counsellors have a 
thin store of professional stories on which to call. I argue against such singular 
descriptions and explanations of and assumptions about developmental status. 
There is much that we fail to see when we look at counsellors through the lenses 
of singular developmental descriptions. Although this thesis has demonstrated the 
effects of these positions upon beginning counsellors, I do not think the limiting 
effects of such practices affect only those categorised as beginners. 
Our professional identities are storied not only on the terms of the theory that 
produces professional stories. Although the distinction that counsellors do not go 
to supervision for therapy is accepted across the profession, there is less 
agreement on the extent to which personal lives are relevant in supervision. 
However, when supervision involves the storying of professional identity and 
counsellors are called to story their production of ethical practice, it is very 
difficult to do that in ways that are independent of our own lives. The values that 
produce our professional work also produce our lives. In Extract 10.2 Gillian 
1 The term is from White ( 1995). 
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offered a story from her own family life in her role as reflecting team member. 
Not only did her story demonstrate the idea that clients are not somehow people 
different from those of us who work as counsellors; it also brought a community 
of concern alongside the counsellor and client, thus offering a resource for the 
ongoing counselling work. In Extract 9.1 Deb drew on her experiences as a 
mother in the assessment of her concerns about her client's safety. Our lives are 
multiply storied, and personal as well as professional stories are resources for 
supervision. The task is to make visible how we use these resources, professional 
and personal, so that we wittingly evaluate the knowledge sources on which we 
draw. By evaluating the knowledge sources on which we draw we position 
ourselves well to take ethical responsibility for our counselling practices. 
Just as I argue for applying caution about the nominalisation 'beginner', I argue 
for caution about employing the nominalisation 'narrative' to describe practice. 
In Chapter Eleven I showed two contrasting presentations of a celebration agenda. 
In the second of these Maureen's agency in producing pleasing therapeutic events 
was obscured by the nominalisation employed: narrative was what was to be 
celebrated. I took the position that it was Maureen's story, rather than narrative's 
story that was to be brought forward in the supervision. Although my work as 
supervisor was less collaborative than I would have preferred, nonetheless I affirm 
my interest in supporting Maureen to story her engagement with therapeutic 
practices that were effective for her client. I argue for the presence of the 
counsellor in stories of practice on a number of grounds. Here, I argue that there 
is not a singular story of narrative therapy from which counsellors are absent or 
disembodied. Rather, narrative therapy is produced in the embodied and 
relational actions of counsellors. It is these relational actions, actions taken in 
relation with people and with ideas, that can be uniquely storied as counsellor and 
supervisor investigate particular instances of practice for the identity stories they 
produce and for the moral orders in which they are situated. It is in the telling and 
the retelling that professional identity is performed. 
Positions for supervisors 
Supervisors, then, are positioned as audience to and participants in the telling and 
the retelling. They are to serve the retelling. They do not serve by simply 
Chapter Twelve 300 
listening while counsellors narrate. Rather, supervisors are active in selecting 
from a range of positions they might take up in support of the counsellor 
producing themselves as a professional practitioner. I think of supervisors, too, as 
multiply positioned. Their task is a collaborative one: they are alongside the 
counsellor, according to Clare. The supervisor is alongside the counsellor in the 
storying of practice, for example in taking up the commentary position in 
exploring the discursive vista before them both. Ruth and Lee (Extract 8.1) were 
positioned alongside each other, exploring the discursive vista of decision-
making. Theirs was a co-investigation, as in tum they added to the inquiry: either 
supervisor or counsellor could have been speaking at either conversational tum. 
As a reflecting team member, Mary was alongside Tania (Excerpt, 10.1), 
commenting on the effects of professional isolation as she knew them. Mary's 
joining with Tania was an anti-isolation move, as she positioned herself alongside. 
The supervisor might also take a position opposite the counsellor, as a co-
responsible colleague working to understand the discursive context on which the 
supervision is to focus, and where the counsellor is positioned in that context. 
This was the position Adele took as she stood back from assumptions about 
researching ideas or producing ideas, for Tania to action, around the low-client-
numbers problem. She selected instead to work to understand the discursive 
production of the problem (Extract 9.2). Adele took care about her positioning: 
she did not wish to use the power relation of supervision to call Tania further into 
an unfavourable position in a good counsellors discourse. Supervision is a site of 
professional governance and, in a metadiscursive position, Adele selected to 
position herself in that governance in non-oppressive ways. She took a position 
opposite seeking to learn about the location of the problem: her inquiry helped to 
render the familiar strange as the calls of employment relations discourse were 
exposed. 
Supervisors are positioned, too, as witnesses to counsellor practice. Di was 
witness to Emma's preferred and usual practice of standing in support of her 
clients, when that was temporarily threatened, and to the effects for Emma of 
standing alongside women in their struggle to free themselves from abusive 
relationships (Extract 8.2). Adele was witness to Tania's positioning in an 
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employment relations discourse. In the witness position, supervisors use their 
authority to offer commentary or inquiry that investigates the practices of power 
in which counsellors are positioned, or in which their clients are positioned. 
These and other supervisor positions will be investigated further in the 
descriptions of supervision practice that follow. The descriptions will show that 
supervisors are multiply positioned as they engage in supervision as 
deconstructing inquiry. 
Supervision and deconstructing inquiry 
The theoretical resource of deconstruction was an important one in producing 
supervision practice in this study. Deconstructing strategies similar to those we 
employ in counselling were used, but we used them with awareness of the 
professional supervision relationships and tasks within which our practice was 
produced. The deconstructi ve task was taken up by counsellors, supervisors and 
the reflecting team. Deconstructing inquiry focussed on many sites: counselling 
practice, the discursive conditions of client's lives, supervision practice, our work 
in the project. This section describes modes of deconstructing inquiry in 
superv1s1on. 
Interrogating counselling discourse 
Counselling practice is the central concern of supervision: supervision is about 
supporting the counsellor for effective practice with clients and monitoring that 
practice (NZAC Code of Supervision, 2000). It makes sense then, that counselling 
discourse will be an important focus of supervision talk as we make sense of our 
practice in responsible professional reflection. Although in the project we had 
varying familiarity with narrative counselling practices, each of us had undertaken 
the project on the basis of being open to further engagement with these practices. 
We investigated counselling discourse in a number of ways. 
A collaborative stance was particularly visible in the decentred inquiry that was 
employed by members of the reflecting team in Phase Two. For example, Alex 
asked, "Is there an idea in counselling that ... " (Extract 10.3). Her inquiry was 
about the ideas that construct counselling practice, and, as Anne pointed out, was 
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thus not judgmental in respect of Laura's counselling practice. Laura was not the 
originator of the discourse that produced ideas about the focus of individual 
counselling. The mode of inquiry Alex employed was effective in separating 
"speaker from speech - identity from discourse" (Gergen, 1999, p.153): is there 
an idea in counselling ... , she asked. When counselling practice is represented as 
an idea located in discourse, counsellors are invited into a position of evaluation 
of that idea. We can investigate that idea for its effects, and evaluate whether 
those are effects we seek or not. On that occasion, in their reflecting team 
conversation Alex and Gwen teased out the ideas that constructed counselling as 
individually focussed, although they did not name the discourse of individualism. 
However, what they did in their inquiry was to spotlight the locations in text 
where relationship was made invisible by the re-production of an individual 
emphasis in the dominant counselling wisdom. And it was the re-production of 
that emphasis that was constructing Laura as misguided in her concern for 
relationship. 
Although the inquiry was decentred, emphasising discursive practices in 
counselling, the inquiry was neither disembodied nor distanced and objective. 
Alex, for example, placed herself as a moral actor in the discursive practices under 
consideration, when she offered an analogous example. As counsellors and 
supervisors and reflecting team members we are ourselves positioned in the 
discourses, the practices of which we are interrogating. Our interrogation is of 
discourse and positioning and discursive practice, rather than of persons, however. 
Nonetheless, counsellors are not absolved of responsibility for ethical action by 
. this move. For within any discourse there are many positions we might take up, 
and many positions that might make ethical sense to take up. We employ the 
tools of deconstructing inquiry to enhance our options for ethical action, by taking 
care about selecting amongst the positions calls we hear. By selecting amongst 
the calls, we also select that which we go on to reproduce in our counselling 
practice. The value of a subjunctive mode (Parry & Doan, 1994) in supervision is 
illustrated by the supervision from which Extract 10.3 was taken. That 
supervision began with the professional story that counsellors are to focus on the 
person who is in the counselling room with them: if we take this account to 
present an important professional value, supervision will work to assist Laura to 
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reposition herself to attend singularly, that is only to her client. It was on that 
basis that the supervision had proceeded in Phase One. In Phase Two a second 
professional story was introduced through deconstructing inquiry: if we suspend 
our judgement that Laura's interest is inappropriate, what knowledge might her 
interest offer to the counselling work? The reflecting team inquiry rendered 
visible the construction and locatedness of practice: if we take Laura's actions to 
be legitimate how might we theorise that? If we are to take it that we limit our 
focus to the client in front of us, how are we to theorise that? In this way in 
deconstructing inquiry in supervision, we make visible how professional 
counselling actions come to be seen as making sense: the next move is to take 
responsibility for the positions in which we locate ourselves on the basis of this 
sense-making. We identify how we are and might be constituted as professional 
subjects in various counselling practices based in particular epistemologies. We 
identify the epistemological and professional story-lines in which we might insert 
ourselves and we take our inserting of ourselves to be responsible action forwhich 
and of which we can give account. 
I make sense of Beth's storying of pleasing events in her practice on similar terms, 
although her supervision presentation had been very different (Extract 11.1). 
Laura (Extract 10.3) had presented herself as burdened (by what had seemed like 
inappropriate interest in her client's sister), while Beth wanted to celebrate 
(events in her practice). During the exploration of these pleasing events, through 
which Beth might insert herself into a storyline about narrative therapy, the 
supervisor asked her what these events and her pleasure might mean for her 
ongoing counselling work. Again the subjunctive mode presented the opportunity 
for a decentred conversation about discourse, before the thoughtful re-location of 
the self back into a selected position in the account. If she were to take her 
interest in narrative practices further, she would need to explore the idea that 
narrative works with some people and not with others, Beth had replied. The 
tentativeness of inquiry and response in subjunctive mode makes visible the 
location where Beth might insert herself as an ethical agent, positioning herself 
purposefully in her practice. I have described the conversation, here in this 
example, as "exploration" rather than as "deconstructing inquiry" as in the 
previous illustration: the similarity upon which I wish to focus is the processes of 
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inquiry that render visible the means by which we make up our practice in 
storying that practice and then locating ourselves as ethical actors within and 
producers of those stories. Counsellors who have engaged in and continue to be 
engaged in making sense of their actions in relation with professional knowledges 
are well positioned by supervision for ethical action in counselling. 
This might seem like a big claim to make, and I might be asked to defend it by 
those concerned that I have not been sufficiently cognisant of professional 
standards. In responding to such inquiry, I would call on the notion of multiple 
voices. I would argue that, in the supervision I have been describing, counsellors 
and supervisors (and team members) work to locate themselves: there is always 
another account that is possible or another voice that might speak into the 
conversation. In Extract 11.2, I invoked a client's authority. Similarly, 
counsellors and supervisors might invoke other participants to the supervision 
conversation. If you were a parent in this family, what would you be making of 
these ideas we are having, we might ask. Ifwe were invited to defend this 
counselling action to an Ethics Committee hearing, how would we do that? If 
Linda (a respected colleague) were here, what would she be appreciating about 
the steps you have taken with this client? And is there anything else she might 
recommend, do you think, any particular concerns she might have? These 
questions are not frivolous questions by which we can smugly reassure ourselves 
we have already thought of everything: nor are they about increasing our sense of 
supervision as surveillance. Rather, they suppose a professional community of 
many voices, as resources on which counsellors and supervisors might call. These 
sorts of questions are a purposeful acknowledgement of the situatedness of our 
work and the availability of many positions within the discourses of professional 
practice. We have responsibility for making these positions visible and calling on 
a present or imagined professional (and client) community as resources as we 
select the position calls to which we respond. The best we can do - and it is a very 
satisfactory best - is to acknowledge the contingency of our positioning and the 
deliberateness of our selections in taking actions we claim to be ethical. 
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Interrogating supervision discourse 
A deconstructing supervision also interrogates the terms of its own production. 
Counsellors and supervisors pay attention to the effects of hierarchy, recognising 
that in supervision a relation of power exists between counsellor and supervisor. 
For the supervisor represents the professional community which constructs 
supervision as one of the bases of its claims for responsibility for autonomous 
professional self-regulation. We cannot step outside the regulatory aspect of 
supervision, but we can recognise its presence and effects. Practices that 
recognise the production of hierarchical oversight while minimising oppressive 
effects were exemplified in the project. For example, supervisors located their 
authority by situating questions or comments; they suggested that reports to 
agencies might be written collaboratively by counsellors and supervisors; 
attention was paid in moments of practice to the sort of person being assembled in 
supervision. Such practices work to unsettle taken for granted aspects of 
supervisory authority. In paying attention as supervisors to how we produce our 
authority, we pay attention to the supervision relationships we build with 
counsellors. In paying this attention, I argue, we work to position counsellors 
well to work with awareness of the production of professional authority, both in 
supervision and in counselling. 
I have argued for the value of a wider inquiry about the terms of supervision 
discourse. A deconstructing supervision investigates not only particular 
supervision events but also the professional canon, for that canon is constitutive of 
those particular events. I note, too, that deconstruction is not achieved by singular 
action; the call of dominant practice is not readily silenced. The work of 
deconstructing supervision is ongoing. Davies wrote of 
... the need for ongoing discourse analytic work, made necessary both by 
the sheer complexity of discourse and discursive practice, and by the 
power of dominant discourses to reassert themselves, and to erase partially 
or override the deconstructive work that has been done. (1998, p.138) 
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In the extract from Research Meeting Three that I quoted in the introduction to 
this chapter, Maureen said that the questions that had been put to her had made 
her clarify her position. I would have preferred that Maureen's experience had 
been of invitation into such clarification, and collaboration in that clarification. In 
having been made, Maureen has experienced herself as acted upon. There are 
vestiges of the counsellor positioned as in receipt of supervision (Manthei, 1997; 
Matthews, quoted in Hermansson, 1999). Metaphors like this, that position 
counsellors as subject to supervision by another, have considerable hold on the 
discourse of supervision: they are part of the everyday currency of professional 
talk, and are reproduced in the voices of senior members of the profession 
(Matthews, quoted in Hermansson, 1999; Manthei, 1997). In deconstructing 
supervision, I am arguing for a reworking of the discourse of supervision from 
one where counsellors are in the subjected subject position. I am speaking for a 
discourse of supervision where counsellors are not in receipt of, but are active in 
the subjective production of supervision just as they are active in the production of 
their counselling practice. However, as Davies suggested, "Putting a concept 
under erasure does not obliterate the term" ( 1998, p.139). A deconstructing 
supervision is one that calls us into an ongoing recursive reflection on and in the 
discourse practices we are reproducing for the ways in which they constitute 
relationship and constitute persons. We saw Adele, in Extract 9.2, resisting the 
call to position herself as expert by providing solutions, by coming up with 
something, for that position would be oppressive of Tania as counsellor. She was 
also subverting the reproduction of a discourse that called both Tania and herself 
to assemble themselves as good employees/counsellors/supervisors. 
A deconstructing supervision is one where a supervisor takes a metadiscursive 
position in respect of supervision, noticing the moral orders in which their practice 
is produced. Where it is appropriate they might be explicit about the moral orders 
in which they, the supervisor, are positioned. In the Research Meeting Two 
discussion of Supervision 7 (Extract 11.2), Anne had suggested that it would have 
been helpful if I had located my inquiry about Val's celebration by disclosing the 
thinking behind my question. In Extract 7 .1 I showed Zoe and Leah struggling to 
establish shared meaning when they were positioned in different supervision 
discourses. One discourse constructed supervision as conversation about action, 
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and the other as conversation about the interrelationships between actions and 
meanings. Neither paid particular attention to the positioning of the counsellor in 
the practice. Leah's later reflection had drawn attention to the effects of her 
questioning in inviting Zoe to defend her practice. In contrast, as Di worked to 
understand the concern Emma had brought to supervision (Extract 8.2), she asked 
Emma to clarify the territory in which she wanted the conversation located: 
would it be useful to focus on the difficult feelings or on the discursive context 
that produced those feelings, Di asked. If counsellors are not to be acted upon, 
invitations for them to be positioned as co-producers of supervision need to be 
made. Bilateral negotiation of supervision processes contrasts with the unilateral 
construction of supervision offered by dominant professional discourse. In 
bilateral negotiation counsellors are positioned well to ask for, rather than having 
to demand as Kate did, supervision that engages with their professional concerns 
on terms that make sense to them and that serve their counselling practice well. 
In a deconstructing version of supervision supervisors and counsellors pay 
particular attention to how we inhabit the institution of supervision. We practise 
supervision knowing that we are participating in processes and strategies of 
professional self-governance. It is not a question of freeing ourselves from 
regulation but of recognising and investigating that regulation and its effects on us 
and on our relationships with those with whom we are in professional relationship. 
Recognition and investigation of regulation make possible the resisting, 
subverting and changing, of discourse practices, that Davies (1991) suggested is 
the expression of agency. 
Producing alternative storylines for supervision 
I suggested in Chapter One that my purpose is to add to the accounts of 
supervision upon which we have to call. This project has produced some 
alternative possibilities, some new conventions even, for offering accounts of 
professional practice in supervision. As this discussion chapter continues there 
are four aspects of a deconstructing supervision to which I wish to draw attention. 
I believe that professional identity is produced more richly when our supervision 
talk takes us into these domains. The four aspects which I now address in tum 
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are: alternative discourses of responsibility; storying the pleasures of our work; 
a supervision of the imaginary; an emphasis on professional community. 
Redescribing responsibility 
When supervisors are involved in ongoing live supervision with counsellors as 
they work with clients we might know with most certainty about the effectiveness 
of the work of counsellors with each individual client or family. But in 
counselling in New Zealand, counsellors and supervisors are likely to meet 
together once a fortnight for one hour. Supervision is mostly by self-report. The 
kind of detailed case-by-case oversight, about which King and Wheeler (1999) 
asked in their U.K. study of supervisor responsibility, is not possible in these 
circumstances. Nor, I note, is there any evidence of the effectiveness of that case 
by case oversight mode of supervision. What kinds of responsibility, then, is it 
sensible and possible for supervisors to take in these local circumstances? What 
kinds of responsibility is it possible for supervision to produce? 
As I have shown, both in the readings of the literature I have given and in the 
examples in Chapter Seven, the discourse of supervisor responsibility is one that 
has considerable currency. Borders and Leddick suggested that a supervisor is 
responsible for "a counselor and that counselor's clients, for the counselor's 
learning and the counselor's welfare" (1987, p.2). In the expansiveness of this 
account of supervisor responsibility little space is left for the counsellor 
themselves to be responsible for anything. On the other hand King and Wheeler's 
(1999) study showed that amongst U.K. supervisors there was little agreement 
about the extent of supervisors' responsibilities and few were willing to take 
action in relation to concerns about a counsellor's practice. They suggested that 
an assurance of oversight at the level of casework could not be assumed. In New 
Zealand, Janet Irwin as Chair of the Ethics Committee of NZAC appeared to 
suggest that improved or increased supervision could be implicated in preventing 
future ethical breaches (Hermansson, 1999, p.147-148). How that would happen 
is not clear: would it be improved supervisor vigilance or would more attention 
be paid to questions of ethical practice that would make a difference, or would it 
be something else? 
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Each of those positions produces a different relation between counsellor and 
supervisor and produces responsibility differently. In particular the Borders and 
Leddick position produces a supervision in which responsibility is located in the 
supervisor. This present study has shown how echoes of that position were 
reproduced in local practice, although there is no local literature to suggest that 
supervisor responsibility is to be this extensive, and the NZAC Codes do not 
locate this extent of responsibility in the supervisor. Clare noted that she felt 
responsibility to monitor the workloads of those she supervised in order that she 
could be accountable if that was required (by the professional Association): I am 
it, she said, indicating a sense of ultimate accountability and responsibility that 
she carried. Clare was thus taking seriously the expectation Irwin that supervisor 
monitoring might ensure ethical practice. 
More particularly, however, the practices of instrumentality about which 
participants spoke and which were produced in some of the supervision in this 
project showed the effects of the extension of the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility produced by and producing Borders and Leddick's position. All 
participants reported contact with versions of the relations of surveillance -
reporting in and checking up - produced within the terms of this discourse, 
although it was Kate and Liz who spoke most emphatically about their 
experiences of the positions offered counsellors within this regime. One of the 
problematic practices of this regime was the insertion of the supervisor into a 
position of expertise over a counsellor's work. In practice, as in much of the 
supervision literature, the counsellor was thus offered a subjected position in 
supervision, a position from which, I argue, it is very difficult to exercise the 
moral and ethical responsibilities of counselling practice. Kate had noticed the 
absence of authority that she had experienced as the supervised person when the 
supervisor took the expert position in exercising unilateral responsibility. 
At the other extreme from the Borders and Leddick position is the very flexible 
and unclear approach to responsibility to which King and Wheeler's (1999) 
research drew attention. I argue that that position is equally and perhaps more 
problematic. At worst, a more or less laissez-faire position appears to call neither 
counsellor nor supervisor into positions from which to exercise ethical and moral 
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responsibilities for the responsible work of counselling. The professional culture 
in New Zealand has had more in common with that in which King and Wheeler 
conducted their research than that for which Borders and Leddick wrote. In New 
Zealand, as in the U.K. participation in supervision is mandated by the 
professional association but its work is not governed by statute and there is no 
available case law. 
This project brought to its centre alternative sets of discursive practices for the 
exercise of responsibility in supervision. The preceding chapters have offered 
descriptions of discursive practice in which responsibility was exercised as 
relational responsibility. For example, Emma and Di (Extract 9.2) investigated 
the discursive production of Di's temporary separation from her preferred stance 
in relation with her clients. Collaborative inquiry would restore Di's preference, 
not supervisor intervention to establish right practice. However, the inquiry did 
not slip into a position where anything at all would do, for the work of the 
supervision showed Di investing herself in a metadiscursive commentary position 
about the effects of the separation for her relations with her clients. Phoebe and 
Frances (Extractl0.4), too, invested themselves in positions of relational 
responsibility in their reflecting team conversation as they took positions to claim 
that counsellors have a responsibility to take a position in their work. These 
practices of relational responsibility work as ethical action, for they produce 
conversations where the effects of practices and practice positions are made 
visible. The exercise of responsibility for the effects of our practices is taken to 
be ethical action. 
In these and other ways the project constructed a storyline of responsibility that 
constructs responsibility as produced within the supervision relationship rather 
than in the person of the supervisor. A supervisor cannot be in the practice setting 
with the counsellor: the counsellor needs to be well positioned to take ethical 
responsibility for their counselling practice. The exercise of responsibility in 
supervision involves making visible the moral orders in which we practice 
counselling to position counsellors well for ongoing ethical practice. 
Chapter Twelve 311 
An emphasis on professional community 
When responsibility is produced in the supervision relationship rather than in the 
person of the supervisor, relationship is brought to the centre of supervision. 
While the literature makes claims about the importance of relationship in 
supervision, I demonstrated in Chapter Three that those claims do not always hold 
up well when we look at how and where the counsellor is positioned. In 
emphasising relationship, I also emphasise professional community, whether that 
community is present in the imaginations of the counsellor and supervisor or is 
represented by a reflecting team, for example. It is in relationship with 
professional community that authority for practice is negotiated. Clare said, in 
Research Meeting Three, 
The reinforcement [of pleasing events in practice] for me comes from the 
process, not from any person in particular, from the process and the way of 
thinking. Not from an authority; like we become the authority, including 
myself. 
Clare's speaking pays attention to processes of local authorisation in professional 
community, rather than prescription of practice from the cultural/professional 
centre, or in the person of the supervisor. Local authorisation is not to be 
interpreted through a lens of autonomy and individualism, but through the lens of 
a local, negotiating, dialogical community of practice that understands 
responsibility to be relational. Such a professional community of concern is not 
itself closed, nor closed to other voices, but is in negotiation with other voices and 
its own, itself multi vocal rather than uni vocal. Its work is generated in relation 
with the professionally available approaches to practice and knowledge and 
power, as it reworks them in response to the ethical questions produced in 
practice. Liz reflected on the effects for her of the sense of community of practice 
the reflecting team offered her: 
Yeah, I think it's kind of, like; you come up with that expression, 'lives 
more richly described' [White, 1995], but it seems like [this process 
invites] a fuller experience of what I know; that if I only draw on my own 
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voice, that's far more limiting if I've only got my own voice to draw on. 
But I know that I've got your voice to draw on, Clare, and Kate's and 
Kathie's, and Anne's ... 
Liz was emphasising the presence in her everyday professional life of the 
reflecting team group as a community of professional concern. Her professional 
identity and practice were produced as she called on the voices of the community 
of concern. In the project, the reflecting team offered an embodied, present 
representation of the professional community. In dyadic supervision, however, 
the voices of other professionals can be invoked, as we deconstruct counselling or 
supervision practice, as we investigate our positioning, as we story our practice, 
and as we present our abilities. 
I argue that supervision is an act of and in professional community. It involves 
the collegial collaboration of professionals who meet to enhance the effectiveness 
and ethical production of a counsellor's practice. The supervisor is thus 
positioned as a representative of the professional community which constitutes 
supervision in this way. Supervision is thus in many ways a public task, one for 
which counsellor and supervisor might be held to account in the professional 
community, in its processes of government. Community might reproduce a 
discourse of surveillance, or it might be recruited as audience to developments in 
a counsellor's professional practice. As a public task, supervision is a site of the 
performance of counsellor identity, one where that performance is produced in 
relation with professional colleagues. It is a site for assembling ourselves as 
moral actors, responsible in the professional work of counselling and to our 
professional peers who are audience to our claims. 
A supervision of the imaginary 
The imaginary might enter supervision in a number of ways and for a number of 
purposes, not only in the form of an imaginary community of concern. Anne 
asked the team to think with her about the possibilities for ongoing practice with 
her client who had made significant changes in his marijuana use (Extract 10.2). 
She was not calling only on our established practice knowledge, but was inviting 
us to engage with her in the production of possibilities, to use acts of the 
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imagination. Supervision in the subjunctive mode, producing talk of possibilities, 
contrasts with supervision in the indicative mode (Parry & Doan, 1994) where 
factual accounts are offered in reciprocal processes of reporting in and checking 
up. As we saw with Val in Extract 11.2, the move into the subjunctive mode may 
be a difficult aspect of a migration of professional identity toward narrative 
practice. Where a discourse of supervisor responsibility prevails and supervision 
is produced on instrumental terms, there is little room for the imaginary. When 
we move into the generativity of the imagination in supervision, we produce a 
supervision discourse that goes beyond established professional knowledge and 
beyond what is already known in a particular piece of client work. 
Acknowledging that the full story of which Kate spoke - the full facts of the 
client's story and the counselling story - cannot be told or known, we seek other 
possible stories, and explanations and meanings. We thus expand the possibilities 
for practice. 
Storying the pleasures of our work 
The moves in counselling from deficit-orientated therapies to strengths-oriented 
ones offer a similar reorientation for supervision (Lowe & Guy, 1996; White, 
1997). One aspect of that reorientation was taken up in this project through the 
celebration metaphor. In the discussion of responsibility, above, I noted the 
constraints imposed by the ratio of counselling to supervision work, when 
supervision is a fortnightly activity. I have heard the argument made that 
supervision must focus on areas for development, not on existing competencies, 
because of this time constraint. However, it does not seem to me to be reasonable 
to assume that development occurs in practice only when we focus on aspects of 
practice that are problematic. Through paying attention to competence, to those 
aspects of our work which please us, to those moments or sessions when our work 
is most effective, we enlarge the presence of those aspects of our practice. We 
make positions of competence or pleasure more accessible through richly storying 
the events that produced them. As Liz and Anne noticed, to bring to the fore 
descriptions of strengths and preferred practices enhances counsellor agency. 
When supervision conversations highlight locations in supervision text where 
counsellors are agentic, counsellors are positioned well for the production of 
ethical counselling practice with their clients. 
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This chapter 
This chapter has assembled together the central ideas produced in this project. It 
has emphasised in particular the ways in which the project responded to my first 
research question: what might the narrative metaphor offer counselling 
supervision? The responses I have offered in this chapter will be summarised in 
Chapter Fourteen. The second research question, about a local version of 
counselling, has been given less direct attention here. The responses to that 
question are diverse. Importantly, the local professional culture is not subject to 
the legislative or licensing bindings of the profession in North America. Without 
these bindings we are offered opportunity to deconstruct the discourse of 
supervisor responsibility and resist its solidification. I think that is one of the 
most significant moves a constructionist approach to supervision offers. We are 
offered the possibility of locating responsibility in professional relationship and in 
professional community. I think, too, that here in New Zealand we need to work 
to read supervision through the texts of our local codes where we have kept 
counsellors visible as the subjects of sentences about supervision and monitoring 
and responsibility. In our local professional culture we have many possibilities 
for producing supervision otherwise, for taking care about how we use it in self-
government of our professional selves. Deconstruction offers opportunity to 
render such possibilities visible and accessible. That has been a worthwhile 
outcome of this project. 
The third research question, about the implications of the responses to the first 
two for counsellor and supervisor education, has had little direct attention. It is 
that question to which the next chapter offers a partial response. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
Taking the practice forward 
Introduction 
The criterion for acceptability of a knowledge claim is the fruitfulness of its 
implementation. ( Polkinghome, 1992, p.162) 
My interest in producing knowledge to serve practice, about which I wrote in Chapter 
Five, has not been lost over the time and the events of this project. In this chapter I 
offer an example of the productivity of this research project, an example which does 
not take the account beyond the bounds for which this study had ethical approval, as 
many examples that come to mind might. White introduced the term "taking it back 
practices" (1997, p.202), to describe the ways in which, for example, a client who has 
made their interview with White accessible to others, is offered in return reflections 
from those who witness the taped interviews. These reflections will acknowledge the 
contribution of the client to the professional or personal understandings of the 
witnesses. This chapter constitutes something of a taking it back practice, a 
witnessing to one of the ways in which this project has directly shaped my own 
practice in counsellor education. In this way it serves as acknowledgement of some 
of what the participants and the project offered to me. At the same time the chapter 
also serves as a forum of accountability, describing an example of how I have put this 
project to work, in taking it back to the practice community. 
My third research question asked about the implications of this study's findings for 
the education of counsellors and supervisors in supervision in a narrative mode. This 
chapter offers one of my responses to this question. This thesis has drawn attention to 
some subjected subject positions offered counsellors in dominant supervision 
discourse. In contrast with the position spoken by Matthews, "in receipt of 
supervision" (Chapter Four), or the position spoken by Kate, I didn't know what to 
demand, really (Chapter Seven), I have come to work with counselling students, from 
the beginning of their counsellor education, to consider discursive positions in 
supervision. I explore with them possibilities for students of counselling to 
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experience themselves as producers of supervision. Those interests underpin the 
accounts of practice that follow. 
The chapter offers an account of two aspects of my teaching for students in the first 
professional paper of our Masters in Counselling programme, 1031.541 Counselling 
Skills, in the area of supervision. Firstly, I present the text of a paper I have written 
addressing these students. Secondly, I introduce a class activity that I offer to this 
group. 
Students in the Skills paper vary greatly in their experience of counselling. For 
example, in this year's group some are new to the field, and this is their first 
counsellor education; some have positions in schools, a setting with which they are 
familiar but in another role; and others have worked in counselling or social work for 
as long as I have, and are seeking a masters level qualification for the first time. 
Students will all have enrolled, either previously or concurrently, in the course, 
1031.508 Discourse and Counselling Psychologies, that provides the constructionist 
base of our programme. Students in this Skills course participate in a practicum of 
two hundred hours. Their professional supervisors may be based in their placement 
agency, or students may contract with an external community-based supervisor. As 
academic staff in the course, we see our role as teachers rather than supervisors. 
While there is only a small amount of teaching time allocated to supervision, my 
interest in teaching this component is in thinking about students positioning 
themselves in agentive positions in supervision to support them in producing 
professional identity. I do not think that relying on an apprentice-style learning about 
supervision, in supervision (Carroll, 1996; Holloway & Poulin, 1995), is good 
enough. For the apprentice-style or being-in-receipt position leaves students at risk of 
the position that Kate reported in this study, and that Carroll reported from his U.K. 
study, of not knowing what to ask for and of leaving decisions about how supervision 
will be to the supervisor. Kate noted that she would be much more demanding in the 
future in supervision relationships. She said, /didn't really make a lot of demands. 
Maybe I didn't know what to ask for. My intention is to offer opportunities for 
counselling students to position themselves well for respectful relationship in 
supervision, knowing what to ask for, and positioned well to ask for it. 
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It is not that I do not have faith in supervisors. Rather, supervision is a discursive 
practice, and each supervision relationship takes place constituted as discursive 
practice. A site of professional self-government, supervision (like counsellor 
education) is not invulnerable to reproducing practices that might separate new 
counsellors-in-education off from already-held knowledges and abilities and ways of 
being. On this basis, then, I suggest that counsellors who are well prepared to find 
ways to negotiate for collaborative positions in supervision, including at the beginning 
of their careers, are likely better prepared to be flexible and collaborative in engaging 
in counselling relationships that are respectful and ethical. They will be familiar with 
thinking about positioning in professional relation. 
This paper, Supervision: Locating yourself in an agentive position, in respectful 
relation, is written as preparatory reading before a classroom session on supervision. 
Supervision: Locating yourself in an agentive position, in respectful 
relation 
Introduction 
I don't know what experiences of supervision you each bring to this course, or what 
plans you have for supervision this year. This paper is written to offer you some 
possibilities as you orient towards taking up supervision as part of this course. While 
there are many systems and practices of supervision you and your supervisor could 
together copy, there are also great opportunities for you originating together (White, 
1995) in your work in supervision. I believe that an originating supervision, a 
supervision that is generative both of supervision practices and of counselling 
practices is that which best serves us as counsellors in the work we do with clients. 
There is widespread agreement about the purpose of supervision: the provision of 
ethical and effective services to those we meet as clients. 
Ultimately, supervision is for their (clients') benefit. (Holloway and Carroll, 1996, 
p.154) 
Supervision is primarily about ensuring that clients are helped and protected. 
(Feltham, 2000, p.11) 
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The primary purpose of supervision is to enable the counsellor to address the 
needs of the client as effectively as possible. (New Zealand Association of 
Counsellors' (NZAC) Handbook, p. 27) 
But how do we do this? How do we make supervision work in the best interests of our 
clients? The NZAC Code suggests that supervision is concerned with "monitoring, 
developing, and supporting individuals in their role as counsellors". Mearns (1995) 
questioned whether what he characterised as the "nutritious" and "policing" 
functions could be done in the same supervision relationship. Carroll (1996) 
suggested that supervision is primarily an educational process, while Neufeldt, Iversen 
and Juntunen (1995) emphasised inducting counsellors to be reflective practitioners. 
With Neufeldt, Iversen and Juntunen I am interested in a supervision that is productive 
of reflective practice. I am also interested to invite you to reflect on supervision 
practice. 
A useful working definition of supervision with which to begin this reflection is that 
offered by lnskipp and Proctor: 
a working alliance between a supervisor and a counsellor (or counsellors) in 
which the counsellor can offer an account or recording of her work; reflect 
on it; receive feedback and where appropriate guidance. The object of the 
alliance is to enable the counsellor to gain in ethical competence, 
confidence and creativity so as to give her best possible service to her clients." 
(1994,p.l) 
Positioning and supervision 
I have been interested in both what the literature says and what it doesn't say about 
supervision. Let me begin with you, the counsellor in supervision. What are your 
experiences of and expectations of supervision? In what ways do you anticipate that 
supervision will work to support, develop and monitor your practice this year? Do you 
notice that I use the nominalisation supeNision: I do not suggest that your supervisor 
will undertake these tasks, but that the site of supervision is one where you will partner 
your supervisor to work at these tasks together. I note that the NZAC Code of Ethics 
supports this view, in the insertion of the counsellor into the subject position in this 
sentence as the person responsible for the monitoring. 
Counsellors shall monitor their work through regular supervision by 
professionally competent supervisors. (NZAC Handbook, 2000, p.25) 
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Supervision, then, is a site where you reflect on your practice, in partnership with a 
supervisor, and bring forward an account of your practice that will serve your work 
with clients. Who are you, in relation with the supervisor, as you engage in the work of 
reflection and generativity? I refrained from using Worthen and McNeill's (l 996) 
comment in my introduction, because of its use of the word, supervisee. 
The heart of psychotherapy supervision is the attempt to increase the 
supervisee's ability to work effectively with clients (p.31 ). 
You are already familiar with the concept of positioning (Davies, 1991 ). I suggest that 
the grammatical form of the word supeNisee offers a position in relationship that 
construes the counsellor as subjected, as the one acted upon. A supervisor 
supervises, and a supervisee is supervised. The language form, supervisee places the 
holder of that position as an object of the supervisor's practice. And yet, it is the 
counsellor's work as a professional that brings them to supervision. For this reason, I 
prefer to speak about the partners in supervision as counsellor and supervisor. A 
counsellor, I suggest, is offered a position from which to engage actively and 
responsibly in producing effective and ethical practice in supervision. When a 
counsellor becomes a supervisee in relation with a supervisor, when they become the 
object of the sentence, the done to person rather than a doing person, their agency 
is obscured. A supervisee is grammatically positioned to have their identity "authored 
for them" rather than to author themselves (Candlin, 1997, p.xi). 
I believe that you will find supervision most productive of your counsellor identity when 
conditions are such that your agency is brought forward, and you are authoring your 
professional identity in supervision. This is a particular version of the reflective 
practitioner, one who stories their professional identity in reflective supervision 
conversations. How might you position yourself well for and in this storying? Let me 
return to the question I asked earlier: who are you, in relation with the supervisor as 
you engage in the work of reflection and generativity? 
I think it is worth giving thought to this question before you begin the supervision 
relationship that is part of your placement contract for this course. For the story that 
you are a student in the first professional paper for this qualification is only one story 
that could be told about you. Can I suggest that there are likely to be many other 
stories you have about yourself and about your professional self that might support 
you in offering your supervisor the kind of collaborative partnership that might see you 
both co-labouring over the same endeavour, as Fine and Turner suggest? 
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Therapists experience the supervisor co-laboring with them in creating new 
therapy paths - everyone wearing the same yellow hard hats as they jointly 
forge through the brush and maneuver across uncharted ground. (Fine & 
Turner, 1997, p.237) 
like this piece for it conjures up for me the sense that together counsellor and 
supervisor grapple with the ideas and practices out of which you produce yourself as 
an ethical and effective practitioner. Knowledges and practices can be co-
produced. What stories do you have about yourself that might support you to 
"unsettle" a version of supervision that might have you being supervised, and support 
you to engage in a supervision that has you co-labouring? In what ways do you 
know yourself in terms of the preparations you have made for this time in your working 
life? In what ways do others know you in terms of the preparations you have made 
for this time in your working life? What ways of being in your work, and in your 
connecting with people, have you brought forward to support you in taking on what 
this course offers? 
I ask these questions, with the intention of inviting you to think about supervision and 
positioning, and the position calls to which you might want to respond, and the 
position calls that you might want to be the speaker of. Who will you be in 
supervision? Who will your supervisor come to know you as? We will look at this 
matter of positioning further in the 541 class on supervision, through some experiential 
exercises. 
How does supervision happen? 
Just as a counsellor works from a chosen epistemological position (I am assuming that 
you have read Griffith & Griffith (1992)), so will a supervisor. The supervisor's 
epistemological position will of course influence how supervision happens. Most 
recently both Holloway (1995) in the US and Carroll (1996) in the UK have advocated 
for generic, rather than counselling-theory-specific approaches in supervision, and 
that supervision is a specialist activity in its own right. In these ways they have been 
drawing distinctions between counselling and supervision. Carroll argued for an 
educational model of supervision, on the basis that supervision has an educational 
orientation. Holloway offered a systems model. Whatever the supervisor's chosen 
orientation, I think the base-line is a mutual respect for the other's choice. Battles for 
epistemological supremacy don't belong in the supervision room. Locally, Flintoff 
(1996) demonstrated that her sample of students in our programme preferred 
supervision with a supervisor with a narrative orientation; Feltham and Dryden (1994) 
and Todd and Storm (1997b) recommend a match in theoretical orientation. At the 
same time, some very helpful supervisory collaboration has happened when 
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supervisors from other orientations have been keen to engage in supervision working 
respectfully across epistemological differences. 
I recommend that you interview your supervisor about how they approach 
supervision. What do they understand its purpose to be? How do they go about 
engaging in that purpose? What ways of being will they be looking to you to bring? 
What ways of being will they bring? What kind of relationship do they understand the 
supervisory one to be? Carroll (1996) reported that the metaphor of grandparent-
parent-child had been used to describe the supervisor-counsellor-client relation. 
Does that metaphor or the co-labouring one draw your supervisor more, or do they 
prefer another? 
And how will the monitoring of supervision be managed? Is the supervisor happy to 
partner you in the review of and (critical) reflection on your work, understanding that 
the monitoring responsibility is yours? Or do they have some other expectation 
about monitoring? What code of ethics and code of supervision inform their 
practice? The New Zealand Association of Counsellors' Codes are the ones we want 
you to be familiar with and to practice in respect of, in the programme. 
These questions are all relevant to you and your supervisor making a working 
agreement that relates to your work together. lnskipp and Proctor (1993) and Storm 
(1997) offer useful guidelines for contracting, which together with our course outline, 
will support you to complete the documentation of the agreement you negotiate 
with your supervisor and lodge with us. Working agreements should remain 
reviewable and negotiable. 
Mollon (1997) wrote of supervision as a space to think. I think that it is important to 
consider how you prepare to use that space. It may be useful for you to have a 
supervision book, where you record practice questions as they arise in your 
placement setting. It is my experience that self-supervision happens as I prepare for 
supervision. I also believe that purposeful preparation means that counsellors make 
best use of the limited time we have for supervision. Preparation, then, is a dialogue 
with yourself and the ideas and practices with which you are familiar, in anticipation 
of the dialogue with your supervisor. Many supervisors appreciate a clear 
presentation of the supervisory agenda, and clear prioritising. The only guideline I 
want to offer about prioritising is that where there are ethical concerns or concerns 
about safety for you or your client or others in your client's life that arise out of your 
counselling work, these must have first priority. This is another matter that needs 
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clarification in the working agreement, along with means of contact between 
supervision sessions for urgent consultation when a concern about safety arises. 
Preparation, too, may help you to produce a clear, succinct opening to supervision. 
My experience is that a long monological introduction does not invite a supervisor to 
engage with my work. Hall, Sarangi and Slembrouck (1997, p.270) suggested that a 
long story told uninterruptedly conveys to the listener a "don't ask me questions, my 
story will answer all your concerns" message. What kind of invitation do you want to 
offer your supervisor? How can they best serve you in this reflection on your work 
through which you find ways forward for yourself in your work? 
As you work to prioritise as part of your preparation, it might be helpful to remember 
that this space to think is so that your work with clients is ethical and effective. Time 
for reflection on an instance of work that has been effective is not a low priority, in my 
view. The rich storying of an instance of practice might help you to bring forward and 
to make more available particularly effective styles of working: a particular aspect of 
deconstructing questioning, the development of a particular metaphor and so on. I 
think of storying professional identity as being the focus of supervision, that you are 
giving an account of practice and your location in it so that you work purposefully 
and intentionally and ethically with your clients. If we believe that identity is public 
and social, cultural and historical, the storying of professional identity is not a self-
centred activity inappropriate to supervision, but a relationally-centred activity that 
engages with the professional self-in-relation. As professional selves counsellors are in 
relation with their supervisors, their clients, those with whom their clients are in relation, 
the placement agency, the university, the profession, the professional association, the 
systems of knowledge and practice on which counselling draws. 
Deconstructing supervision 
I wonder if you have taken a deconstructing interest in this term, supervision. It is used 
in many contexts and with different meanings from that with which it is imbued in our 
profession. The terms co-vision and consultation and mentoring have bee proposed 
as alternatives to supervision. White (1997) argued that the term co-vision is 
"problematic in that it obscures the power relation that is established by this privilege 
(the location of the person providing the supervisory consultation, as senior and as 
financially rewarded, for example), a power relation that significantly influences the 
outcome of the consultation" (p.149). I do not think these alternatives - co-vision, 
consultation, mentoring - work: they do not include the ongoing commitment to 
which supervisors are called, their joining a counsellor in commitment to the ongoing 
ethical review and preview of their work with clients. For this reason, I continue to use 
the word supervision, while thinking of it as a term under erasure. 
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Derrida puts a cross through the word he is deconstructing in such a way as to 
leave the word visible, readable. The cross signals that it is still a word we 
need to use, as we do not know how to proceed without it. By putting it 
under erasure we can signal that it is problematic, in need of deconstructive 
work. That deconstructive work may eventually lead to the production of a 
different way of talking, of making sense of who we are or what we are doing 
(Davies, 1998, p.139). 
I use the term, supervision, here, as there appears to be no better alternative 
available at present. 
As I leave this discussion, I pick up White's point about power relations in supervision. I 
have already drawn your attention to positioning in supervision, hoping to open 
space for alternative possibilities to be available to you. The supervisory power 
relation will likely intersect with others of gender, culture, class, and other identity 
classifications. In what ways might it be productive of your agency in supervision for 
these intersecting power relations to be acknowledged? In what ways might such 
acknowledgement produce a subjective position for you in the supervisory relation? 
ask these questions, remembering Davies' suggestion. 
Agency is never freedom from discursive constitution of the self but the 
capacity to recognise that constitution and to resist, subvert and change the 
discourses themselves through which one is being constituted (Davies, 1991, 
p.51). 
At the same time as, in supervision, you might be examining the discursive constitution 
of a client or of a problem concern or of the relation between you and a client, you 
yourself continue to be discursively constituted. As we both do, as I write and then 
you read these ideas! 
Working collaboratively in supervision 
The literature uses the term, supervisory alliance. Let me ask you four final questions 
about you and this alliance. What ideas do you have about how counsellors and 
supervisors might work together to build working alliances that are productive of 
counsellor authority? And more importantly what is it that you as counsellor have 
done and might do in the construction of supervision relationships that will serve you 
well, that will offer you collaborative conversation, if that is what you seek? 
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Loganbill, Hardy and Delworth listed supervisor variables that were considered 
significant in effective supervisory relationships: genuineness, potency, optimism, 
courage, sense of time as a gift, sense of humour, capacity for intimacy, openness to 
fantasy and imagery, respect and consideration (1982, pp.28-29). What ways of 
being do you bring to supervision to contribute to a supervision that is satisfying and 
effective for you and for your supervisor? How will you introduce these ways of being 
to your supervisor? 
What to bring to supervision? 
Supervision is a space to think about your work, a site to perform as a reflective 
practitioner. Supervision is a relation in which you story your professional identity. You 
may wish to bring to supervision instances of practice that disturb you or worry you, 
intrigue you or delight you or give you pleasure, puzzle you or frighten you, separate 
you from your sense of competence or thrill you for their meaningfulness. You may 
focus on work with a particular client or you may want to review work with a number 
of clients where themes are similar. Or you may bring a particular problem area that 
represents the woods through which you and your supervisor will find a way together 
to produce new understandings for you both. Or there may be aspects of agency 
practice, or of wider-professional practice that draw your attention. Or struggles to 
put constructionist ideas to work when other ideas are familiar, or to connect 
instances of work with constructionist ideas to produce new practice. These are 
some possibilities for supervision conversations. The sharing of tapes of your practice is 
another which I strongly encourage (Crocket, 1998b). The informed consent involved 
in taping will be covered in the Ethics section of the course. Your supervision book 
can be a place where you gather together possibilities for supervision conversations, 
possibilities available for you to review as you prepare for meeting with your 
supervisor. I repeat my earlier suggestion that preparation for supervision will support 
you to use supervision well: some of the work of supervision is done as counsellors 
prepare, for in our preparation we are self-supervising. You may be interested to 
notice, too, the professional self-identity stories you tell as you prepare for supervision; 
and to notice the supervision relationships into which this preparation calls you and 
your supervisor. 
In conclusion 
My hope in offering you this brief paper is that you will have access to an account of 
supervision that offers you more authority than those readily available accounts that 
focus on monitoring and reassuring new counsellors, and more collegiality than 
offered by the grandparent-parent-child metaphor (to which Carroll (1996) referred). 
Perhaps donning a yellow hard hat (Turner & Fine, 1997) is not your preference, and 
perhaps metaphors of coast rather than bush, or quite different metaphors 
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altogether, speak to you of the kind of working relationship which you and your 
supeNisor might together navigate towards. For now, let me use the navigation 
metaphor to suggest that supeNision will depend as much on a counsellor's 
contribution, as on a supeNisor's, for the co-navigational work of supeNision: to be in 
a supeNision relationship, I suggest, you already have much experience in navigating 
in a variety of conversations and the supeNision relationship will be enriched by the 
accounts that you bring to it. 
Thinking about positions in relation 
In this work to think with counselling students about the positions-in-relation that are 
offered to them in supervision, I am interested in helping them identify subjective 
subject positions that will be most productive of their agency as counsellors. I want 
them to be well positioned for intentional participation in supervision. In a teaching 
session as part of this work of orientation to supervision, I invite students into an 
imaginary storying experience. My purpose in this activity is to bring forward into 
the work and relationship of supervision, a richer range of accounts than would 
otherwise be present, for I suggest that both dominant developmental accounts and 
dominant supervision accounts pay little attention to the qualities and competencies 
that newer counsellors already have present in their lives. These alternative accounts 
are a rich resource for storying professional identity and for the serious work of 
superv1s1on. 
Into the imaginary 
As we begin this experience, I ask the students to sit quietly with themselves and to 
think of someone, from another setting, who knows them and their work or their 
qualities well. They might think of one of the people who supported their application 
to our programme, or of a professional colleague in a previous setting, or of someone 
with whom they work on a committee, or a friend who supports their current study. I 
then ask them to imagine that former colleague, or other, having a conversation with 
the person who is to be their supervisor. As they imagine this conversation, these are 
the kinds of questions I ask. (These questions work better read aloud, for they come 
from the spoken word.) 
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What might your former colleague, for example, tell your supervisor about the 
qualities they themselves most appreciate in you and your work? What other 
qualities, that they value, might they tell about? What ways of being do you think they 
might want to speak of appreciating as they speak of their experiences of you? What 
experiences of you will they be drawing on in this telling? 
As you imagine this conversation, what might your former colleague tell your 
supervisor about what they think your supervisor will come to appreciate about 
working with you, in supervision? And what else might they say of what they think 
your supervisor may come to appreciate? 
As you imagine yourself entering the supervision relationship with your supervisor, 
what will it be like for you entering that supervision relationship with that supervisor, 
carrying with you these accounts of yourself that you have just overheard in this 
imagined conversation? How do you see yourself as you engage in the work of 
supervision alongside your supervisor? What does it mean for you to see yourself in 
these ways? What does it mean for the supervision relationship that you see yourself 
in these ways? How do you see your supervisor seeing you? What does it mean for 
you and for the supervisor that you see your supervisor seeing you in these ways? 
What does it mean for the work of supervision? 
My experience is that these kinds of questions open the supervision space to be 
otherwise than an assumed hierarchy of expert and beginner. The questions offer 
counsellors positions where they, too, are seen to bring experiences, wisdom and 
valued personal and professional qualities and experiences to supervision. 
Experiences, knowledge and qualities that might have been obscured become 
available and accessible. In this way counselling students are positioned well to 
engage in robust reflection on their counselling work in supervision. My experience 
has been that these acts of the imaginary work to position them well, too, to engage in 
building a working supervision relationship in collaboration with their supervisor. 
Counselling students are less likely to find themselves in the position of having 
supervision done to them. Students have spoken of the value of making more visible 
to themselves the many stories that make up their lives at a time when a story of 
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themselves as a beginning counsellor might obscure the richness what they already 
bring for the work of supervision. Who are we, as we sit down together, you and I, in 
supervision? It seems to me that this is an important question for counsellors and 
supervisors to be asking. What stories of our personal and professional lives do we 
both bring to this work? The pause in which these questions are asked offers space to 
think about respectful relationship in supervision, relationship that recognises that we 
are all multiply storied. The supervision room is alive with the possibilities of the 
stories that might be told. I take my task as a counsellor educator to be the 
highlighting of the positions in the texts which students might take up to locate 
themselves well in supervision and for the responsible tasks they share with their 
supervisors in supervision. 
It is also my task to engage in education with supervisors. While that work is another 
story, to be told in a future publication, I note that it calls on the same theoretical and 
practical interests as my work with counsellors. It thus emphasises supervision as a 
discourse practice, paying attention to the strategies by which supervision produces us 
as professional counsellors both through the profession's accounts of supervision and 
in its moment by moment practices. 
The work of this chapter 
This chapter has demonstrated two instances of practice where I have taken forward 
some practice possibilities generated in this study for my work in preparing 
counsellors for participation in supervision. In this way it provides a very partial 
answer to the question of the implications of the study' s findings for the education of 
counsellors and supervisors. Clearly, the implications, in general, are that supervision 
is studied and practised on the understanding that supervision is itself a discourse 
practice, a practice produced by and producing relations of power, making some 
modes of being possible and constraining others. This understanding, rather than 
models, rather than techniques, underpins my approach to supervision in a counsellor 
education curriculum. What accounts of supervision do we have available, and what 
positions do they offer us? What practices are we producing on the basis of this 
account, and what effects do these practices have? What are the practices we prefer 
for ethical relation between ourselves, and between us and those with whom we are in 
professional relation? These questions sit alongside our encounters with the 
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knowledges that are on offer at the profession's centre as I engage in producing and 
"delivering" a supervision curriculum in counsellor education. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
Producing practice 
I did indeed grow up with a fault line running through me, but that is a 
very New Zealandish feature when you consider that it is a country of 
earthquakes and volcanoes. [ ... ] Perhaps the country has imposed its own 
unstable geography on my power to perceive. I don't mind. I regret it 
only in the sense that one always regrets not being able to be everything all 
at once. Dislocations can expose the secret nature of the land. They can 
make for an intensely interesting landscape, provided one doesn't come to 
feel that a landscape full of fault lines is the only legitimate kind. 
Dislocations make me a world reader rather than a local one, and they 
make me contingent rather than categorical. (Mahy, 2000, p.33) 1 
Research and supervision practice: location and dislocation 
Perhaps it is not so surprising that in the words of a writer of children's fiction I 
find a passage so full of resonance as I prepare to lead this document to a close. 
Mahy, for many years a librarian as well as a writer, commented: "Being a 
librarian forces you to think a lot about truth and to pretend you have got over any 
confusion you might ever have had about it" (p.31 ). Perhaps researcher might be 
substituted for librarian and the same claim made: being a researcher forces you 
to think a lot about truth and to pretend you have got over any confusion you 
might ever have had about it. For how does one draw together an account that at 
once makes truth claims and recognises their contingency? While her childhood 
Christmas was spent swimming in a New Zealand summer, Mahy wrote, her 
Christmas reading was of "snow and robins and holly": she lived in the Pacific 
yet was nurtured by a northern literature. My own professional history is similar: 
I have lived in a local counselling culture and in the absence of a local literature I 
have read a literature written in a different clime about a different set of 
1 Margaret Mahy is a New Zealand writer of children's fiction who has won national and 
international awards and acclaim for her work. 
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professional conditions. That literature has contained both resonance and 
dissonance, both truth and fantasy. It has provided storylines by which my 
professional life has been enriched. And my (dis)location has also made visible to 
me the ways in which the story lines of that literature, and of that supervision 
literature, do not tell all there is to be told. For example, its categories - novices 
and neophytes and master practitioners - do not fit. Nor do its categorical claims 
ring true: as neither counsellor nor supervisor have I experienced supervisors 
having responsibility for clients and their wellbeing and for counsellors and their 
wellbeing, as Borders and Leddick (1987) constructed things. 
When later I read the narrative therapy literature produced in Australia and New 
Zealand a sense of professional dislocation became more apparent. The fault line 
produced through the meeting of systems of thought was something like the 
geological instability of the meeting of tectonic plates that produces this country's 
landscape. Like the landscape of this country the landscape of narrative therapy is 
an intensely interesting one, produced at a disjuncture where the certainties of 
modernist psychology came up and come up against the uncertainties and 
multiplicities of postmodernism. In counselling, these uncertainties have been 
expressed particularly in the critique offered by indigenous and feminist voices 
asking questions about power and categories and institution and exclusion. In this 
unstable landscape narrative therapy makes sense to me. And it remains 
contingent: the local professional culture in which I work and write includes 
considerable diversity. And it is a local culture that is always partly spoken in 
terms of a diverse international professional culture. As we produce a local 
professional literature in supervision I hope that it will be in reference (but not 
deference) to a world literature, and that we will recognise that our positions are 
contingent rather than categorical ones. 
The account I have produced in this document is a contingent one, not a 
categorical one: the claims I have made are particularly located. Hopes for the 
development of counselling supervision in New Zealand were expressed by 
Mcconkey: 
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Supervision needs attention. It needs to be talked about, examined, read 
about and understood. Our own historical development of supervision 
requires researching and documenting, so that a genuine New Zealand-
based version of the discipline is developed, rather than merely 
'transplanting' something from the northern hemisphere. (1999, p.82) 
This account is a genuinely New Zealand version: other, differently genuine, 
New Zealand versions will no doubt follow. This account is a New Zealand 
version produced in relation with a number of fault lines. In Chapter One I 
located our counsellor education programme: its history is in eclectic approaches 
to counselling and guidance in education and its present is in narrative therapy. 
This project has called on the fields of both counselling and family therapy. As I 
have written this account I have noticed my bi-location in not being able to write 
as though my audience was located in only one or the other of those fields. 
Similarly, as I have written I have heard readers of a postmodern vein responding 
with an, "Of course," as though what I write does not need saying again. But I 
have not assumed that this account addresses only such an audience: to do so 
would be to deny the realities of the varied professional landscape in this small 
professional community where other systems of thought produce the accounts of 
practice that occupy the centre ground. It would also be to deny my own 
migration of professional identity and my interest in producing dialogue in 
diversity. Modernist and postmodern practice meet and come up against each 
other in daily practice, as in this document. Other fault lines, in particular my 
positioning as both researcher and practitioner and as both participant and 
researcher, have influenced my "power to perceive". Like Mahy, I have, of 
course, not been able to see everything all at once. 
Most significantly what I have seen is that the question of responsibility in 
supervision is problematised by this investigation. Questions of the production of 
professional responsibility in supervision need ongoing investigation and 
professional debate. As well, there are theoretical questions about the counsellor 
as professional subject that warrant a deeper theoretical analysis. In particular, 
there is room to investigate the question of the cultural locatedness of my interest 
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in a first person subject, storying, professing, accounting for and producing their 
counselling practice in the work of supervision. 
Storying research practice 
In Chapter One I introduced the two stories that would be threaded through this 
document. Firstly there was the story that I set out to tell: that story is the story 
of how narrative therapists might practice as narrative supervisors. Secondly, 
there was the story of how I produced myself as a researcher. As a narrative 
therapist I was familiar with employing the strategy of disclosing my thinking 
about my thinking (Weingarten, 1992) in my work. It is a strategy that pays 
attention to the power relations of our work: I do not assume the authority of my 
question but make my own positioning available for investigation. I have brought 
that strategy, one that I claim to be an ethical stance, to this work of producing 
myself as a researcher. I could not leave my research practice working invisibly 
behind the scenes of my first three research questions, for answers that I might 
produce were contingent upon my positioning. My location made some 
possibilities visible to me and left others obscured. Most visible was an emphasis 
on practice. Practice relevance was an important criterion for me. In what I now 
regard as an elegant move, the reflecting team, a therapeutic device, was the 
device with which I gained access to the field of study. I make the claim for 
elegance as research and practice came to sit so easily together. Not only was 
practice made accessible to research but research was made accessible to practice. 
A reflecting team is a community of collaborative practice. As researcher, I was 
positioned for collaborative research of practice in practice, as a member of the 
reflecting team. The possibilities for the reflecting team as a research and practice 
site have been exposed in this study: the reflecting team process is ripe for further 
exploration as a research tool. It is one to which I shall return as I continue to 
develop my research practice. 
In retrospect the research design might have been enhanced if I had planned for 
clearer and more structured involvement of the participants in the data analysis. I 
might have done this in a number of ways. I might have given more emphasis to 
the reflective aspects of the project and less to the practice aspects during the life 
of the group. To have done that I would have needed to bring more rigour to 
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positioning myself as researcher. In seeking collaboration in the data-generating 
phase, I did not position myself as well as I might have to guide the research 
process. As well, the design of the study and my own immersion in practice 
meant that most of the analytic work has happened since the group stopped 
meeting. On reflection I would have liked to have included the group in the 
process of deepening the analysis. That would have served the research task 
better. However, I accept that I erred on the side of serving the practice well: 
participants' professional practice was enhanced through their participation. A 
richer engagement in data analysis with participants is a possibility to explore in 
future research. 
I have found it hard to accept, too, that much of the productivity of this project is 
invisible in this thesis document. While I have been working to write this 
document in my everyday professional life in teaching and supervision I have 
been using and going beyond the ideas and practices that the project produced. To 
write about these practices is beyond what I have ethical permission to do. 
However, I record that this project has been taken forward in the practices of all 
its participants - and in the practices of many of those with whom they have 
worked. In the counsellor education programme in which I teach reflecting team 
practices have been introduced in a number of courses as a consequence of this 
project. In the most recent development, final year Masters students are working 
in peer reflecting team consultation groups in an e-forum; their work has been a 
delight for me to observe. Subsequent to the research group, some of us set up a 
different reflecting team supervision group, and those participants have gone on 
and used these processes in their own practices. In these ways the project has 
been, as I hoped, a servant of practice. My work as I generated data has served 
practice well. While I have not held myself at the centre of either the knowledge 
production process or the knowledge produced, I do have a number of contingent 
stories to tell about the project. Those stories return me to that first story I 
introduced in this thesis document, the one I set out to tell about narrative 
approaches in counselling supervision. 
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A story of supervision practice 
My interest in an account of supervision was a local one, particularly situated in 
counselling, in constructionist practice, and in New Zealand. I do not think the 
value of the study's findings is limited to this particular location, but I do 
acknowledge the locatedness of the study. That locatedness is both a strength and 
a limitation of this study. I am happy to argue for this version of supervision as a 
contingent one, recognising that the positions I take will raise questions for those 
for whom supervisor responsibility signifies the foundation of the counselling 
profession's claims to professional accountability. I prefer a more complex 
understanding of the professional subject than the discourse of supervisor 
responsibility offers. Counsellors and supervisors are multiply positioned as we 
produce the practices of disciplinary power. We are accountable for the work we 
do, but the terms of that accounting are complex, and to serve practice well I 
believe that we need to keep this complexity visible, rather than assume that 
somehow supervisors can ensure safe counselling practice. I argue that it takes a 
community of practitioners for the work of ethical practice. I locate my work in 
relation with a community of practice, recognising that while it will be both 
similar to and different from the work of others, it exists only in professional 
community. It is the community of practice that has produced and used the 
narrative metaphor as a mode of therapy that has made possible the account I offer 
here. 
The narrative metaphor expands the professional practice of supervision as 
significantly as it has expanded the possibilities for therapy. With an emphasis on 
the ethics of relationship narrative supervision unsettles the familiar unilateral 
construction of relationship and production of responsibility and knowledge. It 
disturbs the marginalised positions counsellors are offered in dominant 
supervision discourse. In disturbing, it works to highlight positions that 
counsellors might take up as ethical and moral agents in supervision, emphasising 
that it is in the work of a collaborative supervision relationship that ethical 
effectiveness for counselling practice is enhanced. Through deconstruction 
counsellors and supervisors attend to relations and practices of power in both 
supervision discourse and counselling discourse. Through deconstruction we 
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investigate the authorities by which knowledge is produced and knowledge claims 
made. I argue that storying the locations of our own practices is critical to 
supervision, for it is in this way that we negotiate and acknowledge, in 
community, the moral orders we produce and reproduce in our counselling work. 
We come to understand the contingency of our claims when they are located in 
these ways as we story our professional identities in relation with professional 
knowledge and theories of knowledge. We observe our own constitution as 
professional subjects, participating in professional self-government at the same 
time as we unsettle its practices. In supervision we engage in dialogue in the 
domains of pleasure, imagination, epistemology, ethics, politics, justice and 
morality. Our focus is the relationships with our professional selves thus 
produced, and so the relationships with our professional colleagues and 
communities, and most importantly the relationships we offer clients. For it is to 
position ourselves well for ethical and effective counselling practice that as 
counsellors we engage in professional supervision. 
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Epilogue 
And, if after we have written, the text 
enters into others' dialogic encounters, 
then how can we claim to be the final 
arbiters of meaning for something whose 
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Appendix I 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDIES 
PhD. Research Project: 
NARRATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPERVISION - Kathie Crocket 
Information for participants 
Although I am known to you all in different contexts, I want to provide for you the 
material I gave to the Higher Degrees Committee, in which I located myself and the study 
I proposed. 
Locating myself and this project 
I come to this research project out of three professional roles - as a counsellor and 
a supervisor, and as a member of a team of counsellor educators. 
I have worked as a counsellor for twelve years, eight of these in the Student 
Counselling Service at this university. Through this time I have engaged in 
individual, peer and group supervision of my own counselling practice with 
supervisors representing a range of theoretical perspectives, and using a range of 
working styles. For some years I have also provided professional supervision for 
counsellors in community and education settings, with changes in my style of 
supervising reflecting my changing theoretical orientation. 
I am actively involved in the New Zealand Association of Counsellors, and was 
one of the first four and am still one of the few, Accredited Members of the 
association. 
My experiences in counsellor education include my own university-based 
training at Massey University, two years as an associate lecturer contributing to 
the Professional Development papers at Massey, as well as my part-time 
membership of the counsellor education team in the Department of Education 
Studies at Waikato over the past four years. 
My teaching focus within the counsellor education programme is professional 
practice. I am particularly interested in the interface between students' 
university-based learning experiences and their placement-based learning, and 
the critical role supervision plays as students of counselling produce themselves 
as professional counsellors. 
Individually and together, these three professional roles provide an invitation to 
me to take up this research project. The New Zealand Association of 
Counsellor's Code for Supervision suggests supervisors need to engage in 
research in supervision. Schon's (1983) work on reflection in professional 
practice highlighted the value of the ongoing self-education that comes about 
when a practitioner "becomes a researcher into his (sic) own practice"(p.299). 
Schon goes on to make the claim that "research is an activity of practitioners" 
(p.308), and thus it is as a counsellor and as a supervisor and as an educator of 
counsellors that I wish to reflect on my own practice and engage with other 
practitioners in reflecting on their practices. This stance will be reflected in the 
research processes. 
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The standing ground which the University of Waikato counsellor education 
programme now occupies offers opportunity to make some important 
developments in supervision. We have the richness of a variety of traditions 
from which we can draw. We are locating our programme in social 
constructionist ideas (Winslade et al., 1994; Monk & Drewery, 1993; Monk et 
al., 1997). Worldwide, these ideas have been developed in counselling practice 
mostly by those who have historically identified themselves as family therapists. 
However, we are teaching the ideas within the context of a course with an 
historical focus on an eclectic approach to counselling and guidance in 
educational and community contexts. We thus bring together two major 
traditions, each with its own understandings and practices around supervision. 
We are further positioned by our identifying as counsellors professionally 
associated with the New Zealand Association of Counsellors, whose Code of 
Ethics and Code of Supervision further inform our expectations and 
understandings. 
This history means that we are relying heavily on "borrowed" assumptions and 
practices in supervision. While many of these borrowings have been and 
continue to be useful, Schon's (1983, 1987) "reflective practitioner" stance alerts 
me to the value of giving an account of the ways in which these borrowings come 
together, and the kind of "fit" practitioners make in their practice as "espoused 
theory" and "theory in action" (Schon, 1987) interweave with each other. 
Most important, however, is the need to continue to explore in action and 
reflection how the postmodern shift in counselling is mirrored in counselling 
supervision. The isomorphic relationship between counselling and supervision 
processes and counselling and supervising relationships is a recurring theme in 
the literature (Carifio and Hess, 1987; and Flemons, Green, & Rambo, 1996); 
and at the same time practitioners are making the case for the philosophies and 
practices they experience in supervision to be congruent with their choices of 
narrative-informed counselling. 
As you may know, this project has had a long gestation, as I have worked my way 
through methodological possibilities and impossibilities. In what I propose I have taken 
as my guide Kaye's call that: 
Inquiry must derive from a framework capable of accessing the processes 
involved in psychotherapy if we are to become more effective therapists and if 
our research is to have any meaning for practitioners (Kaye, 1990 p.38). 
This has led to my proposal to establish a collaborative inquiry group to: 
* provide professional supervision for its members 
* research that process. 
I intend that, within the structure and processes that I propose, the group will provide rich 
professional development opportunities for us all, along with rich material to inform my 
research. 





UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDIES 
PhD. Research Project: 
NARRATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPERVISION - Kathie Crocket 
Proposed ethical guidelines for collaborative inquiry group 
These guidelines are to be read alongside NZAC Code of Ethics, to which all group 
members adhere. 
* A formal supervision agreement will be established, so that all the supervision within 
this group is subject to the standards of confidentiality of NZAC Code of Ethics and Code 
of Supervision. 
* This group will provide formal supervision of all the counselling work of these 
members: 
* We intend that this group will provide a safe forum in which participants are able to 
disclose all significant supervision material. Where a group member is unable to do this 
about a particular issue that requires attention, she will take responsibility for seeking 
individual supervision from another group member/another supervisor, and will inform 
the group of that. 
* All notes produced within group sessions and transcripts of sessions will be treated 
with the standard of care of other professional practice material, and kept secure. 
* Any concerns group members have about the group or aspects of its process will be 
brought to the attention of the group. 
* We will disclose the nature of group members' other relationships, past and continuing, 
with each other at the outset of the group. 
* Group members will provide professional disclosure to clients of their participation in 
the inquiry group, preferably through a written professional disclosure statement, such as: 
As a counsellor I have a commitment to regular professional supervision. In 
1997 I am participating in a supervision group, which also involves research. 
* While being free to discuss in appropriate professional contexts the learning and 
practice developments in the group, we will do so in a way that protects other group 
members from harm. 
* The usual standards of care in regard to confidentiality for counselling clients when we 
speak in supervision will apply. Group members will take the responsibility for 
informing Kathie as the researcher, where transcripts need amending or audio/video tapes 
need editing in order to protect counselling clients from being identified in the 
dissemination of information through the formal research stages of the process. 
* While it will be Kathie's ultimate responsibility as researcher, to ensure that group 
processes are respectful, all group members share responsibility for ensuring that group 
processes are safe and respectful. 
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Appendix III 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDIES 
PhD. Research Project: 
NARRATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPERVISION - Kathie Crocket 
Proposed structural guidelines - collaborative inquiry group 
Group members agree to being involved in the following professional and research 
activities: 
1. Initial formal group meeting to: 
i. formally propose my ideas to potential participants 
ii. negotiate working agreement 
m. negotiate ethical guidelines 
1v. negotiate structure for group meetings 
v. "teach" reflecting team processes 
2. First supervision meeting: 
- use dyadic/reflecting team structure to give each counsellor an opportunity to clarify, 
and determine goals and directions for themselves in supervision, and in the project, for 
the following five months. 
- establish a "timetable" for supervision, that sets out the roles each member will take in 
subsequent sessions. 
3. Subsequent meetings for supervision: 
i. Nominated counsellor-supervisor dyad engage in supervision for 25-30 minutes, 
observed by the reflecting team. 
ii. Reflecting team offer thoughts on counsellor's material. (10 minutes) 
iii. Counsellor responds. (5 minutes) 
iv. Reflecting team offers thoughts on supervision processes. (10 minutes) 
v. Supervisor responds. 
This process will generally be repeated twice each time the group meets. Over twelve 
meetings each group member will have worked twice in a dyad with each other member, 
once as counsellor and once as supervisor. 
4. Every third meeting the process outlined in 3, above, will not be repeated. Instead, the 
second part of the session will be used to review: 
- members' experiences of the supervision they are giving and receiving, and of the 
group's working, 
the knowledges and practices around supervision that we have been generating. 
5. Research focus 
The group will meet three times during the year, for longer sessions at times to be 
negotiated, with the research focus the only agenda. Kathie will facilitate a meta-level 
structured reflection that focuses on the central research questions: 
* What constitutes effective counselling supervision in this counselling community? 
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* What does embracing a social constructionist position mean for how supervisors and 
counsellors engage in professional supervision? 
* What, then, are the implications for the education of counsellors and supervisors in 
supervision in the narrative mode? 
Kathie will take formal responsibility for facilitating group process, recognising that 
group members bring skills and experience to share that task. 
To discuss: 
*Withdrawal from the group 
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Appendix IV 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDIES 
PhD. Research Project: 
NARRATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPERVISION· Kathie Crocket 
Proposed supervision working agreement 
* We agree to meet as a collaborative inquiry group that will provide professional 
supervision for us as its members. 
* We will provide peer supervision of our own and other members' counselling work, 
using the processes outlined in Structural Guidelines. 
* We take on jointly the supervisory responsibility, outlined in the 
NZAC Code of Supervision, for the counselling work of each group member. 
* As Members of New Zealand Association of counsellors, we abide by the NZAC Code 
of Ethics. 
* The group will meet for supervision in the Student Services Seminar room at the 
University of Waikato. 
* We will meet weekly/fortnightly to provide supervision, using the structure set out in 
the structural guidelines. 
* We will meet on .... days at ...... , for two hours. 
* Kathie will prepare the venue and make video and audio equipment available. Tea, 
coffee and biscuits will be available in the 15 minutes before the group begins. 
* We agree to participate in the research context of this group as outlined in the 
Information for participants, and in the Ethical and Structural Guidelines. 
* We agree to each session being videotaped and audiotaped for research purposes, and 
to Val Lazenby transcribing the audiotapes. 
* Kathie will post each group member two copies of the transcript, one for the member to 
read, and another which members each agree to comment on and return to Kathie. 
* We agree to audiotapes being made by individual group members to make use of 
supervision discussion for ongoing client work. These latter audiotapes will be wiped 2 
months after being recorded. 
* There will no exchange of money for supervision. 
* Group members will expect to attend every meeting of the group, whether practice- or 
research-focused. 
* The group begins with an expectation that members are committed to participating 
from February to December 1997. 
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* Should a group member wish to withdraw before December 97, we prefer that to be 
done in negotiation with the group. Where that is not possible, a withdrawing member is 
asked to invite a mutually acceptable support person to negotiate withdrawal from the 
research process with Kathie, or with Kathie and her supervisors. 
• Group members with any concerns about the group are welcome to raise these in the 
group, to speak with Kathie, or to approach her academic supervisors. 




UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDIES 
PhD. Research Project: 
NARRATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPERVISION · Kathie Crocket 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
Now that I have provided you with my ideas and hopes for this research project, both in 
informal contact and in the Information for participants, I need to ask you to give your 
formal assent to participation in the project. I know that as a professional counsellor, and 
as a researcher, you will be aware that I will be conducting this research within the 
context of both the professional ethical codes, and the University of Waikato procedures 
and principles for conducting research. In asking, now, that you sign this research 
consent form, I am not wanting to rigidly delineate these matters in a way that is contrary 
to the collaborative spirit of the project, but rather to propose a clear starting point from 
which I can gain approval from the School Ethics Committee, in order to begin formally 
negotiating within the group working documents that will give account of the ethical 
context in which we all agree to situate this project. 
I enclose: 
i. Proposed ethical guidelines for the group. 
ii. Proposed structural guidelines for the group. 
I am willing and keen to answer any questions you have now or at any time. 
Please answer the questions below and sign both copies of the form (one for each of us) if 





Do you understand that I am undertaking this project partly in fulfilment of a PhD. 
degree, and so am subject to university requirements and to oversight from the nominated 
university academic staff, Dr Wendy Drewery and Dr Monica Payne? 
Yes: No 
Have you read the Information for participants? 
Yes: No 
Do you have sufficient information to make a decision to enter into the first stages of 
involvement in the research process? 
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Yes: No 
Do you agree to meet with me and a small group to consider the possibilities that this 
project offers and the commitment that you are willing to make to it? 
Yes: No 
If you wish to participate in the ongoing collaborative inquiry group, do you agree at that 
meeting to negotiate and develop the attached supervision working agreement in regard to 
the supervision we will undertake? 
Yes: No 
If you wish to participate in the ongoing inquiry group, do you agree that at that meeting 
to negotiate or to amend the attached proposed ethical guidelines for the group in its work 
and to participate in the project within the context of those guidelines? 
Yes: No 
If you wish to participate in the ongoing collaborative inquiry group, do you agree at that 
meeting to negotiate or approve or amend the attached proposed structural guidelines for 
the group in its work and to participate in the project within the context of those 
guidelines? 
Yes: No 












































Extract 11.1 Storying professional identity: celebration 
Extract 8.2 Assuming competence 
Extract 7 .1 Reproducing instrumental practice 
Extract 10.4 Taking responsibility for taking a position 
Extract 11.2 The speaking subject 
Research Meeting One 
Extract 10.3 Deconstructing inquiry 
Extract 9.2 Deconstructing supervision 
Extract 10.1 Joining a community of concern 
Extract 9.3 Positions for ethical action 
Extract 10.2 A giving up story 
Research Meeting Two 
Extract 9.1 Dialogic assessment: producing responsibility 
Extract 8.1 Interrogating decision making discourse 
Extract 8.3 Counsellor as researcher of practice 
Research Meeting Three 
Review Meetings at Supervision 3, 6, 9, 12, 18. 
On all other occasions there were two separate supervision sessions, each working 
through the four phases of the reflecting team process for supervision. 
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